explicit waiver in California

1978(In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 363 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ]; Richard M. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 370, 378 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 752 , 482 P.2d 664 ].) The exclusionary rules relating to pretrial identification apply to minors (In re Carl T. (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 344, 351-353 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 655 ]), statements obtained from juveniles in violation of Miranda are inadmissible (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 810 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 425 , 500 P.2d 1 ]); and there must be an explicit waiver of rights prior to acceptance of a judicial admission of the charge (In re Michael M. (

1978(In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 363 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ]; Richard M. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 370, 378 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 752 , 482 P.2d 664 ].) The exclusionary rules relating to pretrial identification apply to minors (In re Carl T. (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 344, 351-353 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 655 ]), statements obtained from juveniles in violation of Miranda are inadmissible (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 810 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 425 , 500 P.2d 1 ]); and there must be an explicit waiver of rights prior to acceptance of a judicial admission of the charge (In re Michael M. (

1978(In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 363 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ]; Richard M. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 370, 378 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 752 , 482 P.2d 664 ].) The exclusionary rules relating to pretrial identification apply to minors (In re Carl T. (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 344, 351-353 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 655 ]), statements obtained from juveniles in violation of Miranda are inadmissible (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 810 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 425 , 500 P.2d 1 ]); and there must be an explicit waiver of rights prior to acceptance of a judicial admission of the charge (In re Michael M. (

1978(In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 363 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ]; Richard M. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 370, 378 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 752 , 482 P.2d 664 ].) The exclusionary rules relating to pretrial identification apply to minors (In re Carl T. (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 344, 351-353 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 655 ]), statements obtained from juveniles in violation of Miranda are inadmissible (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 810 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 425 , 500 P.2d 1 ]); and there must be an explicit waiver of rights prior to acceptance of a judicial admission of the charge (In re Michael M. (

2016Code, § 6076 ), and because the rule binds all members of the State Bar (rule 1-100(A), 1st par.), it would be absurd for this or any other court to aid Chambers in accomplishing a fee division that would violate the rule's explicit requirement of written client consent and would subject Chambers to professional discipline."]; Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp . (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1405 , 1417, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 781 ["Fee agreements that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct may be deemed unenforceable on public policy grounds."]; Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert v. Super

2016Code, § 6076 ), and because the rule binds all members of the State Bar (rule 1-100(A), 1st par.), it would be absurd for this or any other court to aid Chambers in accomplishing a fee division that would violate the rule's explicit requirement of written client consent and would subject Chambers to professional discipline."]; Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp . (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1405 , 1417, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 781 ["Fee agreements that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct may be deemed unenforceable on public policy grounds."]; Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert v. Super

2016Code, § 6076 ), and because the rule binds all members of the State Bar (rule 1-100(A), 1st par.), it would be absurd for this or any other court to aid Chambers in accomplishing a fee division that would violate the rule's explicit requirement of written client consent and would subject Chambers to professional discipline."]; Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp . (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1405 , 1417, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 781 ["Fee agreements that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct may be deemed unenforceable on public policy grounds."]; Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert v. Super

2016Code, § 6076 ), and because the rule binds all members of the State Bar (rule 1-100(A), 1st par.), it would be absurd for this or any other court to aid Chambers in accomplishing a fee division that would violate the rule's explicit requirement of written client consent and would subject Chambers to professional discipline."]; Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp . (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1405 , 1417, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 781 ["Fee agreements that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct may be deemed unenforceable on public policy grounds."]; Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert v. Super

2016(See, e.g., Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142, 161 [“[B]ecause this court approved rule 2–200 under legislative authorization (see Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6076), and because the rule binds all members of the State Bar (rule 1–100(A), 1st par.), it would be absurd for this or any other court to aid Chambers in accomplishing a fee division that would violate the rule’s explicit requirement of written client consent and would subject Chambers to professional discipline.”]; Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1417 [“Fee agreements that violate the Rul

2016Code, § 6076 ), and because the rule binds all members of the State Bar (rule 1-100(A), 1st par.), it would be absurd for this or any other court to aid Chambers in accomplishing a fee division that would violate the rule's explicit requirement of written client consent and would subject Chambers to professional discipline."]; Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp . (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1405 , 1417, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 781 ["Fee agreements that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct may be deemed unenforceable on public policy grounds."]; Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert v. Super

2016(See, e.g., Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142, 161 [“[B]ecause this court approved rule 2–200 under legislative authorization (see Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6076), and because the rule binds all members of the State Bar (rule 1–100(A), 1st par.), it would be absurd for this or any other court to aid Chambers in accomplishing a fee division that would violate the rule’s explicit requirement of written client consent and would subject Chambers to professional discipline.”]; Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1417 [“Fee agreements that violate the Rul

2016(See, e.g., Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142, 161 [“[B]ecause this court approved rule 2–200 under legislative authorization (see Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6076), and because the rule binds all members of the State Bar (rule 1–100(A), 1st par.), it would be absurd for this or any other court to aid Chambers in accomplishing a fee division that would violate the rule’s explicit requirement of written client consent and would subject Chambers to professional discipline.”]; Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1417 [“Fee agreements that violate the Rul

2024I, § 16 expressly requires a personal waiver of the jury trial right from the defendant]; Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1332 [trial court has no sua sponte duty to inform a defendant of his or her “right to testify, or to obtain his personal waiver of that right”]; see also People v. Hayes (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1226, 1232 [“[t]he waiver of the right to testify may be made by counsel, and the courts have wisely refused to impose a sua sponte obligation on the trial court to extract a personal waiver from the defendant”].) In 2012, the Supreme Court reaffirmed these previous decisions, again

2012(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332-1333 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 ]; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 805-806 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 , 842 P.2d 1192 ] (Alcala); In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 305 , 813 P.2d 1335 ].) Defendant does not assert that a conflict occurred here.

2021Proposition 115, adopted by the voters in 1990, amended Penal Code section 872, subdivision (b) to create a “limited” hearsay exception (Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1074 (Whitman)), allowing “a properly qualified investigating officer to relate out-of-court statements by crime victims or witnesses” (id. at p. 1072).

1998The court held this lack of reciprocity was fatal under the Fourteenth Amendment. (412 U.S. at pp. 471-473, 476 [93 S.Ct. at pp. 2210-2211, 2212-2213].) The Wardius court “stressed the unfairness of a discovery procedure that denied the defendant significant procedural benefits afforded the state, and thereby interfered with his ability to secure a fair trial.” (Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1082 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 ]; Wardius, supra, 412 U.S. atp. 476 [93 S.Ct. *1326 at pp. 2212-2213] [“It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details

2013(See Flores v. Axxis Network & Telecommunications, Inc., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 806 ; Vasquez, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 434-435; see also Marcario v. County of Orange (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 397, 404, 405 [several California cases have held that “an employee could not be compelled even to participate in an arbitration proceeding mandated by a collective bargaining agreement, if the claims at issue are based upon state statutes,” unless the agreement to arbitrate such claims is “clear and unmistakable”]; Jonites v. Exelon Corp. (7th Cir. 2008) 522 F.3d 721, 725 [collective bargaining a

2013(See Flores v. Axxis Network & Telecommunications, Inc., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 806 ; Vasquez, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 434-435; see also Marcario v. County of Orange (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 397, 404, 405 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 ] [several California cases have held that “an employee could not be compelled even to participate in an arbitration proceeding mandated by a collective bargaining agreement, if the claims at issue are based upon state statutes,” unless the agreement to arbitrate such claims is “ ‘clear and unmistakable’ ”]; Jonites v. Exelon Corp. (7th Cir. 2008) 522 F.3d 721, 7

2013(See Flores v. Axxis Network & Telecommunications, Inc., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 806 ; Vasquez, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 434-435; see also Marcario v. County of Orange (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 397, 404, 405 [several California cases have held that “an employee could not be compelled even to participate in an arbitration proceeding mandated by a collective bargaining agreement, if the claims at issue are based upon state statutes,” unless the agreement to arbitrate such claims is “clear and unmistakable”]; Jonites v. Exelon Corp. (7th Cir. 2008) 522 F.3d 721, 725 [collective bargaining a

2013(See Flores v. Axxis Network & Telecommunications, Inc., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 806 ; Vasquez, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 434-435; see also Marcario v. County of Orange (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 397, 404, 405 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 ] [several California cases have held that “an employee could not be compelled even to participate in an arbitration proceeding mandated by a collective bargaining agreement, if the claims at issue are based upon state statutes,” unless the agreement to arbitrate such claims is “ ‘clear and unmistakable’ ”]; Jonites v. Exelon Corp. (7th Cir. 2008) 522 F.3d 721, 7

2013(Stats. 1995, ch. 439, § 2, p. 3429.) This new statute “loosened the restrictions on the admissibility of other-crimes evidence in cases involving sex crimes” (People v. Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1002, fn. 7), by creating an explicit exception to the *930 restrictions of Evidence Code section 1101.

2013(Stats. 1995, ch. 439, § 2, p. 3429.) This new statute ―loosened the restrictions on the admissibility of other-crimes evidence in cases involving sex crimes‖ (People v. Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1002, fn. 7 ), by creating an explicit exception to the restrictions of Evidence Code section 1101.

2005(See, e.g., People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 110 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31 , 26 P.3d 357 ; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 126-127 , 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 , 913 P.2d 980 .) In Falsetta , the Supreme Court held that the crucial factor ensuring that a defendant's right to due process is not violated by the admission of prejudicial propensity evidence under section 1108 is the explicit requirement, found in both sections 1108 and 1109, that the evidence not be "inadmissible pursuant to Section 352." ( People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 911, 917-918, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d

2005(See, e.g., People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 110 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31 , 26 P.3d 357 ; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 126-127 , 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 , 913 P.2d 980 .) In Falsetta , the Supreme Court held that the crucial factor ensuring that a defendant's right to due process is not violated by the admission of prejudicial propensity evidence under section 1108 is the explicit requirement, found in both sections 1108 and 1109, that the evidence not be "inadmissible pursuant to Section 352." ( People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 911, 917-918, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d

1999To carry out the intention of the enactment, we read section 1170.1, subdivision (g), as if it contained an exception for enhancements for serious felonies pursuant to section 667, comparable to the explicit exception for enhancements for violent felonies under section 667.5.” ( 37 Cal.3d at p. 838 .) Similarly, in People v. Pieters, supra, 52 Cal.3d 894 , the Supreme Court found a three-year enhancement for cocaine offenses involving more than 10 pounds of the drug was impliedly excepted from the same general double-the-base-term limit for sentencing (Pen.

1985To carry out the intention of the enactment, we read section 1170.1, subdivision (g), as if it contained an exception for enhancements for serious felonies pursuant to section 667, comparable to the explicit exception for enhancements for violent felonies under section 667.5.” As observed by the Supreme Court in People v. Jackson, supra, 37 Cal.3d 826 , at page 838, footnote 15, “Proposition 8’s failure to amend section 1170.1, subdivision (g) appears to be a draftsman’s oversight. . . .” The enhancement for defendant’s prior robbery conviction is not subject to the double base limitation of s

1978(In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 363 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ]; Richard M. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 370, 378 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 752 , 482 P.2d 664 ].) The exclusionary rules relating to pretrial identification apply to minors (In re Carl T. (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 344, 351-353 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 655 ]), statements obtained from juveniles in violation of Miranda are inadmissible (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 810 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 425 , 500 P.2d 1 ]); and there must be an explicit waiver of rights prior to acceptance of a judicial admission of the charge (In re Michael M. (

1978(In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 363 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ]; Richard M. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 370, 378 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 752 , 482 P.2d 664 ].) The exclusionary rules relating to pretrial identification apply to minors (In re Carl T. (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 344, 351-353 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 655 ]), statements obtained from juveniles in violation of Miranda are inadmissible (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 810 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 425 , 500 P.2d 1 ]); and there must be an explicit waiver of rights prior to acceptance of a judicial admission of the charge (In re Michael M. (

2022(People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 215 .) “When the record fails to disclose a timely and adequate demand to testify, ‘a defendant may not await the outcome of the trial and then seek reversal based on his claim that despite expressing to counsel his desire to testify, he was deprived of that opportunity.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 805-806 .) Accordingly, “[a] trial court has no duty to give such advice or seek an explicit waiver, unless a conflict with counsel comes to its attention. [Citations.]” (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 762 .) Defendant argues

2012(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332-1333 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 ]; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 805-806 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 , 842 P.2d 1192 ] (Alcala); In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 305 , 813 P.2d 1335 ].) Defendant does not assert that a conflict occurred here.

2015(Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 ] [defendant waived Miranda rights where he received and understood Miranda warnings, did not invoke his rights, and made voluntary statement to the police]; North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 373 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 286 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 ] [waiver of Miranda rights in some cases can be “inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated,” without an explicit waiver].) However, even where an accused waives his or her Miranda rights, once the accused asserts his or her right to counsel, “the inter

2015(Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 ] [defendant waived Miranda rights where he received and understood Miranda warnings, did not invoke his rights, and made voluntary statement to the police]; North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 373 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 286 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 ] [waiver of Miranda rights in some cases can be “inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated,” without an explicit waiver].) However, even where an accused waives his or her Miranda rights, once the accused asserts his or her right to counsel, “the inter

2018(See, e.g., Mendez , supra , 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 544 , 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 [CBA did not require arbitration of FEHA claims; "It does not mention FEHA, it does not explicitly incorporate by reference any statutory antidiscrimination laws, and it does not contain an explicit waiver of the right to seek judicial redress for statutory discrimination causes of action"]; id . at p. 546, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 ["At a minimum, the agreement must specify the statutes for *838 which claims of violation will be subject to arbitration"]; Choate , supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 [to e

2018(See, e.g., Mendez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 544 [CBA did not require arbitration of FEHA claims; “It does not mention FEHA, it does not explicitly incorporate by reference any statutory antidiscrimination laws, and it does not contain an explicit waiver of the right to seek judicial redress for statutory discrimination causes of action”]; id. at p. 546 [“At a minimum, the agreement must specify the statutes for which claims of violation will be subject to arbitration”]; Choate, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467 [to effect a waiver the CBA “must be specific, and mention either the statutor

2018(See, e.g., Mendez , supra , 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 544 , 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 [CBA did not require arbitration of FEHA claims; "It does not mention FEHA, it does not explicitly incorporate by reference any statutory antidiscrimination laws, and it does not contain an explicit waiver of the right to seek judicial redress for statutory discrimination causes of action"]; id . at p. 546, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 ["At a minimum, the agreement must specify the statutes for *838 which claims of violation will be subject to arbitration"]; Choate , supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 [to e

2018(See, e.g., Mendez , supra , 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 544 , 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 [CBA did not require arbitration of FEHA claims; "It does not mention FEHA, it does not explicitly incorporate by reference any statutory antidiscrimination laws, and it does not contain an explicit waiver of the right to seek judicial redress for statutory discrimination causes of action"]; id . at p. 546, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 ["At a minimum, the agreement must specify the statutes for *838 which claims of violation will be subject to arbitration"]; Choate , supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 [to e

2018(See, e.g., Mendez , supra , 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 544 , 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 [CBA did not require arbitration of FEHA claims; "It does not mention FEHA, it does not explicitly incorporate by reference any statutory antidiscrimination laws, and it does not contain an explicit waiver of the right to seek judicial redress for statutory discrimination causes of action"]; id . at p. 546, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 ["At a minimum, the agreement must specify the statutes for *838 which claims of violation will be subject to arbitration"]; Choate , supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 [to e

2018(See, e.g., Mendez , supra , 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 544 , 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 [CBA did not require arbitration of FEHA claims; "It does not mention FEHA, it does not explicitly incorporate by reference any statutory antidiscrimination laws, and it does not contain an explicit waiver of the right to seek judicial redress for statutory discrimination causes of action"]; id . at p. 546, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 ["At a minimum, the agreement must specify the statutes for *838 which claims of violation will be subject to arbitration"]; Choate , supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 [to e

2018(See, e.g., Mendez , supra , 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 544 , 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 [CBA did not require arbitration of FEHA claims; "It does not mention FEHA, it does not explicitly incorporate by reference any statutory antidiscrimination laws, and it does not contain an explicit waiver of the right to seek judicial redress for statutory discrimination causes of action"]; id . at p. 546, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 ["At a minimum, the agreement must specify the statutes for *838 which claims of violation will be subject to arbitration"]; Choate , supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 [to e

2018(See, e.g., Mendez , supra , 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 544 , 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 [CBA did not require arbitration of FEHA claims; "It does not mention FEHA, it does not explicitly incorporate by reference any statutory antidiscrimination laws, and it does not contain an explicit waiver of the right to seek judicial redress for statutory discrimination causes of action"]; id . at p. 546, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 ["At a minimum, the agreement must specify the statutes for *838 which claims of violation will be subject to arbitration"]; Choate , supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 [to e

2016(See Stewart v. Justice Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 607, 612 [“We are under a duty to indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights”].) Instead, in a case like this, where Uwaydah asserted a defense of impossibility, the Board must provide him with an opportunity to present that defense.

1980The prior conviction must therefore be stricken (see Stewart v. Justice Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 607 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 589 ]).

2015(Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 384 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 ] [defendant waived Miranda rights where he received and understood Miranda warnings, did not invoke his rights, and made voluntary statement to the police]; North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 373 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 286 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 ] [waiver of Miranda rights in some cases can be “inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated,” without an explicit waiver].) However, even where an accused waives his or her Miranda rights, once the accused asserts his or her right to counsel, “the inter

1968(See People v. Rollins (1967) 65 Cal.2d 681, 691 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 423 P.2d 221 ].) Miranda holds that, absent an explicit waiver, statements of one subjected to custodial police interrogation are admissible as evidence only if the person in custody is warned, prior to questioning, that: (1) he has a right to remain silent, (2) anything he says may be used as evidence against him, (3) he has the right to the presence of a lawyer during the interrogation, and (4) if indigent, he has a right to a court-appointed lawyer ( 384 U.S., at p. 444 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706 ]). *175 It is clear from the

2013(In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95 .) "A trial court has no duty to give such advice or seek an explicit waiver, unless a conflict with counsel comes to its attention." (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 762 .) C Mohamed asserts the trial court erred by not obtaining an express waiver of his right to testify.

2012(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332-1333 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 ]; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 805-806 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 , 842 P.2d 1192 ] (Alcala); In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 305 , 813 P.2d 1335 ].) Defendant does not assert that a conflict occurred here.