20 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Federal Sign v. Texas Southern Universityred2 sentences2011See Federal Sign v. Texas S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. 1997). 2011See Federal Sign v. Texas S. Univ. , 951 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. 1997). | 2 | 2 |
Indian Towing Co. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025Just as “this Court must not promote profligacy by careless construction,” “[n]either should it as a self-constituted guardian of the Treasury im- port [sovereign] immunity back into a statute designed to limit it.” Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955). 19 Evaluating whether Broadmoor’s “breach-of-contract allegations . . . fall within the scope of the express statutory waiver,” Pepper Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 210– 11, requires answering four questions posed by Section 114.003’s text: 1. | 1 | 1 |
Wichita Falls State Hospital v. Taylorgreen1 sentence2018See Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 694 n.3. | 1 | 1 |
Texas Workers' Compensation Commission v. City of Eagle Pass/Texas Municipal League Workers' Compensation Joint Insurance Fundgreen1 sentence2017See id. at 806 ; see also Tex. Lab. | 1 | 1 |
Madden v. Texas Board of Chiropractic Examinersgreen1 sentence2015Ramirez v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 927 SW2d, 770, 772-73 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996); and Madden v. Bd. of Chiropractor Examiners, 663 SW2d 622, 624 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1983 writ ref. nre). 9 AUS-6044683-2 6060904/l He states absent an express statutory requirement to hold a contested case hearing, the analysis should focus on what is implied in the statute as it relates to the definition of a contested case as set forth in the APA. | 1 | 1 |
Ramirez v. Texas State Board of Medical Examinersgreen1 sentence2015Ramirez v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 927 SW2d, 770, 772-73 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996); and Madden v. Bd. of Chiropractor Examiners, 663 SW2d 622, 624 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1983 writ ref. nre). 9 AUS-6044683-2 6060904/l He states absent an express statutory requirement to hold a contested case hearing, the analysis should focus on what is implied in the statute as it relates to the definition of a contested case as set forth in the APA. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Commitment of Malonegreen1 sentence2013See In re Commitment of Malone, 336 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2011, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Vasquezgreen1 sentence2010Ex parte Vasquez, 712 S.W.2d 754, 754 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitleygreen1 sentence2005See Tex. Transp.Code Ann. § 452.052(c) (Vernon 1999); Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Ted Breezy v. University of Texas Medical Branch at Galvestongreen1 sentence2004See Noah , — S.W.3d at -, 2004 WL 1794642, *6 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission v. IT-Davy
green
2 sentences2017Because we conclude that sections 12.301 and 12.303 construed together provide an express statutory waiver, we need not decide whether the context of section 12.301 indicates that the legislature intended the use of the term “person” in that section alone to waive immunity. 7 Tex. Parks & Wildlife Code §§ 12.301, .303; Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 311.005(2), .034; Texas Citizens, 336 S.W.3d at 628 ; IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 . 2017Having already concluded that sections 12.301 and 12.303 provide an express statutory waiver of immunity for the State’s claims against the District for unlawfully possessing oysters, see IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 , we further conclude that the legislature has expressly authorized retrospective relief as against the District violations of those statutory provisions, see Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 377 . | 4 | 2016–2021 |
Railroad Commission v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water
green
2 sentences2017Because we conclude that sections 12.301 and 12.303 construed together provide an express statutory waiver, we need not decide whether the context of section 12.301 indicates that the legislature intended the use of the term “person” in that section alone to waive immunity. 7 Tex. Parks & Wildlife Code §§ 12.301, .303; Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 311.005(2), .034; Texas Citizens, 336 S.W.3d at 628 ; IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 . 2016Read together, and construed in light of section 311.005(2)'s definition of "person" to include a governmental subdivision, sections 12.301 and 12.303 thus provide that the attorney general may bring suit against any person, including a governmental subdivision such as the District, who unlawfully possesses fish, and therefore provide an express statutory waiver of immunity. 4 See Tex. Parks & Wildlife Code §§ 12.301, .303; Tex. Gov't Code §§ 311.005(2), .034; Texas Citizens, 336 S.W.3d at 628 ; IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 . | 2 | 2016–2017 |
The City of El Paso v. Lilli M. Heinrich
green
2 sentences2017Having already concluded that sections 12.301 and 12.303 provide an express statutory waiver of immunity for the State’s claims against the District for unlawfully possessing oysters, see IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 , we further conclude that the legislature has expressly authorized retrospective relief as against the District violations of those statutory provisions, see Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 377 . 2016Having already concluded that sections 12.301 and 12.303 provide an express statutory waiver of immunity for the State's claims against the District for unlawfully possessing oysters, see IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 854 , we further conclude that the legislature has expressly authorized retrospective relief as against the District violations of those statutory provisions, see Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 377 . | 2 | 2016–2017 |
Roccaforte v. Jefferson County
green
2 sentences2012In that case, the supreme court held that the plaintiffs failure to deliver notice of suit to county officials by mail, an express statutory requirement, did not require dismissal of the suit against the county. 3 Id. 2012In that case, the supreme court held that the plaintiff’s failure to deliver notice of suit to county officials by mail, an express statutory requirement, did not require dismissal of the suit against the county.3 Id. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda
green
1 sentence2023Because immunity from suit implicates subject-matter jurisdiction, a defendant may properly raise the defense in a plea to the 9 jurisdiction.5 Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225-26 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Kerry Heckman, on Behalf of Themselves and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Williamson County
green
1 sentence2023They also maintain the Comptroller’s office violated the PRPRPA by issuing the certificate without first following its requirements for a takings impact assessment, and because the PRPRPA contains an express statutory waiver of immunity, their suit should not be dismissed. 7 of some third party not before the court.’” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155 (quoting Simon v. E. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
green
1 sentence2023Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 , 41–42 (1976)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
B & B VENDING CO. v. City of Garland
green
1 sentence1991Id. at 134 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Patten v. Cox
green
2 sentences1921Patten v. Cox, 9 Tex. Civ. 1921Patten v. Cox, 9 Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Taylor v. Van Meter
neutral
1 sentence1903The thirty-eighth section of the Act of 1849 requires the bell to be rung or the whistle to be sounded for the distance of eighty rods before reaching a highway crossing, and not only provides a penalty for failure to do this, but expressly provides that the road shall ‘be liable for all damages which shall be sustained by any person by reason of such neglect/ The theory of appellant’s counsel, that this only applies to injuries done upon the actual intersection of the two roads, where the land belongs equally to both roads, finds no support in the language of the act, and we are not at libert | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.