BADE, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellants are Cambodian villagers who allege that they were trafficked into Thailand and subjected to forced labor at seafood processing factories. Plaintiffs allege that Thai companies perpetrated these offenses, and that companies present in the United States knowingly benefitted from their forced labor. Plaintiffs brought their claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1595, 1 the civil remedy provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”), as reauthorized and amended in the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 and the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. 2

We are asked to determine the extraterritorial reach of § 1595 and to construe the terms of that provision. We assume without deciding that § 1595 may apply 1 Plaintiffs also brought claims under the Alien Tort Statute. The district court dismissed those claims at the pleading stage, and they are not at issue in this appeal. 2 We refer to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, as reauthorized and amended, as the TVPRA.

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extraterritorially and conclude that Plaintiffs did not present a triable issue on the requirements for such application or on the merits of their claims. Therefore, the district court properly entered summary judgment against Plaintiffs. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time to respond to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. We affirm.

I

A

In 2000, Congress enacted the TVPA “to ‘combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.’” Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1592)). By enacting this statute, “Congress created several new federal criminal offenses intended to more comprehensively and effectively combat human trafficking.” Roe v. Howard, 917 F.3d 229, 236 (4th Cir. 2019).

In 2003, Congress reauthorized and amended the TVPRA, adding a civil remedy provision codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1595. See Ditullio, 662 F.3d at 1094. Initially, that provision provided civil remedies only for violations of § 1589 (forced labor), § 1590 (trafficking), and § 1591 (sex trafficking of children). See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 4(a)(4)(A), 117 Stat. 2875 (2003). But in 2008, Congress again reauthorized the TVPRA and amended it to expand the civil remedies provision, which now provides:

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An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.

18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (providing a civil remedy for the offenses listed in Title 18, Chapter 77, “Peonage, Slavery, and Trafficking in Persons”); see Ditullio, 662 F.3d at 1094 n.1.

The 2008 amendments also added § 1596, which authorizes extraterritorial application for specific sections of the TVPRA. See 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 223(a), 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). This provision, entitled “Additional jurisdiction in certain trafficking offenses,” provides:

(a) In general.—In addition to any domestic or extra-territorial jurisdiction otherwise provided by law, the courts of the United States have extra-territorial jurisdiction over any offense (or any attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense) under section 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, or 1591 if—

(1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted

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for permanent residence (as those terms are defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)); or

(2) an alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the alleged offender.

18 U.S.C. § 1596(a). As a result of the 2008 amendments, the TVPRA now extends extraterritorial application to violations of § 1581 (peonage), § 1583 (enticement into slavery), § 1584 (sale into involuntary servitude), § 1589 (forced labor), § 1590 (trafficking), and § 1591 (sex trafficking of children), but only if the alleged offender is a United States citizen, a lawful permanent resident, or is present in the United States. See id.

B

In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that they were the victims of peonage, forced labor, involuntary servitude, and human trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1584, 1589, 1590, 1592, and 1593A, and they sought damages under § 1595, the civil remedy provision of the TVPRA. Plaintiffs further alleged that Defendants-Appellees Phatthana Seafood Co., Ltd. (“Phatthana”) and S.S. Frozen Food Co., Ltd. (“S.S. Frozen”) perpetrated these offenses, and that Defendants-Appellees Rubicon Resources, LLC (“Rubicon”) and Wales & Co. Universe Ltd. (“Wales”) knowingly benefitted from Phatthana’s and S.S. Frozen’s unlawful conduct.

Specifically, Plaintiffs say that they were recruited from their villages to work in factories in Thailand producing shrimp and seafood for export to the United States. Plaintiffs were promised well-paying jobs with free accommodations,

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but once in Thailand, they became victims of peonage, forced labor, and involuntary servitude. Plaintiffs were paid less than promised, charged for accommodations, charged for other unexpected expenses, unable to leave without their passports, which they were told would not be returned until “recruitment fee[s]” and other amounts were paid, and subjected to harsh conditions. Plaintiffs asserted that these abuses occurred from sometime in 2010 until October 2012. Phatthana’s seafood processing factory in Songkhla province, where six of the seven Plaintiffs worked, began operations in August 2010. The seventh Plaintiff, Keo Ratha, worked at an S.S. Frozen seafood processing factory from October 2011 to January 2012.

Phatthana and S.S. Frozen are foreign companies. Phatthana is a Thai company that owned two seafood processing factories in Thailand, including the factory in Songkhla province. ^[3] Phatthana does not have an address, employees, factories, or other property in the United States. Phatthana had business relationships with Rubicon and Wales, which we describe in more detail below.

S.S. Frozen is also a Thai company and it owned a seafood processing factory in Songkhla province, next to Phatthana’s Songkhla factory. S.S. Frozen does not have an address or employees in the United States, and it did not sell any seafood in the United States during the period at issue— August 2010 to October 2012. Unlike Phatthana, S.S. Frozen did not have any business relationships with Rubicon or Wales.

Plaintiffs first maintain that we should construe the phrase “present in,” as used in § 1596, to not require physical We next consider Plaintiffs’ second argument—that Phatthana and S.S. Frozen were present in the United States through an agency relationship or joint venture with Rubicon—and conclude it is unconvincing.

Plaintiffs assert that Phatthana is “present in” the United States for purposes of § 1596 because Rubicon, which is present in the United States acted as Phatthana’s agent. The district court properly rejected this argument. An agent under California law is “one who represents another, called the principal, in dealings with third persons.” Cal. Civ. Code § 2295. “Agency requires that the principal maintain control over the agent’s actions,” Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218, 1232 (9th Cir. 2013), and generally, “[a] purchaser is not ‘acting on behalf of’ a supplier in a distribution relationship in which goods are purchased from the supplier for resale,” id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 cmt. g (2006)).

Plaintiffs contend that Rubicon’s marketing activities, on-site visits to Phatthana’s factories, management of the 24 RATHA V. PHATTHANA SEAFOOD

importation and shipping of Phatthana products, and management of customer relations establish an agency relationship between Rubicon and Phatthana. But none of the evidence in the record supports the inference that Phatthana exercised control over Rubicon’s purchasing, marketing, sales, and customer-relations activities, or that Phatthana’s relationship with Rubicon was anything more than a purchaser-supplier relationship. While it is true that Rubicon was registered as Phatthana’s “agent” with the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), such an agent acts merely “as a communications link between FDA and the foreign facility for both emergency and routine communications.” 21 C.F.R. § 1.227. This narrowly delineated relationship under federal regulations does not show that Phatthana exercised the control over Rubicon necessary to establish a general agency relationship. Plaintiffs’ agency-based argument therefore fails.

Plaintiffs further maintain that Phatthana was present in the United States because it and Rubicon were engaged in a joint venture to market and sell shrimp in the United States. This argument fails largely for the same reasons Plaintiffs’ agency argument fails.

To establish a joint venture under California law, Plaintiffs must show “an agreement between the parties under which they have a community of interest, that is, a joint interest, in a common business undertaking, an understanding as to the sharing of profits and losses, and a right of joint control.” Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 447 P.2d 609, 615 (Cal. 1968) (quoting Holtz v. United Plumbing & Heating Co., 319 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1957)); accord Ramirez v. Long Branch Unified Sch. Dist., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). To support their joint venture argument, Plaintiffs rely on the same

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evidence they cited to support their agency-based claim. As explained, that evidence establishes only that Rubicon and Phatthana were engaged in a purchaser-supplier relationship; it does not create a triable issue that Rubicon and Phatthana would share profits and losses or would be subject to joint control.

To the contrary, the limited liability company agreement creating Rubicon states that Rubicon was formed as a joint venture between Brian Wynn (the CEO and manager of Rubicon), Wales, Thailand Fishery Cold Storage Public Co. (whose share in Rubicon was later transferred to another company), and P&M Holding Co.; that those four entities would share in Rubicon’s net income and losses; and that Wynn had “exclusive authority to manage the operations and affairs of” Rubicon. Neither the original agreement nor its subsequent amendments identifies Phatthana as a member of the joint venture.

Plaintiffs rely on filings by “Rubicon Group” submitted to the Commerce Department as part of an antidumping proceeding. 14 The “Rubicon Group” is not synonymous with Rubicon Resources, LLC, but rather is the term used in a Commerce Department antidumping proceeding to describe a collection of “affiliated firms, collapsed for [antidumping] analysis pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f).” See Pakfood Pub. Co. v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1333 n.3 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010). Plaintiffs asserts that those

14 Antidumping laws “address harm to domestic manufacturing from foreign goods sold at an unfair price” by imposing a duty on imports. United States v. Eurodif S. A., 555 U.S. 305, 310–11 (2009). Antidumping proceedings, like the one referred to here, involve the government’s determination of the duty rates for certain kinds of imports. See Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand, 74 Fed. Reg. 47,551-02, 47,551 (Sept. ^[16], 2009).

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Commerce Department filings show that Phatthana, as well as other Thai shrimp companies, were “subgroup” members of the Thailand Fishery Cold Storage group, which in turn was a member of the Rubicon Group. The filings state that “a company within each Rubicon subgroup,” including the signatories to the Rubicon joint venture agreement, “is a Member (or partner) of Rubicon Resources, and holds a [ ]% interest in the company,” and that “each Rubicon subgroup encompasses the individual Rubicon Group companies,” including Phatthana, which is thereby “integrated into the Rubicon Group business structure.”

At most, these filings confirm that there is a joint venture relationship between the entities named as members of Rubicon Resources in the Rubicon joint venture agreement and that there is some relationship between at least one of those entities and Phatthana. But neither these filings nor Plaintiffs’ briefs explain what it means for Phatthana to be “integrated” into the overall Rubicon Group business structure, or what it means that a Rubicon subgroup “encompasses” a sub-subgroup such as Phatthana. Plaintiffs offers no evidence of any direct agreement between Rubicon and Phatthana regarding the sharing of profits and losses or a joint right of control. In light of the existence of a Rubicon joint venture agreement that does not include Phatthana, as well as the evidence that Rubicon and Phatthana’s relationship was that of a purchaser and a supplier, these Commerce Department filings alone cannot support the inference that Phatthana and Rubicon were engaged in a joint venture.

Plaintiffs’ third argument also falls short. Focusing on the phrase “an alleged offender” as used in § 1596, Plaintiffs contend that § 1596 is satisfied so long as one of the

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defendants involved in the case meets the statutory criteria. But even if this novel interpretation is sound (and we doubt that it is), we conclude below that the district court correctly entered summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims against Rubicon and Wales. Consequently, there are no other defendants besides Phatthana and S.S. Frozen left to satisfy § 1596’s requirements, and as we have explained, neither of those Defendants meet § 1596’s demands. ^[15]

* * *

Plaintiffs have not raised a triable issue that Phatthana and S.S. Frozen were “present in the United States,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a)(2), and thus they have not established that their § 1595 claims against these Defendants involve a permissible extraterritorial application of the TVPRA. We therefore affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Phatthana and S.S. Frozen.

Plaintiffs assert that there is “sufficient evidence” that Rubicon benefitted from Phatthana’s alleged TVPRA violations. They point to three distinct benefits that Rubicon allegedly obtained from its relationship with Phatthana. But none of those allegations presents a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiffs first argue that Rubicon “benefitted from marketing the shrimp produced by Phatthana.” They point to materials stating that “Rubicon has 13 factories,” including Phatthana’s Songkhla factory, “that are 100% owned and captive to Rubicon Resources.” But the page touting Rubicon’s production capabilities and a “Factory Index” that includes the Songkhla factory are undated. And Plaintiffs have offered no evidence or explanation of the purpose of these materials, when they were produced, or when (or even whether) they were distributed to potential customers. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ argument rests on Rubicon’s marketing role, not on any ownership or production role. We thus find these materials insufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that Rubicon benefitted from its alleged marketing of Phatthana’s products.

We reject Plaintiffs’ second argument—that Rubicon obtained a “competitive advantage” through its association with Phatthana—for a similar reason. Plaintiffs point to “[d]eclarations from Louisiana shrimpers attest[ing] to the competitive advantage and the impact on American industry” of the Thai shrimp industry. But these general statements from American shrimpers about international market conditions do not suggest that Rubicon benefitted

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from its alleged venture with Phatthana. Therefore, we find the declarations insufficient to present a genuine dispute of material fact.

Perhaps realizing these deficiencies, Plaintiffs advance a third argument: that an attempt to benefit satisfies § 1595(a)’s “knowingly benefits” requirement. We disagree. The text of § 1595 does not extend liability to those who attempt to benefit from a venture. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). And we cannot read the word “attempt” into § 1595 without violating “a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that ‘absent provision[s] cannot be supplied by the courts.’” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360–61 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 94 (2012)).

Moreover, Congress’s decision to impose civil liability on those who “benefit” but not those who “attempt to benefit” is significant because attempt liability is plainly authorized elsewhere in the TVPRA. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1594(a) (“Whoever attempts to violate section 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, or 1591 shall be punishable in the same manner as a completed violation of that section.”). 16 When “Congress uses certain language in one part of a statute and different language in another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012). Had Congress intended to create civil liability under § 1595 for attempts to benefit, Turning to Plaintiffs’ claims against Wales, we conclude that Plaintiffs failed to present evidence to support a reasonable inference that Wales knew or should have known that Phatthana was engaged in conduct violating the TVPRA when it received a benefit from the alleged venture. Wales admits that on February 23, 2012, it became aware of a news article published in the Phnom Penh Post detailing allegations from Plaintiff Ratha’s whistleblower report. 17 In light of this admission, we bifurcate our analysis into the periods before and after February 23, 2012. We first conclude that Plaintiffs have not presented a triable issue on whether Wales knew or should have known of Phatthana’s alleged TVPRA violations before February 23, 2012. We then conclude that Plaintiffs have not presented a triable issue on whether Wales benefitted from the alleged venture on or after February 23, 2012. a

We first consider whether a reasonable factfinder could infer from the evidence that Wales knew or should have

17 We assume without deciding that Wales possessed actual knowledge of the alleged violations on and after February 23, 2012.

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known of the alleged labor abuses at Phatthana’s Songkhla factory between August 2010 (when the factory started operating) and February 22, 2012 (the day before Rubicon was undisputedly aware of Ratha’s whistleblower report). Plaintiffs argue that Wales “received industry-specific, country-specific, and Defendant-specific information sufficient to put any reasonable party on notice” that labor abuses were occurring at the Songkhla factory “well before” the allegations in Ratha’s whistleblower report were published in February 2012. They point to reports and articles about labor abuses generally in Thailand, as well as their retained experts’ reports, to substantiate their claims.

As we explain in the following sections, this evidence falls short of creating a genuine dispute of material fact on whether Wales knew or should have known of Phatthana’s alleged TVPRA violations before February 2012. “[T]he phrase ‘knew or should have known’ usually connotes negligence.” Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347, 1358 (9th Cir. 1980). And “[n]egligence is a less culpable mental state than actual knowledge . . . or recklessness.” Erickson Prods., Inc. v. Kast, 921 F.3d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 2019). Assuming § 1595 imposes a negligence standard, Plaintiffs’ evidence suggests, at most, that Wales should have known of labor abuses in the Thai shrimp industry generally. Sweeping generalities about the Thai shrimp industry are too attenuated to support an inference that Wales knew or should have known of the specifically alleged TVPRA violations at the Songkhla factory between 2010 and 2012. i

Plaintiffs first point to evidence generally establishing that abusive labor practices were common in Thailand, particularly in the shrimp industry. They rely upon the 2009

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edition of The Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, which identified the Thai shrimp industry on a list of 58 countries and 122 goods having a “significant incidence of child labor and forced labor in the production of certain goods.” But as this report itself cautions, “a listing of any particular good and country does not indicate that all production of the good in that country involves forced labor or child labor, but rather that there is a significant incidence” of such conduct in that country’s industry. And the report makes clear that identifying “specific firms or individuals using child labor or forced labor” is beyond its mandate. The identification of child labor and forced labor as a general problem in the Thai shrimp industry, before the relevant time period, sheds little light on whether labor abuses were occurring at Phatthana’s Songkhla factory, let alone whether Wales knew or should have known of such abuses.

Plaintiffs’ reliance on a January 2008 report from the AFL-CIO’s Solidarity Center, The Degradation of Work: The True Cost of Shrimp, is likewise insufficient to overcome their burden at summary judgment. The only reference to Phatthana in this forty-page report appears in a section addressing whether Thai seafood workers earned minimum wage (191 baht per day, as an industry source estimated). The report includes the following statement based on information from a 2005 interview with a worker at a different Phatthana factory: “[A] pay stub from a worker at the Pattana [sic] Seafood Company in Samut Sakhon showed a reported pay of 191 baht per day, but daily take- home pay was closer to 160 baht after deductions for equipment and permits.” But Plaintiffs offer no argument or evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that this reference to one worker’s statement, concerning wages at an entirely different processing facility, long before the

34 RATHA V. PHATTHANA SEAFOOD time period at issue, should have put Wales on notice that it was working with entities engaged in TVPRA violations. ^[18]

Plaintiffs assert that news reports referencing the Solidarity Center Report, published between April and June 2008, “identif[ied] Rubicon’s customers as the consumers” of shrimp produced in Thailand. Plaintiffs are correct that one of these articles identified “nine big U.S. supermarket chains” that “sell[ ] Thai shrimp in the U.S.,” including Walmart, one of Rubicon’s customers. Another article identified Walmart as a retailer that imports shrimp from Thailand. This article, however, also stated that the Solidarity Center report “makes clear not all shrimp imports into the United States from Thailand and Bangladesh come from problem plants.” These articles do not identify any Thai companies, much less Phatthana, as a bad actor engaged in labor abuses, and they do not state that Walmart or any of the other U.S. supermarket chains were selling shrimp produced by forced labor. Therefore, these articles establish nothing more than reported labor abuses in Thailand in 2008 and that some U.S. supermarkets were selling shrimp produced in Thailand. This evidence cannot support a reasonable inference of Wales’s knowledge of