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15 New York opinions name it 5 courts 1932–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Callahangreen2 sentences2011We repeat what we said in People v Callahan ( 80 NY2d 273, 285 [1992]): “[I]n cases where there has been a bargained-for waiver of the right to appeal and the intermediate appellate court determines that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed, it would be helpful if the intermediate appellate court would specify whether its disposition is based on the existence of an enforceable waiver or instead on the merits of the defendant’s appellate claims. 2007Our “disposition is based on the existence of an enforceable waiver,” and, in the alternative, “on the merits of the defendant’s appellate claims.” (People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, 285 [1992].) Regardless of whether the appeal waiver applies to defendant’s pro se claim, we find that claim without merit. | 4 | 5 |
People v. Thomasgreen1 sentence2010In analyzing this issue, we consider principles of contract interpretation in the context of prenuptial agreements and revisit our determination in Richards v Richards ( 232 AD2d 303, 303 [1996]), where we found that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act “only a spouse can waive spousal rights to employee plan benefits, that a fiancee is not a spouse, and that such rights, therefore, cannot be effectively waived in a prenuptial agreement.” After entering into a prenuptial agreement, the parties were married on April 6, 1992. | 1 | 1 |
PEOPLE EX REL. ACKRIDGE v. Barkleygreen1 sentence2007Here, defendant expressly waived his right to appeal during the colloquy and “executed a detailed written waiver acknowledging his right to appeal, relating that he had discussed his appellate options with his attorney and stating that he was waiving his right to appeal voluntarily” (People v Fludd, 33 AD3d 1124, 1125 [2006], lv denied 9 NY3d 843 [2007]; see People v Ramos, 7 NY3d 737, 738 [2006]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gagniergreen1 sentence2007Notably, any challenge to the court’s ruling in that regard would be precluded by an enforceable waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Hunt, 29 AD3d 1081, 1083 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 813 [2006]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fluddgreen1 sentence2007Here, defendant expressly waived his right to appeal during the colloquy and “executed a detailed written waiver acknowledging his right to appeal, relating that he had discussed his appellate options with his attorney and stating that he was waiving his right to appeal voluntarily” (People v Fludd, 33 AD3d 1124, 1125 [2006], lv denied 9 NY3d 843 [2007]; see People v Ramos, 7 NY3d 737, 738 [2006]). | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. New York Hospitalgreen2 sentences1992Section 15-108 (c) of the General Obligations Law may be waived by agreement (see, Mitchell v New York Hosp., 61 NY2d 208 ); and article second of the Special Arbitration Agreement set forth hereinabove, constitutes an enforceable waiver of General Obligations Law § 15-108 (c), which tends to effectuate the public policy of insuring prompt compensation of injured parties, while reserving the right of one tortfeasor to seek contribution from another. 1992(Mitchell v New York Hosp., supra, at 214.) Article second of the Special Arbitration Agreement is not, however, applicable to the facts and circumstances presented in the matter before the court. | 1 | 1 |
Corinno Civetta Construction Corp. v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence1989Corp. v City of New York ( 67 NY2d 297, 309 [1986], supra) even where an enforceable clause exculpates a party from liability to a contractor for damages resulting from delays in the performance of the latter’s work (such as art 13 of the contract herein), damages may be recovered for "(1) delays caused by the contractee’s bad faith or its willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct, (2) uncontemplated delays, (3) delays so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract by the contractee, and (4) delays resulting from the contractee’s breach of a fundamental | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thomasgreen1 sentence1987Were the circumstances of this case insufficient to justify a forfeiture of defendant’s statutory speedy trial rights prior to nullification of his plea, as a matter of law (see, People v Howe, 56 NY2d 622, 624 [1982]), the court would nonetheless find an enforceable waiver of those rights upon the facts (People v Thomas, 53 NY2d 338, 342, n 2 [1981], supra). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Howegreen1 sentence1987Were the circumstances of this case insufficient to justify a forfeiture of defendant’s statutory speedy trial rights prior to nullification of his plea, as a matter of law (see, People v Howe, 56 NY2d 622, 624 [1982]), the court would nonetheless find an enforceable waiver of those rights upon the facts (People v Thomas, 53 NY2d 338, 342, n 2 [1981], supra). | 1 | 1 |
Jerry v. Board of Educationgreen1 sentence1983A suspension was deemed to be but one kind of ouster (i.e., dispossession) of the employee from his office or position, to which he nevertheless retained title pending a final valid disciplinary determination (see Matter of Jerry v Board of Educ., 35 NY2d 534, 545-546 [dissent], supra). 3 Reinstatement to the position (requiring the employer to accept and pay for his services) was a precedent to any claim for back wages or salary (see Toscano v McGoldrick, 300 NY 156 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Utsey
green
1 sentence2007We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence, and defendant’s arguments for a reduced penalty under the Drug Law Reform Act (L 2004, ch 738) are without merit (People v Utsey, 7 NY3d 398 [2006]). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Matter of Dox v. Tynon
green
1 sentence2001Under prior law, it was well settled that “[a] custodial parent’s right to collect child support payments pursuant to court order [was] subject to waiver, both express and implied” (Matter of Dox v Tynon, 90 NY2d 166, 174 ; Maule v Kaufman, 33 NY2d 58 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Maule v. Kaufman
green
1 sentence2001Under prior law, it was well settled that “[a] custodial parent’s right to collect child support payments pursuant to court order [was] subject to waiver, both express and implied” (Matter of Dox v Tynon, 90 NY2d 166, 174 ; Maule v Kaufman, 33 NY2d 58 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Edward M. Stafford and Peggie Ann Stafford v. International Harvester Company and Eastco Truck Sales, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997Moreover, among the five definitions of "accrue" in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) (1966), the most pertinent for a legal context is "to come into existence as an enforceable claim " ( id. , at 13 [emphasis supplied]). 1997That is, only then did a cause of action "accrue" in the sense that a suit may be maintained thereon , only then could the cause of action come into existence as an enforceable claim in that jurisdiction ( see , Stafford v International Harvester Co. , 668 F.2d 142, 151 , supra [discussing Martin v Dierck Equip. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Martin v. Julius Dierck Equipment Co.
green
2 sentences1997Co. ( 43 N.Y.2d 583 ) where, as the majority writing here points out (majority opn, at 184), we held a cause of action for personal injury in breach of warranty did not accrue until it was amenable to suit, i.e., "when a suit may be maintained thereon" (Black's Law Dictionary, op. cit. , at 21) and when it came into existence as "an enforceable claim" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary [Unabridged], op. cit. , at 13). 1997Co. ( 43 NY2d 583 ) where, as the majority writing here points out (majority opn, at 184), we held a cause of action for personal injury in breach of warranty did not accrue until it was amenable to suit, i.e., "when a suit may be maintained thereon” (Black’s Law Dictionary, op. cit, at 21) and when it came into existence as "an enforceable claim” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary [Unabridged], op. cit., at 13). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Toscano v. McGoldrick
green
1 sentence1983A suspension was deemed to be but one kind of ouster (i.e., dispossession) of the employee from his office or position, to which he nevertheless retained title pending a final valid disciplinary determination (see Matter of Jerry v Board of Educ., 35 NY2d 534, 545-546 [dissent], supra). 3 Reinstatement to the position (requiring the employer to accept and pay for his services) was a precedent to any claim for back wages or salary (see Toscano v McGoldrick, 300 NY 156 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Gould v. Looney
green
1 sentence1983To the extent, however, that they assumed that title alone to the employment position gave rise to an enforceable claim for wages or salary, without regard to whether the nonworking (e.g., suspended or locked-out) employee had an immediately enforceable right to repossession of (i.e., reinstatement to) the position, they inadvertently ignored a common-law distinction, preserved in the statutory provisions cited above (Civil Service Law, § 75; Education Law, § 3020-a) of long standing and crucial significance to the issue of compensation. 2 Contrary to Special Term’s statement in Matter of Goul | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Dowdell
green
1 sentence1981Concurring with this holding and going further, the Third Department made a similar ruling in People v Dowdell ( 72 AD2d 622 ) holding that a simple indication on record that a defendant requested immediate sentence was sufficient to spell out an enforceable waiver thereof (citing People ex rel. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Pease Oil Co. v. Monroe County Oil Co.
neutral
1 sentence1932Act, § 266; Cornell v. Bonsall, 176 App. Div. 798 ; Vassear v. Livingston, 13 N. Y. 248, 252 ; U. S. Expansion Bolt Co. v. Marmorstein, 181 App. Div. 790 .) In Pease Oil Co. v. Monroe County Oil Co. ( 78 Misc. 285 ) it is said: “A counterclaim must be a complete cause of action existing in favor of the defendant asserting it (Cragin v. Lovell, 88 N. Y. 258 ), and must be set forth with the same particularity — disclosing an enforceable claim against the plaintiff — as is required in a complaint for a like cause. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Security Trust Co. v. Pritchard
green
1 sentence1932(Weeks v. O’Brien, 25 App. Div. 206 .) ” In Security Trust Co. v. Pritchard ( 122 Misc. 760 ) the counterclaim was dismissed where it appeared that the defendant had already brought an action which was then pending embracing the same subject-matter. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Weeks v. O'Brien
neutral
1 sentence1932(Weeks v. O’Brien, 25 App. Div. 206 .) ” In Security Trust Co. v. Pritchard ( 122 Misc. 760 ) the counterclaim was dismissed where it appeared that the defendant had already brought an action which was then pending embracing the same subject-matter. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Cragin v. . Lovell
green
1 sentence1932Act, § 266; Cornell v. Bonsall, 176 App. Div. 798 ; Vassear v. Livingston, 13 N. Y. 248, 252 ; U. S. Expansion Bolt Co. v. Marmorstein, 181 App. Div. 790 .) In Pease Oil Co. v. Monroe County Oil Co. ( 78 Misc. 285 ) it is said: “A counterclaim must be a complete cause of action existing in favor of the defendant asserting it (Cragin v. Lovell, 88 N. Y. 258 ), and must be set forth with the same particularity — disclosing an enforceable claim against the plaintiff — as is required in a complaint for a like cause. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Vassear v. . Livingston
neutral
1 sentence1932Act, § 266; Cornell v. Bonsall, 176 App. Div. 798 ; Vassear v. Livingston, 13 N. Y. 248, 252 ; U. S. Expansion Bolt Co. v. Marmorstein, 181 App. Div. 790 .) In Pease Oil Co. v. Monroe County Oil Co. ( 78 Misc. 285 ) it is said: “A counterclaim must be a complete cause of action existing in favor of the defendant asserting it (Cragin v. Lovell, 88 N. Y. 258 ), and must be set forth with the same particularity — disclosing an enforceable claim against the plaintiff — as is required in a complaint for a like cause. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Cornell v. Bonsall
neutral
1 sentence1932Act, § 266; Cornell v. Bonsall, 176 App. Div. 798 ; Vassear v. Livingston, 13 N. Y. 248, 252 ; U. S. Expansion Bolt Co. v. Marmorstein, 181 App. Div. 790 .) In Pease Oil Co. v. Monroe County Oil Co. ( 78 Misc. 285 ) it is said: “A counterclaim must be a complete cause of action existing in favor of the defendant asserting it (Cragin v. Lovell, 88 N. Y. 258 ), and must be set forth with the same particularity — disclosing an enforceable claim against the plaintiff — as is required in a complaint for a like cause. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
U. S. Expansion Bolt Co. v. Marmorstein
neutral
1 sentence1932Act, § 266; Cornell v. Bonsall, 176 App. Div. 798 ; Vassear v. Livingston, 13 N. Y. 248, 252 ; U. S. Expansion Bolt Co. v. Marmorstein, 181 App. Div. 790 .) In Pease Oil Co. v. Monroe County Oil Co. ( 78 Misc. 285 ) it is said: “A counterclaim must be a complete cause of action existing in favor of the defendant asserting it (Cragin v. Lovell, 88 N. Y. 258 ), and must be set forth with the same particularity — disclosing an enforceable claim against the plaintiff — as is required in a complaint for a like cause. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.