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71 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1910–2026 33 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mobley v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Mobley v. State, 269 Ga. 738, 740 (1) ( 505 SE2d 722 ) (1998) (listing applicable factors in determining whether a self-defense claim based on the battered person syndrome has been established). 2015See Mobley v. State, 269 Ga. 738, 740 (1) ( 505 SE2d 722 ) (1998) (listing applicable factors in determining whether a self-defense claim based on the battered person syndrome has been established). | 4 | 4 |
Worthem v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See also Worthem v. State, 270 Ga. 469, 471 (2) ( 509 SE2d 922 ) (1999) (“the provocation necessary to support a charge of voluntary manslaughter is markedly different from that which will support a self-defense claim” (punctuation and footnote omitted)). 2019See also Worthem v. State, 270 Ga. 469, 471 (2) ( 509 SE2d 922 ) (1999) (“the provocation necessary to support a charge of voluntary manslaughter is markedly different from that which will support a self-defense claim” (punctuation and footnote omitted)). | 3 | 4 |
Willerson v. Stategreen2 sentences2026The use of excessive force or unlawful force while acting in self-defense is not justifiable.” (cleaned up)); Willerson v. State, 312 Ga. 369, 373 (2021) (“Given the brutality of the attack against the victim, the extent of the victim’s injuries, and the fact that [the appellant] suffered no injuries in the alter- cation, the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to con- tradict the self-defense claim.”). 2025See also Willerson v. State, 312 Ga. 369, 373 (863 SE2d 50) (2021) (“Given the brutality of the attack against the victim, the extent of the victim’s injuries, and the fact that [the defendant] suffered no injuries in the altercation, the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to contradict the self-defense claim.”). | 3 | 3 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025In her motion, Griffin contended that, because counsel “abandoned” her self-defense claim at the end of the trial, Griffin “was denied her right to maintain her innocence and assert her chosen defense” under McCoy, in which the United States Supreme Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, “a defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty,” and that “counsel may not admit [his] client’s guilt of a charged crime over the client’s int 2025In her motion, Griffin contended that, because counsel “abandoned” her self-defense claim at the end of the trial, Griffin “was denied her right to maintain her innocence and assert her chosen defense” under McCoy, in which the United States Supreme Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, “a defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty,” and that “counsel may not admit [his] client’s guilt of a charged crime over the client’s int | 2 | 3 |
McClure v. Stategreen2 sentences2023However, the trial court concluded that in refusing the requested self-defense charge, it had erred because under McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856 (834 SE2d 96) (2019) “a defendant need not admit to anything in order to be entitled to an affirmative defense charge, so long as there is slight evidence to support it, and . . . a defendant need not choose between different affirmative defenses.” But the trial court concluded that its error was harmless because trial counsel argued only that the shooting was an accident (i.e., not self-defense) in his opening 8 statement and because the evidence pres 2020He added, “I seen the weapon and who pulled it, it was Monique Goodman, it was by her foot.” After this testimony, the State objected to admission of the incident with Frank because White had testified that “Monique [Goodman] did it, not [White].” The trial court tentatively concluded that the evidence was not relevant “at this point in time” because White had shown no evidence of self-defense.2 The next day, before opening statements, the issue was briefly revisited, and White’s counsel stated that “we are not proceeding on a self-defense claim.” The trial court rejected White’s counsel’s arg | 2 | 3 |
Walker v. the Statesgreen2 sentences2025See Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 232, 235-236 (1) ( 862 SE2d 285 ) (2021) (because the jury was authorized to disbelieve the defendant’s self-defense claim, the evidence was sufficient to support the firearm-possession conviction); Merritt v. State, 311 Ga. 875, 877-878 (1) ( 860 SE2d 455 ) (2021) (evidence was sufficient to support aggravated assault family violence where defendant shot and killed his wife and mother to his children, and evidence 9 authorized the jury to reject defendant’s accident theory). 2023See Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 232, 235-236 (1) (862 SE2d 285) (2021) (because the jury was authorized to disbelieve the defendant’s self-defense claim, the evidence was sufficient to support felony-murder and firearm-possession convictions). 3 3 It is not clear that Copeland would have been entitled to claim self- defense in the first place. | 2 | 2 |
Redding v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Redding v. State, 320 Ga. 107, 117-118 (3) (b) ( 907 SE2d 258 ) (2024) (holding that any error in admitting other-acts evidence of the appellant’s violent behavior during traffic stop was harmless in trial for felony murder where “the evidence against [the appellant] was strong,” the appellant’s self-defense claim was weak, and “it [was] difficult to see how the other-acts evidence . . . would have had a ‘significant influence’ on the jury”). 2025See, e.g., Redding v. State, 320 Ga. 107, 117-118 (3) (b) ( 907 SE2d 258 ) (2024) (holding that any error in admitting other-acts evidence of the appellant’s violent behavior during traffic stop was harmless in trial for felony murder where “the evidence against [the appellant] was strong,” the appellant’s self-defense claim was weak, and “it [was] difficult to see how the other-acts evidence . . . would have had a ‘significant influence’ on the jury”). | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2023The evidence was also sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that DeMuro provoked any threat of the use of deadly force as an excuse to shoot Gilman, or that he shot Gilman after Gilman was trying to withdraw from the conflict, either or which would preclude a justification defense pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-21 (b).2 Furthermore, pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-1, malice in the killing of another may either be express, a “deliberate intention unlawfully 2 See Williams, 316 Ga. at 150-151 (1) (The evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to reject the defendant’s self-defense claim 2023The evidence was also sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that DeMuro provoked any threat of the use of deadly force as 16 an excuse to shoot Gilman, or that he shot Gilman after Gilman was trying to withdraw from the conflict, either of which would preclude a justification defense pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-21 (b).2 Furthermore, pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-1 (b), malice in the killing of another may either be express, a “deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of another human being which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof[,]” or implied, “where n | 2 | 2 |
Gaston v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 639 (2) (a) ( 837 SE2d 808 ) (2020) (defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had trial counsel requested a self-defense instruction because evidence supporting a justification theory was weak). 2022See Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 639 (2) (a) ( 837 SE2d 808 ) (2020) (defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had trial counsel requested a self-defense instruction because evidence supporting a justification theory was weak). | 2 | 2 |
Huff v. Stategreen2 sentences2023The evidence was also sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that DeMuro provoked any threat of the use of deadly force as an excuse to shoot Gilman, or that he shot Gilman after Gilman was trying to withdraw from the conflict, either or which would preclude a justification defense pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-21 (b).2 Furthermore, pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-1, malice in the killing of another may either be express, a “deliberate intention unlawfully 2 See Williams, 316 Ga. at 150-151 (1) (The evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to reject the defendant’s self-defense claim 2023The evidence was also sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that DeMuro provoked any threat of the use of deadly force as an excuse to shoot Gilman, or that he shot Gilman after Gilman was trying to withdraw from the conflict, either or which would preclude a justification defense pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-21 (b).2 Furthermore, pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-1, malice in the killing of another may either be express, a “deliberate intention unlawfully 2 See Williams, 316 Ga. at 150-151 (1) (The evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to reject the defendant’s self-defense claim | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Gulleygreen2 sentences2020See United States v. Gulley, 526 F3d 809, 819 (5th Cir. 2008) (pointing out that “a self defense claim may be proven regardless of whether the victim has a violent or passive character,” and collecting federal cases on this issue). 2020See United States v. Gulley, 526 F3d 809, 819 (5th Cir. 2008) (pointing out that “a self defense claim may be proven regardless of whether the victim has a violent or passive character,” and collecting federal cases on this issue). | 2 | 2 |
Pena v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Pena v. State , 297 Ga. 418 , 423, 774 S.E.2d 652 (2015) (holding that evidence of the defendant's PTSD stemming from abuse he experienced during childhood, offered to support his claim of self defense based on BPS, was properly excluded because "evidence of abuse or violent acts committed against a defendant by someone other than the victim is not admissible to support a justification defense"); O'Connell v. State , 294 Ga. 379 , 381-382, 754 S.E.2d 29 (2014) (concluding that evidence of the defendant's BPS and PTSD based on abuse by individuals other than the victim was inadmissib 2019See, e.g., Pena v. State , 297 Ga. 418 , 423, 774 S.E.2d 652 (2015) (holding that evidence of the defendant's PTSD stemming from abuse he experienced during childhood, offered to support his claim of self defense based on BPS, was properly excluded because "evidence of abuse or violent acts committed against a defendant by someone other than the victim is not admissible to support a justification defense"); O'Connell v. State , 294 Ga. 379 , 381-382, 754 S.E.2d 29 (2014) (concluding that evidence of the defendant's BPS and PTSD based on abuse by individuals other than the victim was inadmissib | 2 | 2 |
Mullis v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 577 ( 619 SE2d 668 ) (2005); Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 577-579 ( 27 SE2d 91 ) (1943). 2015See Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 577 ( 619 SE2d 668 ) (2005); Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 577-579 ( 27 SE2d 91 ) (1943). | 2 | 2 |
Ramirez v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 577 ( 619 SE2d 668 ) (2005); Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 577-579 ( 27 SE2d 91 ) (1943). 2015See Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 577 ( 619 SE2d 668 ) (2005); Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 577-579 ( 27 SE2d 91 ) (1943). | 2 | 2 |
Mohamud v. Stategreen2 sentences2022And in light of the jury instructions as a whole, Parrish has not shown that the trial court erred in refusing to give the additional simple or aggravated-assault instruction.40 40 See Redding v State, 311 Ga. App. 757, 759-60 (2) (858 SE2d 469) (2021) (explaining that trial court did not err in refusing to give mistake-of-fact charge, despite defendant’s theory that he mistakenly thought victim had a gun, because 29 But even if the trial court’s refusal to provide this instruction amounted to error, it would be harmless given that “it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to th 2022And in light of the jury instructions as a whole, Parrish has not shown that the trial court erred in refusing to give the additional simple or aggravated-assault instruction.40 40 See Redding v State, 311 Ga. App. 757, 759-60 (2) (858 SE2d 469) (2021) (explaining that trial court did not err in refusing to give mistake-of-fact charge, despite defendant’s theory that he mistakenly thought victim had a gun, because 29 But even if the trial court’s refusal to provide this instruction amounted to error, it would be harmless given that “it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to th | 1 | 2 |
Gomez v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Ivey's first claim of ineffective assistance therefore fails. (b) Ivey next claims that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object when the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof to Ivey by arguing in closing that, "if there was something that Michael Simmons or Flora Weathers could have stated that would have contributed to the defendant's self-defense claim, they have subpoena powers." 3 Ivey, however, "did not *248 raise this ineffective assistance claim when [ ]he was represented by new counsel in h[is] motion for new trial and the trial court did not rule on i 2019Ivey's first claim of ineffective assistance therefore fails. (b) Ivey next claims that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object when the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof to Ivey by arguing in closing that, "if there was something that Michael Simmons or Flora Weathers could have stated that would have contributed to the defendant's self-defense claim, they have subpoena powers." 3 Ivey, however, "did not *248 raise this ineffective assistance claim when [ ]he was represented by new counsel in h[is] motion for new trial and the trial court did not rule on i | 1 | 2 |
O'Connell v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Pena v. State , 297 Ga. 418 , 423, 774 S.E.2d 652 (2015) (holding that evidence of the defendant's PTSD stemming from abuse he experienced during childhood, offered to support his claim of self defense based on BPS, was properly excluded because "evidence of abuse or violent acts committed against a defendant by someone other than the victim is not admissible to support a justification defense"); O'Connell v. State , 294 Ga. 379 , 381-382, 754 S.E.2d 29 (2014) (concluding that evidence of the defendant's BPS and PTSD based on abuse by individuals other than the victim was inadmissib 2019See, e.g., Pena v. State , 297 Ga. 418 , 423, 774 S.E.2d 652 (2015) (holding that evidence of the defendant's PTSD stemming from abuse he experienced during childhood, offered to support his claim of self defense based on BPS, was properly excluded because "evidence of abuse or violent acts committed against a defendant by someone other than the victim is not admissible to support a justification defense"); O'Connell v. State , 294 Ga. 379 , 381-382, 754 S.E.2d 29 (2014) (concluding that evidence of the defendant's BPS and PTSD based on abuse by individuals other than the victim was inadmissib | 1 | 2 |
Freeman v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Pena v. State , 297 Ga. 418 , 423, 774 S.E.2d 652 (2015) (holding that evidence of the defendant's PTSD stemming from abuse he experienced during childhood, offered to support his claim of self defense based on BPS, was properly excluded because "evidence of abuse or violent acts committed against a defendant by someone other than the victim is not admissible to support a justification defense"); O'Connell v. State , 294 Ga. 379 , 381-382, 754 S.E.2d 29 (2014) (concluding that evidence of the defendant's BPS and PTSD based on abuse by individuals other than the victim was inadmissib 2019See, e.g., Pena v. State , 297 Ga. 418 , 423, 774 S.E.2d 652 (2015) (holding that evidence of the defendant's PTSD stemming from abuse he experienced during childhood, offered to support his claim of self defense based on BPS, was properly excluded because "evidence of abuse or violent acts committed against a defendant by someone other than the victim is not admissible to support a justification defense"); O'Connell v. State , 294 Ga. 379 , 381-382, 754 S.E.2d 29 (2014) (concluding that evidence of the defendant's BPS and PTSD based on abuse by individuals other than the victim was inadmissib | 1 | 2 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2014See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2. 2014See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2. | 1 | 2 |
| Williams v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2025The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding all five acts pursuant to Rule 403. 10 See Brown, 303 Ga. at 162-163 (given the self-defense claim in a murder case, the probative value of intent based on other-act evidence of shooting at another person was “extremely low at best,” especially where, inter alia, the State had “other admissible evidence” and the other act was not necessary to help explain what happened in the murder case, such that the danger of unfair prejudice “substantially outweighed” the probative value) (citation omitted). 2025The State specifically argued that it needed evidence of the five other acts to prove Flowers’s “propensity for initiating and continuing violent encounters,” and “propensity to resort to threat or use of firearms with little or no provocation,” which are inherently prejudicial purposes. 16 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding all five acts pursuant to Rule 403.10 See Brown, 303 Ga. at 162-163 (2) (given the self-defense claim in a murder case, the probative value of intent based on other-act evidence of shooting at another person was “extremely low at best,” especially wh | 1 | 1 |
| Mims v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Remygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Merritt v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Shaw v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See OCGA § 16-5-2 (a) (“A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he causes the death of another human being under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person[.]”); Shaw v. State, 301 Ga. 14, 20 (3) ( 799 SE2d 186 ) (2017) (“The provocation necessary to support a charge of voluntary manslaughter is markedly different from that which will support a self-defense claim.” (citation and punctuation omitted) 2025See OCGA § 16-5-2 (a) (“A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he causes the death of another human being under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person[.]”); Shaw v. State, 301 Ga. 14, 20 (3) ( 799 SE2d 186 ) (2017) (“The provocation necessary to support a charge of voluntary manslaughter is markedly different from that which will support a self-defense claim.” (citation and punctuation omitted) | 1 | 1 |
McCoy v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2025In her motion, Griffin contended that, because counsel “abandoned” her self-defense claim at the end of the trial, Griffin “was denied her right to maintain her innocence and assert her chosen defense” under McCoy, in which the United States Supreme Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, “a defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty,” and that “counsel may not admit [his] client’s guilt of a charged crime over the client’s int | 1 | 1 |
| Demuro v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Allen, 317 Ga. at 5-6 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2025Allen, 317 Ga. at 5-6 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2 In reviewing a claim that the jury was wrong to reject a self-defense claim and find the defendant guilty, “[t]his Court will uphold the jury’s verdict as long as there is some competent evidence, even if contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.” DeMuro v. State, 317 Ga. 155, 155 (1) ( 892 SE2d 31 ) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). 6 Although some of us may have ruled differently than the trial court did here, we are not the factfinder in this case, and the record permitted the trial co | 1 | 1 |
| STEPP-McCOMMONS v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morris v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dolensek v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Payne v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Copeland v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Birdow v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coates v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gobert v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Olds v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Henderson v. State
green
2 sentences2026See Mbungu, 322 Ga. at 568 (concluding that exclusion of evidence of victim’s threats against defendant was harmless where the excluded evidence was similar to other evidence that was admitted and where defendant’s self-defense claim was weak); Tarver v. State, 319 Ga. 165 , 171–73 (2024) (any error in exclusion of evidence about prior acts of the victim to show the defendant’s state of mind when he shot the victim 16 was harmless given that the excluded evidence was largely cumulative of admitted evidence and the defendant’s self-defense claim was weak); Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708 , 713– 2026See Mbungu, 322 Ga. at 568 (concluding that exclusion of evidence of victim’s threats against defendant was harmless where the excluded evidence was similar to other evidence that was admitted and where defendant’s self-defense claim was weak); Tarver v. State, 319 Ga. 165 , 171–73 (2024) (any error in exclusion of evidence about prior acts of the victim to show the defendant’s state of mind when he shot the victim 16 was harmless given that the excluded evidence was largely cumulative of admitted evidence and the defendant’s self-defense claim was weak); Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708 , 713– | 3 | 2025–2026 |
Tarver v. State
green
2 sentences2026See Mbungu, 322 Ga. at 568 (concluding that exclusion of evidence of victim’s threats against defendant was harmless where the excluded evidence was similar to other evidence that was admitted and where defendant’s self-defense claim was weak); Tarver v. State, 319 Ga. 165 , 171–73 (2024) (any error in exclusion of evidence about prior acts of the victim to show the defendant’s state of mind when he shot the victim 16 was harmless given that the excluded evidence was largely cumulative of admitted evidence and the defendant’s self-defense claim was weak); Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708 , 713– 2026See Mbungu, 322 Ga. at 568 (concluding that exclusion of evidence of victim’s threats against defendant was harmless where the excluded evidence was similar to other evidence that was admitted and where defendant’s self-defense claim was weak); Tarver v. State, 319 Ga. 165 , 171–73 (2024) (any error in exclusion of evidence about prior acts of the victim to show the defendant’s state of mind when he shot the victim 16 was harmless given that the excluded evidence was largely cumulative of admitted evidence and the defendant’s self-defense claim was weak); Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708 , 713– | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Chandler v. State
green
2 sentences2015The appeal was thereafter docketed to the April 2015 term of this Court and orally argued on July 13, 2015. 2 Though Hendrix cites Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402 (3) (b), (c) ( 405 SE2d 669 ) (1991) as authority for offering evidence of a victim’s prior acts of violence in support of a self-defense claim, Hendrix fails to acknowledge that Chandler is no longer viable under Georgia’s new Evidence Code, see Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga. 532 (3) ( 773 SE2d 755 ) (2015). 2015The appeal was thereafter docketed to the April 2015 term of this Court and orally argued on July 13, 2015. 2 Though Hendrix cites Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402 (3) (b), (c) ( 405 SE2d 669 ) (1991) as authority for offering evidence of a victim’s prior acts of violence in support of a self-defense claim, Hendrix fails to acknowledge that Chandler is no longer viable under Georgia’s new Evidence Code, see Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga. 532 (3) ( 773 SE2d 755 ) (2015). | 2 | 2012–2015 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences2015For these reasons, we appropriately address whether there was error under Heard, which involves deciding whether Heard is good law. 15 776-779 ( 723 SE2d 915 ) (2012) (Nahmias, J., concurring, joined by Carley, P.J., and Hines, J.). 2015For these reasons, we appropriately address whether there was error under Heard, which involves deciding whether Heard is good law. 15 776-779 ( 723 SE2d 915 ) (2012) (Nahmias, J., concurring, joined by Carley, P. J., and Hines, J.). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Broussard v. State
green
2 sentences2007Broussard v. State, 276 Ga. 216 (2), 576 S.E.2d 883 (2003)." Stinchcomb, supra, 280 Ga. at 172 (1), 626 S.E.2d 88 . 2. 2007Broussard v. State, 276 Ga. 216 (2), 576 S.E.2d 883 (2003)." Stinchcomb, supra, 280 Ga. at 172 (1), 626 S.E.2d 88 . 2. | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Maynor v. State
green
2 sentences2026See Allen, 322 Ga. at 423 (holding that the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant did not act in self-defense where his self- serving testimony was inconsistent with his prior admissions and with the testimony of multiple eyewitnesses); Maynor, 317 Ga. at 7 497–98 (holding that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to disprove the appellant’s self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt where his self-serving testimony—that the victim tried to hit him with a car, verbally instigated a fight, and was armed— was the only evidenc 2026Moreover, “the jurors were also authorized to consider their disbelief in [Williams’s] testimony—and the inconsistencies between it and the eyewitness accounts of others—as substantive evidence of his guilt.” Maynor, 317 Ga. at 498 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Rowland v. State
green
1 sentence2025See Tarver, 319 Ga. at 171–73 (any error in exclusion of evidence about prior acts of the victim to show the defendant’s state of mind when he shot the victim was harmless given that the excluded evidence was largely cumulative of admitted evidence and the defendant’s self-defense claim was weak); Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708 , 713–14 (2021) (any error in striking from the defendant’s trial testimony reference to a statement the victim made to the defendant about having been to prison previously was 9 harmless in the light of admitted testimony about more explicit threats to the defendant m | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Venturino v. State green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Moore v. State green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Luce v. United States green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Morris v. State green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Henry County Board of Education v. S. G. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Hood v. State green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Redding v. State green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Hernandez v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Selman v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Smith v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.