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13 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1970–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Pitsonbargergreen2 sentences2021Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 458-59 . 2008See 725 ILCS 5/122 — 3 (West 2004); see also People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444 , 793 N.E.2d 609 (2002). | 2 | 3 |
Gozlon-Peretz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004There is a well-established rule of statutory construction which states, "an express statutory requirement here, contrasted with statutory silence there, shows an intent to confine the requirement to the specified instance." Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67 , 116 S.Ct. 437, 442 , 133 L.Ed.2d 351, 360 (1995), citing Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 , 111 S.Ct. 840, 846-47 , 112 L.Ed.2d 919, 930 (1991), and quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 , 104 S.Ct. 296, 300 , 78 L.Ed.2d 17, 24 (1983) ("`[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute 2004There is a well-established rule of statutory construction which states, "an express statutory requirement here, contrasted with statutory silence there, shows an intent to confine the requirement to the specified instance." Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67 , 116 S.Ct. 437, 442 , 133 L.Ed.2d 351, 360 (1995), citing Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 , 111 S.Ct. 840, 846-47 , 112 L.Ed.2d 919, 930 (1991), and quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 , 104 S.Ct. 296, 300 , 78 L.Ed.2d 17, 24 (1983) ("`[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute | 2 | 3 |
Field v. Mansgreen2 sentences2004There is a well-established rule of statutory construction which states, “an express statutory requirement here, contrasted with statutory silence there, shows an intent to confine the requirement to the specified instance.” Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67 , 133 L. 2004There is a well-established rule of statutory construction which states, “an express statutory requirement here, contrasted with statutory silence there, shows an intent to confine the requirement to the specified instance.” Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67 , 133 L. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Luis R.green2 sentences2015Both Richardson and Rich rely on a dissent filed in In re Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d 295, 307-09 (2010) (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Burke, J.). ¶ 36 In Luis R., a majority of this court reversed the dismissal of the State’s delinquency petition because the trial court improperly relied on a lack of jurisdiction. 2015Both Richardson and Rich rely on a dissent filed in In re Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d 295, 307-09 (2010) (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Burke, J.). - 11 - ¶ 36 In Luis R., a majority of this court reversed the dismissal of the State’s delinquency petition because the trial court improperly relied on a lack of jurisdiction. | 2 | 2 |
Russello v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004There is a well-established rule of statutory construction which states, "an express statutory requirement here, contrasted with statutory silence there, shows an intent to confine the requirement to the specified instance." Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67 , 116 S.Ct. 437, 442 , 133 L.Ed.2d 351, 360 (1995), citing Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 , 111 S.Ct. 840, 846-47 , 112 L.Ed.2d 919, 930 (1991), and quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 , 104 S.Ct. 296, 300 , 78 L.Ed.2d 17, 24 (1983) ("`[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute 2004There is a well-established rule of statutory construction which states, "an express statutory requirement here, contrasted with statutory silence there, shows an intent to confine the requirement to the specified instance." Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67 , 116 S.Ct. 437, 442 , 133 L.Ed.2d 351, 360 (1995), citing Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 , 111 S.Ct. 840, 846-47 , 112 L.Ed.2d 919, 930 (1991), and quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 , 104 S.Ct. 296, 300 , 78 L.Ed.2d 17, 24 (1983) ("`[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Campa
green
1 sentence2009Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 264 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Kidd
green
1 sentence1993App. 3d 1065 , 536 N.E.2d 816 .) Therefore, under the express statutory exception, the victim’s statement is not rendered inadmissible by rules precluding use of hearsay evidence. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Lynch
green
2 sentences1993App. 3d 121, 124 , 460 N.E.2d 817, 819 .) Additionally, “substantial compliance” with the statute through the inclusion in the record of all the information which would have been in the report does not excuse the express statutory requirement of a written presentence report. 1993(People v. Harris (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 290, 303 , 473 N.E.2d 1291, 1297 ; Lynch, 122 Ill. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences1993(People v. Harris (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 290, 303 , 473 N.E.2d 1291, 1297 ; Lynch, 122 Ill. 1993(People v. Harris (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 290, 303 , 473 N.E.2d 1291, 1297 ; Lynch, 122 Ill. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Hartfield
green
1 sentence1974The State cites People v. Hartfield, supra, as support for its contention that in the absence of an express statutory requirement, the failure to make an announcement of authority and purpose prior to a forced entry does not infringe constitutional rights. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Cleghorn v. Postlewaite
green
1 sentence1970The rule that notice and hearing were required in these personal property assessment cases came from judicial declarations beginning in 1867 with Cleghorn v. Postlewaite, 43 Ill. 428 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.