enforceable claim in Georgia

27 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2024 10 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

Case	Followed	Cited
Coen v. CDC Software Corp.green ga · 2018 · cited in 7 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2021–2024 2 sentences 2024See Coen, 304 Ga. at 105 (explaining that in determining if the “cause of action” is the same, we look at “the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2024See Coen, 304 Ga. at 105 (explaining that in determining if the “cause of action” is the same, we look at “the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim”).	7	7
Morrison v. Morrisongreen ga · 2008 · cited in 6 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2012–2022 2 sentences 2021“A cause of action has been defined as being the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 116 (3) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). 2021“A cause of action has been defined as being the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 116 (3) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted).	6	6
Haley v. Regions Bankgreen ga · 2003 · cited in 6 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2008–2022 2 sentences 2017The term “cause of action” means “the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Id. (punctuation and emphasis omitted). 2012“A cause of action has been defined as being the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Haley v. Regions Bank, 277 Ga. 85, 91 (2) ( 586 SE2d 633 ) (2003).	4	6
Crowe v. Eldergreen ga · 2012 · cited in 5 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2013–2016 2 sentences 2016Under Georgia law, “[a] cause of action [is] deemed to be the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. 2014“A cause of action has been deemed to be ‘the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.’ ” Crowe v. Elder, 290 Ga. 686 , 688 *404 ( 723 SE2d 428 ) (2012).	3	5
ROCKDALE COUNTY. v. U. S. ENTERPRISES, INC.; And Vice Versagreen ga · 2021 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 1 sentence 2023But we can assume (without deciding) that res judicata applies — (1) identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies, and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Rockdale County v. U.S. Enterprises, Inc., 312 Ga. 752, 758 ( 865 SE2d 135 ) (2021) (cleaned up). 14 applies to a disciplinary proceeding like this one, because we agree that, under these circumstances, res judicata does not bar this disciplinary proceeding. “‘Cause of action’” is “‘the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim’ . . . with special a	1	1
Edwards v. Lewisgreen ga · 2008 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 2 sentences 2023The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” “It is well established that the right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment . . . is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Edwards v. Lewis, 283 Ga. 345, 348 (2) (658 SE2d 116) (2008). 2023The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” “It is well established that the right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment . . . is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Edwards v. Lewis, 283 Ga. 345, 348 (2) (658 SE2d 116) (2008).	1	1
Gilliam v. Stategreen ga · 2021 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 2 sentences 2022Without the caveat and counterclaim before us, it is impossible to evaluate 18 284 Ga. 112, 115 (3) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008) (holding that caveat to petition for probate and claims for breach of fiduciary trust, constructive trust, and intentional interference with a gift were not identical causes of action because the focus of the claims was the alleged direction to make an inter vivos gift, not the validity of the will), disapproved of on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021). 2022Without the caveat and counterclaim before us, it is impossible to evaluate 18 284 Ga. 112, 115 (3) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008) (holding that caveat to petition for probate and claims for breach of fiduciary trust, constructive trust, and intentional interference with a gift were not identical causes of action because the focus of the claims was the alleged direction to make an inter vivos gift, not the validity of the will), disapproved of on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021).	1	1
Rowland v. Vickersgreen ga · 1974 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 2 sentences 2022See also Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 272 Ga. 209, 211-212 (2) (528 SE2d 508) (2000) (“We hold expressly that the effect of a voluntary dismissal [with prejudice] does not extend to any party not named therein.”); Rowland v. Vickers, 233 Ga. 67, 68 10 “[A]lthough we have occasionally been imprecise and inconsistent with the terms ‘subject matter’ and ‘cause of action,’ we have actually been looking to the ‘entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim’ to determine whether res judicata has been triggered.” Coen, 304 Ga. at 110 (2) (footnote omitted)). 14 (20 2022See also Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 272 Ga. 209, 211-212 (2) (528 SE2d 508) (2000) (“We hold expressly that the effect of a voluntary dismissal [with prejudice] does not extend to any party not named therein.”); Rowland v. Vickers, 233 Ga. 67, 68 10 “[A]lthough we have occasionally been imprecise and inconsistent with the terms ‘subject matter’ and ‘cause of action,’ we have actually been looking to the ‘entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim’ to determine whether res judicata has been triggered.” Coen, 304 Ga. at 110 (2) (footnote omitted)). 14 (20	1	1
Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.green ga · 2000 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 2 sentences 2022See also Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 272 Ga. 209, 211-212 (2) (528 SE2d 508) (2000) (“We hold expressly that the effect of a voluntary dismissal [with prejudice] does not extend to any party not named therein.”); Rowland v. Vickers, 233 Ga. 67, 68 10 “[A]lthough we have occasionally been imprecise and inconsistent with the terms ‘subject matter’ and ‘cause of action,’ we have actually been looking to the ‘entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim’ to determine whether res judicata has been triggered.” Coen, 304 Ga. at 110 (2) (footnote omitted)). 14 (20 2022See also Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 272 Ga. 209, 211-212 (2) (528 SE2d 508) (2000) (“We hold expressly that the effect of a voluntary dismissal [with prejudice] does not extend to any party not named therein.”); Rowland v. Vickers, 233 Ga. 67, 68 10 “[A]lthough we have occasionally been imprecise and inconsistent with the terms ‘subject matter’ and ‘cause of action,’ we have actually been looking to the ‘entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim’ to determine whether res judicata has been triggered.” Coen, 304 Ga. at 110 (2) (footnote omitted)). 14 (20	1	1
Wannamaker v. Carrgreen ga · 1987 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 2 sentences 2020See also Wannamaker v. Carr, 257 Ga. 634, 635 (2) ( 362 SE2d 53 ) (1987) (2) (“[T]he court granted [the wife’s] 1987 application for a writ of scire facias reviving the dormant 1972 judgment back ten years to 1977. 2020See also Wannamaker v. Carr, 257 Ga. 634, 635 (2) ( 362 SE2d 53 ) (1987) (2) (“[T]he court granted [the wife’s] 1987 application for a writ of scire facias reviving the dormant 1972 judgment back ten years to 1977.	1	1
Life & Casualty Insurance v. Webbgreen gactapp · 1965 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003Co. of Tenn. v. Webb, 112 Ga. App. 344, 347-348 ( 145 SE2d 63 ) (1965). 2003Co. of Tenn. v. Webb, 112 Ga. App. 344, 347-348 ( 145 SE2d 63 ) (1965).	1	1
Fortson v. Fortsongreen ga · 1945 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1965–1965 2 sentences 1965A cause of action has been defined as being “the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Where some, of the operative facts necessary to the causes of action are different in the two cases, the later suit is not upon the same cause as the former (Irwin v. Spratlin, 127 Ga. 240 ( 55 SE 1037 , 9 AC 341); Brooks v. Miller, 118 Ga. 676 ( 45 SE 485 )), although the subject matter may be the same (Fortson v. Fortson, 200 Ga. 116, 119 ( 35 SE2d 896 ); Gillens v. Gillens, 148 Ga. 631 ( 97 SE 669 )), and even though the causes arose out of the same transaction. 1965A cause of action has been defined as being “the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Where some, of the operative facts necessary to the causes of action are different in the two cases, the later suit is not upon the same cause as the former (Irwin v. Spratlin, 127 Ga. 240 ( 55 SE 1037 , 9 AC 341); Brooks v. Miller, 118 Ga. 676 ( 45 SE 485 )), although the subject matter may be the same (Fortson v. Fortson, 200 Ga. 116, 119 ( 35 SE2d 896 ); Gillens v. Gillens, 148 Ga. 631 ( 97 SE 669 )), and even though the causes arose out of the same transaction.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

Case	Cited	Years
Brown v. Brown green ga · 1998 1 sentence 2020In that case, on May 9, 1997, the wife filed a petition for revival of installment alimony payments, and the Court held that she had “an enforceable claim for unpaid alimony for no more than the 10-year period preceding May 9, 1997.” Id.	1	2020–2020
Raby v. Minshew green ga · 1976 1 sentence 2008(Cit.)” [Cits.] Haley v. Regions Bank, supra. Accordingly, Appellants’ “claim of res judicata is without merit.” Raby v. Minshew, supra. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that summary judgment can be based on neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel and that none of Appellants’ claims is barred for any reason stated by the superior court.	1	2008–2008
Hartsfield Co. v. Shoaf green ga · 1937 1 sentence 1984“Black defines the word ‘accruing’ as meaning ‘inchoate; in process of maturing; that which may or will ripen into a vested right, an available demand, or an existing cause of action.’ ” Hartsfield Co. v. Shoaf, 184 Ga. 378 ( 191 SE 693 ) (1937).	1	1984–1984
Oliver v. Harrison neutral ga · 1937 1 sentence 1984“Black defines the word ‘accruing’ as meaning ‘inchoate; in process of maturing; that which may or will ripen into a vested right, an available demand, or an existing cause of action.’ ” Hartsfield Co. v. Shoaf, 184 Ga. 378 ( 191 SE 693 ) (1937).	1	1984–1984
Worth v. Carmichael green ga · 1902 2 sentences 1965Worth v. Carmichael, 114 Ga. 699 ( 40 SE 797 ). 1965Worth v. Carmichael, 114 Ga. 699 ( 40 SE 797 ).	1	1965–1965
Brooks v. Miller neutral ga · 1903 2 sentences 1965A cause of action has been defined as being “the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Where some, of the operative facts necessary to the causes of action are different in the two cases, the later suit is not upon the same cause as the former (Irwin v. Spratlin, 127 Ga. 240 ( 55 SE 1037 , 9 AC 341); Brooks v. Miller, 118 Ga. 676 ( 45 SE 485 )), although the subject matter may be the same (Fortson v. Fortson, 200 Ga. 116, 119 ( 35 SE2d 896 ); Gillens v. Gillens, 148 Ga. 631 ( 97 SE 669 )), and even though the causes arose out of the same transaction. 1965A cause of action has been defined as being “the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Where some, of the operative facts necessary to the causes of action are different in the two cases, the later suit is not upon the same cause as the former (Irwin v. Spratlin, 127 Ga. 240 ( 55 SE 1037 , 9 AC 341); Brooks v. Miller, 118 Ga. 676 ( 45 SE 485 )), although the subject matter may be the same (Fortson v. Fortson, 200 Ga. 116, 119 ( 35 SE2d 896 ); Gillens v. Gillens, 148 Ga. 631 ( 97 SE 669 )), and even though the causes arose out of the same transaction.	1	1965–1965
Irvin v. Spratlin green ga · 1906 2 sentences 1965A cause of action has been defined as being “the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Where some, of the operative facts necessary to the causes of action are different in the two cases, the later suit is not upon the same cause as the former (Irwin v. Spratlin, 127 Ga. 240 ( 55 SE 1037 , 9 AC 341); Brooks v. Miller, 118 Ga. 676 ( 45 SE 485 )), although the subject matter may be the same (Fortson v. Fortson, 200 Ga. 116, 119 ( 35 SE2d 896 ); Gillens v. Gillens, 148 Ga. 631 ( 97 SE 669 )), and even though the causes arose out of the same transaction. 1965A cause of action has been defined as being “the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Where some, of the operative facts necessary to the causes of action are different in the two cases, the later suit is not upon the same cause as the former (Irwin v. Spratlin, 127 Ga. 240 ( 55 SE 1037 , 9 AC 341); Brooks v. Miller, 118 Ga. 676 ( 45 SE 485 )), although the subject matter may be the same (Fortson v. Fortson, 200 Ga. 116, 119 ( 35 SE2d 896 ); Gillens v. Gillens, 148 Ga. 631 ( 97 SE 669 )), and even though the causes arose out of the same transaction.	1	1965–1965
Gillens v. Gillens neutral ga · 1918 1 sentence 1965A cause of action has been defined as being “the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Where some, of the operative facts necessary to the causes of action are different in the two cases, the later suit is not upon the same cause as the former (Irwin v. Spratlin, 127 Ga. 240 ( 55 SE 1037 , 9 AC 341); Brooks v. Miller, 118 Ga. 676 ( 45 SE 485 )), although the subject matter may be the same (Fortson v. Fortson, 200 Ga. 116, 119 ( 35 SE2d 896 ); Gillens v. Gillens, 148 Ga. 631 ( 97 SE 669 )), and even though the causes arose out of the same transaction.	1	1965–1965
Ledbetter v. Reese green ga · 1918 1 sentence 1965A cause of action has been defined as being “the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim.” Where some, of the operative facts necessary to the causes of action are different in the two cases, the later suit is not upon the same cause as the former (Irwin v. Spratlin, 127 Ga. 240 ( 55 SE 1037 , 9 AC 341); Brooks v. Miller, 118 Ga. 676 ( 45 SE 485 )), although the subject matter may be the same (Fortson v. Fortson, 200 Ga. 116, 119 ( 35 SE2d 896 ); Gillens v. Gillens, 148 Ga. 631 ( 97 SE 669 )), and even though the causes arose out of the same transaction.	1	1965–1965
High v. Hollis green gactapp · 1926 1 sentence 1965Since the former litigation would not necessarily adjudicate the question of whether the killing was done with malice aforethought by the defendant spouse, the doctrine of estoppel by judgment does not apply as “there is an estoppel by judgment only as to such matters within the scope of the previous pleadings as necessarily had to be adjudicated in order for the previous judgment to be rendered, or as to such matters, within the scope of those pleadings, as might or might not have been adjudicated, but which are shown by aliunde proof to have been actually litigated and determined.” Farmer v.	1	1965–1965
Farmer v. Baird green gactapp · 1926 1 sentence 1965Since the former litigation would not necessarily adjudicate the question of whether the killing was done with malice aforethought by the defendant spouse, the doctrine of estoppel by judgment does not apply as “there is an estoppel by judgment only as to such matters within the scope of the previous pleadings as necessarily had to be adjudicated in order for the previous judgment to be rendered, or as to such matters, within the scope of those pleadings, as might or might not have been adjudicated, but which are shown by aliunde proof to have been actually litigated and determined.” Farmer v.	1	1965–1965

Statutes the citing opinions construe

GA § 9-12-40 (18) GA § 9-11-56 (8)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

MS 86 (1935–2024) CA 32 (1913–2026) GA 27 (1965–2024) AL 23 (1909–2014) TX 19 (1926–2019) NC 18 (1946–2024) NY 15 (1932–2011) IL 14 (1936–2025) FL 14 (1954–2024) WI 14 (1954–2009) NJ 10 (1986–2024) MA 10 (1980–2023) KS 8 (1960–2021) PA 8 (1943–2023) IA 7 (1904–2025) HI 7 (2002–2025) CT 7 (1977–2019) CO 6 (1902–2021) LA 6 (1957–2005) NM 5 (1999–2019) DE 5 (1940–2021) MO 5 (1913–1999) MI 5 (1992–2018) ND 4 (1988–2012) MN 4 (1995–2014) UT 4 (1954–2019) IN 4 (1917–2012) OH 4 (2010–2024) WA 3 (1902–1982) SD 3 (1943–2022) VT 3 (2003–2016) VA 3 (2004–2017) NE 2 (1938–2017) NH 2 (1988–1995)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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