self-defense instruction in Maryland

1990The court observed: From the turbulent waters of the criminal law of Maryland, roiled by the dictates of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 *212 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 508 ] (1975), emerged an esoteric qualification to the doctrine of self-defense, known as the “imperfect right of self-defense.” We noticed it in Evans v. State, 28 Md.App. 640, 658, n. 4 , 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197 , 362 A.2d 629 (1976), recognized it in Shuck v. State, 29 Md.App. 33, 40-45 , 349 A.2d 378 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md. 733 (1976), mentioned it in Wentworth v. State, 29 Md.App. 11

1990The court observed: From the turbulent waters of the criminal law of Maryland, roiled by the dictates of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 *212 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 508 ] (1975), emerged an esoteric qualification to the doctrine of self-defense, known as the “imperfect right of self-defense.” We noticed it in Evans v. State, 28 Md.App. 640, 658, n. 4 , 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197 , 362 A.2d 629 (1976), recognized it in Shuck v. State, 29 Md.App. 33, 40-45 , 349 A.2d 378 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md. 733 (1976), mentioned it in Wentworth v. State, 29 Md.App. 11

1990See Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 179 , 486 A.2d 196 (1985), quoting with approval Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87, 97 , 145 A.2d 428 (1958) (“it is incumbent upon the court, ... when requested in a criminal case, to give an ... instruction on every essential question or point of law supported by evidence”); Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 477 , 365 A.2d 545 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 2183 , 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) (where there is no evidence supporting an instruction, it need not be given). *221 It is clear from the record that requests were made to instruct the jury on the doctri

1990See Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 179 , 486 A.2d 196 (1985), quoting with approval Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87, 97 , 145 A.2d 428 (1958) (“it is incumbent upon the court, ... when requested in a criminal case, to give an ... instruction on every essential question or point of law supported by evidence”); Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 477 , 365 A.2d 545 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 2183 , 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) (where there is no evidence supporting an instruction, it need not be given). *221 It is clear from the record that requests were made to instruct the jury on the doctri

2024Dykes, 319 Md. at 217 (“It is of no matter that the self-defense claim is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary.”).

2024Dykes, 319 Md. at 217 (“It is of no matter that the self-defense claim is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary.”).

2022The self-defense doctrine—in particular, the fourth element of the test—also requires the defendant to demonstrate that they “used no more force than the exigency required,” Sydnor v. State, 365 Md. 205, 216 (2001) (quoting State v. Martin, 329 Md. 351, 357 (1993)), which embodies the idea of proportionality by requiring a defendant to show that the degree and amount of the force that the defendant used was appropriate in relation to the severity of the threat of physical harm that required responsive force.

2022App. 173, 191-92 (2000), aff’d, 365 Md. 205 (2001) (noting that “the basis for lethal force dissipates” when a person no longer “is in danger of imminent death or serious bodily harm,” and that the person’s “response must be measured and directly proportional to any perceived threat that 22 As already noted, officers often lawfully initiate contact that results in the use of force, a fact that we bear in mind as we consider what the self-defense doctrine tells us about the meaning of “necessary and proportional” in the context of police use of force. 52 [107 Op. Att’y does not rise to the leve

1990The court observed: From the turbulent waters of the criminal law of Maryland, roiled by the dictates of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 *212 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 508 ] (1975), emerged an esoteric qualification to the doctrine of self-defense, known as the “imperfect right of self-defense.” We noticed it in Evans v. State, 28 Md.App. 640, 658, n. 4 , 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197 , 362 A.2d 629 (1976), recognized it in Shuck v. State, 29 Md.App. 33, 40-45 , 349 A.2d 378 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md. 733 (1976), mentioned it in Wentworth v. State, 29 Md.App. 11

1990The court observed: From the turbulent waters of the criminal law of Maryland, roiled by the dictates of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 *212 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 508 ] (1975), emerged an esoteric qualification to the doctrine of self-defense, known as the “imperfect right of self-defense.” We noticed it in Evans v. State, 28 Md.App. 640, 658, n. 4 , 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197 , 362 A.2d 629 (1976), recognized it in Shuck v. State, 29 Md.App. 33, 40-45 , 349 A.2d 378 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md. 733 (1976), mentioned it in Wentworth v. State, 29 Md.App. 11

2010In Faulkner v. State, 54 Md.App. 113, 114-15 , 458 A.2d 81 (1983), aff'd, 301 Md. 482 , 483 A.2d 759 (1984), Judge Orth (former Chief Judge of this Court, then retired from the Court of Appeals, and specially assigned to this Court) recounted the Maryland reception of this very significant new addition to this State’s homicide law: From the turbulent waters of the criminal law of Maryland, roiled by the dictates of Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975), emerged an esoteric qualification to the doctrine of self-defense, known as the “imperfect right of self-defense.” We noticed it in Evans v. State, recogn

2010In Faulkner v. State, 54 Md.App. 113, 114-15 , 458 A.2d 81 (1983), aff'd, 301 Md. 482 , 483 A.2d 759 (1984), Judge Orth (former Chief Judge of this Court, then retired from the Court of Appeals, and specially assigned to this Court) recounted the Maryland reception of this very significant new addition to this State’s homicide law: From the turbulent waters of the criminal law of Maryland, roiled by the dictates of Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975), emerged an esoteric qualification to the doctrine of self-defense, known as the “imperfect right of self-defense.” We noticed it in Evans v. State, recogn

2017However, as the State noted in its brief, the Smullen Court “did not relax the requirement of the self-defense doctrine[which is,] that the defendant believe that [he or] she was in immediate and imminent danger.” We explained that it is the defendant’s burden to produce “some evidence” that, “in light of that pattern of abuse, the defendant could honestly, and perhaps reasonably, perceive an imminent threat of immediate danger.” Id. at 273 , 844 A.2d at 453 .

2017However, as the State noted in its brief, the Smullen Court “did not relax the requirement of the self-defense doctrine[which is,] that the defendant believe that [he or] she was in immediate and imminent danger.” We explained that it is the defendant’s burden to produce “some evidence” that, “in light of that pattern of abuse, the defendant could honestly, and perhaps reasonably, perceive an imminent threat of immediate danger.” Id. at 273 , 844 A.2d at 453 .

2022Under the self-defense doctrine, for example, “[a] nondeadly aggressor (i.e., one who begins an encounter, using only his fists or some nondeadly weapon) who is met with deadly force in defense may justifiably defend himself against the deadly attack.” Watkins v. State, 79 Md.

2005Cf. Watkins v. State, 79 Md.App. 136, 139 , 555 A.2d 1087 (1989) (holding that the accused was entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense, although he was the initial aggressor at the non-deadly level, because the victim was the one who escalated the fight from a non-deadly one to a lethal confrontation).

2018"It has been established," however, "that self-defense is not a defense to felony murder." Sutton v. State , 139 Md.

2018“It has been established,” however, “that self-defense is not a defense to felony murder.” Sutton v. State, 139 Md.

2026The State next cites Nicholson v. State, a case in which we held that the failure to give a self-defense instruction was harmless error “[b]ecause the jury was not permitted to acquit [the defendant] of second-degree felony murder on the basis of self-defense.” 239 Md.

2026In Marquardt, we concluded that the defendant, who admitted to breaking into the victim’s apartment with a baseball bat, was not entitled to a self-defense instruction related to his second-degree assault charge. 164 Md.

2025Even if Mr. Gonzalez-Mena did not actually intend to seriously injure or kill Ms. Jones with the machete, as we noted in State v. Marr in the context of a self-defense instruction, “the facts or circumstances must be taken as perceived 24 by the defendant, even if they were not the true facts or circumstances, so long as a reasonable person in the defendant’s position could also reasonably perceive the facts or circumstances in that way.” 362 Md. 467, 480 (2001).

2025If the perception turns out to be false, that “does not necessarily make it unreasonable[.]” Id. at 481 .

2022Jones v. State, 357 Md. 408, 422 (2000).

2022App. 328, 331 (1968), which was not of the defendant’s own making, Jones, 357 Md. at 422 .

2022First, the self-defense doctrine embodies the concept of necessity by requiring the defendant to show that the use of force was essential because the defendant reasonably feared “imminent peril,” Morris v. State, 4 Md.

2022Cf. Faulkner, 179 Md. at 601 (noting that the self-defense doctrine requires proof that the actor “used no more force than the exigency reasonably demanded”).

2022The self-defense doctrine—in particular, the fourth element of the test—also requires the defendant to demonstrate that they “used no more force than the exigency required,” Sydnor v. State, 365 Md. 205, 216 (2001) (quoting State v. Martin, 329 Md. 351, 357 (1993)), which embodies the idea of proportionality by requiring a defendant to show that the degree and amount of the force that the defendant used was appropriate in relation to the severity of the threat of physical harm that required responsive force.

2022See, e.g., Sydnor v. State, 133 Md.

2017There was no evidence of self-defense of assaults of the husband when he was shot. [Defendant] had been talking for over three months prior to the murder about how to have her husband killed, with payment to the assailants out of his insurance proceeds. 9 State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the defendant did not prove she was in immediate danger at the time of the killing and, thus, failed to make a prima facie showing of self-defense); see also State v. Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tenn. Crim.

2017There was no evidence of self-defense of assaults of the husband when he was shot. [Defendant] had been talking for over three months prior to the murder about how to have her husband killed, with payment to the assailants out of his insurance proceeds. 9 State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the defendant did not prove she was in immediate danger at the time of the killing and, thus, failed to make a prima facie showing of self-defense); see also State v. Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tenn. Crim.

2017The Colorado Court of Appeals did “not agree that a self-defense instruction [was] available in a contract-for-hire case for three reasons.” People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 763 (Colo. App. 1991).

2017“Secondly, a self-defense instruction in a murder-for-hire situation would undermine ancient notions of self-defense which originated in the common law.” Id.

2017There was no evidence of self-defense of assaults of the husband when he was shot. [Defendant] had been talking for over three months prior to the murder about how to have her husband killed, with payment to the assailants out of his insurance proceeds. 9 State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the defendant did not prove she was in immediate danger at the time of the killing and, thus, failed to make a prima facie showing of self-defense); see also State v. Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tenn. Crim.

2017There was no evidence of self-defense of assaults of the husband when he was shot. [Defendant] had been talking for over three months prior to the murder about how to have her husband killed, with payment to the assailants out of his insurance proceeds. 9 State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the defendant did not prove she was in immediate danger at the time of the killing and, thus, failed to make a prima facie showing of self-defense); see also State v. Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tenn. Crim.