rational doctrine in Kentucky

1934In the Ashbrook Case, we said: “In Turpin v. Thompson, etc., 2 Metc. 420 , this court held, that the doctrine that a promissory note given causa mortis must either be payable to bearer or be assigned has been exploded, and that now *243 the delivery of such note passes the beneficial interest to the donee; and we regard this as the rational doctrine more accordant to principle and modern authority.” In the McCoy Case, after pointing ont that so much of the Ashbrook Case as held that a gift cansa mortis of an open account in bank could not be effected by the delivery of the passbook had been pr

1867Thompson, &c. ( 2 Met., 420 ), this court held, that the doctrine that a promissory note given causa mortis must either be payable to bearer or be assigned has been exploded, and that now the delivery of such note passes the beneficial interest to the donee; and we regard this as the rational doctrine more accordant to principle and modern authority.

2001Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473 (1999), a capital murder case which involved a waiver of a competency hearing, set out a rational standard of review regarding the failure of a trial judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing with respect to competency to stand trial.

2001Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473 (1999), a capital murder case which involved a waiver of a competency hearing, set out a rational standard of review regarding the failure of a trial judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing with respect to competency to stand trial.

1977This is a matter to be determined by the members of the Association, and it is beyond the power of this Court to impose its ideas of what the rules of the Association should be.” This holding was expressly approved by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Chabert v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, La., 323 So.2d 774 (1975).

1934In the Ashbrook Case, we said: “In Turpin v. Thompson, etc., 2 Metc. 420 , this court held, that the doctrine that a promissory note given causa mortis must either be payable to bearer or be assigned has been exploded, and that now *243 the delivery of such note passes the beneficial interest to the donee; and we regard this as the rational doctrine more accordant to principle and modern authority.” In the McCoy Case, after pointing ont that so much of the Ashbrook Case as held that a gift cansa mortis of an open account in bank could not be effected by the delivery of the passbook had been pr

1914But if he use other expressions which clearly indicate what his intention was, and show that he did not mean what the word imports, in its legal acceptation, that intention must prevail, notwithstanding he has used the same word in other parts of th© will.” The rule above laid down has been followed in many cases by this court, particularly in Johnson v. Jacob, 11 Bush, 646 , which construed the will of John I.