corroboration rule in Washington

2025In Clayton, the defendant argued that the no corroboration instruction was an improper comment on the evidence. 32 Wn.2d at 573 .

2025While this court has repeatedly expressed misgivings about the use of the no corroboration instruction, we are bound by our Supreme Court’s decades old holding in State v. Clayton, 32 Wn.2d 571, 578 , 202 P.2d 922 (1949), that the instruction is not an improper comment on the evidence. 2 In Clayton, the trial court gave the following instruction: You are instructed that it is the law of this State that a person charged with attempting to carnally know a female child under the age of eighteen years may be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix alone.

2010See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 989 , 113 S.Ct. 504 , 121 L.Ed.2d 440 (1992). *1281 ¶ 13 Here, the Court of Appeals engaged in similar analysis, recognizing that the corroboration requirement of the rule is rooted in traditional notions of justice and has become a settled principle of the administration of criminal justice and concluding that the Washington corpus delicti rule and its federal counterpart were not constitutionally mandated.

2010See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 989 (1992). ¶13 Here, the Court of Appeals engaged in similar analysis, recognizing that the corroboration requirement of the rule is rooted in traditional notions of justice and has become a settled principle of the administration of criminal justice and concluding that the Washington corpus delicti rule and its federal counterpart were not constitutionally mandated.

2010See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 989 , 113 S.Ct. 504 , 121 L.Ed.2d 440 (1992). *1281 ¶ 13 Here, the Court of Appeals engaged in similar analysis, recognizing that the corroboration requirement of the rule is rooted in traditional notions of justice and has become a settled principle of the administration of criminal justice and concluding that the Washington corpus delicti rule and its federal counterpart were not constitutionally mandated.

2010See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 989 (1992). ¶13 Here, the Court of Appeals engaged in similar analysis, recognizing that the corroboration requirement of the rule is rooted in traditional notions of justice and has become a settled principle of the administration of criminal justice and concluding that the Washington corpus delicti rule and its federal counterpart were not constitutionally mandated.

2014See Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d at 943 (the fact that informant accurately described the defendant’s vehicle is not sufficient corroboration for a stop).

2014Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d at 943 .

2008App. at 763 (citing Opper, 348 U.S. 84 ; Landsdown v. United States, 348 F.2d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 1965)).

2008A pretrial order suppressing evidence, if the trial court expressly finds that the practical effect of the order is to terminate the case. [5] "The choice, interpretation, or application of a statute to a set of facts is a matter of law reviewed de novo." State v. Law, 110 Wash.App. 36, 39 , 38 P.3d 374 (2002). [6] See State v. Johnson, 115 Wash.App. 890, 897 , 64 P.3d 88 (2003). [7] Division One of this court noted in C.D.W. that the conclusion that corpus delicti is not constitutionally based "finds [additional] support in the fact that the federal courts themselves have replaced the require

2010See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 989 , 113 S.Ct. 504 , 121 L.Ed.2d 440 (1992). *1281 ¶ 13 Here, the Court of Appeals engaged in similar analysis, recognizing that the corroboration requirement of the rule is rooted in traditional notions of justice and has become a settled principle of the administration of criminal justice and concluding that the Washington corpus delicti rule and its federal counterpart were not constitutionally mandated.

2008Corbett, 106 Wash.2d at 576 , 723 P.2d 1135 (emphasis added); see also C.D.W., 76 Wash.App. at 763 , 887 P.2d 911 . ¶ 13 Although these cases support the State's assertion that Washington's version of the corpus delicti rule is not a constitutional standard, they do not address whether the federal version of the corpus delicti rule is a constitutional standard. [7] To determine that issue, we must examine whether the corroboration rule discussed in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 , 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583 , cert. denied, 506 U.S. 989

2010See Dow, 142 Wash.App. at 981-82 , 176 P.3d 597 .

2010See Dow, 142 Wn.

2008In Lopez-Alvarez, the court stated that the corroboration standard arose “from the high incidence of false confessions and the resulting need to prevent ‘errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone,’ ” and from “the belief that ‘a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the “confession” will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.’ ” 970 F.2d at 589 & n.5 (quoting Warszower, 312 U.S. at 347 ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 ,

2008In Lopez-Alvarez , the court stated that the corroboration standard arose "from the high incidence, of false confessions and the resulting need to prevent `errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone,'" and from "the belief that `a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system depends on extrinsic evidence independent secured through skillful investigation.'" 970 F.2d at 589 & n. 5 (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (196

2017Brockob, 159 Wn.2d at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aten, 130 Wn.2d at 656 ). -16- State v. Cardenas-Flores (Zaida Yesenia), 93385-5 Federal courts and some state courts have rejected this corroboration rule for confessions in favor of a trustworthiness standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 , 75 S. Ct. 158 , 99 L.

2017Brockob, 159 Wn.2d at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aten, 130 Wn.2d at 656 ). -16- State v. Cardenas-Flores (Zaida Yesenia), 93385-5 Federal courts and some state courts have rejected this corroboration rule for confessions in favor of a trustworthiness standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 , 75 S. Ct. 158 , 99 L.

2019A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES “[C]orpus delicti is a corroboration rule that ‘prevent[s] defendants from being unjustly convicted based on confessions alone.’” State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243 , 252, 401 P.3d 19 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dow, 168 Wn.2d 243, 249 , 227 P.3d 1278 (2010)).

2019However, Ms. Kaur also testified that other items were stolen. 9 No. 35230-7-III State v. Cate Mr. Cate also argues it was improper to consider the $100 in cash because the corpus delicti is not established for this evidence. “[C]orpus delicti is a corroboration rule that ‘prevent[s] defendants from being unjustly convicted based on confessions alone.’” Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d at 252 (quoting State v. Dow, 168 Wn.2d 243, 249 , 227 P.3d 1278 (2010)).

2019A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES “[C]orpus delicti is a corroboration rule that ‘prevent[s] defendants from being unjustly convicted based on confessions alone.’” State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243 , 252, 401 P.3d 19 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dow, 168 Wn.2d 243, 249 , 227 P.3d 1278 (2010)).

2019However, Ms. Kaur also testified that other items were stolen. 9 No. 35230-7-III State v. Cate Mr. Cate also argues it was improper to consider the $100 in cash because the corpus delicti is not established for this evidence. “[C]orpus delicti is a corroboration rule that ‘prevent[s] defendants from being unjustly convicted based on confessions alone.’” Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d at 252 (quoting State v. Dow, 168 Wn.2d 243, 249 , 227 P.3d 1278 (2010)).

2025State v. Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 487 , 681 P.2d 227 (1984) (stating that “once [our Supreme Court] has decided an issue of state law, that interpretation is binding on all lower courts until it is overruled.”).

2025State v. Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 487 , 681 P.2d 227 (1984) (stating that “once [our Supreme Court] has decided an issue of state law, that interpretation is binding on all lower courts until it is overruled.”).

2017Specifically, "[t]he State must present other independent evidence ... that the crime a defendant described in the [corifession] actually occurred." Id. at 328 . 3 Essentially, corpus delicti is a corroboration rule that "prevent[ s] defendants from being unjustly convicted based on confessions alone." Dow, 168 Wn.2d at 249 ; see 3 A variety of terms have been used to describe defendants' statements when analyzing corpus delicti claims.

2017Brockob, 159 Wn.2d at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aten, 130 Wn.2d at 656 ). -16- State v. Cardenas-Flores (Zaida Yesenia), 93385-5 Federal courts and some state courts have rejected this corroboration rule for confessions in favor of a trustworthiness standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 , 75 S. Ct. 158 , 99 L.

2008Smith, 348 U.S. at 152-53 (emphasis added) (some citations omitted). ¶16 Nor do these controlling cases set out a common law basis for the corroboration rule; they note that the corroboration rule is a judicially-created exclusionary rule, necessary only to protect a defendant from being convicted based on unreliable evidence that can easily be misconstrued by a jury.

2008We observed in [Smith, 348 U.S. at 153 ], that the requirement of corroboration is rooted in “a long history of judicial experience with confessions and in the realization that sound law enforcement requires police investigations which extend beyond the words of the accused.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488-89 (footnote omitted). ¶19 And the federal courts have continued to recognize that the corroboration rule is not constitutionally based.

2008Division One of this court noted in C.D.W. that the conclusion that corpus delicti is not constitutionally based “finds [additional] support in the fact that the federal courts themselves have replaced the requirement that the elements of the corpus delicti be independently corroborated with a less stringent corroboration rule.” 76 Wn.

2008Corbett, 106 Wash.2d at 576 , 723 P.2d 1135 (emphasis added); see also C.D.W., 76 Wash.App. at 763 , 887 P.2d 911 . ¶ 13 Although these cases support the State's assertion that Washington's version of the corpus delicti rule is not a constitutional standard, they do not address whether the federal version of the corpus delicti rule is a constitutional standard. [7] To determine that issue, we must examine whether the corroboration rule discussed in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 , 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583 , cert. denied, 506 U.S. 989

2008This limitation is an additional indication that the corroboration requirement was not constitutionally based; had it been a constitutional limitation, it would have applied across the board at its inception. ¶18 Nine years later, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L.

2008This limitation is an additional indication that the corroboration requirement was not constitutionally based; had it been a constitutional limitation, it would have applied across the board at its inception. ¶18 Nine years later, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L.

2003Jones, 112 Wash.2d at 496 , 772 P.2d 496 (the statute's essential purposes should not be defeated by a stubborn insistence on corroboration that is impossible to obtain).

2003Jones, 112 Wn.2d at 496 (the statute’s essential purposes should not be defeated by a stubborn insistence on corroboration that is impossible to obtain).

1991RCW 9A.44.120; Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 170 .

1986See State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 174 .