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16 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1854–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. RBgreen2 sentences2025Our goal, nonetheless, must always be fairness." State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 333-34 (2005); see also State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 155 (2014) (noting the principle that defendants are entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one). 2019The proper and rational standard is not perfection; as devised and administered by imperfect humans, no trial can ever be entirely free of even the smallest defect." State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 333-34 (2005). | 4 | 5 |
State v. Jahnell Weaver (069185)green2 sentences2025Our goal, nonetheless, must always be fairness." State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 333-34 (2005); see also State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 155 (2014) (noting the principle that defendants are entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one). 2024Our goal, nonetheless, must always be fairness." State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 333-34 (2005); see also State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 155 (2014) (noting a defendant is entitled to fair trial, not a perfect one). | 2 | 2 |
Lutwak v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024Our goal, nonetheless, must always be fairness.'" State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308 , 333- 34 (2005) (quoting Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)). 2021Our goal, nonetheless, must always be fairness. 'A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.'" State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 333-34 (2005) (quoting Lutwak v. U.S., 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)). | 2 | 2 |
cluster 602367green2 sentences2000"At a bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed-motive case will have to adduce circumstantial evidence `of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.'" Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F. 2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 865 , 114 S.Ct. 186 , 126 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F. 3d 586 (3d Cir.1995) (in banc ) (citation omitted). [ Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 1, 18-19 , 685 A. 2d 1329 (1996).] We are 2000“At a bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed-motive case will have to adduce circumstantial evidence ‘of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.’ ” Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865 , 114 S.Ct. 186 , 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir.1995) (in banc ) (citation omitted). [Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 1, 18-19 , 685 A.2d 1329 (1996).] We are sati | 1 | 1 |
Armbruster v. Unisys Corp.green1 sentence1996Accord Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir.1994): LI]n the Price Waterhouse framework in a case unaffected by the Civil Eights Act of 1991, the evidence the plaintiff produces is so revealing of discriminatory animus that it is not necessary to rely on any presumption from the prima facie case to shift the burden of production. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schmidgreen2 sentences1994This standard must take into account (1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property, generally, its "normal" use, (2) the extent and nature of the public's invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both the private and public use of the property. [ 84 N.J. at 563 , 423 A. 2d 615 .] Using a test essentially the same as Schmid, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established, in Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158 , 432 A. 2d 1382 (1981), "a limiting rationale for applying [the Pennsylvania] constit 1994This standard must take into account (1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property, generally, its “normal” use, (2) the extent and nature of the public’s invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both the private and public use of the property. [84 NJ. at 563, 423 A.2d 615 .] Using a test essentially the same as Schmid, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established, in Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158 , 432 A.2d 1382 (1981),. “a limiting rationale for applying [the Pennsylvania] constitutio | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
John D. Starceski, at No. 94-3208 v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, at No. 94-3182
green
2 sentences2024"In a mixed-motive case, 'direct evidence of discriminatory animus leads not only to a ready logical inference of bias, but A-2857-21 13 also to a rational presumption that the person expressing bias acted on it.'" Id. at 101 (quoting Starceski, 54 F.3d at 1097 ). 2019In a mixed-motives case, "direct evidence of discriminatory animus leads not only to a ready logical inference of bias, but also to a rational presumption that the person expressing bias acted on it." Id. at 101 (quoting Starceski v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 54 F.3d 1089 , 1096 n.4 (3d Cir.1995). | 5 | 1996–2024 |
Fleming v. Correctional Healthcare Solutions, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019In a mixed-motives case, "direct evidence of discriminatory animus leads not only to a ready logical inference of bias, but also to a rational presumption that the person expressing bias acted on it." Id. at 101 (quoting Starceski v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 54 F.3d 1089 , 1096 n.4 (3d Cir.1995). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Prihoda v. Husz
green
2 sentences2002Indeed, this Court in State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 280 , 571 A.2d 914 (1990), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996), applied the Lucas principle and vacated defendant’s death sentence following a guilty plea because there was no corroboration of defendant’s confession. 2002Indeed, this Court in State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 280 , 571 A. 2d 914 (1990), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996), applied the Lucas principle and vacated defendant's death sentence following a guilty plea because there was no corroboration of defendant's confession. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
DiFrisco v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2002Indeed, this Court in State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 280 , 571 A.2d 914 (1990), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996), applied the Lucas principle and vacated defendant’s death sentence following a guilty plea because there was no corroboration of defendant’s confession. 2002Indeed, this Court in State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 280 , 571 A. 2d 914 (1990), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996), applied the Lucas principle and vacated defendant's death sentence following a guilty plea because there was no corroboration of defendant's confession. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Sweeney v. United States
green
2 sentences2002Indeed, this Court in State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 280 , 571 A.2d 914 (1990), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996), applied the Lucas principle and vacated defendant’s death sentence following a guilty plea because there was no corroboration of defendant’s confession. 2002Indeed, this Court in State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 280 , 571 A. 2d 914 (1990), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996), applied the Lucas principle and vacated defendant's death sentence following a guilty plea because there was no corroboration of defendant's confession. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Di Frisco
green
2 sentences2002Indeed, this Court in State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 280 , 571 A. 2d 914 (1990), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996), applied the Lucas principle and vacated defendant's death sentence following a guilty plea because there was no corroboration of defendant's confession. 2002Indeed, this Court in State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 280 , 571 A. 2d 914 (1990), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129 , 116 S.Ct. 949 , 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996), applied the Lucas principle and vacated defendant's death sentence following a guilty plea because there was no corroboration of defendant's confession. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.
green
2 sentences2000“At a bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed-motive case will have to adduce circumstantial evidence ‘of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.’ ” Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865 , 114 S.Ct. 186 , 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir.1995) (in banc ) (citation omitted). [Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 1, 18-19 , 685 A.2d 1329 (1996).] We are sati 2000“At a bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed-motive case will have to adduce circumstantial evidence ‘of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.’ ” Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865 , 114 S.Ct. 186 , 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir.1995) (in banc ) (citation omitted). [Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 1, 18-19 , 685 A.2d 1329 (1996).] We are sati | 1 | 2000–2000 |
William J. Miller v. Cigna Corporation the Insurance Company of North America
green
2 sentences2000"At a bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed-motive case will have to adduce circumstantial evidence `of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.'" Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F. 2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 865 , 114 S.Ct. 186 , 126 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F. 3d 586 (3d Cir.1995) (in banc ) (citation omitted). [ Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 1, 18-19 , 685 A. 2d 1329 (1996).] We are 2000“At a bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed-motive case will have to adduce circumstantial evidence ‘of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.’ ” Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865 , 114 S.Ct. 186 , 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir.1995) (in banc ) (citation omitted). [Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 1, 18-19 , 685 A.2d 1329 (1996).] We are sati | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Mobile Home Village, Inc., T/a South Wind Village v. Mayor and Council of Township of Jackson, New Jersey
green
2 sentences2000"At a bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed-motive case will have to adduce circumstantial evidence `of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.'" Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F. 2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 865 , 114 S.Ct. 186 , 126 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F. 3d 586 (3d Cir.1995) (in banc ) (citation omitted). [ Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 1, 18-19 , 685 A. 2d 1329 (1996).] We are 2000“At a bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed-motive case will have to adduce circumstantial evidence ‘of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.’ ” Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865 , 114 S.Ct. 186 , 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir.1995) (in banc ) (citation omitted). [Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 1, 18-19 , 685 A.2d 1329 (1996).] We are sati | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Burgess v. Stern
green
2 sentences2000"At a bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed-motive case will have to adduce circumstantial evidence `of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.'" Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F. 2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 865 , 114 S.Ct. 186 , 126 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F. 3d 586 (3d Cir.1995) (in banc ) (citation omitted). [ Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 1, 18-19 , 685 A. 2d 1329 (1996).] We are 2000“At a bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed-motive case will have to adduce circumstantial evidence ‘of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.’ ” Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865 , 114 S.Ct. 186 , 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir.1995) (in banc ) (citation omitted). [Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 1, 18-19 , 685 A.2d 1329 (1996).] We are sati | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Summerton Live Stock Co. v. Cleveland Mfg. Co.
green
2 sentences2000"At a bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed-motive case will have to adduce circumstantial evidence `of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.'" Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F. 2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 865 , 114 S.Ct. 186 , 126 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F. 3d 586 (3d Cir.1995) (in banc ) (citation omitted). [ Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 1, 18-19 , 685 A. 2d 1329 (1996).] We are 2000“At a bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed-motive case will have to adduce circumstantial evidence ‘of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.’ ” Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865 , 114 S.Ct. 186 , 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir.1995) (in banc ) (citation omitted). [Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 1, 18-19 , 685 A.2d 1329 (1996).] We are sati | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Commonwealth v. Tate
green
2 sentences1994This standard must take into account (1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property, generally, its “normal” use, (2) the extent and nature of the public’s invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both the private and public use of the property. [84 NJ. at 563, 423 A.2d 615 .] Using a test essentially the same as Schmid, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established, in Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158 , 432 A.2d 1382 (1981),. “a limiting rationale for applying [the Pennsylvania] constitutio 1994This standard must take into account (1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property, generally, its “normal” use, (2) the extent and nature of the public’s invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both the private and public use of the property. [84 NJ. at 563, 423 A.2d 615 .] Using a test essentially the same as Schmid, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established, in Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158 , 432 A.2d 1382 (1981),. “a limiting rationale for applying [the Pennsylvania] constitutio | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.
green
2 sentences1983Weinberger, supra, 457 A. 2d at 713 . 1983Weinberger, supra, 457 A. 2d at 713 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Robert Wilson v. United States
green
1 sentence1969An interesting set of judicial reactions to the same problem is found in the recent case of Wilson v. United States, 129 U.S. App. D.C. 107 , 391 F. 2 d 460 (1968), where it appeared that a defendant tried and convicted for assault with a pistol and robbery suffered from permanent retrograde amnesia resulting from an automobile accident shortly after the alleged crimes. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
McFarland v. Dixie MacHinery & Equipment Co.
green
1 sentence1951These views, and the variety of results reached thereunder will be found in McFarland v. Dixie Machinery & Equipment Co., 348 Mo. 341 , 153 S.W. 2 d 67 ( Sup. Ct. 1941); Terminal Railroad Association of St. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Barnes v. Cole
neutral
1 sentence1854Reasonable care requires that in all cases the precautions should be proportionate to the probable danger of injury.” In the case of Barnes v. Cole and Fitzhugh, 21 Wend. 188 , the action was brought to recover damages for an injury done by a steamboat to a scow, which was moored at a dock in the village of Oswego. | 1 | 1854–1854 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.