dangerous rule in New York

1932It is not a question of the giving of actual notice to the electors, hut of legal notice under the statute.” In Matter of Town of LaFayette ( 105 App. Div. 25, 31 ), another case arising out of the Liquor Tax Law, the Appellate Division of the Fourth Department held that statutory notice was essential to the validity of an election where local option questions are submitted, saying: “It is not a question of disfranchising voters by reason of the neglect of duty of the town clerk, and we think it a dangerous rule to lay down that the town clerk may neglect to give the notice required by the pla

1926J., in Brady v. Cassidy ( 104 N. Y. 147, 155 ): “ The rule is well settled that when the terms and language of a contract are ascertained, in the absence of technical phrases, the meaning of which is obscure, or the existence of latent ambiguities, rendering the subject-matter of the contract uncertain and doubtful, the office of interpreting its meaning belongs to the court alone. * * * It would be a dangerous principle to establish, where parties have reduced their contracts to writing, and defined their meaning by plain and unequivocal language, to subject their interpretation to the arbitr

1911In Perry v. Bates ( 115 App. Div. 337 ) it is held, that “when letters written between contracting parties purport merely to confirm the terms of a prior oral agreement the letters are not controlling as to the terms of the contract, which may be shown by oral evidence which supplements or apparently contradicts the letters.” In that case, however, it does not appear that the terms stated in the letter therein questioned were assented to by the other party to the contract; It is probably unnecessary to determine this question in my view of the evidence in the ■ case and the necessary inference

1902(Campbell v. Coon, 149 N. Y. 556 ; Mack v. Colleran, 136 id. 617 ; Van Clief v. Van Vechten, 130 id. 571 .) It would be a very dangerous rule to announce that a contractor who had forfeited all rights under his contract could, by making a. general assignment, invest such assignee with right to obtain and receive the profits of such contract thereafter fulfilled by the owner, relieved entirely from the rights of those persons which the Lien Law protects.

1902(Campbell v. Coon, 149 N. Y. 556 ; Mack v. Colleran, 136 id. 617 ; Van Clief v. Van Vechten, 130 id. 571 .) It would be a very dangerous rule to announce that a contractor who had forfeited all rights under his contract could, by making a. general assignment, invest such assignee with right to obtain and receive the profits of such contract thereafter fulfilled by the owner, relieved entirely from the rights of those persons which the Lien Law protects.

1897Ecc. 105. .“The plaintiff had the power, and it was his duty to prevent the debauchment of his wife.” Gilbert, J., in Bunnell v. Greathead, 49 Barb. 106 ." “It- would be a dangerous principle to establish that a husband who has suspicions of the infidelity of his, wife shall be allowed to lay a train which may lead her to the commission of adultery, in order that he may take advantage of it to obtain" a divorce.” Pierce v. Pierce, 15 Am.

1876It would be a dangerous doctrine to allow a party to take his chances at a trial without reasonable nreparation, and then grant him a new trial, because he had through his own neglect omitted to discover and present evidence that lay in easy reach (Oakley v. Sears, 7 Robt. 111: Quinn v. Lloyd, 1 Sweeny, 253 ; Adams v. Bush, 2 Abb.

1851Ward v. Lewis, 4 Pick. 518 . 4 Kent’s Com. 454.

1851To allow a deed, absolute upon its face, to be avoided by such evidence, would be a dangerous violation of a cardinal rule of evidence." (Gilbert v. The North American Fire Insurance Company 23 Wend. 43 .

1836It would be a dangerous doctrine to hold that the sheriff may, for his own convenience, depute persons to discharge the duties of his office, and yet not be answerable to third persons for their misconduct. 7 Johns, R. 35. 1 Mass. R. 530 . 4 id. 63. 1 Pick. 271 .