express statutory requirement in New York

1996The bald statement in Bucci v Village of Port Chester ( 22 NY2d 195, 203-204 ) that the notice of claim requirement has no relevancy to actions brought under Labor Law § 220 (8) contravenes an express statutory requirement by creating a judicially crafted exception without sufficient justification.

1996The bald statement in Bucci v Village of Port Chester ( 22 N.Y.2d 195, 203-204 ) that the notice of claim requirement has no relevancy to actions brought under Labor Law § 220 (8) contravenes an express statutory requirement by creating a judicially crafted exception without sufficient justification.

2016Although such contracts are governed by the General Obligations Law, before IRB some courts continued to apply a traditional conflicts-of-law analysis, despite the express statutory exception allowing parties to choose New York law to govern their contracts, even if they do not have New York contacts (General Obligations Law §§ 5-1401 [1]; 5-1402 [1]; IRB-Brasil Resseguros, 20 NY3d at 314 ).

2012The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “the broad exemption accorded [by section 26] to ‘every Federal land bank’ ” barred the state from imposing any tax of any kind, unless it fell within the express statutory exception for real estate taxes (see Bismarck, 314 US at 100 ).

2012The Court observed that “[t]he unqualified term ‘taxation’ used in section 26 clearly encompasse[d the sales tax] within its scope,” and thus afforded the entity an important “protection” that could not “be frittered away” (see id. at 99 ).

1993(Siegel, NY Prac § 560, at 878 [2d ed], citing Hecht v Monaghan, 307 NY 461 .) He sees this requirement as turning on whether the determination will affect a "right.” If not, and in the absence of an express statutory hearing requirement, the official offers a hearing as a matter of grace.

1987(Maglich v Saxe, Bacon & Bolan, supra; Haug v Metal City Findings Corp., 47 AD2d 837 .) Accordingly, plaintiff must proceed in the regular course.

1987(Maglich v Saxe, Bacon & Bolan, supra; Haug v Metal City Findings Corp., 47 AD2d 837 .) Accordingly, plaintiff must proceed in the regular course.

1985In interpreting this requirement, the Court of Appeals has held, “An out-of-court confession that is corroborated by evidence that the crime occurred is sufficient to sustain a determination that a youth is a juvenile delinquent, notwithstanding the absence of independent evidence directly linking the youth to the criminal act.” (Matter of Carmelo E., 57 NY2d 431, 433 .) Despite the lack of an express statutory requirement that a Family Court petition or any supporting deposition set forth the corroboration necessary to sustain a conviction, we conclude that the requisite corroboration of an o

1959Although this child was sworn, so that the express statutory requirement of section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply, the evidence against appellant in this record is not of the clear and convincing kind which is necessary in order to sustain a conviction of this type (People v. Meyers, 309 N. Y. 837 ; People v. Dutton, 305 N. Y. 632 ; People v. Rosen, 293 N. Y. 683 ; People v. Derner, 288 N. Y. 599 ; People v. Slaughter, 278 N. Y. 479 ; People v. churgin, 261 N. Y. 661 ).

1959Although this child was sworn, so that the express statutory requirement of section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply, the evidence against appellant in this record is not of the clear and convincing kind which is necessary in order to sustain a conviction of this type (People v. Meyers, 309 N. Y. 837 ; People v. Dutton, 305 N. Y. 632 ; People v. Rosen, 293 N. Y. 683 ; People v. Derner, 288 N. Y. 599 ; People v. Slaughter, 278 N. Y. 479 ; People v. churgin, 261 N. Y. 661 ).

1959Although this child was sworn, so that the express statutory requirement of section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply, the evidence against appellant in this record is not of the clear and convincing kind which is necessary in order to sustain a conviction of this type (People v. Meyers, 309 N. Y. 837 ; People v. Dutton, 305 N. Y. 632 ; People v. Rosen, 293 N. Y. 683 ; People v. Derner, 288 N. Y. 599 ; People v. Slaughter, 278 N. Y. 479 ; People v. churgin, 261 N. Y. 661 ).

1959Although this child was sworn, so that the express statutory requirement of section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply, the evidence against appellant in this record is not of the clear and convincing kind which is necessary in order to sustain a conviction of this type (People v. Meyers, 309 N. Y. 837 ; People v. Dutton, 305 N. Y. 632 ; People v. Rosen, 293 N. Y. 683 ; People v. Derner, 288 N. Y. 599 ; People v. Slaughter, 278 N. Y. 479 ; People v. churgin, 261 N. Y. 661 ).

1959Although this child was sworn, so that the express statutory requirement of section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply, the evidence against appellant in this record is not of the clear and convincing kind which is necessary in order to sustain a conviction of this type (People v. Meyers, 309 N. Y. 837 ; People v. Dutton, 305 N. Y. 632 ; People v. Rosen, 293 N. Y. 683 ; People v. Derner, 288 N. Y. 599 ; People v. Slaughter, 278 N. Y. 479 ; People v. churgin, 261 N. Y. 661 ).

1959Although this child was sworn, so that the express statutory requirement of section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply, the evidence against appellant in this record is not of the clear and convincing kind which is necessary in order to sustain a conviction of this type (People v. Meyers, 309 N. Y. 837 ; People v. Dutton, 305 N. Y. 632 ; People v. Rosen, 293 N. Y. 683 ; People v. Derner, 288 N. Y. 599 ; People v. Slaughter, 278 N. Y. 479 ; People v. churgin, 261 N. Y. 661 ).

1955(Kosiba v. City of Syracuse, 287 N. Y. 283 ; Gwydir v. Cowdell, 291 N. Y. 777 ; Feisthamel v. Roczen, 273 App. Div. 937 ; Krauss v. Layman, 261 App. Div. 1026 .) Such notice would be served only upon the municipality (Sandak v. Tuxedo Union School Dist.

1955(Kosiba v. City of Syracuse, 287 N. Y. 283 ; Gwydir v. Cowdell, 291 N. Y. 777 ; Feisthamel v. Roczen, 273 App. Div. 937 ; Krauss v. Layman, 261 App. Div. 1026 .) Such notice would be served only upon the municipality (Sandak v. Tuxedo Union School Dist.

1955(Kosiba v. City of Syracuse, 287 N. Y. 283 ; Gwydir v. Cowdell, 291 N. Y. 777 ; Feisthamel v. Roczen, 273 App. Div. 937 ; Krauss v. Layman, 261 App. Div. 1026 .) Such notice would be served only upon the municipality (Sandak v. Tuxedo Union School Dist.

1955(Kosiba v. City of Syracuse, 287 N. Y. 283 ; Gwydir v. Cowdell, 291 N. Y. 777 ; Feisthamel v. Roczen, 273 App. Div. 937 ; Krauss v. Layman, 261 App. Div. 1026 .) Such notice would be served only upon the municipality (Sandak v. Tuxedo Union School Dist.

1954The requirement does not apply to any ultimate remainderman nor to any primary remainderman upon whose death during minority a secondary or contingent remainder has been limited (Manice v. Manice, supra).

1952(Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 55 .) Estoppel is insufficient as a defense to such a cause of action, in view of the express statutory requirement of written consent (Hammond v. Crowell Publishing Co., 253 App. Div. 205, 206 ; Lane v. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66 , affd, 256 App. Div. 1065 ).

1952(Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 55 .) Estoppel is insufficient as a defense to such a cause of action, in view of the express statutory requirement of written consent (Hammond v. Crowell Publishing Co., 253 App. Div. 205, 206 ; Lane v. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66 , affd, 256 App. Div. 1065 ).

1952(Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 55 .) Estoppel is insufficient as a defense to such a cause of action, in view of the express statutory requirement of written consent (Hammond v. Crowell Publishing Co., 253 App. Div. 205, 206 ; Lane v. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66 , affd, 256 App. Div. 1065 ).

1952(Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 55 .) Estoppel is insufficient as a defense to such a cause of action, in view of the express statutory requirement of written consent (Hammond v. Crowell Publishing Co., 253 App. Div. 205, 206 ; Lane v. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66 , affd, 256 App. Div. 1065 ).

1948In addition, although the burden of proof of the existence of the marriage relationship between the parties rests in the first instance upon petitioner, nevertheless “ Proof of the solemnization of a ceremonial marriage between parties gives rise to a true presumption of its validity.” (Matter of Dugro, 261 App. Div. 236 , headnote.) Every ceremonial marriage is presumed to be valid; and on any party attacking it is cast a heavy burden of proof.

1910Crim. 141, and Matter of Kenny, 23 Misc.