6 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1902–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Huey Ex Rel. Huey v. J.C. Trucking, Inc.green2 sentences1998Trucking, Inc., 837 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Colo.1992). 1996Trucking, Inc., 837 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Colo.1992). | 2 | 2 |
Weitz Co., LLC v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.green1 sentence2021Co. , 181 P.3d 309, 312 (Colo. App. 2007) (“Dictionaries may be used to assis t in the determination of the plain and ordinary meaning of wor ds.”). ¶ 22 The word “accrued” means “to com e into existence as an enforceable claim: vest as a right, ” and the word “create” means “to bring into existence: make out of not hing for the first time.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 13, 532 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Trevino v. HHL Financial Services, Inc.green2 sentences2010See Trevino v. HHL Financial Services, Inc., 945 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Colo. 1997) ("When a hospital treats a patient's injuries, it has an enforceable claim for full payment for its services, regardless of the patient's financial status."). *1087 Because he was insured, his medical providers wrote off part of the value of the medical services that they provided because they were contractually obligated to do so. 2010See Trevino v. HHL Financial Services, Inc., 945 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Colo.1997) ("When a hospital treats a patient's injuries, it has an enforceable claim for full payment for its services, regardless of the patient's financial status."). | 1 | 1 |
Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2010See Acuar, 531 S.E.2d at 322-23 ; see also Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 198 , 129 P.3d 487, 495 (Ariz.Ct.App.2006) (holding that under the collateral source rule, the plaintiff is "entitled to claim and recover the full amount of her reasonable medical expenses for which she was charged, without any reduction for the amounts apparently written off by her healthcare providers pursuant to the contractually agreed-upon rates with her medical insurance carriers"). 2010See Acuar, 531 S.E.2d at 322-23 ; see also Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 198 , 129 P.3d 487, 495 (Ariz.Ct.App.2006) (holding that under the collateral source rule, the plaintiff is "entitled to claim and recover the full amount of her reasonable medical expenses for which she was charged, without any reduction for the amounts apparently written off by her healthcare providers pursuant to the contractually agreed-upon rates with her medical insurance carriers"). | 1 | 1 |
Acuar v. Letourneaugreen1 sentence2010See Acuar, 531 S.E.2d at 322-23 ; see also Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 198 , 129 P.3d 487, 495 (Ariz.Ct.App.2006) (holding that under the collateral source rule, the plaintiff is "entitled to claim and recover the full amount of her reasonable medical expenses for which she was charged, without any reduction for the amounts apparently written off by her healthcare providers pursuant to the contractually agreed-upon rates with her medical insurance carriers"). | 1 | 1 |
Golden Animal Hospital v. Hortongreen1 sentence1996See Golden Animal Hospital v. Horton, 897 P.2d 833 (Colo.1995) (MMI is the appropriate point to determine the award of permanent disability benefits; interpreting the minors’ statute, § 8-42-102(4), C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Virella v. Registrar of Humacao
neutral
2 sentences1902The court in the course of the opinion suggestively observes: “In some states having statutes regulating the authority of the administrator over the real estate of the decedent similar to ours, it is held that the administrator may maintain an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of the decedent’s real estate, for the purpose of subjecting such real estate to the payment of debts; but the administrator must in substance aver and prove that there are debts against the estate, and that the real estate which he thus seeks to recover is necessary and liable to the payment of such debts.” In 1902The court in the course of the opinion suggestively observes: “In some states having statutes regulating the authority of the administrator over the real estate of the decedent similar to ours, it is held that the administrator may maintain an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of the decedent’s real estate, for the purpose of subjecting such real estate to the payment of debts; but the administrator must in substance aver and prove that there are debts against the estate, and that the real estate which he thus seeks to recover is necessary and liable to the payment of such debts.” In | 2 | 1902–1902 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.