enforceable claim in North Carolina

2013Coats, 264 N.C. at 333 , 141 S.E.2d at 491 (citing Johnston v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 67 N.C. 101 (1870)). {65} While the requirements for bringing an action against a public officer have been extended to counties, Section 1-77 “does not apply to actions against the State.” Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 334 , 222 S.E.2d 412, 432 (1976). {66} “‘[T]he cause of action arises in the county where the acts or omissions constituting the basis of the action occurred.’” Id. at 333 , 222 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting Coats, 264 N.C. at 334 , 141 S.E.2d at 492 ). “‘[A] cause of action may be said to accrue, within the

2013Coats, 264 N.C. at 333 , 141 S.E.2d at 491 (citing Johnston v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 67 N.C. 101 (1870)). {65} While the requirements for bringing an action against a public officer have been extended to counties, Section 1-77 “does not apply to actions against the State.” Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 334 , 222 S.E.2d 412, 432 (1976). {66} “‘[T]he cause of action arises in the county where the acts or omissions constituting the basis of the action occurred.’” Id. at 333 , 222 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting Coats, 264 N.C. at 334 , 141 S.E.2d at 492 ). “‘[A] cause of action may be said to accrue, within the

2013Coats, 264 N.C. at 333 , 141 S.E.2d at 491 (citing Johnston v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 67 N.C. 101 (1870)). {65} While the requirements for bringing an action against a public officer have been extended to counties, Section 1-77 “does not apply to actions against the State.” Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 334 , 222 S.E.2d 412, 432 (1976). {66} “‘[T]he cause of action arises in the county where the acts or omissions constituting the basis of the action occurred.’” Id. at 333 , 222 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting Coats, 264 N.C. at 334 , 141 S.E.2d at 492 ). “‘[A] cause of action may be said to accrue, within the

2013Coats, 264 N.C. at 333 , 141 S.E.2d at 491 (citing Johnston v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 67 N.C. 101 (1870)). {65} While the requirements for bringing an action against a public officer have been extended to counties, Section 1-77 “does not apply to actions against the State.” Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 334 , 222 S.E.2d 412, 432 (1976). {66} “‘[T]he cause of action arises in the county where the acts or omissions constituting the basis of the action occurred.’” Id. at 333 , 222 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting Coats, 264 N.C. at 334 , 141 S.E.2d at 492 ). “‘[A] cause of action may be said to accrue, within the

1946Pomeroy, Equity Jurisdiction, Vol. 2, sec. 385, p. 51, et seq.; Hairston v. Keswick Corp., 214 N. C., 678 , 200 S. E., 384 .

1946Pomeroy, Equity Jurisdiction, Vol. 2, sec. 385, p. 51, et seq.; Hairston v. Keswick Corp., 214 N. C., 678 , 200 S. E., 384 .

2018“Our courts have long recognized that a party seeking equitable relief, such as injunctive relief, must come before the court with ‘clean hands.’ Those who seek equitable remedies must do equity, and this maxim is not a precept for moral observance, but an enforceable rule.” Kennedy, 160 N.C.

2018App. at 15 , 584 S.E.2d at 328 .

2016In a negligence action, the right to sue is vested when a person fails "to exercise that degree of care which a reasonable and prudent [person] would exercise under similar conditions and which proximately cause injury or damage to another." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Trust Co. , 292 N.C. 416 , 422, 233 S.E.2d 589 , 593 (1977) ).

2016In a negligence action, the right to sue is vested when a person fails "to exercise that degree of care which a reasonable and prudent [person] would exercise under similar conditions and which proximately cause injury or damage to another." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Trust Co. , 292 N.C. 416 , 422, 233 S.E.2d 589 , 593 (1977) ).

2004App. 779, 784 , 468 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1996) (holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged he was discharged due to his political affiliation and activities), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 410 , 494 S.E.2d 600 (1997), or (3) based on activity by the employer contrary to law or public policy.

2004Wrongful discharge claims have been recognized in North Carolina where the employee was discharged (1) for refusing to violate the law at the employer's request, see, e.g., Coman, 325 N.C. at 175 , 381 S.E.2d at 447 (holding the complaint stated a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where the employee was discharged for refusing to comply with his employer's demand that he continue to operate a commercial vehicle for periods of time that violated federal regulations); Sides, 74 N.C.App. at 343 , 328 S.E.2d at 826-27 (holding that the plaintiff's complaint stated an enfor

2004App. 779, 784 , 468 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1996) (holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged he was discharged due to his political affiliation and activities), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 410 , 494 S.E.2d 600 (1997), or (3) based on activity by the employer contrary to law or public policy.

2004Wrongful discharge claims have been recognized in North Carolina where the employee was discharged (1) for refusing to violate the law at the employer's request, see, e.g., Coman, 325 N.C. at 175 , 381 S.E.2d at 447 (holding the complaint stated a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where the employee was discharged for refusing to comply with his employer's demand that he continue to operate a commercial vehicle for periods of time that violated federal regulations); Sides, 74 N.C.App. at 343 , 328 S.E.2d at 826-27 (holding that the plaintiff's complaint stated an enfor

2003Co., 36 N.C.App. at 182 , 243 S.E.2d at 819 .

2003Co., 36 N.C.App. at 182 , 243 S.E.2d at 819 .

1992Furthermore, in the earlier appeal of this case, this Court, in an unpublished opinion, held that the facts presented by appellants did "not give rise to an enforceable claim against the appellees under any theory known to our law." It should be noted that under Rule 11, "a represented party may rely on his attorney's advice as to the legal sufficiency of his claims" and only "will be held responsible if his evident purpose is to harass, persecute, otherwise vex his opponents, or cause them unnecessary cost or delay." Bryson, 330 N.C. at 663 , 412 S.E.2d at 337 .

1992Furthermore, in the earlier appeal of this case, this Court, in an unpublished opinion, held that the facts presented by appellants did "not give rise to an enforceable claim against the appellees under any theory known to our law." It should be noted that under Rule 11, "a represented party may rely on his attorney's advice as to the legal sufficiency of his claims" and only "will be held responsible if his evident purpose is to harass, persecute, otherwise vex his opponents, or cause them unnecessary cost or delay." Bryson, 330 N.C. at 663 , 412 S.E.2d at 337 .

1990The bank's argument that the view we have adopted was overruled in Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Modular Marketing Corp., 44 Cal.App.3d 460 , 118 Cal.Rptr. 699 (1975) is incorrect.

1990The bank's argument that the view we have adopted was overruled in Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Modular Marketing Corp., 44 Cal.App.3d 460 , 118 Cal.Rptr. 699 (1975) is incorrect.

1989Assuming that the facts above alleged are true, as we must since the sufficiency of a complaint to state an enforceable claim is being determined, Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71 , 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976), it is manifest that two claims for which the law affords relief are stated and the order dismissing the complaint is erroneous.

1989Assuming that the facts above alleged are true, as we must since the sufficiency of a complaint to state an enforceable claim is being determined, Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71 , 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976), it is manifest that two claims for which the law affords relief are stated and the order dismissing the complaint is erroneous.