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32 California opinions name it 3 courts 1913–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mathews Cadillac, Inc. v. Phoenix of Hartford Insurancegreen2 sentences1993Co. (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 393, 397 [ 153 Cal. Rptr. 267 ], an action against an insurer under section 11580, subdivision (b)(2), was dismissed because no judgment was ever entered against the insured, the court holding that "no liability accrues as an enforceable claim against the insurer until recovery of a final judgment against the [insured]." (Italics added.) — In Zander v. Texaco, Inc. (1968) 259 Cal. App.2d 793, 807 [ 66 Cal. Rptr. 561 ], an action by a judgment creditor against an insurer, the court rejected *287 the insurer's claim that the action was barred by limitations, explaining 1993Co. (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 393, 397 [ 153 Cal. Rptr. 267 ], an action against an insurer under section 11580, subdivision (b)(2), was dismissed because no judgment was ever entered against the insured, the court holding that "no liability accrues as an enforceable claim against the insurer until recovery of a final judgment against the [insured]." (Italics added.) — In Zander v. Texaco, Inc. (1968) 259 Cal. App.2d 793, 807 [ 66 Cal. Rptr. 561 ], an action by a judgment creditor against an insurer, the court rejected *287 the insurer's claim that the action was barred by limitations, explaining | 2 | 2 |
People v. Berkowitzgreen2 sentences2018Moreover, the denial of the suppression motion was the only prior ruling of substance either judge had made that could be subject to review on appeal, and thus must have been exactly what defendant waived by giving up his "right of appeal." (See People v. Berkowitz (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 671 , 677-678, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 150 ( Berkowitz ).) Application of these principles leads us to conclude the record before us shows an enforceable waiver of defendant's right to appeal. 2018Moreover, the denial of the suppression motion was the only prior ruling of substance either judge had made that could be subject to review on appeal, and thus must have been exactly what defendant waived by giving up his "right of appeal." (See People v. Berkowitz (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 671 , 677-678, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 150 ( Berkowitz ).) Application of these principles leads us to conclude the record before us shows an enforceable waiver of defendant's right to appeal. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Herreragreen2 sentences2016None of these circumstances is evidence of guilt, and you must not infer or assume from any or all of them he is more likely to be guilty than not guilty.‖ We agree with the Attorney General that defense counsel expressly waived any right Sandoval had to have the court read the indictment. ―Section 1093 of the Penal Code expressly authorizes the waiving of the reading of the information and 18 clearly this is a function which lies within the general authority of counsel to perform for the defendant absent any specific requirement in the law that the waiver must be by the defendant personally.‖ 2015None of these circumstances is evidence of guilt, and you must not infer or assume from any or all of them he is more likely to be guilty than not guilty.” We agree with the Attorney General that defense counsel expressly waived any right Sandoval had to have the court read the indictment. ‘“Section 1093 of the Penal Code expressly authorizes the waiving of the reading of the information and clearly this is a function which lies within the general authority of counsel to perform for the defendant absent any specific requirement in the law that the waiver must be by the defendant personally.” ( | 1 | 2 |
At&T Mobility LLC v. Concepciongreen1 sentence2024(See Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. 339 [FAA embodies fundamental principle that arbitration is matter of contract].) Finally, Heritage Bank argues the waiver provision should be construed not as a so-called “wholesale” waiver of plaintiffs’ PAGA claims in violation of Iskanian, but instead more narrowly as an enforceable waiver of only the nonindividual PAGA claims. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Becerragreen2 sentences2022(See, e.g., Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 188 [noting the valid and enforceable appellate waiver was part of the defendant’s written plea agreement]; Cisneros-Ramirez, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 401 [noting the defendant’s appellate waivers, which he initialed and signed as part of the guilty plea form, were “articulated in terms that [we]re neither vague nor limited”].) Although a written plea agreement is not required to establish an enforceable waiver, its absence under the circumstances of this case undermines any conclusion that the appellate waiver was indeed a fully informed, ba 2022(See, e.g., Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 188 [noting the valid and enforceable appellate waiver was part of the defendant’s written plea agreement]; Cisneros-Ramirez, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 401 [noting the defendant’s appellate waivers, which he initialed and signed as part of the guilty plea form, were “articulated in terms that [we]re neither vague nor limited”].) Although a written plea agreement is not required to establish an enforceable waiver, its absence under the circumstances of this case undermines any conclusion that the appellate waiver was indeed a fully informed, ba | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cisneros-Ramirezgreen2 sentences2022(See, e.g., Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 188 [noting the valid and enforceable appellate waiver was part of the defendant’s written plea agreement]; Cisneros-Ramirez, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 401 [noting the defendant’s appellate waivers, which he initialed and signed as part of the guilty plea form, were “articulated in terms that [we]re neither vague nor limited”].) Although a written plea agreement is not required to establish an enforceable waiver, its absence under the circumstances of this case undermines any conclusion that the appellate waiver was indeed a fully informed, ba 2022(See, e.g., Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 188 [noting the valid and enforceable appellate waiver was part of the defendant’s written plea agreement]; Cisneros-Ramirez, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 401 [noting the defendant’s appellate waivers, which he initialed and signed as part of the guilty plea form, were “articulated in terms that [we]re neither vague nor limited”].) Although a written plea agreement is not required to establish an enforceable waiver, its absence under the circumstances of this case undermines any conclusion that the appellate waiver was indeed a fully informed, ba | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jaime P.green2 sentences2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] ( Juarez ), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged ( People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Shoregreen1 sentence2008Relying on a 1971 edition of Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, that appellate court defined "accrue" as: "`1: to come into existence as a legally enforceable claim 2: to come by way of increase or addition 3: to be periodically accumulated whether as an increase or a decrease' (Webster's New Collegiate Dict. (7th ed. 1971) p. 6)." ( In re Marriage of Shore, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 295, fn. 3 [discussing "accrued" child support rights].) Plaintiffs also point out that the first definition listed in Black's Law Dictionary for "accrue" is "to come into existence as an enforceable right or c | 1 | 1 |
| Zander v. Texaco, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Chamberlin v. City of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kathryn Tashire v. State Farm Fire And Casualty Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vucinich v. Gordongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lewis v. Kohlsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ventre v. Tiscorniagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Guarantee Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blonde v. Estate of Jenkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Osborn v. Hopkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dillon v. Board of Pension Commissionersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barnes v. Glidegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences2026In relevant part, article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution provides “[t]he Legislature shall have no power to . . . make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual . . . .” “The term ‘gift’ in the constitutional provision ‘includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim,’ even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.” (Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450 .) As we have 15 explained above, here Yancey has an enforceable claim under Govern 2026In relevant part, article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution provides “[t]he Legislature shall have no power to . . . make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual . . . .” “The term ‘gift’ in the constitutional provision ‘includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim,’ even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.” (Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450 .) As we have 15 explained above, here Yancey has an enforceable claim under Govern | 2 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Panizzon
green
2 sentences2019Under those circumstances, "both the length of the sentence and the right to appeal the sentence are issues that cannot fairly be characterized as falling outside of defendant's contemplation and knowledge when the waiver was made." ( Panizzon , supra , 13 Cal.4th at p. 86 , 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 913 P.2d 1061 .) Put differently, "[d]efendant's characterization of the issue on appeal as an 'unforeseen or unknown error' is off the mark because the sentence imposed by the court was neither unforeseen nor unknown at the time defendant executed the [w]aiver and [p]lea agreement." ( Ibid . ) Therefo 2019Under those circumstances, "both the length of the sentence and the right to appeal the sentence are issues that cannot fairly be characterized as falling outside of defendant's contemplation and knowledge when the waiver was made." ( Panizzon , supra , 13 Cal.4th at p. 86 , 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 913 P.2d 1061 .) Put differently, "[d]efendant's characterization of the issue on appeal as an 'unforeseen or unknown error' is off the mark because the sentence imposed by the court was neither unforeseen nor unknown at the time defendant executed the [w]aiver and [p]lea agreement." ( Ibid . ) Therefo | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Wright
green
2 sentences2019We realize our analysis conflicts with that of our colleagues in Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal as reflected in *1099 People v. Wright , supra , 31 Cal.App.5th 749 , 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 837 ( Wright ). 2019We realize our analysis conflicts with that of our colleagues in Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal as reflected in *1099 People v. Wright , supra , 31 Cal.App.5th 749 , 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 837 ( Wright ). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
City of Industry v. City of Fillmore
green
1 sentence2026(See City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 208 .) 19 state is not a ‘gift’ . . . if the transfer is supported by adequate consideration or if the transfer serves a valid public purpose”].) Running may have an enforceable claim against the City based on the Indenture, and she argues in her reply brief her water rights were “bargained-for.” But Running did not make that argument in the trial court or in her opening brief on appeal. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Hangen v. Hangen
green
1 sentence2026She relies on Hangen v. Hangen (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 11, 14 , and dictionaries that define the word to mean “ ‘come into existence as an enforceable claim.’ ” Based on these definitions, she contends Todd accrued the warrant as he accrued his membership interest in DJT (and not when it was granted to him after the parties entered the MSA). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Leahey v. Department of Water & Power
green
1 sentence2023In particular, in Leahey v. Department of Water & Power (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 281 , the court stated, “The term ‘accrue’ means: ‘To come into existence as an enforceable claim; to vest as a right; as, a cause of action has accrued when the right to sue has become vested.’ ” (Id. at p. 286.) Appellant points out that the third clause included in Leahey contemplates an immediately enforceable right. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In Re Marriage of Fellows
green
1 sentence2023Because we conclude the Request was a prohibited retroactive request for modification of support under section 3651, we need not consider those additional statutes. 4 Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179 , 186.) The Hangen court observed that “the word ‘accrue’ means ‘To come into existence as an enforceable claim; to vest as a right.’ ” (Hangen, at p. 14.) The court further observed that, under the support order at issue in the case, the support was “ ‘payable’ ” on the first day of each month, which meant that the “monthly support payments accrued on the first of each month.” (Id. at pp. 13–14.) Th | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Poet v. State Air Resources Board
green
1 sentence2023Rather, it failed to meet the requirement of a specific performance standard because the mitigation measure called for a plan that would limit increases in GHG emissions by an amount “up to” no net additional emissions, with the ultimate acceptable reduction left to the discretion of the City Council. ( Communities, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 91, 93.) As a result, the only enforceable requirement in the mitigation measure was that the plan reduce GHG emissions to a level that satisfied that body’s “subjective judgment.” (Id. at p. 93.) Communities therefore accurately labeled the purported | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Rodriguez v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2017The court commented that such an interpretation would violate "the principle that the *1172 statute's requirements for waiver be interpreted as strict and exclusive." ( Rodriguez , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1470 , 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 728 .) However, the majority does not read section 1295, subdivision (c) the same way as the appellate court in Rodriguez, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 1461 , 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 728 . 2017The court commented that such an interpretation would violate "the principle that the *1172 statute's requirements for waiver be interpreted as strict and exclusive." ( Rodriguez , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1470 , 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 728 .) However, the majority does not read section 1295, subdivision (c) the same way as the appellate court in Rodriguez, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 1461 , 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 728 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
California State Automobile Ass'n. Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2015Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 284 , 788 P.2d 1156 ], on which Hartford also relies to support its assertion that “an enforceable claim arises against a liability insurer not when injury occurs, but when the insured is held liable for that injury,” is similarly inapt. 2015Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 284 , 788 P.2d 1156 ], on which Hartford also relies to support its assertion that “an enforceable claim arises against a liability insurer not when injury occurs, but when the insured is held liable for that injury,” is similarly inapt. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Estate of Will
neutral
1 sentence2013An enforceable waiver of inheritance rights must comply with the requirements of sections 143 or 144 (setting the criteria for enforceability of a waiver, e.g., adequate disclosure being made of assets if disclosure was not waived, representation by counsel, or possession of independent knowledge about such assets). (§§ 142, subd. (b); 143, subd. (a)(1).) No such issues are argued on appeal about whether at the time of signing, the decedent had violated any fiduciary duty to the spouse. (§ 144, subd. (a)(2); In re Estate of Will (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 902, 908 ; Fam. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Medina
green
2 sentences2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In Re York
green
2 sentences2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Jungers
green
2 sentences2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In Re Smith
green
2 sentences2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Juarez
neutral
2 sentences2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Tyrell J.
red
2 sentences2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Balestra
green
2 sentences2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] ( Juarez ), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged ( People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Olguin
green
2 sentences2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 2010Except for People v. Juarez (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1095 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 238 ] (Juarez), which is later discussed, none of the other cases relied upon by my colleagues in which a condition of probation was challenged (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 873 ]; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 , 892 P.2d 804 ]; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ], overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
The United States v. Vowell and M'clean
green
2 sentences2008Relying on a 1971 edition of Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, that appellate court defined "accrue" as: "`1: to come into existence as a legally enforceable claim 2: to come by way of increase or addition 3: to be periodically accumulated whether as an increase or a decrease' (Webster's New Collegiate Dict. (7th ed. 1971) p. 6)." ( In re Marriage of Shore, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 295, fn. 3 [discussing "accrued" child support rights].) Plaintiffs also point out that the first definition listed in Black's Law Dictionary for "accrue" is "to come into existence as an enforceable right or c 2008Relying on a 1971 edition of Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, that appellate court defined "accrue" as: "`1: to come into existence as a legally enforceable claim 2: to come by way of increase or addition 3: to be periodically accumulated whether as an increase or a decrease' (Webster's New Collegiate Dict. (7th ed. 1971) p. 6)." ( In re Marriage of Shore, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 295, fn. 3 [discussing "accrued" child support rights].) Plaintiffs also point out that the first definition listed in Black's Law Dictionary for "accrue" is "to come into existence as an enforceable right or c | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Board
green
2 sentences2001In Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 801 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 523 P.2d 617 ], the ARB was held subject to *1285 the APA because the ARB thrice sought to postpone its oxides of nitrogen pollution control program for different reasons, the last being to conserve gasoline during the energy crises. 2001In Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 801 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 523 P.2d 617 ], the ARB was held subject to *1285 the APA because the ARB thrice sought to postpone its oxides of nitrogen pollution control program for different reasons, the last being to conserve gasoline during the energy crises. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
In Re Marriage of Strassner
green
2 sentences1999Our analysis of these points is as follows. *1019 Respondent appears to concede that appellant would have an enforceable claim if the judgment here, as in cases like Abernethy v. Fishkin, supra, 699 So.2d at pages 239-240; Owen v. Owen, supra, 419 S.E.2d at pages 269-271; and In re Marriage of Strassner, supra, 895 S.W.2d 614, 617-618 , had included an agreement on his part to indemnify appellant in the event he waived retirement pay to which she was entitled. 1999Our analysis of these points is as follows. *1019 Respondent appears to concede that appellant would have an enforceable claim if the judgment here, as in cases like Abernethy v. Fishkin, supra, 699 So.2d at pages 239-240; Owen v. Owen, supra, 419 S.E.2d at pages 269-271; and In re Marriage of Strassner, supra, 895 S.W.2d 614, 617-618 , had included an agreement on his part to indemnify appellant in the event he waived retirement pay to which she was entitled. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Stinson v. Home Insurance green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Williams v. Transport Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Life & Casualty Insurance v. Webb green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Elliott v. Mosgrove green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Turner v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Gordon v. Barr green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| In Re Fisher neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Levy v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Cosgriff v. . Foss green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.