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8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1990Such evidence ... include[s] a *533 child victim's precocious knowledge of sexual activity...." Swan, 114 Wash.2d at 623 , 790 P.2d at 615 (footnote deleted); accord Jones, 112 Wash.2d at 495-97 , 772 P.2d at 500 . 1990Such evidence ... include[s] a *533 child victim's precocious knowledge of sexual activity...." Swan, 114 Wash.2d at 623 , 790 P.2d at 615 (footnote deleted); accord Jones, 112 Wash.2d at 495-97 , 772 P.2d at 500 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Swangreen2 sentences1990See Swan, 114 Wash.2d at 622 , 790 P.2d at 615 ; Jones, 112 Wash.2d at 493-495, 772 P.2d at 499; Note, supra, at 820; see also Hunt, 48 Wash.App. at 847-849 , 741 P.2d at 571 (corroboration requirement protects against fabricated or imagined allegations that defendant cannot test with cross-examination). 1990See Swan, 114 Wash.2d at 622 , 790 P.2d at 615 ; Jones, 112 Wash.2d at 493-495, 772 P.2d at 499; Note, supra, at 820; see also Hunt, 48 Wash.App. at 847-849 , 741 P.2d at 571 (corroboration requirement protects against fabricated or imagined allegations that defendant cannot test with cross-examination). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mauchleygreen2 sentences2019The trustworthiness standard “requires corroboration of the confession itself rather than corroboration that a crime was committed.” Mauchley, 67 P.3d at 488 . ¶ 27 Having adopted a new corroboration rule, the court turned to the issue of retroactivity. 2013Compare Brown, 617 F.3d at 860 (noting that "corroboration goes to sufficiency"), and Dalhouse, 534 F.3d at 806 (stating that the trustworthiness standard "does not affect the admissibility of a confession, at least not in this circuit") (emphasis in original), with Landsdown v. United States, 348 F.2d 405, 409 (5th Cir.1965) (requiring corroboration before the confession can be "admiftted] into evidence against the accused"), and Mauchley, ¶¶ 58-60, 67 P.3d at 490 (treating the trustworthiness standard as a rule governing the admissibility of confessions); see also McCormick on Evidence § 145 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Robsongreen1 sentence2019See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990); see also State v. Jess, 184 P.3d 133, 160 (Haw. 2008) (“For a judicial decision to implicate due process concerns, the change wrought upon the defendant’s interests must be substantive, as opposed to procedural . . . .”). 15 ¶ 33 But contrary to the People’s assertion, the corpus delicti rule is not merely procedural.3 The LaRosa court itself rejected that argument, observing that it had always treated the corpus delicti rule as a “‘substantive rule of law relating to the quantum of proof necessary to sustain a conviction’ and not a rule affec | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Youngbloodgreen1 sentence2019See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990); see also State v. Jess, 184 P.3d 133, 160 (Haw. 2008) (“For a judicial decision to implicate due process concerns, the change wrought upon the defendant’s interests must be substantive, as opposed to procedural . . . .”). 15 ¶ 33 But contrary to the People’s assertion, the corpus delicti rule is not merely procedural.3 The LaRosa court itself rejected that argument, observing that it had always treated the corpus delicti rule as a “‘substantive rule of law relating to the quantum of proof necessary to sustain a conviction’ and not a rule affec | 1 | 1 |
Carmell v. Texasgreen1 sentence2019See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990); see also State v. Jess, 184 P.3d 133, 160 (Haw. 2008) (“For a judicial decision to implicate due process concerns, the change wrought upon the defendant’s interests must be substantive, as opposed to procedural . . . .”). 15 ¶ 33 But contrary to the People’s assertion, the corpus delicti rule is not merely procedural.3 The LaRosa court itself rejected that argument, observing that it had always treated the corpus delicti rule as a “‘substantive rule of law relating to the quantum of proof necessary to sustain a conviction’ and not a rule affec | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jessgreen1 sentence2019See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990); see also State v. Jess, 184 P.3d 133, 160 (Haw. 2008) (“For a judicial decision to implicate due process concerns, the change wrought upon the defendant’s interests must be substantive, as opposed to procedural . . . .”). 15 ¶ 33 But contrary to the People’s assertion, the corpus delicti rule is not merely procedural.3 The LaRosa court itself rejected that argument, observing that it had always treated the corpus delicti rule as a “‘substantive rule of law relating to the quantum of proof necessary to sustain a conviction’ and not a rule affec | 1 | 1 |
People v. Newtongreen2 sentences2017See People v. Newton, 966 P.2d 563, 574 (Colo. 1998). a. 2017Id. at 565-67 . ¶38 Noting that “[t]he text of CRE 804(b)(3) does not impose a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements,” we looked to a court of appeals decision and *683 several federal decisions that nevertheless applied a corroboration requirement to statements against penal interest offered to inculpate the defendant. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Browngreen2 sentences2013See United States v. Brown, 617 F.3d 857, 862 (6th Cir.2010). 2013Compare Brown, 617 F.3d at 860 (noting that "corroboration goes to sufficiency"), and Dalhouse, 534 F.3d at 806 (stating that the trustworthiness standard "does not affect the admissibility of a confession, at least not in this circuit") (emphasis in original), with Landsdown v. United States, 348 F.2d 405, 409 (5th Cir.1965) (requiring corroboration before the confession can be "admiftted] into evidence against the accused"), and Mauchley, ¶¶ 58-60, 67 P.3d at 490 (treating the trustworthiness standard as a rule governing the admissibility of confessions); see also McCormick on Evidence § 145 | 1 | 1 |
Robert Henry Landsdown v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013Compare Brown, 617 F.3d at 860 (noting that "corroboration goes to sufficiency"), and Dalhouse, 534 F.3d at 806 (stating that the trustworthiness standard "does not affect the admissibility of a confession, at least not in this circuit") (emphasis in original), with Landsdown v. United States, 348 F.2d 405, 409 (5th Cir.1965) (requiring corroboration before the confession can be "admiftted] into evidence against the accused"), and Mauchley, ¶¶ 58-60, 67 P.3d at 490 (treating the trustworthiness standard as a rule governing the admissibility of confessions); see also McCormick on Evidence § 145 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dalhousegreen1 sentence2013Compare Brown, 617 F.3d at 860 (noting that "corroboration goes to sufficiency"), and Dalhouse, 534 F.3d at 806 (stating that the trustworthiness standard "does not affect the admissibility of a confession, at least not in this circuit") (emphasis in original), with Landsdown v. United States, 348 F.2d 405, 409 (5th Cir.1965) (requiring corroboration before the confession can be "admiftted] into evidence against the accused"), and Mauchley, ¶¶ 58-60, 67 P.3d at 490 (treating the trustworthiness standard as a rule governing the admissibility of confessions); see also McCormick on Evidence § 145 | 1 | 1 |
Downey v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2013See Downey v. People, 121 Colo. 307, 819 , 215 P.2d 892, 898 (1950). 2013See Downey v. People, 121 Colo. 307, 819 , 215 P.2d 892, 898 (1950). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jerry Dale Lowegreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137, 1146 (4th Cir.1995) (examining the circumstances surrounding the declarant's statement as well as determining whether independent evidence supported the statement); United States v. Edelin, 996 F.2d 1238, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1993) (same); People v. Pack, 797 P.2d 774, 776-77 (Colo.App.1990) (same). 1998See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137, 1146 (4th Cir.1995) (examining the circumstances surrounding the declarant’s statement as well as determining whether independent evidence supported the statement); United States v. Edelin, 996 F.2d 1238, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1993) (same); People v. Pack, 797 P.2d 774, 776-77 (Colo.App.1990) (same). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Claude Leander Rileygreen2 sentences1998See also People v. Fincham, 799 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo.App.1990) ("While it is true that reliability may be inferred where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted exception, a declaration against penal interest is too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." (citation omitted)). [14] For other court decisions applying a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements, see United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 , 1170 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Ri 1998For other court decisions applying a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements, see United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1170 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1383 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir.1978). . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mooregreen2 sentences1998However, in People v. Moore, 693 P.2d 388, 390 (Colo.App.1984), the court of appeals applied a corroboration requirement to an accomplice's statement that was offered to inculpate the defendant. 1998However, in People v. Moore, 693 P.2d 388, 390 (Colo.App.1984), the court of appeals applied a corroboration requirement to an accomplice’s statement that was offered to inculpate the defendant. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Aaron Boycegreen2 sentences1998See also People v. Fincham, 799 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo.App.1990) ("While it is true that reliability may be inferred where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted exception, a declaration against penal interest is too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." (citation omitted)). [14] For other court decisions applying a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements, see United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 , 1170 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Ri 1998For other court decisions applying a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements, see United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1170 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1383 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir.1978). . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Casamentogreen2 sentences1998See also People v. Fincham, 799 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo.App.1990) ("While it is true that reliability may be inferred where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted exception, a declaration against penal interest is too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." (citation omitted)). [14] For other court decisions applying a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements, see United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 , 1170 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Ri 1998For other court decisions applying a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements, see United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1170 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1383 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir.1978). . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Edward W. Seeleygreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., United States v. Taggart, 944 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1989) (stating that "courts have interpreted the rule as implicitly imposing a similar [corroboration] requirement where the government uses the hearsay to inculpate "). [14] After examining the case law, we conclude that the corroboration requirement for a statement that inculpates the accused is not the same as the corroboration requirement for a statement that exculpates the accused. 1998See, e.g., United States v. Taggart, 944 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1989) (stating that “courts have interpreted the rule as implicitly imposing a similar [corroboration] requirement where the government uses the hearsay to inculcate ”). 14 After examining the case law, we conclude that the corroboration requirement for a statement that inculpates the accused is not the same as the corroboration requirement for a statement that exculpates the accused. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Carlos Garcia and Jose Luis Garciagreen2 sentences1998See also People v. Fincham, 799 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo.App.1990) ("While it is true that reliability may be inferred where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted exception, a declaration against penal interest is too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." (citation omitted)). [14] For other court decisions applying a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements, see United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 , 1170 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Ri 1998For other court decisions applying a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements, see United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1170 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1383 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir.1978). . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Martha Ann Taggart, A/K/A Martha Ann Robertson, A/K/A Anngreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., United States v. Taggart, 944 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1989) (stating that "courts have interpreted the rule as implicitly imposing a similar [corroboration] requirement where the government uses the hearsay to inculpate "). [14] After examining the case law, we conclude that the corroboration requirement for a statement that inculpates the accused is not the same as the corroboration requirement for a statement that exculpates the accused. 1998See, e.g., United States v. Taggart, 944 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1989) (stating that “courts have interpreted the rule as implicitly imposing a similar [corroboration] requirement where the government uses the hearsay to inculcate ”). 14 After examining the case law, we conclude that the corroboration requirement for a statement that inculpates the accused is not the same as the corroboration requirement for a statement that exculpates the accused. | 1 | 1 |
| United States of America, and Cross-Appellant v. Longino Xavier Edelin, and Cross-Appelleegreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Packgreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137, 1146 (4th Cir.1995) (examining the circumstances surrounding the declarant's statement as well as determining whether independent evidence supported the statement); United States v. Edelin, 996 F.2d 1238, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1993) (same); People v. Pack, 797 P.2d 774, 776-77 (Colo.App.1990) (same). 1998See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137, 1146 (4th Cir.1995) (examining the circumstances surrounding the declarant’s statement as well as determining whether independent evidence supported the statement); United States v. Edelin, 996 F.2d 1238, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1993) (same); People v. Pack, 797 P.2d 774, 776-77 (Colo.App.1990) (same). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Finchamgreen1 sentence1998See also People v. Fincham, 799 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo.App.1990) ("While it is true that reliability may be inferred where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted exception, a declaration against penal interest is too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." (citation omitted)). [14] For other court decisions applying a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements, see United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 , 1170 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Ri | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gilberto Pablo Alvarezgreen2 sentences1998See also People v. Fincham, 799 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo.App.1990) ("While it is true that reliability may be inferred where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted exception, a declaration against penal interest is too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." (citation omitted)). [14] For other court decisions applying a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements, see United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 , 1170 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Ri 1998For other court decisions applying a corroboration requirement for inculpatory statements, see United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1170 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1383 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir.1978). . | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Huntgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Montoyagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bennett
green
1 sentence2013Benneit requires a court, when ruling on a motion for a judgment of acquittal, to analyze the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether it is "substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." Bennett, 183 Colo. at 130 , 515 P.2d at 469 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Warszower v. United States
green
2 sentences2013Thus, Bennett does not prohibit us from articulating a different corroboration requirement if necessary to protect defendants from false confessions. 137 Without engaging in an empirical battle over the frequency with which false confessions occur, we recognize that some defendants on occasion do confess to nonexistent crimes or crimes committed by others. 6 Despite its "extremely limited function," Smith, 348 U.S. at 153 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , the corroboration requirement thus serves a valid purpose: to prevent "errors in conviec-tions based upon untrue confessions alone," Warszower v. United Stat 2013Thus, Bennett does not prohibit us from articulating a different corroboration requirement if necessary to protect defendants from false confessions. 137 Without engaging in an empirical battle over the frequency with which false confessions occur, we recognize that some defendants on occasion do confess to nonexistent crimes or crimes committed by others. 6 Despite its "extremely limited function," Smith, 348 U.S. at 153 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , the corroboration requirement thus serves a valid purpose: to prevent "errors in conviec-tions based upon untrue confessions alone," Warszower v. United Stat | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Smith v. United States
green
2 sentences2013Thus, Bennett does not prohibit us from articulating a different corroboration requirement if necessary to protect defendants from false confessions. 137 Without engaging in an empirical battle over the frequency with which false confessions occur, we recognize that some defendants on occasion do confess to nonexistent crimes or crimes committed by others. 6 Despite its "extremely limited function," Smith, 348 U.S. at 153 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , the corroboration requirement thus serves a valid purpose: to prevent "errors in conviec-tions based upon untrue confessions alone," Warszower v. United Stat 2013Thus, Bennett does not prohibit us from articulating a different corroboration requirement if necessary to protect defendants from false confessions. 137 Without engaging in an empirical battle over the frequency with which false confessions occur, we recognize that some defendants on occasion do confess to nonexistent crimes or crimes committed by others. 6 Despite its "extremely limited function," Smith, 348 U.S. at 153 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , the corroboration requirement thus serves a valid purpose: to prevent "errors in conviec-tions based upon untrue confessions alone," Warszower v. United Stat | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Lucas
green
1 sentence2013This problem, though possibly overstated in the caselaw, is compounded by the fact that confessions "stand high in the probative hierarchy of proof." See Lucas, 152 A.2d at 61 ; see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 Stan. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Because the information presented on the scent tracking in this case was properly before the jury, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 1 .We granted certiorari on the following questions: (I) Is dog tracking evidence “scientific” evidence the admissibility of which is governed by the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). 1999Because the information presented on the scent tracking in this case was properly before the jury, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 1 .We granted certiorari on the following questions: (I) Is dog tracking evidence “scientific” evidence the admissibility of which is governed by the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Frye v. United States
red
1 sentence1999Because the information presented on the scent tracking in this case was properly before the jury, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 1 .We granted certiorari on the following questions: (I) Is dog tracking evidence “scientific” evidence the admissibility of which is governed by the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Drake green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Idaho v. Wright green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Williamson v. United States
green
2 sentences1998Our statement in Drake that the reliability of an inculpatory statement may be based on independent corroborating evidence was effectively overruled by Wright . [16] In his answer brief, Newton states, "The Colorado construction ... does not require the fact-intensive inquiry or segmented analysis of each separate statement within a narrative." The People similarly note in their reply brief that "the traditional Colorado approach will result in the admission of more evidence, and in the form of broad narratives, while the Williamson rule will result in the admission of less evidence, and admis 1998Our statement in Drake that the reliability of an inculpatory statement may be based on independent corroborating evidence was effectively overruled by Wright . [16] In his answer brief, Newton states, "The Colorado construction ... does not require the fact-intensive inquiry or segmented analysis of each separate statement within a narrative." The People similarly note in their reply brief that "the traditional Colorado approach will result in the admission of more evidence, and in the form of broad narratives, while the Williamson rule will result in the admission of less evidence, and admis | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. District Court of El Paso County green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Bourjaily v. United States green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.