dangerous rule in Kansas

2014The Kansas Supreme Court made a similar declaration in 1874 in Comm’rs of Sedgwick Co. v. Bailey, 13 Kan. 600, 607 , 1874 WL 760 (1874): “It would be a dangerous doctrine to announce, that any of the provisions of the constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of the legislature, unless it is clear beyond all question that such was the intention of the framers of the instrument." This plain language in Article 6, Sections 1 and 6(b), which reflects the assignment of mandatory constitutional duties to the Kansas Legislature, is in sharp contrast to another section of

1996The “few decisions” to which Turner referred are the two cited by the Court of Appeals. 21 Kan.

1952(State v. Gillen, 151 Kan. 359, 364 , 99 P. 2d 832 .) Furthermore, in State v. Crilly, supra, this court quoted with approval from an Illinois case, and said: “ ‘The requirement of the statute that the jury in a criminal case shall be placed in charge of a sworn, officer upon retirement is waived by the failure of the accused to object at the time to the omission of the oath, and the question is thereafter not open to review upon writ of error, although the point is urged as a ground for new trial by motion supported by affidavits.’ ” (p. 809.) In addition to the foregoing I cannot escape the

1952(State v. Gillen, 151 Kan. 359, 364 , 99 P. 2d 832 .) Furthermore, in State v. Crilly, supra, this court quoted with approval from an Illinois case, and said: “ ‘The requirement of the statute that the jury in a criminal case shall be placed in charge of a sworn, officer upon retirement is waived by the failure of the accused to object at the time to the omission of the oath, and the question is thereafter not open to review upon writ of error, although the point is urged as a ground for new trial by motion supported by affidavits.’ ” (p. 809.) In addition to the foregoing I cannot escape the

1907“We must therefore be astute not to permit devices to become successful which are used for the very purpose of destroying that right.” (Page 283.) In Dow v. Bradstreet Co., 46 Fed. 824 , it was alleged in a petition for removal that a resident defendant had been joined with a non-resident defendant to prevent a removal, and that the resident defendant was a sham party, with no interest whatever in the controversy.

1893They are equally effective when they arise by implication.” (Prouty v. Stover, 11 Kas. 235 .) “It would be a dangerous doctrine to announce, that any of the provisions of the constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of the legislature, unless it is clear beyond all question that such was the intention of the framers of the instrument.” (Comm’rs of Sedgwick Co. v. Bailey, 13 Kas. 607 .) The first contention is, that chapter 214 is unconstitutional because it attempts to delegate legislative power to the petitioners, and confer upon them the absolute and arbitrary p