Frank Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co. Regent Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 873 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1989). · Go Syfert
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Frank Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co. Regent Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 873 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“since chmiel's independent contract claim concerns a job position governed by the collective bargaining agreement, it is completely preempted by section 301”
142 citation events (58 in the last 25 years) across 27 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Calvin Barton v. House of Raeford Farms, Incorporated (ca4, 2014-03-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Calvin Barton v. House of Raeford Farms, Incorporated (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
4th Cir. · 2014 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
since chmiel's independent contract claim concerns a job position governed by the collective bargaining agreement, it is completely preempted by section 301
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Hendree v. UPS, Inc.
E.D. Cal. · 2024 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
california's age discrimination statute 13 creates a mandatory and independent state right which is not preempted by section 301
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nelson v. Foster Poultry Farms (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
E.D. Cal. · 2023 · confidence medium
Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir. 5 1988) (finding no § 301 preemption of FEHA disability discrimination claim because the right not to be 6 discriminated against because of physical handicap is “defined and enforced under state law without 7 reference to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement”); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 8 873 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1989); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 240 (9th Cir. 9 1990); Ramirez, 998 F.2d at 748-49 (“In every case in which we have considered an action brought 10 under the California Employment Act, we hav…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eric Rojas v. Mission Linen Supply
C.D. Cal. · 2023 · confidence medium
State antidiscrimination statutes are not generally preempted “because the right is defined and enforced under state law without reference to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement.” Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Ackerman v. W.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tiahrt v. Aria Resort & Casino, LLC
D. Nev. · 2023 · confidence medium
But the Ninth Circuit has explained that Caterpillar involved a job not covered by the union contract, Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, 19 Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 1987), which is not true here. 32 Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1989). 20 33 To be sure, the Chmiel court also relied on the fact that the “independent agreement” in Chmiel was “inconsistent with the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement[,]” which might 21 not be true here.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brian Armstrong v. WB Studio Enterprises, Inc.
C.D. Cal. · 2020 · confidence medium
Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] CBA provision does not trigger preemption of a reasonable accommodation claim when it is only potentially relevant to the state law claims, without any guarantee that interpretation or direct reliance on the CBA terms will occur.” (emphasis in original)); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1989); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 240 (9th Cir. 1990); Ramirez v. Fox Tele.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Badalato v. Wish to Give Production LLC
E.D.N.C. · 2019 · confidence medium
Accordingly, Barton is inapposite where the case stands for the proposition that a contract claim “concern[ing] a job position governed by [a] collective bargaining agreement” is completely preempted. 745 F.3d at 109 (quoting Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989)) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.
D.C. Cir. · 2018 · confidence medium
See Grandison v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc. , 514 F.Supp.2d 12 , 17 (D.D.C. 2007) ("[When plaintiff's] ... common-law claims implicitly assert that his rights ... are superior to [defendant's] rights under the CBA[, t]he only way such allegations could be adjudicated would be to interpret [defendant's rights] under the CBA."); Chmiel , 873 F.2d at 1285 (finding preemption where "alleged independent agreement is inconsistent with the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement ....").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Potomac Electric Power Company (2×)
D.D.C. · 2018 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Avedisian v. Quinnipiac Univ., 387 F. App’x 59, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2010) (“As [plaintiff] identifies no other ‘nonnegotiable rights’ pertaining to the tenure review process that were ‘conferred on [her] as a matter of state law,’ we discern no error in the district court’s conclusion that her breach of contract claim is preempted.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123 )); Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]here the position in dispute is covered by the CBA, the CBA controls and any claims seek…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Klausen v. Warner Bros. Television (2×)
C.D. Cal. · 2016 · confidence medium
Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir.1988) (finding no § 301 preemption of FEHA disability discrimination claim because the right not to be discriminated against because of physical handicap is “defined and enforced under state law without reference to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement”); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir.1989) (finding no § 301 preemption of FEHA age discrimination claim because the statute creates a “mandatory and independent state right”); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 240 (9th Cir.1990) (finding no §…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hernandez v. Creative Concepts, Inc.
D. Nev. · 2012 · confidence medium
Young, 830 F.2d at 999 (quotation omitted). “[N]ot every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by section 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law.” Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989) (quotations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Park v. Young Bros.
9th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Harris v. Alumax Mill Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it was based on the same conduct as a preempted claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it arose out of the same conduct as a preempted contract claim).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Valles v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.
9th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Jimeno v. Mobil Oil Corp., 66 F.3d 1514, 1522-28 (9th Cir.1995) (concluding that the LMRA did not preempt a state law claim for physical disability discrimination in employment brought under FEHA); Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, 998 F.2d 743, 748-49 (9th Cir.1993) (concluding that a FEHA claim of employment discrimination based on national origin was not preempted by the LMRA); Jackson v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 644 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that a FEHA claim of racial discrimination in employment was not preempted by the LMRA because “enforcement of the state discrim…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schrader v. Noll Manufacturing Co.
9th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir.1988) (finding no § 301 preemption of FEHA disability discrimination claim because the right not to be discriminated against because of physical handicap is “defined and enforced under state law without reference to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement”); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir.1989) (finding no § 301 preemption of FEHA age discrimination claim because the statute creates a “mandatory and independent state right”); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 240 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding no �…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Somerville v. Longview Fibre Co. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
In Chmiel , we held that § 301 preempted tort-based state claims arising “out of the same conduct [that] formed the basis of the contract claim.” 873 F.2d at 1286 (assessing an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Broce v. ARCO Pipe Line Co.
9th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
See Jimeno v. Mobil Oil Corp., 66 F.3d 1514, 1522 (9th Cir.1995); Ramirez, 998 F.2d at 748-49 ; Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 240 (9th Cir.1990); Jackson v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 644 (9th Cir.1989); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989); Ackerman v. Western Elec.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perez v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co.
E.D. Cal. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Jimeno, 66 F.3d at 1527 (holding the FEHA standard “provide[d] a means to determine ‘reasonable accommodation’ without reference to the CBA”); Ramirez, 998 F.2d at 748 (holding that “the rights conferred by the California Employment Act are ‘defined and enforced under state law without reference to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement.’ ”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hagens v. Rio Doce Pasha Terminal, L.P.
9th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Co., Inc., 114 F.3d 892, 894-95 (9th Cir.1997); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989); Stallcop v. Kaiser Found.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Larranaga v. Northwest Defenders Ass'n
9th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Claims for breach of a collective bargaining agreement are preempted under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”). 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hernandez v. Denver Post
10th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g. , Avco Corp. , 390 U.S. at 560-61 (holding § 301 case properly removed even if requested remedy not available upon removal); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co. , 873 F.2d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding § 301 preempted employee’s state claims and case was properly removed even if he was not entitled to a “for cause” standard or access to the grievance procedures under the collective bargaining agreement).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Salmons v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
S.D.W. Va · 1999 · confidence medium
Defendants cite Brentwood v. Boeing Co., 168 F.3d 498 , 1999 WL 50859 (9th Cir.(Wash.) Jan. 7, 1999) (citing Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1989); Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 999-1001 (9th Cir. 1987)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Young v. Lockheed Advanced Development Co., a Div. of L ockheed Corp.
9th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel, 873 F.2d 1283, 1285-86 (9th Cir.1989). 22 Appellants argue that their contract-based claims are exempt from LMRA preemption because they are based on Lockheed's Human Resources Directives ("HRD") and not on the CBA.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael Veta v. American Airlines, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 238-39 (9th Cir.1990); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989). 14 Veta argues that Congress, in enacting the RLA, did not intend to completely divest the state of the ability to supplant the RLA with provisions protecting individual employees rights.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beale v. GTE CALIFORNIA
C.D. Cal. · 1996 · confidence medium
Preemption of Discrimination Claims The Ninth Circuit has held that Section 301 does not preempt actions under state antidiscrimination statutes “because the right [not to be discriminated against] is defined and enforced under state law without reference to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement.” Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that Section 301 does not preempt a lawsuit alleging age discrimination in violation of state law).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harriet Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, a Business Entity, Form Unknown, Michael Beavers and Does 1-25, Inclusive
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989); Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paul Montag v. The Aerospace Corporation J.R. Parsons (2×)
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir.1984)); see also Schlacter-Jones v. General Telephone, 936 F.2d 435, 440 (9th Cir.1991) (plaintiff's California state law claim for breach of implied contract preempted by section 301); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotels Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Swinford v. RUSS DUNMIRE OLDSMOBILE, INCORP.
Wash. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1989). 5 Because any independent agreement of employment concerning a job position covered by a CBA can be effective only as part of the CBA, the CBA controls.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Evelyn J. McCauley v. Fred Meyer Inc Gary Roeter
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Harris v. Alumax Mill Products, Inc., 897 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir.1990); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989); Newberry v. Pacific Racing Association, 854 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.1988); Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 1002 ) (9th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martin Jimeno, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Mobil Oil Corporation, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
See Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 748-49 (9th Cir.1993) (finding no preemption of a FEHA national origin discrimination claim); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 240 (9th Cir.1990) (finding no preemption of a FEHA religious discrimination claim); Jackson v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 644 (9th Cir.1989) (finding no preemption of a FEHA racial discrimination claim); Chmiel v. Beverly Wil-shire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989) (finding no preemption of a FEHA age discrimination claim).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc.
11th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
See McCormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 534-37 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048 , 112 S.Ct. 912 , 116 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 239-40 (9th Cir.1990); Douglas, 877 F.2d at 569-573; Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285-1286 (9th Cir.1989); Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1148-50 (9th Cir.1988); Miller v. AT & T Network Systems, 850 F.2d 543 , 550- 51 (9th Cir.1988); Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 996, 1002 (9th Cir.1987); Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jesse J. Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc.
11th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
See McCormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 534-37 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048 , 112 S.Ct. 912 , 116 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 239-40 (9th Cir.1990); Douglas, 877 F.2d at 569-573; Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285-1286 (9th Cir.1989); Newberry v. Pacific Racing Assn, 854 F.2d 1142, 1148-50 (9th Cir.1988); Miller v. AT & T Network Systems, 850 F.2d 543, 550-51 (9th Cir.1988); Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 996, 1002 (9th Cir.1987); Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 13…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wood v. County of Alameda
N.D. Cal. · 1995 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 241-58 , 104 S.Ct. 615, 617-26 , 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) (federal statute regulating handling and use of nuclear materials did not preempt plaintiff from claiming punitive damages under state law for defendant’s mishandling of such materials); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1989) (federal labor law did not preempt plaintiff from bringing age discrimination claim under state law).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Park City Education Ass'n v. Board of Education (2×)
Utah Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Retherford, 844 P.2d at 970 (citing Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285-86 (9th Cir.1989); Eitmann v. New Orleans Pub.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jerome R. Downey v. General Interiors, Inc., Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant, Sydney Woltkamp, Jerome R. Downey, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Sydney Woltkamp, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, General Interiors, Inc. Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee. Jerome R. Downey v. General Interiors, Inc. Sydney Woltkamp
9th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robert E. Thompson v. The Johnson Group Al Phillips the Cleaner, Inc. Mel Shapiro Dawn Adamson Donna Cowart and Does I Through X
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 411-12 ; Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir.1989).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Rosario Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc. Chuck Ammann Nancy Ferguson (6×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989) (Chmiel).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commodore v. University Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (2×)
Wash. · 1992 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 238 (9th Cir.1990) (holding California statute establishes public policy against religious discrimination in workplace, and therefore *133 such a claim is not preempted); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989) (holding California's age discrimination statute creates mandatory employment right independent of any CBA and therefore is not preempted under section 301); Ackerman v. Western Elec.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Leonardis v. Burns International Security Services, Inc. (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
D.N.J. · 1992 · confidence medium
Angst, 969 F.2d at 1536 ; Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989). *1176 Despite Plaintiffs claims to the contrary, case law dictates that Section 301 preemption is appropriate on the Independent Contract Claim.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Rodriguez v. United Airlines, Inc. (3×) also: Cited "see"
N.D. Cal. · 1992 · confidence medium
Co., Inc., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517-19 (9th Cir.1988) (plaintiff’s FEHA claim not barred by the LMRA because FEHA establishes rights without reference to a collective bargaining agreement); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir.1989) (the LMRA does not preempt plaintiff’s FEHA claim); Miller v. AT & T Network Systems, 850 F.2d 543, 550 (9th Cir.1988) (the LMRA does not preempt Oregon’s antidiscrimination statute because state law establishes an mandatory and independent state right).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sieu Mei Tu and Joseph Z. Tu, Plaintiffs/appellants/cross-Appellees v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., Pacific Fruit Express Co., Atchison, Topeka, Sante Fe Railroad Co., Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., and Brotherhood of Railway, Airline, and Steamship Clerks, Defendants/appellees/cross-Appellants
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989). 17 Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal jurisdiction exists only if a federal question is presented on the face of a complaint.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Milne Employees Association v. Sun Carriers, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 238-39 (9th Cir.1990); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989); Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 999 (9th Cir.1987). 32 Here, MEA concedes that the underlying contracts, with respect to the unionized employees, are the collective bargaining agreements.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Milne Employees Ass'n v. Sun Carriers, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 238-39 (9th Cir.1990); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989); Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 999 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Boyle v. MTV Networks, Inc.
N.D. Cal. · 1991 · confidence medium
Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989); Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir.1987); Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1372 ; Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 2:714 (Rutter Group 1990).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Richard B. Eldridge, and Kathleen A. Eldridge Richard N. Eldridge Vincent S. Eldridge v. Felec Services, Inc. (4×)
9th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 238-39 (9th Cir.1990); Jackson v. Southern Cal. Gas, 881 F.2d 638, 644 (9th Cir.1989); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel, 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989); Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir.1988); Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 999-1001 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) No. 88-15741 (2×)
9th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers (2×)
9th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Olivar v. Evenflo Juvenile Furniture
9th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 997-98, 999 (9th Cir.1987); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989); Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1373-75 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985)); Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir.1988). 6 The district court was also correct in its conclusion that claims arising under section 301 are governed by the six-month statute of limitations prescribed by Del Costello v. International Brotherho…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John Wayne Harris v. Alumax Mill Products, Inc. Andrew Meyers United Steelworkers of America (2×)
9th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Id.; Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989) (Chmiel) (finding preempted a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Scott v. Machinists Automotive Trades District Lodge No. 190, 827 F.2d 589, 591-92 (9th Cir.1987) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People of California v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (2×)
S.D. Cal. · 1989 · confidence medium
Id.; Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 , 391 n. 4, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, n. 4 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited "see" Sellar v. Woodland Park Zoological Society (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
W.D. Wash. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904 , 921 & n.12 (9th Cir. 2018); see 24 1 also Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283 , 1285–86 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding 2 breach of contract, implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of 3 emotional distress claims were preempted by Section 301, but not claim of age discrimination for 4 wrongful discharge under California public policy).2 5 Second, the court examines whether the claim is “substantially dependent” on a CBA. 6 Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1153 (quoting Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1033 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Frank CHMIEL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BEVERLY WILSHIRE HOTEL COMPANY; Regent International Hotels, Ltd., Defendants-Appellees
87-5601.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
May 3, 1989.
873 F.2d 1283
Nancy P. Adel, Adel & Pollack, Beverly Hills, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant., Robert H. Platt, Manatt, Phelps, Rothen-berg & Phillips, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Hug, Alarcon, Kozinski.
Cited by 88 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 88%
Citer courts: E.D. California (1)
ALARCON, Circuit Judge:

Frank Chmiel appeals from the order of the district court denying his motion to remand to state court and granting the Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co. (BWHC) and the Regent International Hotels, Ltd. (RIH) motions to dismiss.

Chmiel contends that the case was improperly removed. He argues that each of the causes of action alleged in his complaint was created by state law and was not completely preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).

I.

Chmiel was employed by BWHC as a bellman in the Beverly Wilshire Hotel from 1956 to 1985. He was a member of Local 11 of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union, AFL-CIO, (Union). The terms of his employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the Union and the Hotel-Restaurant Employers Council of Southern California (Council). The collective bargaining agreement specified that employees could be terminated only upon “just cause,” and established grievance procedures for “controversies pertaining to the application or interpretation” of the agreement.

In 1985, RIH acquired BWHC. RIH and the Union negotiated a sideletter agreement in which RIH agreed to assume the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the Council provided that:

effective December 31, 1985, all employees employed at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel ... will be employed ... as probationary employees ... until April 30, 1986.... [A]s to all such probationary employees, ... [the] Company shall have the absolute right in its sole discretion to lay off or discharge ... and ... any probationary employee so laid off or discharged shall have no rights under the grievance procedure set forth in the ... [collective bargaining] Agreement.

Chmiel remained employed with the Beverly Wilshire Hotel until April 22, 1986. On that day, 8 days before the probationary period under the sideletter agreement lapsed, RIH discharged him.

Chmiel brought an action against BWHC and RIH in the Superior Court of California in which he pleaded five causes of action arising under California law. Three of the causes of action sounded in tort: wrongful discharge in violation of California public policy against age discrimination, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The fourth cause of action sounded in contract. Chmiel claimed BWHC and RIH breached an express or implied in-fact agreement that he would not be discharged except upon a showing of good cause. The fifth cause of action was for age discrimination in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12941 (West Supp.1988).

BWHC and RIH removed this action to the district court pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). Chmiel moved to remand the action to state court. He argued that his causes of action did not arise under federal law and were independent of the collective bargaining agreement. BWHC and RIH also moved to dismiss Chmiel’s complaint claiming that his state law causes of action were preempted by federal law. The district court denied Chmiel’s motion to remand. The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss each of the causes of action as completely[*1285] preempted by section 301. In addition, the district court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend for failure to state a claim under the collective bargaining agreement. On January 5, 1987, the complaint was dismissed with prejudice because Chmiel failed to amend his complaint to state a claim under the collective bargaining agreement.

II.

“We review the denial of a motion to remand an action to state court for want of removal jurisdiction de novo.” Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, 830 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir.1987) (citations omitted).

As we recently explained in Young:

Even when federal law preempts state law, a state law claim may not be removed unless federal law also supplants it with a federal claim. The federal claim requirement arises from the limitations on removal jurisdiction contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1441. If the plaintiff could not have asserted a federal claim based on the allegations of her state law complaint, she could not have brought the case originally in federal court as required for removal jurisdiction under section 1441. In that case, preemption would be merely asserted as a defense. Thus, to remove a state law claim to federal court under the complete preemption doctrine, federal law must both completely preempt the state law claim and supplant it with a federal claim.

Id. at 997 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); accord Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir.1985) (“removal is improper when federal law simply displaces state law without replacing the state cause of action with a federal one”) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863, 106 S.Ct. 180, 88 L.Ed.2d 150 (1985).

To decide whether the district court erred in denying Chmiel’s motion to remand, we must determine whether each of Chmiel’s causes of action are completely preempted by federal law.

“The preemptive force of section 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of a collective bargaining agreement.” Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir.1987) cert. denied, - U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2819, 100 L.Ed.2d 921 (1988) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2853, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983)). “[S]ection 301 preempts any individual labor contract inconsistent with a collective bargaining agreement in order to assure uniform federal interpretation of the collective agreement.” Young, at 1001 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1911, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985)). Additionally, it preempts “claims which are substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement.” Paige at 861 (citation omitted).

However, “ ‘[n]ot every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by section 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law.’ ” Id. at 863 (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211, 105 S.Ct. at 1911). “[A] claim is not preempted if it poses no significant threat to the collective bargaining process and furthers a state interest in protecting the public transcending the employment relationship.” Young, at 1001; (citing Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367, 1373-75 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099, 105 S.Ct. 2319, 85 L.Ed.2d 839 (1985)).

Chmiel’s contract cause of action is preempted by section 301. Chmiel alleges in his complaint that his employer, independently of the collective bargaining agreement, expressly or impliedly agreed that he would not be involuntarily terminated except upon a showing of good cause. This alleged independent agreement is inconsistent with the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement as modified by the sideletter agreement. Under the sideletter agreement, Chmiel was a probationary employee at the time of his discharge whom BWHC and RIH had “the absolute right in [their] sole discretion to ... discharge.” Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement provides that “[n]o employee covered[*1286] by this Agreement shall be ... allowed to enter into any individual contract or agreement with the Employer ... varying the conditions of employment contained [in the collective bargaining agreement].”

A claim based upon an independent employment contract is not completely preempted if it concerns a job not governed by a collective bargaining agreement. Young, at 998; see Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2430-32 and 2431 n. 9, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (“[plaintiffs] rely on contractual agreements made while they were in managerial or weekly salaried positions—agreements in which the collective-bargaining agreement played no part.”). Since Chmiel’s independent contract claim concerns a job position governed by the collective bargaining agreement, it is completely preempted by section 301. See Young at 997-999.

III.

Chmiel’s tort claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is also completely preempted under section 301. We held in Young that the implied covenant tort is waived where the collective bargaining agreement contains terms concerning job security. Id. at 1000. See also Paige at 861-862 (breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cause of action preempted because it places “in issue the terms of the collective bargaining agreement”).

IV.

Chmiel’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from the termination of his employment arises out of the same conduct which formed the basis of the contract claim. “As resolution of the claims is inextricably intertwined with the interpretation of the CBA, they are preempted.” Young at 1002 (citations omitted); See Newberry v. Pac. Racing Assoc., 854 F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir.1988) (emotional distress claim arises out of discharge and cannot be decided without interpreting or analyzing the terms of CBA and is therefore preempted under section 301). The claim of emotional distress is preempted by section 301.

V.

Chmiel’s age discrimination claim for wrongful discharge in violation of California public policy and Cal. Gov’t Code § 12941, however, is not preempted by section 301. The California statute is in furtherance of the declared policy of prohibiting an employer from refusing “to hire or employ, or to discharge, dismiss, reduce, suspend, or demote any individual over the age of 40 on the ground of age.” Cal. Gov’t. Code § 12941.

California’s age discrimination law is a nonnegotiable right and applies to both unionized and nonunionized workers. Ackerman v. Western Elect. Co., Inc., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 n. 2 (9th Cir.1988). The Supreme Court reiterated that the proper test for preemption is whether resolution of the state law claim requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., - U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1882 n. 7, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (“as long as state law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is independent of the agreement for section 301 preemption purposes”).

We recently held that antidiscrimination statutes were not preempted by section 301 because the right is defined and enforced under state law without reference to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement. See Ackerman v. West. Elect. Co., Inc., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517-1518 (9th Cir.1988) (claim based on California Government Code § 12940 for discrimination because of physical handicap or medical condition not preempted by section 301 even where CBA contained general discrimination clause because right is defined and enforced under state law without reference to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement); Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.1988) (Oregon’s antidiscrimination statute created a mandatory and independent state right which is not preempted by Section 301). Califor[*1287] nia’s age discrimination statute creates a mandatory and independent state right which is not preempted by section 301.

VI.

Chmiel argues that his action should not have been removed because federal law does not “supplant” or provide substitute remedies for his claims. “Although this court at one time stated that a case could not be removed to federal court on complete preemption grounds unless the federal cause of action relied upon provided the plaintiff with a remedy, this analysis has been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court.” Newberry, 854 F.2d at 1146 (citation omitted). Therefore, “we need only inquire whether [the] claim arose under section 301, thus permitting removal to federal court, although the plaintiff may have sought a remedy available only under state law.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Young, 830 F.2d at 998-99 (employer’s individual contract claim completely preempted and supplanted by a federal claim for breach of the CBA under section 301 even though Young’s probationary status might ultimately bar an effective remedy under the CBA).

Chmiel’s claim that he could not be terminated without a showing of good cause was properly removed to federal court. The collective bargaining agreement as modified by the side-letter agreement, sets forth the conditions for terminating a probationary employee. Chmiel’s union waived his implied covenant rights in the sideletter agreement when it agreed that he could be dismissed without just cause and without access to the grievance procedures. This court has found that “a union can waive the right of a probationary employee to the protection of California’s implied covenant tort.” Young, at 1001. Since Chmiel was covered by the CBA, his “implied covenant claim was preempted by section 301 even though [he] may have no comparable employment protection under the CBA.” Id. Therefore, the supplantation requirement is met and the claims can serve as a basis for federal removal jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in denying Chmiel’s motion to remand this matter to state court. The district court properly assumed removal jurisdiction over the contract claim, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, and the emotional distress claim as causes of action completely preempted under section 301 because of the existence of a collective bargaining agreement.

The age discrimination claim is not preempted by section 301 because it alleges a violation of California public policy. We remand the age discrimination cause of action to the district court. The district court shall determine whether to retain pendent jurisdiction over the age discrimination claim or to remand it to state court.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.