rational defense in Texas

2018The court of criminal appeals has stated that “... it is difficult to see how one accused of a crime may not have sufficient intelligence or mental ability to understand the content of his confession and yet be competent to stand trial, understand the nature of the charge against him and to assist his counsel in preparing a rational defense.” Casias, 452 S.W.2d at 489 .

2002App. 1979), the court of criminal appeals stated that ". . . it is difficult to see how one accused of a crime may not have sufficient intelligence or mental ability to understand the content his confession and yet be competent to stand trial, understand the nature of the charge against him and to assist his counsel in preparing a rational defense." Id . at 860, quoting Casias , 452 S.W.2d at 489 .

1966“No person who becomes insane after he committed an offense shall be tried for the same while in such condition,” was a part of the Penal Code in 1874 when the Supreme Court of Texas, in Guagando v. State, 41 Tex. 626 , held that it gave the defendant the right to have his mental competency to make a rational defense determined before proceeding with the trial for the offense charged, and that a trial of insanity after conviction cannot relate back and supply the omission.

1962In the early case of Guagando v. State, 41 Texas 626 , it was held that the question to be determined at a preliminary insanity hearing is whether the accused is mentally competent to make a rational defense.

1982Such testimony showed Grayson had an intelligence quotient (IQ) of 51 and was classified as a low grade moron. “ In Casias v. State, 452 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Cr.App.1970), this court said: “ ‘ “As in Grayson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 438 S.W.2d 553 , it is difficult to see how one accused of a crime may not have sufficient intelligence or mental ability to understand the content of his confession and yet be competent to stand trial, understand the nature of the charge against him and to assist his counsel in preparing a rational defense.” ’ “We find the evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s

1979“In Casias v. State, 452 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Cr.App.1970), this court said: “ ‘As in Grayson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 438 S.W.2d 553 , it is difficult to see how one accused of a crime may not have sufficient intelligence or mental ability to understand the content of his confession and yet be competent to stand trial, understand the nature of the charge against him and to assist his counsel in preparing a rational defense.’ ” We find the evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that appellant had the mental capacity to understand the warnings and to affirmatively waive his rights.

2010Cummins v. Price , 421 Pa. 396, 406 , 218 A.2d 758, 763 (1966) saying that an amnesia defendant "is as able to cooperate with his counsel in making a rational defense as is any defendant who alleges that at the time of the crime he was insane or very intoxicated or completely drugged, or a defendant whose mind allegedly went blank or blacked out or who panicked and contends or testifies that he does not remember anything"); Morrow v. State , 293 Md. 247, 254 , 443 A.2d 108, 112 (1982) ("the practical effect of amnesia is the same as being alone in bed at the time of the crime . . . or memory l

2010Cummins v. Price , 421 Pa. 396, 406 , 218 A.2d 758, 763 (1966) saying that an amnesia defendant "is as able to cooperate with his counsel in making a rational defense as is any defendant who alleges that at the time of the crime he was insane or very intoxicated or completely drugged, or a defendant whose mind allegedly went blank or blacked out or who panicked and contends or testifies that he does not remember anything"); Morrow v. State , 293 Md. 247, 254 , 443 A.2d 108, 112 (1982) ("the practical effect of amnesia is the same as being alone in bed at the time of the crime . . . or memory l

1970All agree that the able and conscientious trial judge, now deceased, in ordering both sides “under the pain of contempt” not to go into the details of the alleged offense, was seeking to protect the rights of appellant as well as the state, and to follow the decision of this court in Townsend v. State, supra, and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pate v. Robinson, supra. The state submits that the trial court correctly followed the procedure outlined in Townsend v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 427 S.W. 2d 55, 62 , quoted in the state’s brief, wherein we said: “In view of the foregoing, we hold that where

1970All agree that the able and conscientious trial judge, now deceased, in ordering both sides “under the pain of contempt” not to go into the details of the alleged offense, was seeking to protect the rights of appellant as well as the state, and to follow the decision of this court in Townsend v. State, supra, and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pate v. Robinson, supra. The state submits that the trial court correctly followed the procedure outlined in Townsend v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 427 S.W. 2d 55, 62 , quoted in the state’s brief, wherein we said: “In view of the foregoing, we hold that where

2023See, e.g., Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 729 (Tex. 2003); Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 801–07; Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497 , 499–500 (Tex. 1995).10 D.

2023See, e.g., Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 729 (Tex. 2003); Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 801–07; Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497 , 499–500 (Tex. 1995).10 D.

1986Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 410-11 , 63 S.Ct. 291, 293 , 87 L.Ed. 363 (1943); Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d 1365, 1376 (5th Cir.1983).

1986Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 410-11 , 63 S.Ct. 291, 293 , 87 L.Ed. 363 (1943); Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d 1365, 1376 (5th Cir.1983).

1983More specifically, he argues “that the deliberateness inquiry of special issue number 1 must logically focus on something other than ... whether the killing was intentional, which question was answered by the jury prior to the punishment phase,” and assails, among others, this Court’s opinion in King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), as having “failed to properly distinguish between the requirement of an intentional killing at the guilt-innocence phase and the deliberateness inquiry of special issue number 1.” This attack on King is misplaced.

1983More specifically, he argues "that the deliberateness inquiry of special issue number 1 must logically focus on something other than ... whether the killing was intentional, which question was answered by the jury prior to the punishment phase," and assails, among others, this Court's opinion in King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), as having "failed to properly distinguish between the requirement of an intentional killing at the guilt-innocence phase and the deliberateness inquiry of special issue number 1." This attack on King is misplaced.

1978Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 , 80 S.Ct. 788 , 4 L.Ed.2d *766 824 (1960); Ex parte Hagans, supra, and cases there cited.

1978Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 , 80 S.Ct. 788 , 4 L.Ed.2d *766 824 (1960); Ex parte Hagans, supra, and cases there cited.

1978Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 , 80 S.Ct. 788 , 4 L.Ed.2d *766 824 (1960); Ex parte Hagans, supra, and cases there cited.

1977We pass only on the right to appeal directly from a finding that he was mentally competent to conduct a rational defense.” In Hardin v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 283 , 248 S.W.2d 487 , this Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review a direct appeal from a finding of insanity at a preliminary hearing because the accused had not been found guilty of anything and no punishment had been assessed, and therefore the case was not a “criminal case” within the meaning of Art. 5, Sec. 5, of the Texas Constitution, which defines the jurisdiction of this Court.

1977We pass only on the right to appeal directly from a finding that he was mentally competent to conduct a rational defense.” In Hardin v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 283 , 248 S.W.2d 487 , this Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review a direct appeal from a finding of insanity at a preliminary hearing because the accused had not been found guilty of anything and no punishment had been assessed, and therefore the case was not a “criminal case” within the meaning of Art. 5, Sec. 5, of the Texas Constitution, which defines the jurisdiction of this Court.

1977This Court, for the first time, passed on the issue of whether the competency hearing could be reviewed, if brought up on appeal with the trial on its merits, in Pena v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 406 , 320 S.W.2d 355 .

1977This Court, for the first time, passed on the issue of whether the competency hearing could be reviewed, if brought up on appeal with the trial on its merits, in Pena v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 406 , 320 S.W.2d 355 .

1974Price v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 496 S.W.2d 103 ; Zapata v. State, Tex.Cr.

1973NOTES [1] In Taylor v. State, 489 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Cr.App.1973) and Jackson v. State, 491 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), this Court has, in footnotes to the opinions, urged trial judges, even in the absence of a request to do so, have the court reporter record all the proceedings unless the same is waived. [1] This same writer was spokesman for the Court in Vines v. State, supra. I recognize the error in that decision and would now have this Court adopt the more rational rule, as urged in this dissent. [1] Cf. Parker v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 397 S. W.2d 853 ; Hartgraves v. State, Tex.Cr.

1973App., 374 S.W.2d 888 ; Pierson v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 15 , 177 S.W.2d 975 ; Navarro v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 196 , 147 S.W.2d 1081 . [2] Cf. Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P.; Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 489 S.W.2d 890 ; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 833 ; Woods v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 952 . [3] Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 363 S.W. 2d 477 . [4] The majority's assertion that Moore was "clearly distinguished" in Morris is a distinction without a difference.

1973App., 374 S.W.2d 888 ; Pierson v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 15 , 177 S.W.2d 975 ; Navarro v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 196 , 147 S.W.2d 1081 . [2] Cf. Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P.; Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 489 S.W.2d 890 ; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 833 ; Woods v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 952 . [3] Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 363 S.W. 2d 477 . [4] The majority's assertion that Moore was "clearly distinguished" in Morris is a distinction without a difference.

1973App., 374 S.W.2d 888 ; Pierson v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 15 , 177 S.W.2d 975 ; Navarro v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 196 , 147 S.W.2d 1081 . [2] Cf. Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P.; Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 489 S.W.2d 890 ; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 833 ; Woods v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 952 . [3] Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 363 S.W. 2d 477 . [4] The majority's assertion that Moore was "clearly distinguished" in Morris is a distinction without a difference.

1973NOTES [1] In Taylor v. State, 489 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Cr.App.1973) and Jackson v. State, 491 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), this Court has, in footnotes to the opinions, urged trial judges, even in the absence of a request to do so, have the court reporter record all the proceedings unless the same is waived. [1] This same writer was spokesman for the Court in Vines v. State, supra. I recognize the error in that decision and would now have this Court adopt the more rational rule, as urged in this dissent. [1] Cf. Parker v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 397 S. W.2d 853 ; Hartgraves v. State, Tex.Cr.

1973App., 374 S.W.2d 888 ; Pierson v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 15 , 177 S.W.2d 975 ; Navarro v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 196 , 147 S.W.2d 1081 . [2] Cf. Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P.; Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 489 S.W.2d 890 ; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 833 ; Woods v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 952 . [3] Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 363 S.W. 2d 477 . [4] The majority's assertion that Moore was "clearly distinguished" in Morris is a distinction without a difference.

1973App., 374 S.W.2d 888 ; Pierson v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 15 , 177 S.W.2d 975 ; Navarro v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 196 , 147 S.W.2d 1081 . [2] Cf. Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P.; Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 489 S.W.2d 890 ; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 833 ; Woods v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 952 . [3] Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 363 S.W. 2d 477 . [4] The majority's assertion that Moore was "clearly distinguished" in Morris is a distinction without a difference.

1973App., 374 S.W.2d 888 ; Pierson v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 15 , 177 S.W.2d 975 ; Navarro v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 196 , 147 S.W.2d 1081 . [2] Cf. Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P.; Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 489 S.W.2d 890 ; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 833 ; Woods v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 952 . [3] Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 363 S.W. 2d 477 . [4] The majority's assertion that Moore was "clearly distinguished" in Morris is a distinction without a difference.

1973App., 374 S.W.2d 888 ; Pierson v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 15 , 177 S.W.2d 975 ; Navarro v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 196 , 147 S.W.2d 1081 . [2] Cf. Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P.; Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 489 S.W.2d 890 ; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 833 ; Woods v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 952 . [3] Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 363 S.W. 2d 477 . [4] The majority's assertion that Moore was "clearly distinguished" in Morris is a distinction without a difference.

1973App., 374 S.W.2d 888 ; Pierson v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 15 , 177 S.W.2d 975 ; Navarro v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 196 , 147 S.W.2d 1081 . [2] Cf. Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P.; Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 489 S.W.2d 890 ; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 833 ; Woods v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 952 . [3] Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 363 S.W. 2d 477 . [4] The majority's assertion that Moore was "clearly distinguished" in Morris is a distinction without a difference.

1973App., 374 S.W.2d 888 ; Pierson v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 15 , 177 S.W.2d 975 ; Navarro v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 196 , 147 S.W.2d 1081 . [2] Cf. Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P.; Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 489 S.W.2d 890 ; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 833 ; Woods v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 952 . [3] Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 363 S.W. 2d 477 . [4] The majority's assertion that Moore was "clearly distinguished" in Morris is a distinction without a difference.