rational defense in California

2013(Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162 , 171- 172.) To be competent, an accused must have the present ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or her, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing a rational defense.

1982(See Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162 [ 43 L.Ed. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 896 ]; In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 808 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 178 , 505 P.2d 1018 ]; People v. Tomas (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 75, 87-88 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 453 ].) “The sanity requirement is satisfied only if an accused person is able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or her, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing a rational defense. [Citations.] “When facts giving rise to a doubt regarding a defendant’s present sanity become known to a trial judge, due process requires that the court, on its own moti

2021(People v. 28 Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 234-235.) In this respect, the court agreed that when a defendant has already been found competent to stand trial, “‘a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency hearing unless it “is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence” casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding.’” (Id. at p. 234, quoting People Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153 .) Here, there were more than “minor changes” in petitioner’s mental state; there was substantial evidence as to her incompetence and inability

2021(People v. 28 Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 234-235.) In this respect, the court agreed that when a defendant has already been found competent to stand trial, “‘a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency hearing unless it “is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence” casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding.’” (Id. at p. 234, quoting People Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153 .) Here, there were more than “minor changes” in petitioner’s mental state; there was substantial evidence as to her incompetence and inability

2021(People v. 28 Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 234-235.) In this respect, the court agreed that when a defendant has already been found competent to stand trial, “‘a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency hearing unless it “is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence” casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding.’” (Id. at p. 234, quoting People Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153 .) Here, there were more than “minor changes” in petitioner’s mental state; there was substantial evidence as to her incompetence and inability

2021(People v. 28 Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 234-235.) In this respect, the court agreed that when a defendant has already been found competent to stand trial, “‘a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency hearing unless it “is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence” casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding.’” (Id. at p. 234, quoting People Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153 .) Here, there were more than “minor changes” in petitioner’s mental state; there was substantial evidence as to her incompetence and inability

2018(See People v. Lightsey , supra , 54 Cal.4th at p. 692 , 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 .) We acknowledge the reluctance of a court to suspend proceedings midtrial, but a court cannot blind itself to a defendant's changed mental health circumstances by refusing to hear from advisory counsel where the objectively observable evidence demonstrates the defendant is not capable of conducting a rational defense.

2018(See People v. Lightsey , supra , 54 Cal.4th at p. 692 , 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 .) We acknowledge the reluctance of a court to suspend proceedings midtrial, but a court cannot blind itself to a defendant's changed mental health circumstances by refusing to hear from advisory counsel where the objectively observable evidence demonstrates the defendant is not capable of conducting a rational defense.

2015In connection with those accomplice instructions, the trial court did instruct that “a purchaser of controlled substances during a sales transaction is not the accomplice of a person selling controlled substances during the sales transaction.” Defendant’s argument is supported by a line of federal cases in the Seventh Circuit, which holds that a “mere buyer-seller relationship is insufficient to establish membership in a conspiracy.” (See, e.g., United States v. Meyer (7th Cir. 1998) 157 F.3d 1067, 1074 ; United States v. Larkins (7th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 162, 167 ; U.S. v. Lechuga (7th Cir. 199

2015In connection with those accomplice instructions, the trial court did instruct that “a purchaser of controlled substances during a sales transaction is not the accomplice of a person selling controlled substances during the sales transaction.” Defendant’s argument is supported by a line of federal cases in the Seventh Circuit, which holds that a “mere buyer-seller relationship is insufficient to establish membership in a conspiracy.” (See, e.g., United States v. Meyer (7th Cir. 1998) 157 F.3d 1067, 1074 ; United States v. Larkins (7th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 162, 167 ; U.S. v. Lechuga (7th Cir. 199

2015In connection with those accomplice instructions, the trial court did instruct that “a purchaser of controlled substances during a sales transaction is not the accomplice of a person selling controlled substances during the sales transaction.” Defendant’s argument is supported by a line of federal cases in the Seventh Circuit, which holds that a “mere buyer-seller relationship is insufficient to establish membership in a conspiracy.” (See, e.g., United States v. Meyer (7th Cir. 1998) 157 F.3d 1067, 1074 ; United States v. Larkins (7th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 162, 167 ; U.S. v. Lechuga (7th Cir. 199

2015In connection with those accomplice instructions, the trial court did instruct that “a purchaser of controlled substances during a sales transaction is not the accomplice of a person selling controlled substances during the sales transaction.” Defendant’s argument is supported by a line of federal cases in the Seventh Circuit, which holds that a “mere buyer-seller relationship is insufficient to establish membership in a conspiracy.” (See, e.g., United States v. Meyer (7th Cir. 1998) 157 F.3d 1067, 1074 ; United States v. Larkins (7th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 162, 167 ; U.S. v. Lechuga (7th Cir. 199

2023(People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691 , 726–727.) And while Cardona’s behavior provided some basis for speculating about a possible mental disorder or developmental disability, speculation is an insufficient basis for requiring the 21 suspension of proceedings for a third time.

2022In Simon, we held that CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1 and 8.85 are “sufficient to address a defendant’s concerns about the proper use of victim impact evidence, and [are] consistent with his or her federal and state constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 143 .) In so holding, we rejected the argument that the trial court should have sua sponte instructed that penalty phase jury to limit its consideration of that victim impact evidence “to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, not an emotional response to

2020Indeed, it is precisely because a witness’s refusal to testify in front of the jury may, in certain circumstances, unduly prejudice a criminal defendant that our Supreme Court has “noted that ‘ “it is the better practice for the court to require the exercise of the privilege out of the presence of the jury.” ’ [Citations.]” (Smith, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 517 .) Because the record does not affirmatively disclose defense counsel had no rational tactical purpose for not objecting to the trial court’s procedure, we cannot reverse for ineffective assistance of counsel.

2015These witnesses are not permitted to offer any opinion as to what is the appropriate penalty in this case.’ (CALJIC No. 8.85.1 (Spring 2010 new) (Spring 2014 ed.) . . . .” (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 689, fn. 11 .) 61 Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 197 .) Defendants cite no persuasive reason to revisit these conclusions. b.

2014(See Mearns, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 501-502 [awarding the $13,575 difference between the sale of old residence and purchase of new residence where relocation was a reaction to criminal act].) Here, the trial court acted well within its broad discretion in ordering restitution as claimed by the victim.

2013(Ibid.) In reversing the judgment, the appellate court stated that when the trial court found appellant sane, there also was substantial evidence to support the contrary conclusion, and the factors which came to light at the beginning of and during trial “completely undermined the medical opinions upon which the present sanity finding was predicated.” (Melissakis, supra, 56 Cal.App.3d at p. 60 .) “[A] trial judge may not avoid his own responsibility to make proper inquiry regarding a defendant’s capacity to stand trial or to understand the nature of the sentencing procedure by relying solely u

2013It is this failure to perform an important judicial function, not what may have resulted from a second hearing, that mandates the reversal.” (Melissakis, supra, 56 Cal.App.3d at p. 62 .) In distinct contrast, in the case before us Dr. Rothberg’s report essentially reiterated what Dr. Plotkin had previously found.

2013(Dusky v. U.S. (1960) 362 U.S. 402 .) This constitutional principle is embodied in sections 1367 and 1368.

2011Further, you must not consider in any way what you may perceive to be the opinions of the victim’s survivors or any other persons in the community regarding the appropriate punishment to be imposed.” The first four sentences of this instruction were suggested by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Com. v. Means (2001) 565 Pa. 309 [ 773 A.2d 143, 158 ] [explaining that the suggested instruction “is not mandated”]); the last sentence is based on a New Jersey Supreme Court decision (State v. Koskovich (2001) 168 N.J. 448 [ 776 A.2d 144, 177 ]).

2011Finally, a victim-impact witness is precluded from expressing an opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference whatsoever by a witness's silence in that regard." However, we have previously considered similar claims regarding a substantially similar instruction, and have concluded that it need not, and should not be given. ( People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370 ; accord, People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 707-708 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 ]; People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 145, 198 ; People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1244

2011Finally, a victim-impact witness is precluded from expressing an opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference whatsoever by a witness's silence in that regard." However, we have previously considered similar claims regarding a substantially similar instruction, and have concluded that it need not, and should not be given. ( People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370 ; accord, People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 707-708 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 ]; People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 145, 198 ; People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1244

2011Finally, a victim-impact witness is precluded from expressing an opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference whatsoever by a witness's silence in that regard." However, we have previously considered similar claims regarding a substantially similar instruction, and have concluded that it need not, and should not be given. ( People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370 ; accord, People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 707-708 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 ]; People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 145, 198 ; People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1244

2011Further, you must not consider in any way what you may perceive to be the opinions of the victim’s survivors or any other persons in the community regarding the appropriate punishment to be imposed.” The first four sentences of this instruction were suggested by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Com. v. Means (2001) 565 Pa. 309 [ 773 A.2d 143, 158 ] [explaining that the suggested instruction “is not mandated”]); the last sentence is based on a New Jersey Supreme Court decision (State v. Koskovich (2001) 168 N.J. 448 [ 776 A.2d 144, 177 ]).

2011Further, you must not consider in any way what you may perceive to be the opinions of the victim’s survivors or any other persons in the community regarding the appropriate punishment to be imposed.” The first four sentences of this instruction were suggested by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Com. v. Means (2001) 565 Pa. 309 [ 773 A.2d 143, 158 ] [explaining that the suggested instruction “is not mandated”]); the last sentence is based on a New Jersey Supreme Court decision (State v. Koskovich (2001) 168 N.J. 448 [ 776 A.2d 144, 177 ]).

2011Further, you must not consider in any way what you may perceive to be the opinions of the victim’s survivors or any other persons in the community regarding the appropriate punishment to be imposed.” The first four sentences of this instruction were suggested by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Com. v. Means (2001) 565 Pa. 309 [ 773 A.2d 143, 158 ] [explaining that the suggested instruction “is not mandated”]); the last sentence is based on a New Jersey Supreme Court decision (State v. Koskovich (2001) 168 N.J. 448 [ 776 A.2d 144, 177 ]).

1991(See, e.g., People v. Flores, supra, 178 Cal.App. 3d 74, 80-81 .) Sergio next argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that he personally inflicted great bodily injury or death on the victims.

1991Such intent may be inferred or presumed. ‘“It is black-letter law that a party is presumed to intend to do that which he voluntarily or willfully does in fact do and also presumed to intend the natural, probable and usual consequences of his own acts.’ (People v. Johnson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 598, 610-611 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 69 ] . . . .) Thus, ‘“[w]here one assaults another violently with a deadly weapon and takes his life the presumption is that the assailant intended death or great bodily harm. [Citation.] And where . . . the assault was made in a manner that was reasonably certain to produce d

1991(California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 200, 211-212 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 840 , 599 P.2d 31 ].) Disposition The judgment is affirmed.

1991(California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 200, 211-212 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 840 , 599 P.2d 31 ].) Disposition The judgment is affirmed.