corroboration rule in Missouri

1996“Conflict between the testimony of the victim and other witnesses does not require application of the corroboration rule.” Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 310 ; State v. Gardner, 849 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Mo.App.1993).

1995The corroboration rule does not apply when the inconsistencies or contradictions in the victim’s trial testimony involved “proof not essential to the case.” State v. Gardner, 849 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Mo.App.1993).

2007“Conflict between the testimony of the victim and other witnesses does not require application of the corroboration rule.” Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 310 ; see Waddell, 164 S.W.3d at 553 .

2005“Conflict between the testimony of the victim and other witnesses does not require application of the corroboration rule.” Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 310 .

1996Defendant relies on State v. Kuzma, 751 S.W.2d 54, 58 (Mo.App.W.D.1987), for the proposition that inconsistencies which will trigger the corroboration rule may come from out-of-court statements even though the victim's in-court testimony was firm.

1995That is because Kuz-ma holds the corroboration rule does not apply where the inconsistency or contradiction bears on proof not essential to the case. 751 S.W.2d at 58 [3].

2013Defendant ignores, however, that both Waddell and Gatewood — the only cases cited by Defendant in support of his argument — declined to apply the corroboration rule where the challenged inconsistencies were between a witness’s trial testimony and the witness’s out-of-court statements. 8 Waddell, 164 S.W.3d at 553-54 ; Gatewood, 965 S.W.2d at 857 . “ ‘[T]he corroboration rule ... does not apply to conflicts between the-victim’s trial testimony and the victim’s out-of-court statements.”’ Waddell, 164 S.W.3d at 553 (quoting State v. Paxton, 140 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Mo.App.2004) (emphasis added in Wad

2010Appellant is misguided in the application of the corroboration rule as it “applies only to inconsistencies within the victim’s trial testimony and does not apply to conflicts between the victim’s trial testimony and the victim’s out-of-court statements.” See Paxton, 140 S.W.3d at 230 .

2014Alternatively, this Court has stated that the corroboration rule applies when “ ‘the victim’s testimony is so contradictory and in conflict with physical facts, surrounding circumstances and common experience, that its validity is thereby rendered doubtful.’ ” State v. Silvey, 894 S.W.2d 662, 673 (Mo. banc 1995) (quoting State v. Harris, 620 S.W.2d 349 , *212 353 (Mo. banc 1981)).

2013S.D.2004)); see also State v. Silvey, 894 S.W.2d 662, 673 (Mo. banc 1995) (inconsistencies in trial testimony, even as to essential elements, do not suffice to invoke the corroboration exception absent any conflict with physical facts, surrounding circumstances, and common experience).

2013Defendant ignores, however, that both Waddell and Gatewood — the only cases cited by Defendant in support of his argument — declined to apply the corroboration rule where the challenged inconsistencies were between a witness’s trial testimony and the witness’s out-of-court statements. 8 Waddell, 164 S.W.3d at 553-54 ; Gatewood, 965 S.W.2d at 857 . “ ‘[T]he corroboration rule ... does not apply to conflicts between the-victim’s trial testimony and the victim’s out-of-court statements.”’ Waddell, 164 S.W.3d at 553 (quoting State v. Paxton, 140 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Mo.App.2004) (emphasis added in Wad

2003See Baker, 23 S.W.3d at 709 (stating that discrepancies about facts surrounding when the incidents happened did not relate to an essential element of the case when the victim’s trial testimony was unambiguous in detailing the elements of the offense); Gatewood, 965 S.W.2d at 857 (stating that the victim’s uncertainty about the day of the week on which the alleged rape occurred does not trigger the corroboration rule; she was certain of the date of the rape).

1994See State v. Nelson, 818 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Mo.App.1991); State v. Ellis, 710 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Mo.App.1986); State v. Platt, 496 S.W.2d 878, 880-81 (Mo.App.1973).” In addition to its formal portions, the information charged, in Count I, that the defendant, on or about April 26, 1990, in Scott County, “had sexual intercourse with C.R., to whom defendant was not married, without the consent of C.R. by the use of forcible compulsion.” Count II charged that on or about April 26, 1990, in Scott County, the defendant “knowingly entered unlawfully in an inhabitable structure located at 804 W.

1992See State v. Ellis, 710 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Mo.App.1986), for a discussion of cases criticizing the corroboration rule. 5 .

1993The corroboration rule 2 does not apply where the inconsistency or contradiction is between the testimony of the victim and that of other witnesses, State v. Sladek, supra, at 310; State v. Nelson, 818 S.W.2d 285, 289 [7] (Mo.App.1991), or where the inconsistency or contradiction bears on proof not essential to the case.

1993The corroboration rule does not apply merely because the testimony of the victim “falls into inconsistencies or contradictions as to minor points of a nonessential nature.” State v. Nelson, supra, at 289; State v. Koonce, 731 S.W.2d 431, 439-440 (Mo.App.1987).

2014Alternatively, this Court has stated that the corroboration rule applies when “ ‘the victim’s testimony is so contradictory and in conflict with physical facts, surrounding circumstances and common experience, that its validity is thereby rendered doubtful.’ ” State v. Silvey, 894 S.W.2d 662, 673 (Mo. banc 1995) (quoting State v. Harris, 620 S.W.2d 349 , *212 353 (Mo. banc 1981)).

1998The corroboration rule the defendant relies upon is triggered where the victim’s testimony is “so contradictory and in conflict with physical facts, surrounding circumstances, and common experience, that its validity is thereby rendered doubtful.” State v. Harris, 620 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Mo. banc 1981).

2014State v. Wright, 998 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Mo.App.1999).

2007As in the destructive contradictions doctrine, the corroboration rule has no application “ ‘to contradictions between the victim’s trial testimony and prior out-of-court statements, to contradictions as to collateral matters, or to inconsistencies not sufficient to make the testimony inherently self-destructive.’ ” State v. Cole, 148 S.W.3d 896, 902 (Mo.App.2004) (quoting State v. Wright, 998 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Mo.App.1999)).

2013See, e.g., Paulson, 220 S.W.3d at 833 (noting that the corroboration rule does not apply to inconsistencies regarding collateral matters); Anderson, 348 S.W.3d at 844 (holding that the victim’s testimony was sufficient to support a conviction for statutory sodomy even though it conflicted with the defendant’s denial of the offense).

2010Section 566.067.1 provides: “[a] person commits the crime of child molestation in the first degree if he or she subjects another person who is less than fourteen years of age to sexual contact.” Section 566.010(3) defines “sexual contact” as “any touching of another person with the genitals or any touching of the genitals or anus of another person, or the breast of a female person, or such touching through the clothing, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person .... ” Appellant argues that the doctrine of destructive contradictions and the corroboration rule apply t

1998To invoke the corroboration rule, the victim’s trial testimony must be so contradictory and so conflicting as to be “inherently incredible, self-destructive or opposed to known physical facts.” Id.

1996Similarly, the corroboration requirement does not apply when the victim’s testimony is inconsistent with her prior out-of-court statements. 7 State v. Marlow, 888 S.W.2d at 421-22 ; State v. Creason, 847 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Mo.App.W.D.1993).

2003Lee, 404 S.W.2d at 747-48 ; Salkil, 659 S.W.2d at 333 .

1989State v. Salkil, 659 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Mo.App.1983).

2013Defendant ignores, however, that both Waddell and Gatewood — the only cases cited by Defendant in support of his argument — declined to apply the corroboration rule where the challenged inconsistencies were between a witness’s trial testimony and the witness’s out-of-court statements. 8 Waddell, 164 S.W.3d at 553-54 ; Gatewood, 965 S.W.2d at 857 . “ ‘[T]he corroboration rule ... does not apply to conflicts between the-victim’s trial testimony and the victim’s out-of-court statements.”’ Waddell, 164 S.W.3d at 553 (quoting State v. Paxton, 140 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Mo.App.2004) (emphasis added in Wad

2013Defendant ignores, however, that both Waddell and Gatewood — the only cases cited by Defendant in support of his argument — declined to apply the corroboration rule where the challenged inconsistencies were between a witness’s trial testimony and the witness’s out-of-court statements. 8 Waddell, 164 S.W.3d at 553-54 ; Gatewood, 965 S.W.2d at 857 . “ ‘[T]he corroboration rule ... does not apply to conflicts between the-victim’s trial testimony and the victim’s out-of-court statements.”’ Waddell, 164 S.W.3d at 553 (quoting State v. Paxton, 140 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Mo.App.2004) (emphasis added in Wad

2007Indeed, “[t]he trend in Missouri has been to limit the application of the corroboration rule [enunciated in Pierce ] to the victim’s trial testimony.” State v. Griggs, 999 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Mo.App.1998).

2004“Generally, in sexual offense cases the victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction, even if uncorroborated.” State v. Sprinkle, 122 S.W.3d 652, 666 (Mo.App.2003); see also State v. Griggs, 999 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Mo.App.1998); State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Mo. banc 1992).

2024And more importantly, the “corroboration rule” established in Pierce was later abrogated by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208, 212-213 (Mo. banc 2014): The corroboration rule is abolished in Missouri.

2015Second, the corroboration rule only applied to victims of sex crimes, therefore assuming that a sex crime victim’s testimony is less credible than another crime victim’s testimony and that “judges and juries are uniquely unable to make accurate factual determinations in sex crime cases.” Id.

2013The corroboration rule is more properly referred to as the corroboration exception to the general rule that “in sexual offense eases[,] the victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction, even if uncorroborated.” State v. Sprinkle, 122 S.W.3d 652, 666 (Mo.App.

2013The corroboration rule is more properly referred to as the corroboration exception to the general rule that “in sexual offense eases[,] the victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction, even if uncorroborated.” State v. Sprinkle, 122 S.W.3d 652, 666 (Mo.App.

2004Id. at 58 .

1996Similarly, the corroboration requirement does not apply when the victim’s testimony is inconsistent with her prior out-of-court statements. 7 State v. Marlow, 888 S.W.2d at 421-22 ; State v. Creason, 847 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Mo.App.W.D.1993).

1992State v. Daniel, 767 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Mo.App.1989).

1992State v. Daniel, 767 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Mo.App.1989).

2013Both rules find their genesis in sexual offense cases, where the testimony of the victim was considered highly suspect, based upon “ ‘[t]he admonition of Lord Hale that it must be remembered that this is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent.’ ” State v. Peters, 186 S.W.3d 774 , 780 n. 4 (Mo.App.

2013See, e.g., Peters, 186 S.W.3d at 778 (where defendant sought to invoke the corroboration exception in response to the victim’s testimony about sexual abuse occurring in seemingly impossible body positions, and in situations where surrounding circumstances indicated that the abuse would have been doubtful).

2006The corroboration requirement “is triggered only by contradictions in the victim’s trial testimony, and not by inconsistencies with his out-of-court statements or the testimony of other witnesses.” State v. Graham, 906 S.W.2d 771, 778 (Mo.App.

1999See, e.g., State v. Harris, 620 S.W.2d 349, 353-54 (Mo. banc 1981) (application limited to the victim’s testimony at trial); State v. Gatewood, 965 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Mo.App.1998) (rule applied to victim’s testimony); State v. George, 921 S.W.2d 638, 643 (Mo.App.1996) (refusing to apply the rule to conflicts between the victim’s testimony and the victim’s out-of-court statements); State v. Graham, 906 S.W.2d 771, 778 (Mo.App. 1995) (stating the rule applied only to trial testimony and not to out-of-court statements).

2014State v. Wadel, 398 S.W.3d 68, 79 (Mo.App.2013).

2013This court has recently addressed a nearly identical argument in Wadel , where we set forth the history and distinctions between the corroboration rule and the destructive contradictions doctrine. 398 S.W.3d at 79 .

2011To put it another way, the corroboration rule does not apply to inconsistencies not sufficient to make “the testimony inherently self-destructive.” State v. Miller, 250 S.W.3d 736, 745 (Mo.App.

2010See, e.g., State v. Miller, 250 S.W.3d 736, 744-45 (Mo.App.2008).

2010Under the corroboration rule, corroboration of a victim’s testimony “ ‘is mandated only when the victim’s testimony is so contradictory and in conflict with physical facts, surrounding circumstances and common experience, that its validity is rendered doubtful such that corroboration of the victim’s testimony is required to sustain the conviction.’ ” State v. Paxton, 140 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Mo.App.2004) (quoting State v. Baker, 23 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Mo.App.2000)). “‘Further, the rule is not applied merely because the testimony of the victim includes inconsistencies or contradictions as to minor poi

2010Under the corroboration rule, corroboration of a victim’s testimony “ ‘is mandated only when the victim’s testimony is so contradictory and in conflict with physical facts, surrounding circumstances and common experience, that its validity is rendered doubtful such that corroboration of the victim’s testimony is required to sustain the conviction.’ ” State v. Paxton, 140 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Mo.App.2004) (quoting State v. Baker, 23 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Mo.App.2000)). “‘Further, the rule is not applied merely because the testimony of the victim includes inconsistencies or contradictions as to minor poi

2008The corroboration rule does not apply to “inconsistencies not sufficient to make the testimony inherently self-destructive.” Paulson, 220 S.W.3d at 833 (quoting State v. Cole, 148 S.W.3d 896, 902 (Mo.App.

2007As in the destructive contradictions doctrine, the corroboration rule has no application “ ‘to contradictions between the victim’s trial testimony and prior out-of-court statements, to contradictions as to collateral matters, or to inconsistencies not sufficient to make the testimony inherently self-destructive.’ ” State v. Cole, 148 S.W.3d 896, 902 (Mo.App.2004) (quoting State v. Wright, 998 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Mo.App.1999)).

2010“The corroboration rule is only triggered when ‘the victim’s testimony is so contradictory or inconsistent as to deprive it of all probative force.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Benwire, 98 S.W.3d 618 , 623 n. 2 (Mo.App.2003)).

2005Furthermore, “the corroboration rule ... does not apply to conflicts between the victim’s trial testimony and the victim’s out-of-court statements.” State v. Paxton, 140 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Mo.App.2004) (emphasis added); State v. Benwire, 98 S.W.3d 618 , 623 n. 2 (Mo.App.2003). “ ‘Any contradictions between a witness’s trial testimony and any previous testimony or statements are for the ... trier of fact to reconcile and consider when judging the witness’s credibility.’ ” Paxton, 140 S.W.3d at 230 (quoting State v. Helmig, 924 S.W.2d 562, 565 (Mo. App.1996)).

2024Pierce only applied as an exception to that general rule and was “restricted to its unique factual situation.” State v. Duley, 219 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Lewis, 431 S.W.3d at 12 (“Its use is also growing increasingly disfavored beyond its limited application such as to the specific facts at issue in Pierce.”).

2008Id.

2013“The doctrine is not a corroboration rule.... ” State v. Case, 140 S.W.3d 80, 92 (Mo.App.

2013See id. at 91-92 .

2013In making his argument, Wadel relies extensively on State v. Pierce, 906 S.W.2d 729, 735-36 (Mo.App.

2003In this point, Benwire appears to be arguing: (1) that K.T. completely denied on the witness stand that anything happened, and therefore this case, like State v. Pierce, 906 S.W.2d 729 (Mo.App.1995), should be reversed; 1 (2) that KT.’s in-court testimony was so contradictory and inconsistent that the corroboration rule is triggered; 2 and (3) that testimony concerning KT.’s out-of-court statements presented pursuant to § 491.075 cannot alone support the conviction without those statements themselves being corroborated.