dangerous doctrine (Louisiana) · Go Syfert
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dangerous doctrine in Louisiana

6 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Crawford v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1974 · cited in 1 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011Adoption of the proposition would be but one step short of accepting lawless reprisal as an appropriate means of redressing grievances, real or fancied.”)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. Mejia, 662 A.2d at 320 (“[T]he emerging trend in other jurisdictions rejects the claim-of-right de fense to robbery because ... it encourages disputants to resolve disputes on the streets through violence instead of through the judicial system.”)(internal quotation marks |fland citations omitted); Crawford v. State, 509 S.W.2d 582, 584-86 (Tex.Crim.App.1974) (“To hold otherwise would b

2011Adoption of the proposition would be but one step short of accepting lawless reprisal as an appropriate means of redressing grievances, real or fancied.")(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. Mejia, 662 A.2d at 320 ("[T]he emerging trend in other jurisdictions rejects the claim-of-right defense *773 to robbery because . . . it encourages disputants to resolve disputes on the streets through violence instead of through the judicial system.")(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Crawford v. State, 509 S.W.2d 582, 584-86 (Tex. Crim.App.1974) ("To hold otherwise wou

11
State v. Mejiared
nj · 1995 · cited in 1 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011Adoption of the proposition would be but one step short of accepting lawless reprisal as an appropriate means of redressing grievances, real or fancied.”)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. Mejia, 662 A.2d at 320 (“[T]he emerging trend in other jurisdictions rejects the claim-of-right de fense to robbery because ... it encourages disputants to resolve disputes on the streets through violence instead of through the judicial system.”)(internal quotation marks |fland citations omitted); Crawford v. State, 509 S.W.2d 582, 584-86 (Tex.Crim.App.1974) (“To hold otherwise would b

2011Adoption of the proposition would be but one step short of accepting lawless reprisal as an appropriate means of redressing grievances, real or fancied.")(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. Mejia, 662 A.2d at 320 ("[T]he emerging trend in other jurisdictions rejects the claim-of-right defense *773 to robbery because . . . it encourages disputants to resolve disputes on the streets through violence instead of through the judicial system.")(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Crawford v. State, 509 S.W.2d 582, 584-86 (Tex. Crim.App.1974) ("To hold otherwise wou

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
New Orleans v. United States green
scotus · 1836
1 sentence

2018As this court said in New Orleans v. United States, [35 U.S.] (10 Pet.) 662, 731[ 9 L.Ed. 573 (1836) ] : 'It would be a dangerous doctrine to consider the issuing of a grant as conclusive evidence of right in the power which issued it.

12018–2018
Alex F. Dreyfus Co. v. Friedman green
la · 1930
2 sentences

1958To uphold the contention made here by Thorn-hill would establish a dangerous rule and would open the door in many cases to the perpetration of fraud upon agents who conscientiously try to carry out their mandates.” In the Doll case the court cited Alex F. Dreyfus Co. v. Friedman, 171 La. 90 , 129 So. 679 , wherein the Supreme Court held that the owner of property is obligated to refer all applicants of the property to the agent, when the contract specifically required that he do so.

1958To uphold the contention made here by Thorn-hill would establish a dangerous rule and would open the door in many cases to the perpetration of fraud upon agents who conscientiously try to carry out their mandates.” In the Doll case the court cited Alex F. Dreyfus Co. v. Friedman, 171 La. 90 , 129 So. 679 , wherein the Supreme Court held that the owner of property is obligated to refer all applicants of the property to the agent, when the contract specifically required that he do so.

11958–1958
Robinson v. Frost Hardwood Floors neutral
lactapp · 1946
1 sentence

1952Convinced as we are that plaintiff’s recovery is largely dependent upon the exercise of his own will to recover and to effect recovery by adherence to a reasonable program of treatment, we find ourselves thoroughly in accord with the conclusions reached hy the district Judge.” See also the following cases: Robinson v. Frost Hardwood Floors, Inc., La.App., 25 So.2d 312 ; Thompson v. Meeker Sugar Ref.

11952–1952
Myles v. Forcum-James Co. green
lactapp · 1943
1 sentence

1952In Myles v. Forcum-James Company, La.App.2d Cir., 16 So.2d 542 -544, Hardy, J., it was said: “It would be a dangerous doctrine to lay down the rule that an injured employee, who obstructed or hindered his own recovery either by active measures or passive disobedience of medical recommendations, should be entitled to an allowance of compensation for a period of three hundred weeks.

11952–1952
Mithoff v. Dewees neutral
la · 1854
1 sentence

1935As said in Mithoff v. Dewees, 9 La.

11935–1935
Succession of Lacosst green
la · 1917
1 sentence

1930In Succession of Lacosst, 142 La. 674 , at page 684, 77 So. 497, 501 , a situation almost similar to the one here presented with reference to this birth certificate had to be considered by the Supreme Court, and in the opinion in that case, we read: “It would indeed be a dangerous doctrine to hold that the declaration of a midwife, having the birth of an illegitimate child recorded, as to who was the father or mother of the child, is equivalent to an acknowledgment of the paternity or maternity on the part of the person named by the midwife.” Clearly, the plaintiff has failed to prove, on this

11930–1930

Where else courts name it

MI 24 (1894–2026) IL 20 (1896–2026) TX 11 (1897–2015) PA 11 (1932–1999) GA 8 (1892–1994) NY 8 (1836–1932) CA 7 (1890–2024) MO 7 (1884–1960) LA 6 (1930–2018) OK 6 (1923–1944) MS 5 (1940–2013) KS 5 (1893–2014) FL 4 (2008–2019) AZ 4 (1899–1935) DC 3 (1997–2025) SD 3 (1909–1922) AL 3 (1886–1977) MD 3 (1913–1993) WI 3 (1913–1925) OR 3 (1911–1961) IA 3 (1900–2004) ID 2 (1905–1921) NC 2 (1952–1966) WA 2 (1914–1998) HI 2 (1925–1954) UT 2 (1901–1967) ND 2 (1902–1956) NV 2 (1885–1968) VA 2 (1926–1941)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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