15 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1881–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mark A. Wisehart v. Cecil Davisgreen2 sentences2007Most recently, the Seventh Circuit, too, has rejected that Remmer created a categorical presumption in Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Ripped from its context, the statement is difficult to take seriously, because it is so easy to imagine situations in which a 'private communication ... with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury' would not create a rational presumption of prejudice"). 2007Most recently, the Seventh Circuit, too, has rejected that Remmer created a categorical presumption in Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Ripped from its context, the statement is difficult to take seriously, because it is so easy to imagine situations in which a ‘private communication ... with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury’ would not create a rational presumption of prejudice”). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
The People v. Burson
green
2 sentences2000As this court has recognized, the need for inquiry into fitness at the time of trial stems from concerns that an incompetent defendant may be disabled from making a rational defense and may be incapable “of co-operating with his counsel to the end that any available defenses may be interposed.” Burson, 11 Ill. 2d at 369 . 2000As this court has recognized, the need for inquiry into fitness at the time of trial stems from concerns that an incompetent defendant may be disabled from making a rational defense and may be incapable "of co-operating with his counsel to the end that any available defenses may be interposed." Burson, 11 Ill.2d at 369 , 143 N.E.2d 239 . | 5 | 1962–2000 |
People v. Staake
green
2 sentences2018Illinois courts therefore apply the Williams rule "only when the subsequent charge filed by the State is 'new and additional.' " People v. Staake , 2016 IL App (4th) 140638 , ¶ 51, 413 Ill.Dec. 396 , 78 N.E.3d 388 , aff'd , 2017 IL 121755 , 421 Ill.Dec. 936 , 102 N.E.3d 217 . 2018Illinois courts therefore apply the Williams rule "only when the subsequent charge filed by the State is 'new and additional.' " People v. Staake , 2016 IL App (4th) 140638 , ¶ 51, 413 Ill.Dec. 396 , 78 N.E.3d 388 , aff'd , 2017 IL 121755 , 421 Ill.Dec. 936 , 102 N.E.3d 217 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Staake
green
2 sentences2018Illinois courts therefore apply the Williams rule "only when the subsequent charge filed by the State is 'new and additional.' " People v. Staake , 2016 IL App (4th) 140638 , ¶ 51, 413 Ill.Dec. 396 , 78 N.E.3d 388 , aff'd , 2017 IL 121755 , 421 Ill.Dec. 936 , 102 N.E.3d 217 . 2018Illinois courts therefore apply the Williams rule "only when the subsequent charge filed by the State is 'new and additional.' " People v. Staake , 2016 IL App (4th) 140638 , ¶ 51, 413 Ill.Dec. 396 , 78 N.E.3d 388 , aff'd , 2017 IL 121755 , 421 Ill.Dec. 936 , 102 N.E.3d 217 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Phipps
green
2 sentences2018The rational for the rule is to ensure defendant *896 *625 has "adequate notice of the subsequent charges to allow preparation of a defense." People v. Phipps , 238 Ill. 2d 54 , 67, 342 Ill.Dec. 893 , 933 N.E.2d 1186 (2010). 2018The rational for the rule is to ensure defendant *896 *625 has "adequate notice of the subsequent charges to allow preparation of a defense." People v. Phipps , 238 Ill. 2d 54 , 67, 342 Ill.Dec. 893 , 933 N.E.2d 1186 (2010). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Kelly v. People
neutral
1 sentence1992And number two, although he was seeing other women at this time, he had a violent and jealous temper, and when any other women that he was seeing were seeing other men, or if he believed they were seeing other men, he became extremely violent..And when these two problems intertwined, drinking and a jealous rage, he became a violent, violent man.” The well-recognized and rational principle that the prosecution may put on reputation evidence to prove the victim’s peaceful character if defendant has first attacked the victim’s character for peacefulness (Kelly v. People (1907), 229 Ill. 81 ) must | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Whitaker v. St. Joseph's Hospital
green
1 sentence1986Joseph’s Hospital (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), 415 N.E.2d 737, 746 .) We have found nothing in the Indiana statute which obligates a plaintiff to litigate a claim in court after the panel’s opinion is rendered. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno
green
2 sentences1983In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973), 413 U.S. 528 , 37 L. 1983In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973), 413 U.S. 528 , 37 L. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
The People v. Cleggett
green
1 sentence1962(People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360 ; People v. Cleggett, 22 Ill.2d 471 .) When the question of sanity at the time of trial is raised, the issue presented is whether defendant has the capacity to make a rational defense, sufficient mind to convey necessary information to his attorney or the court, the capability of understanding the nature of the charges against him and of co-operating with his counsel, and sufficient mind to conduct his defense in a rational and reasonable manner. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
People v. Lewis
neutral
1 sentence1957(People v. Lewis, 2 Ill.2d 328, 331 ; 44 C.J.S., sec. 124, page 282.) He should be capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against him, his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and have sufficient mind to conduct his defense in a rational and reasonable manner, although upon other subjects his mind may be unsound or deranged. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Dixon v. People
neutral
1 sentence1885The ordinary presumption of the continuance of human life should not, under the facts in this case, outweigh the presumption in favor of the innocence of their cohabitation, and that there was no legal impediment to their contracting the matrimonial relation.” In Dixon v. The People, 18 Mich. 84 , the prosecution, desiring to use a witness who claimed to be the wife of the defendant, produced evidence of her marriage to one Phillips in 1859. | 1 | 1885–1885 |
Beers v. Housatonuc Rail-road
green
1 sentence1883The court, in the same case, quotes from the case of Beers v. Railroad, 19 Conn. 566 : “The rational rule and the one as we think established by the best authorities in reference to the care incumbent on the plaintiff is, that it must be ordinary care, as it is termed, which, as stated by Lord Denman, C. | 1 | 1883–1883 |
Yates v. Houston
green
1 sentence1881The ordinary presumption in favor of the continuance of human life, should not under the facts of the case, outweigh the presumption of the innocence of their cohabitation and that there was no legal impediment to their marriage.” Yates v. Houston. 3 Texas, 433 . | 1 | 1881–1881 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.