corroboration requirement in District of Columbia

1993See, e.g., State v. Hill, supra, 578 A.2d at 377-78, 380 . [10] See State v. Banes, 47 N.J. 331 , 221 A.2d 1, 5 (1966) (citing 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra ), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 461 , 87 S.Ct. 2120 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1967); State v. Thomas, 52 Wash.2d 255 , 324 P.2d 821, 822-23 (1958) (corroboration not required, complaint of rape to authorities "admissible, as bearing upon [the complainant's] credibility"); Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288, 294 (Fla.1953) (en banc) (no mention of a corroboration requirement, admissible to rebut "any inference of consent that might have been drawn from silence")

1993See, e.g., State v. Hill, supra, 578 A.2d at 377-78, 380 . [10] See State v. Banes, 47 N.J. 331 , 221 A.2d 1, 5 (1966) (citing 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra ), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 461 , 87 S.Ct. 2120 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1967); State v. Thomas, 52 Wash.2d 255 , 324 P.2d 821, 822-23 (1958) (corroboration not required, complaint of rape to authorities "admissible, as bearing upon [the complainant's] credibility"); Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288, 294 (Fla.1953) (en banc) (no mention of a corroboration requirement, admissible to rebut "any inference of consent that might have been drawn from silence")

2017We have since abolished the corroboration requirement for sexual offenses, Gary v. United States, 499 A.2d 815, 833-34 (D.C. 1985) (en banc), so it is fair to question whether a new trial would have been ordered under current law.

2017We have since abolished the corroboration requirement for sexual offenses, Gary v. United States, 499 A.2d 815, 833-34 (D.C. 1985). (en banc), so it is fair to question whether a new trial would have been ordered under current law.

2014Don’t show up to court.” Mr. Thompkins first contends, in essence, that the government failed to satisfy the corroboration requirement of Op-per v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 92, 93 , 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954) (“[A]dmis-sions of incriminating facts ... call for corroboration”; “it is necessary, therefore, *424 to require the Government to introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement,” but “[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their trut

2014Don’t show up to court.” Mr. Thompkins first contends, in essence, that the government failed to satisfy the corroboration requirement of Op-per v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 92, 93 , 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954) (“[A]dmis-sions of incriminating facts ... call for corroboration”; “it is necessary, therefore, *424 to require the Government to introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement,” but “[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their trut

2012Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 213 (D.C.1993).

2012Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 213 (D.C.1993).

1982The corroboration rule has always been a flexible one, and “the particular quantum of proof required will necessarily vary from case to case depending upon, for example, the age and impressionability of the prose-cutrix and the presence or absence of any apparent motive to falsify or exaggerate.” United States v. Gray, supra at 276, 477 F.2d at 445, quoted in Robinson, supra at 416 ; see also Wallace v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 120, 121 (1976) (level of corroboration required varies with sex and age of complainant and existence of previous relationship with defendant).

1982App., 362 A.2d 120, 121 (1976) (level of corroboration required varies with sex and age of complainant and existence of previous relationship with defendant).

2007In a second case decided the same day, the Court explained that “corroborative evidence does not have to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance, as long as there is substantial independent evidence that the offense has been committed, and the evidence as a whole proves beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty.” Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954). 11 In our jurisdiction, we have adhered to the corroboration requirement enunciated in Opper.

2007In a second case decided the same day, the Court explained that “corroborative evidence does not have to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance, as long as there is substantial independent evidence that the offense has been committed, and the evidence as a whole proves beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty.” Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954). 11 In our jurisdiction, we have adhered to the corroboration requirement enunciated in Opper.

1985Much of the history and the pros and cons of the court created rule regarding corroboration was laid out in the majority and dissenting opinions in Fitzgerald, supra. Since the reasons for this court’s holding in Arnold v. United States, supra, where we abolished the requirement for corroboration when a mature female is involved, are equally applicable to all sex offenses, regardless of the sex or age of the victim or perpetrator, we now abolish the requirement entirely. 21 The constitutional protections provided the defendant are adequate in a sex case and the corroboration requirement no lon

1985Under Fitzgerald, supra, 443 A.2d at 1299 , a sexual offense charge involving a non-mature minor “must be submitted to the jury with specific instructions requiring a finding of independent evidence corroborative of the victim’s testimony as a condition precedent to a guilty verdict.” Hence, the failure of the trial counsel to request or of the trial court, sua sponte, to give the corroboration instruction constituted error. 21 Id. at 1302 ; Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709-10 (D.C.1976) (en banc).

2007See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 502 A.2d 1011, 1022-28 (D.C.1986); see also D.C.Super.

2007See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 267 , 270, 422 F.2d 704, 707 (1970) (rationale for corroboration of sex offenses); Adams, supra, 502 A.2d at 1022 (rationale for corroboration of confessions).

2007See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 267 , 270, 422 F.2d 704, 707 (1970) (rationale for corroboration of sex offenses); Adams, supra, 502 A.2d at 1022 (rationale for corroboration of confessions).

1982See Wallace v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 120, 121 (1976); Arnold v. United States, supra at 342; United States v. Terry, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 267 , 268, 422 F.2d 704, 705 (1970); Kidwell v. United States, 38 App.D.C. 566, 573 (1912).

1992See, e.g., Kidwell v. United States, 38 App.D.C. 566, 573 (1912) (the earliest sex offense case we have been able to find which discusses the corroboration requirement in this jurisdiction).

1992See, e.g., Kidwell v. United States, 38 App.D.C. 566, 573 (1912) (the earliest sex offense case we have been able to find which discusses the corroboration requirement in this jurisdiction).

1982In this jurisdiction, from at least 1902 to 1976, corroboration of the complainant’s testimony was an indispensable prerequisite to conviction in prosecutions for rape and related sex crimes. 6 The corroboration requirement was judicially imposed as a safeguard for the defendant because of the belief that in so-called “sex cases,” “all too frequently [the] complainants [had] an urge to fantasize or even a motive to fabricate,” Coltrane v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 295 , 299, 418 F.2d 1131, 1135 (1969), and they, thus, brought forth “baseless allegations” which were nevertheless difficult

1976We know from the lessons of the past that all too frequently such complainants have an urge to fantacize [ sic ] or even a motive to fabricate, while typically the innocent, as well as the guilty, have only their own testimony upon which to rely.... [ Coltrane v. United States, supra 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 298-99, 418 F.2d at 1134-35 (footnotes omitted).] *418 I view this cause thus and would not apply the corroboration rule to it in such an elastic fashion as to allow these pervasive inconsistencies of near infants to permit conviction.

1982Thus, "[t]he purpose of admitting fresh complaint testimony is ... in a sense, to meet in advance a charge of recent fabrication [which is implicit in the corroboration requirement]. ..." State v. Tirone, 64 N.J. 222, 227 , 314 A.2d 601, 604 (1974).

1982Thus, "[t]he purpose of admitting fresh complaint testimony is ... in a sense, to meet in advance a charge of recent fabrication [which is implicit in the corroboration requirement]. ..." State v. Tirone, 64 N.J. 222, 227 , 314 A.2d 601, 604 (1974).

1980It has been stated that a flexible rule is “responsive to the underlying rationale of the corroboration requirement — the avoidance of baseless accusations — and it is far more consonant with the realities of the trial situation than a rule which would compel the Government to prove virtually its entire case twice: once by the victim’s testimony and again by independent evidence.” United States v. Gray, supra 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 277, 477 F.2d at 445 .

1980It has been stated that a flexible rule is “responsive to the underlying rationale of the corroboration requirement — the avoidance of baseless accusations — and it is far more consonant with the realities of the trial situation than a rule which would compel the Government to prove virtually its entire case twice: once by the victim’s testimony and again by independent evidence.” United States v. Gray, supra 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 277, 477 F.2d at 445 .

1979See In re J.W.Y., D.C.App., 363 A.2d 674, 677 (1976); Arnold v. United States, D.C.App., 358 A.2d 335, 342-44 (1976) (en banc).

1979See In re J.W.Y., D.C.App., 363 A.2d 674, 677 (1976); Arnold v. United States, D.C.

1976The corroboration requirement in sex crimes is therefore “an essential ingredient of the case.” United States v. Bryant, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 124, 129 , 420 F.2d 1327, 1332 (1969).

1976The corroboration requirement in sex crimes is therefore “an essential ingredient of the case.” United States v. Bryant, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 124, 129 , 420 F.2d 1327, 1332 (1969).

1985Under Fitzgerald, supra, 443 A.2d at 1299 , a sexual offense charge involving a non-mature minor “must be submitted to the jury with specific instructions requiring a finding of independent evidence corroborative of the victim’s testimony as a condition precedent to a guilty verdict.” Hence, the failure of the trial counsel to request or of the trial court, sua sponte, to give the corroboration instruction constituted error. 21 Id. at 1302 ; Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709-10 (D.C.1976) (en banc).

1982We are unable to say here, however, that the absence of a corroboration instruction was not "so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial." Watts, supra at 709 .

2014Don’t show up to court.” Mr. Thompkins first contends, in essence, that the government failed to satisfy the corroboration requirement of Op-per v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 92, 93 , 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954) (“[A]dmis-sions of incriminating facts ... call for corroboration”; “it is necessary, therefore, *424 to require the Government to introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement,” but “[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their trut

2013Id. at 652 ; see also Smith, 348 U.S. at 155-56 , 75 S.Ct. 194 (holding that the “unreliability” of the defendant’s statement made it “one which should be carefully scrutinized in the light of the available independent evidence”); United States v. Gresham, 585 F.2d 103, 106 (5th Cir.1978) (noting that the detailed nature of the defendant’s admissions “inspire[s] a degree of confidence in their verity”).

2013See Naples, supra; see also Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190, 197 (D.C.1979) (en banc) (noting that the corroboration rule “strike[s] a balance between the need for such highly probative evidence as a confession ... and the concern that such confessions may have been procured under circumstances that render them untrustworthy”).

2013See Naples, supra; see also Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190, 197 (D.C.1979) (en banc) (noting that the corroboration rule “strike[s] a balance between the need for such highly probative evidence as a confession ... and the concern that such confessions may have been procured under circumstances that render them untrustworthy”).

1992Cf. Sweet v. United States, 449 A.2d 315, 321 (D.C.1982). [5] Gary further abolished the corroboration requirement in cases "where the sexual nature of the touching makes it an assault." 449 A.2d at 834 .

1992Cf. Sweet v. United States, 449 A.2d 315, 321 (D.C.1982). [5] Gary further abolished the corroboration requirement in cases "where the sexual nature of the touching makes it an assault." 449 A.2d at 834 .

1963In extending the corroboration requirement to “verbal” sexual offenses, the court in Kelly v. United States, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 125, 129, 130 , 194 F.2d 150, 154, 155 , ruled there should be in such cases “corroboration of the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time, such as presence at the alleged time and place and similar provable circumstances.” See also, Coleman v. Godsey, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 7 , 249 F.2d 522 ; Guarro v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 97 , 237 F.2d 578 .

1963In extending the corroboration requirement to “verbal” sexual offenses, the court in Kelly v. United States, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 125, 129, 130 , 194 F.2d 150, 154, 155 , ruled there should be in such cases “corroboration of the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time, such as presence at the alleged time and place and similar provable circumstances.” See also, Coleman v. Godsey, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 7 , 249 F.2d 522 ; Guarro v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 97 , 237 F.2d 578 .

1982See also Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 736 , 72 S.Ct. 950, 962 , 96 L.Ed. 1249 (1952). [3] Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 608-10 , 65 S.Ct. 548, 549-50 , 89 L.Ed. 495 (1945). [4] As of 1972, seven jurisdictions had a corroboration requirement and eight required either limited corroboration or corroboration only in certain factual circumstances.

1982See also Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 736 , 72 S.Ct. 950, 962 , 96 L.Ed. 1249 (1952). [3] Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 608-10 , 65 S.Ct. 548, 549-50 , 89 L.Ed. 495 (1945). [4] As of 1972, seven jurisdictions had a corroboration requirement and eight required either limited corroboration or corroboration only in certain factual circumstances.

1982The corroboration rule has always been a flexible one, and “the particular quantum of proof required will necessarily vary from case to case depending upon, for example, the age and impressionability of the prose-cutrix and the presence or absence of any apparent motive to falsify or exaggerate.” United States v. Gray, supra at 276, 477 F.2d at 445, quoted in Robinson, supra at 416 ; see also Wallace v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 120, 121 (1976) (level of corroboration required varies with sex and age of complainant and existence of previous relationship with defendant).

1982The corroboration rule has always been a flexible one, and "the particular quantum of proof required will necessarily vary from case to case depending upon, for example, the age and impressionability of the prosecutrix and the presence or absence of any apparent motive to falsify or exaggerate." *1301 United States v. Gray, supra at 276, 477 F.2d at 445, quoted in Robinson, supra at 416 ; see also Wallace v. United States, D.C.