corroboration requirement in Texas

2021See Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d at 598 (“The corroboration requirement in Article 38.14 does not apply separately to each element of the offense charged or to each aspect of the accomplice’s testimony.”); Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257 (corroborating evidence need not prove defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt by itself); Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 462 (corroborating evidence need not directly connect defendant to crime).

2011Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

2026When the evidence of the witness’s complicity is inconclusive, “the accomplice-witness instruction asks the jury to (1) decide whether the witness is an accomplice as a matter of fact, and (2) apply the corroboration requirement, but only if it has first determined that the witness is an accomplice.” Zamora v. State, 411 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim.

2025This corroboration requirement reflects “a legislative determination that accomplice testimony implicating another person should be viewed with a measure of caution, because accomplices often have incentives to lie, such as to avoid punishment or shift blame to another person.” Zamora v. State, 411 S.W.3d 504, 509 (Tex. Crim.

2010App. 2002)); see also Gribble, 808 S.W.2d at 71 (“[T]he essential purpose of the corroboration requirement is to assure that no person be convicted without some independent evidence showing that the very crime to which he confessed was actually committed . . . .”).

2010App. 2002)); see also Gribble , 808 S.W.2d at 71 ("[T]he essential purpose of the corroboration requirement is to assure that no person be convicted without some independent evidence showing that the very crime to which he confessed was actually committed . . . .").

2014See, e.g., Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. Crim.

2006Under the egregious harm standard, the failure to provide the corroboration instruction generally constitutes harmless error unless the corroborating evidence is "'so unconvincing in fact as to render the State's overall case for conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive.'" Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 (quoting Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim.

2021“The corroboration requirement . . . does not apply separately to each element of the offense charged or to each aspect of the accomplice’s testimony.” State v. Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d 587, 598 (Tex. Crim.

2021See Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d at 598 (“The corroboration requirement in Article 38.14 does not apply separately to each element of the offense charged or to each aspect of the accomplice’s testimony.”); Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257 (corroborating evidence need not prove defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt by itself); Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 462 (corroborating evidence need not directly connect defendant to crime).

2015The statute sets out an “implicit ‘If-then’ proposition: If the evidence raises an issue of [the witness's status as an accomplice], then the trial court shall instruct the jury [regarding the corroboration requirement].” Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 180 (generally discussing group of statutes, including accomplice-witness statute, that “require an instruction under the particular circumstances” and, therefore, constitute “law applicable to the case”).

2013The statute sets out an “implicit ‘If-then’ proposition: If the evidence raises an issue of [the witness’s status as an accomplice], then the trial court shall instruct the jury [regarding the corroboration requirement].” Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 180 (generally discussing group of statutes, including accomplice-witness statute, that “require[] an instruction under the particular circumstances” and, therefore, constitute “law applicable to the case”).

2010Lankford, 255 S.W.3d at 277; see Richardson v. State, 700 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. Crim.

2010Lankford, 255 S.W.3d at 277 ; see Richardson v. State, 700 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

2026See Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 445–47 (suspicious behavior before or after crime may satisfy corroboration requirement); see also Lydic v. State, No. 14-23-00918-CR, 2025 WL 1587760 , at *5 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] June 5, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Smith for this proposition); Haynes v. State, No. 11-11-00197- CR, 2013 WL 3089373 , at *9 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

2024But when there is conflicting or inconclusive evidence regarding the witness’s complicity, “then the accomplice-witness instruction asks the jury to (1) decide whether the witness is an accomplice as a matter of fact, and (2) apply the corroboration requirement, but only if it has first determined that the witness is an accomplice.” Id.; see also Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 439–40 (recognizing that “[w]hen there is doubt as to whether a witness is an accomplice (i.e., the evidence is conflicting), then the trial judge may instruct the jury to determine a witness’s status as a fact issue”)..

2008Indeed, in United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1098-1101 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation requires more corroboration for third-party statements that inculpate the defendant than for statements exculpating him. .

2008Indeed, in United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1098-1101 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation requires more corroboration for third-party statements that inculpate the defendant than for statements exculpating him. [37] Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 . [38] Id. [39] Id. [40] Id. at 599-600, 114 S.Ct. 2431 . [41] Id. at 600, 114 S.Ct. 2431 . [42] Id. at 600-01, 114 S.Ct. 2431 . [43] Id. at 601, 114 S.Ct. 2431 (citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 , 106 S.Ct. 2056 , 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986)). [44] Id. at 604, 114 S.C

2023But if the evidence presented by the parties is conflicting, the trial court “should allow the jury to decide whether the inculpatory witness is an accomplice witness as a matter of fact under instructions defining the term ‘accomplice.’” Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 498–99; see Ash, 533 S.W.3d at 884 (“If the record contains evidence that a witness may have been an accomplice, the issue should be submitted to the jury to decide whether the witness was an accomplice as a matter of fact.”); Zamora, 411 S.W.3d at 510 (“[W]hen the evidence presented by the parties as to the witness’s complicity is confl

2023There must be “some evidence of an affirmative act on the part of the witness to assist in the commission of the charged offense before such an instruction is required.” Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 499 .

2021Salazar v. State, 86 S.W.3d 640 , 644–45 (Tex. Crim.

2015Specifically, the State cites decisions from the United States Supreme Court holding that due-process principles are violated when a confession is coerced by psychological or physical means; holding that a suspect in custody, and before interrogation, must be apprised of his rights; and holding that since the corpus delicti rule was first applied in Texas, the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a case may now be 4 Compare Salazar v. State, 86 S.W.3d 640 , 64–65 (Tex. Crim.

2021“The corroboration requirement [for informant testimony] is similar to the corroboration required of an accomplice witness, and the same standard of review applies for each.” Padilla v. State, 462 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.— 8 Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253 , 257–58 (Tex. Crim.

2021See Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d at 598 (“The corroboration requirement in Article 38.14 does not apply separately to each element of the offense charged or to each aspect of the accomplice’s testimony.”); Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257 (corroborating evidence need not prove defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt by itself); Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 462 (corroborating evidence need not directly connect defendant to crime).

2017See Blake v. State, 971 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. Crim.

2005Young , 95 S.W.3d at 451 ; Blake , 971 S.W.2d at 454 ; Cantelon v. State , 85 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, no pet.).

2011The court in Bingham assumed the hearsay statement would be subjected to its own reliability and corroboration requirement under rule 803(24) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. 913 S.W.2d at 212 ("other evidentiary rules ensure some circumstantial guarantee of reliability before an out-of-court statement of an accomplice will withstand objection”); id. at 211 ("In the context of this case that means that the out-of-court statements of [the accomplice] were admissible, if at all, only as statements against penal interest, a hearsay exception that is subject to a corroboration requirement of its ow

2011The court in Bingham assumed the hearsay statement would be subjected to its own reliability and corroboration requirement under rule 803(24) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. 913 S.W.2d at 212 ("other evidentiary rules ensure some circumstantial guarantee of reliability before an out-of-court statement of an accomplice will withstand objection”); id. at 211 ("In the context of this case that means that the out-of-court statements of [the accomplice] were admissible, if at all, only as statements against penal interest, a hearsay exception that is subject to a corroboration requirement of its ow

1993See Ramirez v. State, 543 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App.1976).

1993See Ramirez v. State , 543 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim.

2023Although a defendant’s mere presence at the scene of the crime, by itself, is not sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony, such evidence “when coupled with other suspicious circumstances, may tend to connect the accused to the crime so as to furnish sufficient corroboration to support a conviction.” Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257 (quoting Brown v. State, 672 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim.

2021Although a defendant’s mere presence at the scene of the crime, by itself, is not sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony, such evidence “when coupled with other suspicious circumstances, may tend to connect the accused to the crime so as to furnish sufficient corroboration to support a conviction.” Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257 (quoting Brown v. State, 672 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim.

2022Lumsden v. State, 564 S.W.3d 858, 875 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d) (citing TEX.

2022Lumsden v. State, 564 S.W.3d 858, 875 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d) (citing TEX.

2019See Pena v. State, 251 S.W.3d 601, 608 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d).

2015Cf. Pena, 251 S.W.3d at 611 (Holding failure to give a corroboration instruction not egregious harm even when State misstated the law and said confidential informant’s testimony did not need to be corroborated.) Viewing the record in its entirety, this Court can conclude that the evidence corroborating Trejo’s testimony was not “so unconvincing in fact as 13 to render the State’s overall case for conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive.” Casanova, 383 S.W.3d at 534 .

2015Lankford v. State, 255 S.W.3d 275, 277 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref’d) (comparing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15.031 (c) with Tex. Code Crim.

2009Lankford v. State , 255 S.W.3d 275, 277 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref’d) (comparing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15.031(c) with Tex. Code Crim.

2015Rather, Article 38.14 reflects the Texas Legislature’s determination that the incriminating testimony of an accomplice “should be viewed with some level of caution.” Gill v. State, 873 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim.

2003See Gill v. State , 873 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim.

2010Gribble , 808 S.W.2d at 71 ; see Bordman , 56 S.W.3d at 71 .

2010Gribble, 808 S.W.2d at 71 ; see Bordman, 56 S.W.3d at 71 .

2010Gribble , 808 S.W.2d at 72 ; see Wooldridge v. State , 653 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tex. Crim.

2010Gribble, 808 S.W.2d at 72 ; see Wooldridge v. State, 653 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tex. Crim.

2009The corroboration requirement “was designed to prevent ‘errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone’ and ‘guarded against the shocking spectacle and deleterious effect upon the criminal justice system when a murder victim suddenly reappeared, hale and hearty, after his self-confessed murderer had been tried and executed.’” Bible v. State, 162 S.W.3d 234, 246 (Tex. Crim.

2009The corroboration requirement "was designed to prevent 'errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone' and 'guarded against the shocking spectacle and deleterious effect upon the criminal justice system when a murder victim suddenly reappeared, hale and hearty, after his self-confessed murderer had been tried and executed.'" Bible v. State , 162 S.W.3d 234, 246 (Tex. Crim.

2025In Cook v. State, we addressed the corroboration requirement for the testimony of a covert agent. 460 S.W.3d 703, 708 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.).

2021In Cook v. State, we addressed the corroboration requirement for the testimony of a covert agent. 460 S.W.3d 703 , 708–10 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.).

2003Cunningham, 877 S.W.2d at 312 ; Davis, 872 S.W.2d at 749 .

1995See Tex.R.Cr.Evid., Rule 803(24); Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 749 (Tex.Cr.App.1994) ("the evidence of corroborating circumstances must clearly indicate trustworthiness."); Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Cr.App.1994) (accomplice's out-of-court statement may be admissible under Rule 803(24), even to the extent it also inculpates accused, given sufficient corroborating circumstances).

2024See Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d at 598 ; Joubert, 235 S.W.3d at 731 ; Holladay, 709 S.W.2d at 199 .

2018See Joubert, 235 S.W.3d at 731 .

2019See id. at 352-53 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 ).

2012When trial counsel’s performance is deficient for failing to request a corroboration instruction, we measure prejudice by determining whether “there was a substantial amount of non-accomplice evidence and whether the record reveals any rational basis on which the jury could have doubted or disregarded that evidence.” Id. at 353 .