corroboration requirement in California

1958The principal object of the corroboration rule is to prevent collusion between the parties, and where it is clear from the evidence in a contested action that there is no collusion the court is justified in granting the decree upon evidence which is only slightly corroborated if otherwise the court is satisfied that the prevailing party is entitled to a decree. [Citations.]” (Serns v. Serns, 70 Cal.App.2d 527, 529 [ 161 P.2d 417 ]; see also Bixby v. Bixby, 120 Cal.App.2d 495, 500 [ 261 P.2d 286 ]; LaVigne v. LaVigne, 96 Cal.App.2d 531, 534 [ 216 P.2d 75 ]; McGann v. McGann, 82 Cal.App.2d 382,

1958The principal object of the corroboration rule is to prevent collusion between the parties, and where it is clear from the evidence in a contested action that there is no collusion the court is justified in granting the decree upon evidence which is only slightly corroborated if otherwise the court is satisfied that the prevailing party is entitled to a decree. [Citations.]” (Serns v. Serns, 70 Cal.App.2d 527, 529 [ 161 P.2d 417 ]; see also Bixby v. Bixby, 120 Cal.App.2d 495, 500 [ 261 P.2d 286 ]; LaVigne v. LaVigne, 96 Cal.App.2d 531, 534 [ 216 P.2d 75 ]; McGann v. McGann, 82 Cal.App.2d 382,

1955That, too, presents a question of fact. ‘The principal object of the corroboration rule is to prevent collusion between the parties, and where it is clear from the evidence in a contested action that there is no col- *59 lusion, the court is justified in granting the decree upon evidence which is only slightly corroborative if otherwise the court is satisfied that the prevailing party is entitled to a decree. ’ (Tompkins v. Tompkins, 83 Cal.App.2d 71, 76 [ 187 P.2d 840 ].)” In the instant case Mrs. Angle testified that on the morning of August 3d she saw the physical marks of brutality on the

1955That, too, presents a question of fact. ‘The principal object of the corroboration rule is to prevent collusion between the parties, and where it is clear from the evidence in a contested action that there is no col- *59 lusion, the court is justified in granting the decree upon evidence which is only slightly corroborative if otherwise the court is satisfied that the prevailing party is entitled to a decree. ’ (Tompkins v. Tompkins, 83 Cal.App.2d 71, 76 [ 187 P.2d 840 ].)” In the instant case Mrs. Angle testified that on the morning of August 3d she saw the physical marks of brutality on the

2022But when . . . it requires only proof of the motive for the murder for which defendant has already been convicted, the corroboration requirement of section 1111 does not apply.” (Footnote omitted.) The court observed that section 1111 provides that “ ‘[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated.’ ” ( Hamilton, supra, at p. 1176 .) The court analogized section 1111’s corroboration requirement to the requirement of proof of corpus delicti for special circumstances that “require[] proof of some crime other than the charged murder,” but not for specia

2022But when . . . it requires only proof of the motive for the murder for which defendant has already been convicted, the corroboration requirement of section 1111 does not apply.” (Footnote omitted.) The court observed that section 1111 provides that “ ‘[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated.’ ” ( Hamilton, supra, at p. 1176 .) The court analogized section 1111’s corroboration requirement to the requirement of proof of corpus delicti for special circumstances that “require[] proof of some crime other than the charged murder,” but not for specia

1958The principal object of the corroboration rule is to prevent collusion between the parties, and where it is clear from the evidence in a contested action that there is no collusion the court is justified in granting the decree upon evidence which is only slightly corroborated if otherwise the court is satisfied that the prevailing party is entitled to a decree. [Citations.]” (Serns v. Serns, 70 Cal.App.2d 527, 529 [ 161 P.2d 417 ]; see also Bixby v. Bixby, 120 Cal.App.2d 495, 500 [ 261 P.2d 286 ]; LaVigne v. LaVigne, 96 Cal.App.2d 531, 534 [ 216 P.2d 75 ]; McGann v. McGann, 82 Cal.App.2d 382,

1958The principal object of the corroboration rule is to prevent collusion between the parties, and where it is clear from the evidence in a contested action that there is no collusion the court is justified in granting the decree upon evidence which is only slightly corroborated if otherwise the court is satisfied that the prevailing party is entitled to a decree. [Citations.]” (Serns v. Serns, 70 Cal.App.2d 527, 529 [ 161 P.2d 417 ]; see also Bixby v. Bixby, 120 Cal.App.2d 495, 500 [ 261 P.2d 286 ]; LaVigne v. LaVigne, 96 Cal.App.2d 531, 534 [ 216 P.2d 75 ]; McGann v. McGann, 82 Cal.App.2d 382,

2009At the time the court gave the instruction at defendant’s guilt phase trial in 1988, CALJIC No. 3.11 read: “A defendant cannot be found guilty based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless such testimony is corroborated by other evidence that tends to connect such defendant with the commission of the offense.” (Ibid. (5th ed. 1988).) In People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 214 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 583 , 776 P.2d 285 ], we held that the corroboration requirement applied to both the in-court testimony and the out-of-court statements of accomplices.

2009At the time the court gave the instruction at defendant’s guilt phase trial in 1988, CALJIC No. 3.11 read: “A defendant cannot be found guilty based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless such testimony is corroborated by other evidence that tends to connect such defendant with the commission of the offense.” (Ibid. (5th ed. 1988).) In People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 214 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 583 , 776 P.2d 285 ], we held that the corroboration requirement applied to both the in-court testimony and the out-of-court statements of accomplices.

2023The challenged instruction in no way lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof.” (People v. Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 434 ; see also People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 968 .) Here, too, the jury was instructed that it was required to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

2021The corroboration requirement does not “constitute[] an element of a criminal offense” and “has no bearing on the prosecution’s proof of any element of the charged crime.” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 968 (Frye), overruled on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390 , 421 & fn. 22.) Instead, “[l]ike the provision making hearsay evidence inadmissible (Evid.

2015Then he didn’t—he didn’t leave me alone still . . . he still bothers me,” the child’s voice high and agitated. 20 We shall not assume that Alberto is making an attempt to impose a corroboration requirement that our Supreme Court expressly declined.8 (See Lucero, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1249 [“the court may rely exclusively on . . . out-of-court statements,” italics added].) We can only assume that Alberto does not agree with the juvenile court’s determination that I.C.’s statements did bear sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy 8 Still, some corroboration was present in the form of the

2007We find this to be an appropriate analogy, because as with the objected to hearsay in a social worker's report, the corroboration requirement of *817 accomplice testimony relates to the sufficiency of the evidence, not its admissibility. ( People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1190 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 998 P.2d 969 ; In re Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1244, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 .) In the context of accomplice testimony, "[c]orroborative evidence, direct or circumstantial, is sufficient if it tends to connect defendant with" the crime even though it is slight and entitled, w

1988The emphasis placed on the corroboration requirement, and on the other accomplice instructions, demonstrates that the jury was properly instructed on the proper standard of evaluating [codefendant’s] testimony.” (Chavez, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 831 ; see also, Stewart, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 975 .) Based on our review of the record and the foregoing analysis, we also conclude that the instructions, as given, did not mislead the jury.

1988The emphasis placed on the corroboration requirement, and on the other accomplice instructions, demonstrates that the jury was properly instructed on the proper standard of evaluating [codefendant's] testimony." ( Chavez, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 831 ; see also, Stewart, supra, 145 Cal. App.3d at p. 975 .) Based on our review of the record and the foregoing analysis, we also conclude that the instructions, as given, did not mislead the jury.

2016(See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1132 [“the corroboration requirement . . . is a substantial right”].) Omitting the bracketed portion of CALCRIM No. 301 did not result in an incorrect statement of the law.

2010It reads in relevant part: “A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.” The purpose of this corroboration requirement is “to ensure that a defendant will not be convicted solely upon the testimony of an accomplice because an accomplice is likely to have self-serving motives.” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 547 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3

1958The principal object of the corroboration rule is to prevent collusion between the parties, and where it is clear from the evidence in a contested action that there is no collusion the court is justified in granting the decree upon evidence which is only slightly corroborated if otherwise the court is satisfied that the prevailing party is entitled to a decree. [Citations.]” (Serns v. Serns, 70 Cal.App.2d 527, 529 [ 161 P.2d 417 ]; see also Bixby v. Bixby, 120 Cal.App.2d 495, 500 [ 261 P.2d 286 ]; LaVigne v. LaVigne, 96 Cal.App.2d 531, 534 [ 216 P.2d 75 ]; McGann v. McGann, 82 Cal.App.2d 382,

1952“The principal object of the corroboration rule is to prevent collusion between the parties, and where it is clear from the evidence in a contested action that there is no collusion, the court is justified in granting the decree upon evidence which is only slightly corroborated if otherwise the court is satisfied that the prevailing party is entitled to a decree.” (Tompkins v. Tompkins, 83 Cal.App. 2d 71, 76 [ 187 P.2d 840 ], corroboration of one of a series of acts, in a contested case; see, also, Keener v. Keener, 18 Cal.2d 445, 449 [ 116 P.2d 1 ]; Krull v. Krull, 105 Cal.App.2d 56, 60 [ 233

2021Taking into account all of the evidence, including the evidence of “the entire conduct of the parties, their relationship, [and] acts,” (Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1128 ; Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 32 ), we conclude that this evidence was more than sufficient to satisfy the corroboration requirement of evidence tending to connect Powell with the crimes charged so as to satisfy the jury that J.D., J.P., and T.B. were telling the truth. (§ 1111; Anderson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 411 ; Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 95 ; Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 880 ; Lewis, supra,

2019(See Rangel , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 1222, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 367 P.3d 649 [testimony of one accomplice cannot corroborate that of another accomplice].) Even assuming for the sake of argument that Tompkins had been an accomplice under section 1111, the purpose of the corroboration rule is to require evidence independent of the accomplice testimony that links the defendant to the crime. ( Romero and Self , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 32, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 855 , 354 P.3d 983 .) Here, Tompkins's statements merely recounted the circumstances of the crime.

2016(People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 469 .) “Whether a person is an accomplice is a question of fact for the jury unless there is no dispute as to either the facts or the inferences to be drawn therefrom.” (People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 834 (Fauber).) The testimony of an accomplice inculpating a defendant must be corroborated by other evidence connecting the accused with the commission of the crime. (§ 1111.) Where there is substantial evidence that a witness is an accomplice, the trial court must instruct sua sponte on the corroboration requirement.

2016(People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 469 .) “Whether a person is an accomplice is a question of fact for the jury unless there is no dispute as to either the facts or the inferences to be drawn therefrom.” (People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 834 (Fauber).) The testimony of an accomplice inculpating a defendant must be corroborated by other evidence connecting the accused with the commission of the crime. (§ 1111.) Where there is substantial evidence that a witness is an accomplice, the trial court must instruct sua sponte on the corroboration requirement.

2021Taking into account all of the evidence, including the evidence of “the entire conduct of the parties, their relationship, [and] acts,” (Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1128 ; Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 32 ), we conclude that this evidence was more than sufficient to satisfy the corroboration requirement of evidence tending to connect Powell with the crimes charged so as to satisfy the jury that J.D., J.P., and T.B. were telling the truth. (§ 1111; Anderson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 411 ; Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 95 ; Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 880 ; Lewis, supra,

2021Taking into account all of the evidence, including the evidence of “the entire conduct of the parties, their relationship, [and] acts,” (Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1128 ; Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 32 ), we conclude that this evidence was more than sufficient to satisfy the corroboration requirement of evidence tending to connect Powell with the crimes charged so as to satisfy the jury that J.D., J.P., and T.B. were telling the truth. (§ 1111; Anderson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 411 ; Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 95 ; Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 880 ; Lewis, supra,

2021Taking into account all of the evidence, including the evidence of “the entire conduct of the parties, their relationship, [and] acts,” (Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1128 ; Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 32 ), we conclude that this evidence was more than sufficient to satisfy the corroboration requirement of evidence tending to connect Powell with the crimes charged so as to satisfy the jury that J.D., J.P., and T.B. were telling the truth. (§ 1111; Anderson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 411 ; Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 95 ; Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 880 ; Lewis, supra,

2021Taking into account all of the evidence, including the evidence of “the entire conduct of the parties, their relationship, [and] acts,” (Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1128 ; Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 32 ), we conclude that this evidence was more than sufficient to satisfy the corroboration requirement of evidence tending to connect Powell with the crimes charged so as to satisfy the jury that J.D., J.P., and T.B. were telling the truth. (§ 1111; Anderson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 411 ; Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 95 ; Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 880 ; Lewis, supra,

2020Any error in instructing the jury as to the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony was thus harmless. ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 .) 21 C.

2020Any error in instructing the jury as to the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony was thus harmless. ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 .) 21 C.

2015(People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1260 .) Moreover, the statement that accomplice testimony need be corroborated by only slight evidence is a correct statement of the law. (§ 1111; People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 982 .) The corroboration requirement of section 1111 is a collateral factual issue, not an element of the charged offense that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

2013As we have further stated in explaining the corroboration requirement, “ 1 “it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense charged,” ’ ” and “ ‘[t]he requisite corroboration may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.’ ” (People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 982.) We therefore find no merit in defendant’s claim that CALJIC No. 3.11 inaccurately or inadequately states the law on accomplice corroboration. b.

2017It would contravene that policy to hold that the very passage of the Mann Act effected a withdrawal by the conspiracy statute of that immunity which the Mann Act itself confers." ( Gebardi v. United States , supra , 287 U.S. at p. 123 , 53 S.Ct. at p. 38 , 77 L.Ed. at pp. 211-212, italics added; see People v. Buffum (1953) 40 Cal.2d 709 , 722, 256 P.2d 317 [abortion-seekers not deemed accomplices under § 1111, whose testimony required corroboration in prosecution for conspiracy to commit abortions, because the conspiracy rule "does not apply where the statutes defining the substantive offense

2017It would contravene that policy to hold that the very passage of the Mann Act effected a withdrawal by the conspiracy statute of that immunity which the Mann Act itself confers." ( Gebardi v. United States , supra , 287 U.S. at p. 123 , 53 S.Ct. at p. 38 , 77 L.Ed. at pp. 211-212, italics added; see People v. Buffum (1953) 40 Cal.2d 709 , 722, 256 P.2d 317 [abortion-seekers not deemed accomplices under § 1111, whose testimony required corroboration in prosecution for conspiracy to commit abortions, because the conspiracy rule "does not apply where the statutes defining the substantive offense

2015Consequently, the jury would have used the general witness credibility instructions in evaluating Grayson’s testimony, and the failure to explicitly instruct the jury to consider Grayson’s testimony with caution was harmless.61 (See People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 304 .) 60Moreover, the jury was explicitly told it could consider whether a witness had been provided immunity in evaluating their testimony. 61For similar reasons, the failure to instruct on the corroboration requirement was harmless with respect to Grayson because “the jury had before it ample information sugg

2013(See People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 303 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 256 P.3d 543 ] [“ ‘A trial court’s failure to instmct on accomplice liability under section 1111 is harmless if there is sufficient corroborating evidence in the record.’ ”].) Defendant contends that corroboration for purposes of this section is more stringent than the corroboration required for accomplice testimony under section 1111 because that section only requires evidence that “tend[s] to connect” the defendant with the crime, whereas section 1111.5, quoted above, requires evidence that “connects” defend

2005(See People v. Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1177 [when special circumstance requires proof of some other crime, that crime cannot be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice]; see also People v. Bowley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 861-862 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 471 , 382 P.2d 591 ] [corroborating evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction where the value of the evidence rested entirely on the testimony of the accomplice].) Had, for example, Brown’s testimony been necessary to identify the voices on the tape, the independent corroboration rule would not have been satisfied.

2005(See People v. Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1177 [when special circumstance requires proof of some other crime, that crime cannot be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice]; see also People v. Bowley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 861-862 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 471 , 382 P.2d 591 ] [corroborating evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction where the value of the evidence rested entirely on the testimony of the accomplice].) Had, for example, Brown’s testimony been necessary to identify the voices on the tape, the independent corroboration rule would not have been satisfied.

1988The emphasis placed on the corroboration requirement, and on the other accomplice instructions, demonstrates that the jury was properly instructed on the proper standard of evaluating [codefendant’s] testimony.” (Chavez, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 831 ; see also, Stewart, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 975 .) Based on our review of the record and the foregoing analysis, we also conclude that the instructions, as given, did not mislead the jury.

1988The emphasis placed on the corroboration requirement, and on the other accomplice instructions, demonstrates that the jury was properly instructed on the proper standard of evaluating [codefendant's] testimony." ( Chavez, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 831 ; see also, Stewart, supra, 145 Cal. App.3d at p. 975 .) Based on our review of the record and the foregoing analysis, we also conclude that the instructions, as given, did not mislead the jury.

2023(See People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 556 [“[c]orroborating evidence may be slight, may be entirely circumstantial, and need not be sufficient to establish every element of the charged offense,” internal quotation marks omitted].) b.

2015As indicated, defendants’ argument about corroboration stems from section 1111, which requires the jurors to view the witness’s testimony with caution, and requires corroboration for conviction. 47 The reason for the rule is manifest: “Of course, an accomplice has a natural incentive to minimize his own guilt before the jury and to enlarge that of his cohorts; accordingly, the law requires an accomplice’s testimony be viewed with caution to the extent it incriminates others.” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 555 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 73 P.3d 1137 ].) In addition, and especially in a cas

2021(See People v. DiGiacomo (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 688, 698-699 [construing instruction regarding corroboration requirement of former section 1103a, which contained language identical to section 118, subdivision (b)].”3 (Trotter, at pp. 439-440, fns. omitted.) The corroboration requirement for perjury “focuses on” and pertains solely to the falsity of the alleged statement that the defendant declared under oath, or penalty of perjury, but knew to be false.

2021(See People v. DiGiacomo (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 688, 698-699 [construing instruction regarding corroboration requirement of former section 1103a, which contained language identical to section 118, subdivision (b)].”3 (Trotter, at pp. 439-440, fns. omitted.) The corroboration requirement for perjury “focuses on” and pertains solely to the falsity of the alleged statement that the defendant declared under oath, or penalty of perjury, but knew to be false.

2022But when . . . it requires only proof of the motive for the murder for which defendant has already been convicted, the corroboration requirement of section 1111 does not apply.” (Footnote omitted.) The court observed that section 1111 provides that “ ‘[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated.’ ” ( Hamilton, supra, at p. 1176 .) The court analogized section 1111’s corroboration requirement to the requirement of proof of corpus delicti for special circumstances that “require[] proof of some crime other than the charged murder,” but not for specia

2022But when . . . it requires only proof of the motive for the murder for which defendant has already been convicted, the corroboration requirement of section 1111 does not apply.” (Footnote omitted.) The court observed that section 1111 provides that “ ‘[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated.’ ” ( Hamilton, supra, at p. 1176 .) The court analogized section 1111’s corroboration requirement to the requirement of proof of corpus delicti for special circumstances that “require[] proof of some crime other than the charged murder,” but not for specia

2021(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson); People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 214 [Failure to instruct on corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony is state law error, subject to Watson’s reasonable probability standard.].) That is, the record shows there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have realized a more favorable result in counts 1, 5, 6, and 7, had the court instructed the jury that it could not convict defendant of perjury in counts 5, 6, and 7 based on J.W.’s testimony alone.

2016The Error Was Not Harmless “Instructional error is subject to harmless error review. [Citation.] Because the omitted instruction is based on section 1111, the asserted error is one of state law, subject to the reasonable probability standard of harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836–837.” (People v. Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 214 .) The corroboration requirement of section 1111 is based on the Legislature’s determination that “ ‘ “because of the reliability questions posed by” ’ accomplice testimony, such testimony ‘ “by itself is insufficient as a matter of