rational defense in Tennessee

1985In Cogburn v. State, our Supreme Court adopted the following rule: And the rule at common law is that an accused cannot be tried while insane, for the obvious reason that his insanity may render him incapable of making a rational defense, and at common law, if at any time while criminal proceedings are pending, the trial court, before or during the trial, either from observation or upon suggestion of counsel, has facts brought to its attention which raise a doubt of the then sanity of the accused, it should, before putting him upon trial or continuing his trial initiate an investigation of suc

1985In Cogburn v. State, our Supreme Court adopted the following rule: And the rule at common law is that an accused cannot be tried while insane, for the obvious reason that his insanity may render him incapable of making a rational defense, and at common law, if at any time while criminal proceedings are pending, the trial court, before or during the trial, either from observation or upon suggestion of counsel, has facts brought to its attention which raise a doubt of the then sanity of the accused, it should, before putting him upon trial or continuing his trial initiate an investigation of suc

1983The Supreme Court said: We prefer to meet the issue head-on and align ourselves with those jurisdictions that recognize that the home buying public has a legitimate expectation that the workmanship and materials used by the builder-vendor in the construction of a dwelling will meet the standard of the trade for homes in comparable locations and price range and that such a warranty is implicit in the contract and survives the passing of title to the real estate and the taking of possession, as an exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor. (citing authorities) The rational for such an exception

1982The rational for such an exception is well stated in Pollard v. Saxe and Yolles Development Co., supra 115 Cal.Rptr. 651 , 525 P.2d at 91 .

2024However, “the trial court’s consideration must be limited to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the defendant” and not represent “an emotional response to the evidence.” Id. at 583-84 (citing State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 892 (Tenn. 1998)).

2024Thus, the court acted within its discretion to allow E.C. to be heard on the larger course of events, as her statement was arguably relevant to “a rational inquiry into the culpability of the defendant.” Ring, 56 S.W.3d at 583 .

2015Id. 1988 WL 72409 , at *2-3 (emphasis added).

1985In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 , 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that the attempted suicide by the defendant after the start of the trial was of sufficient significance to require an investigation into the competency of the accused to stand trial, in order to assure that the defendant was sufficiently competent to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to advise with counsel.

1985In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 , 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that the attempted suicide by the defendant after the start of the trial was of sufficient significance to require an investigation into the competency of the accused to stand trial, in order to assure that the defendant was sufficiently competent to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to advise with counsel.