corroboration requirement in New York

2021The corroboration requirement is satisfied by evidence that " 'tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth' " ( People v Reome , 15 NY3d 188, 192 [2010]).

2019Contrary to defendant's contention, the officer's testimony satisfies the corroboration requirement of CPL 60.22 because it " tends to connect . . . defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth' " (People v Reome, 15 NY3d 188, 192 [2010]; see People v Davis, 28 NY3d 294, 303 [2016]; People v Philbert, 270 AD2d 210, 210 [1st Dept 2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 856 [2000]; see also People v Young, 48 AD3d 901, 903 [3d Dept 2008]; People v Arrington, 31 AD3d 801, 803 [3d Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 865 [2006]; cf.

2016Contrary to defendant’s contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime of burglary in the second degree in this nonjury trial (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

2016Contrary to defendant’s contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime of burglary in the second degree in this nonjury trial (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

2019In light of the corroboration requirement for previous statements of abuse under Family Ct Act § 1046(a)(vi), respondent's due process concerns are unsupported ( see Nicole V. , 71 NY2d at 124 ).

2016The corroboration requirement is not demanding and may be “satisfied by any other evidence tending to support the reliability of the [child’s] previous statements” (Matter of Columbia County Dept. of Social Servs. v Kristin M., 92 AD3d 1101, 1103 [2012]), but mere “repetition of an accusation” will not suffice (Matter of Cobane v Cobane, 57 AD3d 1320, 1321 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 706 [2009]; see Matter of Nicole V., 71 NY2d 112, 124 [1987]).

2013The testimony of the Medical Examiner that the victim died from a gunshot wound and the victim’s statements that he was “shot” and “robbed” satisfy the minimal corroboration requirement of CPL 60.50 that some “additional proof that the offense[s] charged [have] been committed” be presented (see People v Lipsky, 57 NY2d 560, 571 [1982], rearg denied 58 NY2d 824 [1983]; Smielecki, 77 AD3d at 1422 ).

2013The testimony of the Medical Examiner that the victim died from a gunshot wound and the victim’s statements that he was “shot” and “robbed” satisfy the minimal corroboration requirement of CPL 60.50 that some “additional proof that the offense[s] charged [have] been committed” be presented (see People v Lipsky, 57 NY2d 560, 571 [1982], rearg denied 58 NY2d 824 [1983]; Smielecki, 77 AD3d at 1422 ).

2016Contrary to defendant’s contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime of burglary in the second degree in this nonjury trial (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

2016Contrary to defendant’s contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime of burglary in the second degree in this nonjury trial (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

2023Rather, the corroboration requirement is satisfied by "some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was [*2]committed by someone" ( People v Daniels , 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; accord People v Bateman , 212 AD3d at 995 ; People v Baltes , 75 AD3d 656, 659 [3d Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 918 [2010]; see People v Hebert , 218 AD3d at 1004 ).

2012Such additional proof, however, “need not establish guilt or every detail of the crime or confession” (People v Johnson, 79 AD3d 1264, 1266 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 832 [2011]); rather, the corroboration requirement “is satisfied by the production of some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” (People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; accord People v Thompson, 75 AD3d 760, 764 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 893 , 894, 896 [2010]; see People v Baltes, 75 AD3d 656, 659 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 918 [2010]; People v Brown, 20 AD3d 577, 578 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 826 [20

2016We agree with defendant that County Court failed to acknowledge that “the definition of an accomplice for the purpose of the corroboration rule differs significantly from the definition of an accomplice for purposes of accomplice criminal liability” (People v Medeiros, 116 AD3d 1096, 1098 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1045 [2014]; see People v Berger, 52 NY2d 214, 219 [1981]).

2016We agree with defendant that -3- 105693 County Court failed to acknowledge that "the definition of an accomplice for the purpose of the corroboration rule differs significantly from the definition of an accomplice for purposes of accomplice criminal liability" (People v Medeiros, 116 AD3d 1096, 1098 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1045 [2014]; see People v Berger, 52 NY2d 214, 219 [1981]).

2018If, however, the trial court finds that "different inferences may reasonably be drawn from the proof regarding complicity" ( People v Basch , 36 NY2d 154, 157 [1975]; accord People v Caban , 5 NY3d at 152-153 ), then the court must submit that factual question to the jury for resolution and instruct the jury "to apply the corroboration requirement only if [it] makes a factual finding that the witness is an accomplice in fact" ( People v Sage , 23 NY3d at 24 ; see People v Sweet , 78 NY2d 263, 266 [1991]).

2016The inclusion of paragraph (b) was intended to expand the definition of an accomplice "'in order to provide a more equitable, operable and consistent standard for the courts in determining when the requirement of corroboration is applicable'" (People v Basch, 36 NY2d 154, 157 [1975], quoting People v Beaudet, 32 NY2d 371, 378 [1973]).

2023Rather, the corroboration requirement is satisfied by "some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was [*2]committed by someone" ( People v Daniels , 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; accord People v Bateman , 212 AD3d at 995 ; People v Baltes , 75 AD3d 656, 659 [3d Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 918 [2010]; see People v Hebert , 218 AD3d at 1004 ).

2013While it is true that defendant cannot be convicted solely upon the basis of his admissions to Seeley (as embodied in a voice mail that defendant left Seeley on the evening of the burglary 1 and their face-to-face conversation the following morning), the corroboration requirement set forth in CPL 60.50 “merely requires some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” (People v McGee, 20 NY3d 513, 517 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Lapi, 105 AD3d 1084, 1086 [2013]; People v Flemming, 101 AD3d 1483 , 1485 [2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 942 [

2016The corroboration rule rested on policy considerations expressed in the penal statutes up until the 1970s, which insisted on clear proof of sexual misconduct because of general skepticism about accusations of misconduct which were easily made but difficult to disprove (People v Groff, 71 NY2d 101 [1987]).

2009“The corroboration standard . . . requires proof of circumstances tending to prove the material facts of the crime and tending to connect the defendant to that crime” (People v Guerra, 178 AD2d 434 , 434-435 [1991]; see generally People v Groff, 71 NY2d 101, 109 [1987]).

2010This Court has held that consciousness of guilt evidence (e.g., an individual’s nervousness when confronted by the police) is considered very weak evidence and does not necessarily meet the corroboration requirement of CPL 60.22 (1) (see People v Moses, 63 NY2d 299, 309 [1984]; People v Reddy, 261 NY 479, 487-488 [1933]).

2010This Court has held that consciousness of guilt evidence (e.g., an individual's nervousness when confronted by the police) is considered very weak evidence and does not necessarily meet the corroboration requirement of CPL 60.22 (1) ( see People v Moses, 63 NY2d 299, 309 [1984]; People v Reddy, 261 NY 479, 487-488 [1933]). *197 Finally, the majority considers how the victim's testimony indicating the number of perpetrators and the method of attack "harmonizes" with the accomplice's details.

2021The foregoing evidence was sufficient to satisfy the corroboration requirement of CPL 60.50 ( see People v Booden , 69 NY2d 185 [1987]; People v Beauzyl , 56 Misc 3d 141[A] , 2017 NY Slip Op 51118[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]; People v Youmans , 34 Misc 3d 143[A] , 2012 NY Slip Op 50098[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]).

2019The corroboration requirement serves simply "to avoid the possibility that a crime may be confessed when, in fact, no crime has been committed" ( People v Booden , 69 NY2d 185, 187 [1987]; see also People v Murray , 40 NY2d 327, 331-332 [1976]).

2013Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Potter, 262 AD2d 1074, 1074 [1999]; see generally People v Smith, 55 NY2d 945, 947 [1982]), we conclude that the 13-year-old victim’s testimony that defendant had sexual intercourse with her was sufficient to meet the corroboration requirement.

2013Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Potter, 262 AD2d 1074, 1074 [1999]; see generally People v Smith, 55 NY2d 945, 947 [1982]), we conclude that the 13-year-old victim’s testimony that defendant had sexual intercourse with her was sufficient to meet the corroboration requirement.

1972The statutory requirement of corroboration in áll rape cases and under the revised Penal Law in crimes prosecuted under article 130, as well as the judicially created rule extending the corroboration requirement to. crimes intrinsically related to rape or committed in aid of effecting a rape (Penal Law, § 130.15; People v. Lo Verde, 7 N Y 2d 114; People v. English, 16 N Y 2d 719; see, also, People v. Moore, 23 N Y 2d 565, 567-568), finds plausible, if not redoubtable, justification in protecting against the danger of false accusations (People v. Yannucci, 258 App. Div. 171, 173 ; Matter of Sam

1972As stated recently by the Court of Appeals in People v. Linzy (31 N Y 2d 99, 102) decided July 7,1972: “ The statutory requirement of corroboration in all rape cases and under the revised Penal Law in crimes prosecuted under article 130, as well as.the judicially created rule extending the corroboration requirement to crimes intrinsically related to rape or committed in aid of effecting rape (Penal Law, § 130.15; People v. Lo Verde , 7 N Y 2d 114; People v. English, 16 N Y 2d 719; see, also, People v. Moore , 23 N Y 2d 565, 567-568), finds plausible, if not redoubtable, justification in protec

2012Such additional proof, however, “need not establish guilt or every detail of the crime or confession” (People v Johnson, 79 AD3d 1264, 1266 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 832 [2011]); rather, the corroboration requirement “is satisfied by the production of some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” (People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; accord People v Thompson, 75 AD3d 760, 764 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 893 , 894, 896 [2010]; see People v Baltes, 75 AD3d 656, 659 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 918 [2010]; People v Brown, 20 AD3d 577, 578 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 826 [20

2012Such additional proof, however, “need not establish guilt or every detail of the crime or confession” (People v Johnson, 79 AD3d 1264, 1266 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 832 [2011]); rather, the corroboration requirement “is satisfied by the production of some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” (People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; accord People v Thompson, 75 AD3d 760, 764 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 893 , 894, 896 [2010]; see People v Baltes, 75 AD3d 656, 659 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 918 [2010]; People v Brown, 20 AD3d 577, 578 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 826 [20

2023On this record, the corroboration requirement of CPL 60.50 was satisfied ( see People v Murray , 40 NY2d 327, 332-333 [1976], cert denied 430 US 948 [1977]; People v Moore , 185 AD3d 1544, 1544 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1096 [2020]).

2019The corroboration requirement serves simply "to avoid the possibility that a crime may be confessed when, in fact, no crime has been committed" ( People v Booden , 69 NY2d 185, 187 [1987]; see also People v Murray , 40 NY2d 327, 331-332 [1976]).

2016The inclusion of paragraph (b) was intended to expand the definition of an accomplice “ ‘in order to provide a more equitable, operable and consistent standard for the courts in determining when the requirement of corroboration is applicable’ ” (People v Basch, 36 NY2d 154, 157 [1975], quoting People v Beaudet, 32 NY2d 371, 378 [1973]).

2016The inclusion of paragraph (b) was intended to expand the definition of an accomplice "'in order to provide a more equitable, operable and consistent standard for the courts in determining when the requirement of corroboration is applicable'" (People v Basch, 36 NY2d 154, 157 [1975], quoting People v Beaudet, 32 NY2d 371, 378 [1973]).

2013“Whether this corroboration requirement has been satisfied is a ‘fine judgment’ entrusted in the first instance to Family Court, which has the advantage of having heard and seen the various witnesses” (Matter of Jared XX., 276 AD2d 980 , 981 [2000], quoting Matter of Christina F., 74 NY2d 532, 536 [1989]; see Matter of Miranda HH. [Thomas HH.], 80 AD3d at 899 ; Matter of Justin CC. [Tina CC.], 77 AD3d 1056, 1057 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 702 [2011]).

2013“Whether this corroboration requirement has been satisfied is a ‘fine judgment’ entrusted in the first instance to Family Court, which has the advantage of having heard and seen the various witnesses” (Matter of Jared XX., 276 AD2d 980 , 981 [2000], quoting Matter of Christina F., 74 NY2d 532, 536 [1989]; see Matter of Miranda HH. [Thomas HH.], 80 AD3d at 899 ; Matter of Justin CC. [Tina CC.], 77 AD3d 1056, 1057 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 702 [2011]).

2002The corroboration requirement is satisfied if the nonaccomplice evidence “tends to connect a defendant to the crime in a manner sufficient to satisfy the jury that an accomplice is telling the truth” (People v Crow, 284 AD2d 653, 653 , lv denied 96 NY2d 900 ; see People v Steinberg, supra at 683).

2001The corroboration requirement of CPL 60.22 (1) is satisfied by nonaccomplice evidence which tends to connect a defendant to the crime in a manner sufficient to satisfy the jury that an accomplice is telling the truth (see, People v Steinberg, 79 NY2d 673, 683 ).

1998(People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 589-590 [1997]; People v McCray, 198 AD2d 200, 201 [1st Dept 1993].) The corroboration requirement is met merely by proof of circumstances “ ‘ “calculated to suggest the commission of crime, and for the explanation of which the confession furnishes the key” ’ ”.

1998We reject the contention of defendant that her statement was not sufficiently corroborated under CPL 60.50, which provides that “[a] person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed.” The corroboration requirement “does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged” (People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 589 ), but calls only for “some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” (People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 ).

2018If the trial court concludes, based upon the undisputed evidence, that "the jury could [*2]reasonably reach no other conclusion but that" the witness is an accomplice within the meaning of CPL 60.22 (2), then the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law and the court must instruct the jury that the witness is an accomplice, subject to the statutory corroboration requirement ( People v Besser , 96 NY2d 136, 147 [2001]; see People v Sage , 23 NY3d 16, 23 [2014]; People v Caban , 5 NY3d 143, 153 [2005]).

2005Thus, Supreme Court did not err in declining to charge the jury that Moshier was an accomplice as a matter of law for purposes of the corroboration requirement (see CPL 60.22 [2]; People v Tusa, supra at 156 ; see generally People v Besser, 96 NY2d 136, 147 [2001]; cf. People v Sweet, 78 NY2d 263, 266-267 [1991]).

2011The foregoing provides the requisite “slim corroborative linkage to otherwise independently probative evidence from” Hart, thereby satisfying the corroboration requirement (People v Breland, 83 NY2d 286, 294 [1994]; see People v Gilbo, 52 AD3d 952, 953-954 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 788 [2008]).

2003Were we to review this claim, we would find that the corroboration requirement (CPL 60.22) was fully satisfied by the testimony of the victim’s sister who placed the victim with defendant at the time of the murder and by a statement provided by defendant in which he admitted knowing of the plan to kill the victim and being at the scene when the crime was committed (see People v Breland, 83 NY2d 286, 292-294 [1994]).

2013Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree inasmuch as his motion for a trial order of dismissal was not “ ‘specifically directed’ at the alleged error[s]” asserted on appeal (People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]).

2002Defendant’s contention that there is legally insufficient evidence to satisfy the corroboration requirement of CPL 60.50 with respect to certain crimes charged in the indictment is not preserved for our review (see 470.05 [2]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 ).

2018If, however, the trial court finds that "different inferences may reasonably be drawn from the proof regarding complicity" ( People v Basch , 36 NY2d 154, 157 [1975]; accord People v Caban , 5 NY3d at 152-153 ), then the court must submit that factual question to the jury for resolution and instruct the jury "to apply the corroboration requirement only if [it] makes a factual finding that the witness is an accomplice in fact" ( People v Sage , 23 NY3d at 24 ; see People v Sweet , 78 NY2d 263, 266 [1991]).

2005Thus, Supreme Court did not err in declining to charge the jury that Moshier was an accomplice as a matter of law for purposes of the corroboration requirement (see CPL 60.22 [2]; People v Tusa, supra at 156 ; see generally People v Besser, 96 NY2d 136, 147 [2001]; cf. People v Sweet, 78 NY2d 263, 266-267 [1991]).