express statutory requirement in Montana

5 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1927–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

Case	Followed	Cited
Dobbins, DeGuire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olsongreen mont · 1985 · cited in 1 Montana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2009 MT 426, ¶¶ 39-40 , 354 Mont. 50 , 221 P.3d 1230 (citing Dobbins, De Guire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson, 218 Mont. 392, 396 , 708 P.2d 577, 579 (1985)); §28-2-703, MCA. ¶12 Wrigg agrees that the JCCS covenant imposes a partial restraint on trade. 2011Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2009 MT 426, ¶¶ 39-40 , 354 Mont. 50 , 221 P.3d 1230 (citing Dobbins, De Guire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson, 218 Mont. 392, 396 , 708 P.2d 577, 579 (1985)); §28-2-703, MCA. ¶12 Wrigg agrees that the JCCS covenant imposes a partial restraint on trade.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

Case	Cited	Years
Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP green · 2009 2 sentences 2020Appellants argue the District Court erred by so concluding, and further, that JCCS has no legitimate business interest in its client base. ¶21 As we explained in Junkermier I, “[c]ontracts that restrain trade are strongly disfavor[ed], and therefore, ‘covenants that act as an absolute prohibition on trade—absent an express statutory exception—are void.’” Junkermier I, ¶ 39 (citing § 28-2-708, MCA; Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 2008 MT 4, ¶ 17 , 341 Mont. 73 , 175 P.3d 899 ; Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2009 MT 246, ¶¶ 37-38 , 354 Mont. 50 , 221 P.3d 1230 )) (internal quotations omi 2020Appellants argue the District Court erred by so concluding, and further, that JCCS has no legitimate business interest in its client base. ¶21 As we explained in Junkermier I, “[c]ontracts that restrain trade are strongly disfavor[ed], and therefore, ‘covenants that act as an absolute prohibition on trade—absent an express statutory exception—are void.’” Junkermier I, ¶ 39 (citing § 28-2-708, MCA; Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 2008 MT 4, ¶ 17 , 341 Mont. 73 , 175 P.3d 899 ; Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2009 MT 246, ¶¶ 37-38 , 354 Mont. 50 , 221 P.3d 1230 )) (internal quotations omi	3	2011–2020
Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez green mont · 2008 2 sentences 2020Appellants argue the District Court erred by so concluding, and further, that JCCS has no legitimate business interest in its client base. ¶21 As we explained in Junkermier I, “[c]ontracts that restrain trade are strongly disfavor[ed], and therefore, ‘covenants that act as an absolute prohibition on trade—absent an express statutory exception—are void.’” Junkermier I, ¶ 39 (citing § 28-2-708, MCA; Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 2008 MT 4, ¶ 17 , 341 Mont. 73 , 175 P.3d 899 ; Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2009 MT 246, ¶¶ 37-38 , 354 Mont. 50 , 221 P.3d 1230 )) (internal quotations omi 2020Appellants argue the District Court erred by so concluding, and further, that JCCS has no legitimate business interest in its client base. ¶21 As we explained in Junkermier I, “[c]ontracts that restrain trade are strongly disfavor[ed], and therefore, ‘covenants that act as an absolute prohibition on trade—absent an express statutory exception—are void.’” Junkermier I, ¶ 39 (citing § 28-2-708, MCA; Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 2008 MT 4, ¶ 17 , 341 Mont. 73 , 175 P.3d 899 ; Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2009 MT 246, ¶¶ 37-38 , 354 Mont. 50 , 221 P.3d 1230 )) (internal quotations omi	1	2020–2020
Jensen v. State, Department of Transportation neutral mont · 2009 1 sentence 2020Appellants argue the District Court erred by so concluding, and further, that JCCS has no legitimate business interest in its client base. ¶21 As we explained in Junkermier I, “[c]ontracts that restrain trade are strongly disfavor[ed], and therefore, ‘covenants that act as an absolute prohibition on trade—absent an express statutory exception—are void.’” Junkermier I, ¶ 39 (citing § 28-2-708, MCA; Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 2008 MT 4, ¶ 17 , 341 Mont. 73 , 175 P.3d 899 ; Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2009 MT 246, ¶¶ 37-38 , 354 Mont. 50 , 221 P.3d 1230 )) (internal quotations omi	1	2020–2020
In re J.C. neutral mont · 2008 2 sentences 2019See L.A.G. , ¶¶ 13-19 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); D.E. , ¶¶ 22-38 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); L.D. , ¶¶ 11-17 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); In re D.L.B. , 2017 MT 106 , ¶ 10, 387 Mont. 323 , 394 P.3d 169 (involuntary mental health commitment criteria); In re R.M.T. , 2011 MT 164 , ¶ 27, 361 Mont. 159 , 256 P.3d 935 (parental rights termination criteria); In re J.C. , 2008 MT 127 , ¶¶ 37-55, 343 Mont. 30 , 183 P.3d 22 (TLC proceedings) ; D.B. , ¶¶ 17-18 (termination proceeding findings). ¶27 Here, the termination hearing record manifests that, 2019See L.A.G. , ¶¶ 13-19 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); D.E. , ¶¶ 22-38 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); L.D. , ¶¶ 11-17 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); In re D.L.B. , 2017 MT 106 , ¶ 10, 387 Mont. 323 , 394 P.3d 169 (involuntary mental health commitment criteria); In re R.M.T. , 2011 MT 164 , ¶ 27, 361 Mont. 159 , 256 P.3d 935 (parental rights termination criteria); In re J.C. , 2008 MT 127 , ¶¶ 37-55, 343 Mont. 30 , 183 P.3d 22 (TLC proceedings) ; D.B. , ¶¶ 17-18 (termination proceeding findings). ¶27 Here, the termination hearing record manifests that,	1	2019–2019
In re D.L.B. neutral mont · 2017 2 sentences 2019See L.A.G. , ¶¶ 13-19 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); D.E. , ¶¶ 22-38 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); L.D. , ¶¶ 11-17 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); In re D.L.B. , 2017 MT 106 , ¶ 10, 387 Mont. 323 , 394 P.3d 169 (involuntary mental health commitment criteria); In re R.M.T. , 2011 MT 164 , ¶ 27, 361 Mont. 159 , 256 P.3d 935 (parental rights termination criteria); In re J.C. , 2008 MT 127 , ¶¶ 37-55, 343 Mont. 30 , 183 P.3d 22 (TLC proceedings) ; D.B. , ¶¶ 17-18 (termination proceeding findings). ¶27 Here, the termination hearing record manifests that, 2019See L.A.G. , ¶¶ 13-19 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); D.E. , ¶¶ 22-38 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); L.D. , ¶¶ 11-17 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); In re D.L.B. , 2017 MT 106 , ¶ 10, 387 Mont. 323 , 394 P.3d 169 (involuntary mental health commitment criteria); In re R.M.T. , 2011 MT 164 , ¶ 27, 361 Mont. 159 , 256 P.3d 935 (parental rights termination criteria); In re J.C. , 2008 MT 127 , ¶¶ 37-55, 343 Mont. 30 , 183 P.3d 22 (TLC proceedings) ; D.B. , ¶¶ 17-18 (termination proceeding findings). ¶27 Here, the termination hearing record manifests that,	1	2019–2019
In Re RMT neutral mont · 2011 2 sentences 2019See L.A.G. , ¶¶ 13-19 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); D.E. , ¶¶ 22-38 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); L.D. , ¶¶ 11-17 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); In re D.L.B. , 2017 MT 106 , ¶ 10, 387 Mont. 323 , 394 P.3d 169 (involuntary mental health commitment criteria); In re R.M.T. , 2011 MT 164 , ¶ 27, 361 Mont. 159 , 256 P.3d 935 (parental rights termination criteria); In re J.C. , 2008 MT 127 , ¶¶ 37-55, 343 Mont. 30 , 183 P.3d 22 (TLC proceedings) ; D.B. , ¶¶ 17-18 (termination proceeding findings). ¶27 Here, the termination hearing record manifests that, 2019See L.A.G. , ¶¶ 13-19 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); D.E. , ¶¶ 22-38 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); L.D. , ¶¶ 11-17 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); In re D.L.B. , 2017 MT 106 , ¶ 10, 387 Mont. 323 , 394 P.3d 169 (involuntary mental health commitment criteria); In re R.M.T. , 2011 MT 164 , ¶ 27, 361 Mont. 159 , 256 P.3d 935 (parental rights termination criteria); In re J.C. , 2008 MT 127 , ¶¶ 37-55, 343 Mont. 30 , 183 P.3d 22 (TLC proceedings) ; D.B. , ¶¶ 17-18 (termination proceeding findings). ¶27 Here, the termination hearing record manifests that,	1	2019–2019
In the Matter of JC green mont · 2008 1 sentence 2019See L.A.G. , ¶¶ 13-19 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); D.E. , ¶¶ 22-38 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); L.D. , ¶¶ 11-17 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); In re D.L.B. , 2017 MT 106 , ¶ 10, 387 Mont. 323 , 394 P.3d 169 (involuntary mental health commitment criteria); In re R.M.T. , 2011 MT 164 , ¶ 27, 361 Mont. 159 , 256 P.3d 935 (parental rights termination criteria); In re J.C. , 2008 MT 127 , ¶¶ 37-55, 343 Mont. 30 , 183 P.3d 22 (TLC proceedings) ; D.B. , ¶¶ 17-18 (termination proceeding findings). ¶27 Here, the termination hearing record manifests that,	1	2019–2019
Matter of D.L.B. neutral mont · 2017 1 sentence 2019See L.A.G. , ¶¶ 13-19 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); D.E. , ¶¶ 22-38 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); L.D. , ¶¶ 11-17 (required ICWA "Indian child" determination); In re D.L.B. , 2017 MT 106 , ¶ 10, 387 Mont. 323 , 394 P.3d 169 (involuntary mental health commitment criteria); In re R.M.T. , 2011 MT 164 , ¶ 27, 361 Mont. 159 , 256 P.3d 935 (parental rights termination criteria); In re J.C. , 2008 MT 127 , ¶¶ 37-55, 343 Mont. 30 , 183 P.3d 22 (TLC proceedings) ; D.B. , ¶¶ 17-18 (termination proceeding findings). ¶27 Here, the termination hearing record manifests that,	1	2019–2019
Marshall v. Trerise neutral · 1905 2 sentences 1927(King v. Benson, 22 Mont. 256 , 56 Pac. 280 ; Marshall v. Trerise, 33 Mont. 28 , 81 Pac. 400 ; Newman v. Dunleavy, 51 Mont. 149 , 149 Pac. 970 ; Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont. 10 , 208 Pac. 928 ; Dick v. King, 73 Mont. 456 , 236 Pac. 1093 .) The writing upon which the plaintiff predicates his right to recover a brokerage commission is in no sense a binding contract between the defendant company and the plaintiff to sell the property on the terms and conditions stated, but rather the expression, addressed to a person other than the plaintiff, of a willingness on the part of certain of the individual 1927(King v. Benson, 22 Mont. 256 , 56 Pac. 280 ; Marshall v. Trerise, 33 Mont. 28 , 81 Pac. 400 ; Newman v. Dunleavy, 51 Mont. 149 , 149 Pac. 970 ; Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont. 10 , 208 Pac. 928 ; Dick v. King, 73 Mont. 456 , 236 Pac. 1093 .) The writing upon which the plaintiff predicates his right to recover a brokerage commission is in no sense a binding contract between the defendant company and the plaintiff to sell the property on the terms and conditions stated, but rather the expression, addressed to a person other than the plaintiff, of a willingness on the part of certain of the individual	1	1927–1927
Newman v. Dunleavy neutral mont · 1915 2 sentences 1927(King v. Benson, 22 Mont. 256 , 56 Pac. 280 ; Marshall v. Trerise, 33 Mont. 28 , 81 Pac. 400 ; Newman v. Dunleavy, 51 Mont. 149 , 149 Pac. 970 ; Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont. 10 , 208 Pac. 928 ; Dick v. King, 73 Mont. 456 , 236 Pac. 1093 .) The writing upon which the plaintiff predicates his right to recover a brokerage commission is in no sense a binding contract between the defendant company and the plaintiff to sell the property on the terms and conditions stated, but rather the expression, addressed to a person other than the plaintiff, of a willingness on the part of certain of the individual 1927(King v. Benson, 22 Mont. 256 , 56 Pac. 280 ; Marshall v. Trerise, 33 Mont. 28 , 81 Pac. 400 ; Newman v. Dunleavy, 51 Mont. 149 , 149 Pac. 970 ; Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont. 10 , 208 Pac. 928 ; Dick v. King, 73 Mont. 456 , 236 Pac. 1093 .) The writing upon which the plaintiff predicates his right to recover a brokerage commission is in no sense a binding contract between the defendant company and the plaintiff to sell the property on the terms and conditions stated, but rather the expression, addressed to a person other than the plaintiff, of a willingness on the part of certain of the individual	1	1927–1927
Cobb v. Warren neutral mont · 1922 2 sentences 1927(King v. Benson, 22 Mont. 256 , 56 Pac. 280 ; Marshall v. Trerise, 33 Mont. 28 , 81 Pac. 400 ; Newman v. Dunleavy, 51 Mont. 149 , 149 Pac. 970 ; Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont. 10 , 208 Pac. 928 ; Dick v. King, 73 Mont. 456 , 236 Pac. 1093 .) The writing upon which the plaintiff predicates his right to recover a brokerage commission is in no sense a binding contract between the defendant company and the plaintiff to sell the property on the terms and conditions stated, but rather the expression, addressed to a person other than the plaintiff, of a willingness on the part of certain of the individual 1927(King v. Benson, 22 Mont. 256 , 56 Pac. 280 ; Marshall v. Trerise, 33 Mont. 28 , 81 Pac. 400 ; Newman v. Dunleavy, 51 Mont. 149 , 149 Pac. 970 ; Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont. 10 , 208 Pac. 928 ; Dick v. King, 73 Mont. 456 , 236 Pac. 1093 .) The writing upon which the plaintiff predicates his right to recover a brokerage commission is in no sense a binding contract between the defendant company and the plaintiff to sell the property on the terms and conditions stated, but rather the expression, addressed to a person other than the plaintiff, of a willingness on the part of certain of the individual	1	1927–1927
Dick v. King green mont · 1925 2 sentences 1927(King v. Benson, 22 Mont. 256 , 56 Pac. 280 ; Marshall v. Trerise, 33 Mont. 28 , 81 Pac. 400 ; Newman v. Dunleavy, 51 Mont. 149 , 149 Pac. 970 ; Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont. 10 , 208 Pac. 928 ; Dick v. King, 73 Mont. 456 , 236 Pac. 1093 .) The writing upon which the plaintiff predicates his right to recover a brokerage commission is in no sense a binding contract between the defendant company and the plaintiff to sell the property on the terms and conditions stated, but rather the expression, addressed to a person other than the plaintiff, of a willingness on the part of certain of the individual 1927(King v. Benson, 22 Mont. 256 , 56 Pac. 280 ; Marshall v. Trerise, 33 Mont. 28 , 81 Pac. 400 ; Newman v. Dunleavy, 51 Mont. 149 , 149 Pac. 970 ; Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont. 10 , 208 Pac. 928 ; Dick v. King, 73 Mont. 456 , 236 Pac. 1093 .) The writing upon which the plaintiff predicates his right to recover a brokerage commission is in no sense a binding contract between the defendant company and the plaintiff to sell the property on the terms and conditions stated, but rather the expression, addressed to a person other than the plaintiff, of a willingness on the part of certain of the individual	1	1927–1927
King v. Benson neutral · 1899 2 sentences 1927(King v. Benson, 22 Mont. 256 , 56 Pac. 280 ; Marshall v. Trerise, 33 Mont. 28 , 81 Pac. 400 ; Newman v. Dunleavy, 51 Mont. 149 , 149 Pac. 970 ; Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont. 10 , 208 Pac. 928 ; Dick v. King, 73 Mont. 456 , 236 Pac. 1093 .) The writing upon which the plaintiff predicates his right to recover a brokerage commission is in no sense a binding contract between the defendant company and the plaintiff to sell the property on the terms and conditions stated, but rather the expression, addressed to a person other than the plaintiff, of a willingness on the part of certain of the individual 1927(King v. Benson, 22 Mont. 256 , 56 Pac. 280 ; Marshall v. Trerise, 33 Mont. 28 , 81 Pac. 400 ; Newman v. Dunleavy, 51 Mont. 149 , 149 Pac. 970 ; Cobb v. Warren, 64 Mont. 10 , 208 Pac. 928 ; Dick v. King, 73 Mont. 456 , 236 Pac. 1093 .) The writing upon which the plaintiff predicates his right to recover a brokerage commission is in no sense a binding contract between the defendant company and the plaintiff to sell the property on the terms and conditions stated, but rather the expression, addressed to a person other than the plaintiff, of a willingness on the part of certain of the individual	1	1927–1927

Where else courts name it

CA 101 (1892–2025) TX 20 (1903–2025) NY 17 (1910–2016) IL 13 (1970–2021) OH 10 (1951–2024) OR 9 (1981–2025) PA 8 (1954–2021) GA 8 (1972–2022) SD 8 (1984–2013) LA 8 (1981–2018) KS 7 (1900–2015) CO 7 (1919–2008) MO 6 (1987–2022) DC 5 (1989–2015) HI 5 (1960–1976) CT 5 (1993–2017) MT 5 (1927–2020) WA 4 (1955–1998) UT 3 (2004–2024) NC 3 (1950–2010) IN 3 (1927–2016) OK 3 (1950–1992) MA 3 (1951–2011) WV 3 (1990–2005) MN 3 (1961–2013) NH 2 (2010–2020) VT 2 (2003–2009) TN 2 (1943–2005) VA 2 (2000–2001) MD 2 (1962–2007) AK 2 (1982–1994) MI 2 (1975–1999) FL 2 (1991–2024) WI 2 (1932–2005) AZ 2 (1982–1984)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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