5 Missouri opinions name it 1 courts 1913–1999 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re North's Estategreen1 sentence1995Appellant bases its position on what it states is the plain meaning of the word “accrue” as found in In re Estate of North, 320 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Mo.App.1959), which states that “accrued” means to “come into existence as an enforceable claim; to vest as a right.” Appellant’s reliance on this definition as the plain meaning of “accrue” is misplaced, as In re Estate of North dealt specifically with the interpretation of its meaning within RSMo § 441.160. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cooper v. Carter
neutral
2 sentences1999Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 157(b); Cooper v. Carter, 145 Mo.App. 387 , 129 S.W. 224 (1910). 1999Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 157(b); Cooper v. Carter, 145 Mo.App. 387 , 129 S.W. 224 (1910). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Leutzinger v. McNeely
green
2 sentences1982Her estate still has an enforceable claim against the husband, Leutzinger v. McNeely, 273 S.W. 241 , 216 Mo.App. 699 (1925), but it does not have the same need for present support as a living person. 1982Her estate still has an enforceable claim against the husband, Leutzinger v. McNeely, 273 S.W. 241 , 216 Mo.App. 699 (1925), but it does not have the same need for present support as a living person. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Grue v. Hensley
green
2 sentences1952In Chestnut v. Mertz, Mo.App., 144 S.W.2d 194 , 196, we defined cause of action as follows: "A cause of action consists of those facts, as between two parties, entitling one of them to a judicial remedy of some sort against the other for the redress of a wrong." The Supreme Court in Grue v. Hensley, 357 Mo. 592 , 210 S.W.2d 7 , loc.cit. 10, defined cause of action as "the cause for action, i.e., the underlying facts combined with the law giving the party a right to a remedy of one form or another based thereon." A cause of action to contest a will consists of all of those facts available to a 1952In Chestnut v. Mertz, Mo.App., 144 S.W.2d 194 , 196, we defined cause of action as follows: "A cause of action consists of those facts, as between two parties, entitling one of them to a judicial remedy of some sort against the other for the redress of a wrong." The Supreme Court in Grue v. Hensley, 357 Mo. 592 , 210 S.W.2d 7 , loc.cit. 10, defined cause of action as "the cause for action, i.e., the underlying facts combined with the law giving the party a right to a remedy of one form or another based thereon." A cause of action to contest a will consists of all of those facts available to a | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Bircher v. Boemler
green
2 sentences1913There must be brought into existence a legal obligation.” The cases of Bircher v. Boemler, 204 Mo. 554 , 103 S. W. 40 , and Woods v. Land, 30 Mo. App. 176 , show that there must be something more than a mere intention to make, or expectation to receive, compensation at some time and in some way for such services in order to constitute the same an enforceable claim against an estate. 1913There must be brought into existence a legal obligation.” The cases of Bircher v. Boemler, 204 Mo. 554 , 103 S. W. 40 , and Woods v. Land, 30 Mo. App. 176 , show that there must be something more than a mere intention to make, or expectation to receive, compensation at some time and in some way for such services in order to constitute the same an enforceable claim against an estate. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Woods v. Land
green
1 sentence1913There must be brought into existence a legal obligation.” The cases of Bircher v. Boemler, 204 Mo. 554 , 103 S. W. 40 , and Woods v. Land, 30 Mo. App. 176 , show that there must be something more than a mere intention to make, or expectation to receive, compensation at some time and in some way for such services in order to constitute the same an enforceable claim against an estate. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.