rational rule in New York

1914Stuyvesant v. Weil, supra, has cleared the way and made it possible to apply a rational rule to this case, which will prevent a fraud from being successful, and do justice to the plaintiff.

1912Stuyvesant v. Weil, supra,, has cleared the way and made it possible to apply a rational rule to this case which will prevent a fraud from being successful and do justice to the plaintiff.

2023Even though this defense ultimately proved unsuccessful, given the nature of the defense relying solely on defendant's credibility and that defendant's prior conviction was recent and probative of defendant's credibility and honesty, defense counsel also had little or no chance of being successful in a Sandoval application precluding the introduction of the prior conviction ( see People v Warrington , 146 AD3d 1233, 1238-1239 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1038 [2017]; see also People v Stultz , 2 NY3d at 287 ; People v Thiel , 134 AD3d at 1240 ).

2023Even though this defense ultimately proved unsuccessful, given the nature of the defense relying solely on defendant's credibility and that defendant's prior conviction was recent and probative of defendant's credibility and honesty, defense counsel also had little or no chance of being successful in a Sandoval application precluding the introduction of the prior conviction ( see People v Warrington , 146 AD3d 1233, 1238-1239 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1038 [2017]; see also People v Stultz , 2 NY3d at 287 ; People v Thiel , 134 AD3d at 1240 ).

2009Moreover, the Village contended that it assessed all properties within the relevant Franklin Avenue commercial district without regard to proximity to Field 10 on the rational presumption that increased parking in one parking field will alleviate the demands on all other parking fields in the district (see Matter of Palmer v Town of Kirkwood, 288 AD2d 540 [2001]; Sheldon v Town of Highlands, 153 AD2d 733, 737 [1989]; Matter of Scarsdale Chateaux RTN v Steyer, 53 AD2d 672 , 673 [1976], affd 41 NY2d 1043 [1977]).

2009Moreover, the Village contended that it assessed all properties within the relevant Franklin Avenue commercial district without regard to proximity to Field 10 on the rational presumption that increased parking in one parking field will alleviate the demands on all other parking fields in the district (see Matter of Palmer v Town of Kirkwood, 288 AD2d 540 [2001]; Sheldon v Town of Highlands, 153 AD2d 733, 737 [1989]; Matter of Scarsdale Chateaux RTN v Steyer, 53 AD2d 672 , 673 [1976], affd 41 NY2d 1043 [1977]).

1992Under the circumstances, we conclude that trial counsel’s representation of defendant, viewed in its entirety, was meaningful (see, People v Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796, 798-799 ; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 ).

1992Under the circumstances, we conclude that trial counsel’s representation of defendant, viewed in its entirety, was meaningful (see, People v Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796, 798-799 ; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 ).

1983Securities Corp., 263 NY 245 ; Joseph v Schatzkin, 259 NY 241 ; International Text Book Co. v Connelly, 206 NY 188 ; Rice v Butler, 160 NY 578 ; Sparman v Keim, 83 NY 245 ; Green v Green, 69 NY 553 ) and the statute in question does not in any manner abrogate this salutary right.

1983Securities Corp., 263 NY 245 ; Joseph v Schatzkin, 259 NY 241 ; International Text Book Co. v Connelly, 206 NY 188 ; Rice v Butler, 160 NY 578 ; Sparman v Keim, 83 NY 245 ; Green v Green, 69 NY 553 ) and the statute in question does not in any manner abrogate this salutary right.

1983Securities Corp., 263 NY 245 ; Joseph v Schatzkin, 259 NY 241 ; International Text Book Co. v Connelly, 206 NY 188 ; Rice v Butler, 160 NY 578 ; Sparman v Keim, 83 NY 245 ; Green v Green, 69 NY 553 ) and the statute in question does not in any manner abrogate this salutary right.

1983Securities Corp., 263 NY 245 ; Joseph v Schatzkin, 259 NY 241 ; International Text Book Co. v Connelly, 206 NY 188 ; Rice v Butler, 160 NY 578 ; Sparman v Keim, 83 NY 245 ; Green v Green, 69 NY 553 ) and the statute in question does not in any manner abrogate this salutary right.

1983Securities Corp., 263 NY 245 ; Joseph v Schatzkin, 259 NY 241 ; International Text Book Co. v Connelly, 206 NY 188 ; Rice v Butler, 160 NY 578 ; Sparman v Keim, 83 NY 245 ; Green v Green, 69 NY 553 ) and the statute in question does not in any manner abrogate this salutary right.

1983Securities Corp., 263 NY 245 ; Joseph v Schatzkin, 259 NY 241 ; International Text Book Co. v Connelly, 206 NY 188 ; Rice v Butler, 160 NY 578 ; Sparman v Keim, 83 NY 245 ; Green v Green, 69 NY 553 ) and the statute in question does not in any manner abrogate this salutary right.

1979(People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863, 865 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222, 226-227 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 , 615, cert den 434 US 864 ; People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 483 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327, 331-332 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ,. 245.) Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this rational rule of law is hardly inconsistent with the principle that "[o]nce an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel” (People v Arthur

1979(People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863, 865 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222, 226-227 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 , 615, cert den 434 US 864 ; People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 483 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327, 331-332 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ,. 245.) Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this rational rule of law is hardly inconsistent with the principle that "[o]nce an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel” (People v Arthur

1979(People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863, 865 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222, 226-227 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 , 615, cert den 434 US 864 ; People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 483 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327, 331-332 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ,. 245.) Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this rational rule of law is hardly inconsistent with the principle that "[o]nce an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel” (People v Arthur

1979That no inconsistencies were ever perceived or, indeed, anticipated by this court from the application of these two distinct concepts is apparent from the plain language of Hobson itself, where this court, in unanimously reaffirming the rule of the Arthur case (supra) observed: "[T]he fact that a defendant is represented by counsel in a proceeding unrelated to the charges under investigation is not sufficient to invoke the [Arthur] rule (see People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242, 245 , supra; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327, 331-332 ).” (People v Hobson, 39 NY2d, at p 483 , supra.) Thus, the majorit

1979(People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863, 865 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222, 226-227 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 , 615, cert den 434 US 864 ; People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 483 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327, 331-332 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ,. 245.) Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this rational rule of law is hardly inconsistent with the principle that "[o]nce an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel” (People v Arthur

1979That no inconsistencies were ever perceived or, indeed, anticipated by this court from the application of these two distinct concepts is apparent from the plain language of Hobson itself, where this court, in unanimously reaffirming the rule of the Arthur case (supra) observed: "[T]he fact that a defendant is represented by counsel in a proceeding unrelated to the charges under investigation is not sufficient to invoke the [Arthur] rule (see People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242, 245 , supra; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327, 331-332 ).” (People v Hobson, 39 NY2d, at p 483 , supra.) Thus, the majorit

1979(People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863, 865 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222, 226-227 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 , 615, cert den 434 US 864 ; People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 483 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327, 331-332 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ,. 245.) Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this rational rule of law is hardly inconsistent with the principle that "[o]nce an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel” (People v Arthur

1979(People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863, 865 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222, 226-227 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 , 615, cert den 434 US 864 ; People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 483 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327, 331-332 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ,. 245.) Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this rational rule of law is hardly inconsistent with the principle that "[o]nce an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel” (People v Arthur

1979(People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863, 865 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222, 226-227 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 , 615, cert den 434 US 864 ; People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 483 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327, 331-332 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ,. 245.) Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this rational rule of law is hardly inconsistent with the principle that "[o]nce an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel” (People v Arthur

1979(People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863, 865 ; People v Coleman, 43 NY2d 222, 226-227 ; People v Clark, 41 NY2d 612 , 615, cert den 434 US 864 ; People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 483 ; People v Taylor, 27 NY2d 327, 331-332 ; People v Hetherington, 27 NY2d 242 ,. 245.) Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this rational rule of law is hardly inconsistent with the principle that "[o]nce an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel” (People v Arthur

1975Because such a subjective test has obvious weaknesses in trying to apply a rational analysis, although often used by such of the courts which have applied or discussed the cruel and unusual punishments clause, there will be no discussion of it (see, e.g., Wilkinson v Skinner, 34 NY2d 53, 59-60 ; Matter of Lynch, 8 Cal 3d 410, 424, supra; but cf., e.g., Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, 34 NY2d 222 , 233-235; Rochin v California, 342 US 165, 175-176 [Black, J., concurring]).

1974This defendant (we repeat) is able to comprehend his position as one accused of murder, is fully capable of understanding the gravity of the criminal proceedings against him, and is as able to cooperate with his counsel in making a rational defense as is any defendant who alleges that at the time of the crime he was insane or very intoxicated or completely drugged, or a defendant whose mind allegedly went blank or who blacked out or who panicked and contends or testifies that he does not remember anything.” ( 421 Pa., at p. 406 , cited in McClendon, 103 Ariz., at p. 108 ).

1974This defendant (we repeat) is able to comprehend his position as one accused of murder, is fully capable of understanding the gravity of the criminal proceedings against him, and is as able to cooperate with his counsel in making a rational defense as is any defendant who alleges that at the time of the crime he was insane or very intoxicated or completely drugged, or a defendant whose mind allegedly went blank or who blacked out or who panicked and contends or testifies that he does not remember anything.” ( 421 Pa., at p. 406 , cited in McClendon, 103 Ariz., at p. 108 ).