8 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kyle D. Nickgreen2 sentences2025Accord State v. Nick, 2009 MT 174, ¶ 13 , 350 Mont. 533 , 208 P.3d 864 (citing People v. Joyner, 278 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ill. 1972) (“[b]y its very nature,” self-defense “relates to knowingly and intentionally using force to deter another” and not to an accident)); State v. R.S.A., 2015 MT 202, ¶¶ 31-37 , 380 Mont. 118 , 357 P.3d 899 (where defendant “essentially den[ied] he had used any force during the confrontation,” he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction, or instruction on the State’s responsive burden, until he “admitted to stabbing, punching, and/or kicking his pursuers”; testimo 2025Accord State v. Nick, 2009 MT 174, ¶ 13 , 350 Mont. 533 , 208 P.3d 864 (citing People v. Joyner, 278 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ill. 1972) (“[b]y its very nature,” self-defense “relates to knowingly and intentionally using force to deter another” and not to an accident)); State v. R.S.A., 2015 MT 202, ¶¶ 31-37 , 380 Mont. 118 , 357 P.3d 899 (where defendant “essentially den[ied] he had used any force during the confrontation,” he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction, or instruction on the State’s responsive burden, until he “admitted to stabbing, punching, and/or kicking his pursuers”; testimo | 1 | 1 |
State v. Reidgreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Reid, 1 Ala. at 621-622 (avoiding the issue of whether a self-defense exception was required and doubting its necessity); Carroll, 28 Ark. at 100 (self-defense exception not required). | 1 | 1 |
Carroll v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Reid, 1 Ala. at 621-622 (avoiding the issue of whether a self-defense exception was required and doubting its necessity); Carroll, 28 Ark. at 100 (self-defense exception not required). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Joynergreen1 sentence2025Accord State v. Nick, 2009 MT 174, ¶ 13 , 350 Mont. 533 , 208 P.3d 864 (citing People v. Joyner, 278 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ill. 1972) (“[b]y its very nature,” self-defense “relates to knowingly and intentionally using force to deter another” and not to an accident)); State v. R.S.A., 2015 MT 202, ¶¶ 31-37 , 380 Mont. 118 , 357 P.3d 899 (where defendant “essentially den[ied] he had used any force during the confrontation,” he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction, or instruction on the State’s responsive burden, until he “admitted to stabbing, punching, and/or kicking his pursuers”; testimo | 1 | 1 |
State v. Logangreen2 sentences2015The record does not show that Swan paid those fees or that the Salvation Army received a signed voucher or processed a check before the November 15 incident. 8 the affirmative defense, concluding that Stanley “really isn’t relying on justifiable use of force.” See King, ¶ 24 (upholding a district court decision that, for a defendant to avail himself of a self-defense claim against a charge of deliberate homicide, there must be “sufficient facts in the record” to find that, although the defendant “purposely or knowingly caused the death of another he was justified in doing so because he reasona 2015The record does not show that Swan paid those fees or that the Salvation Army received a signed voucher or processed a check before the November 15 incident. 8 the affirmative defense, concluding that Stanley “really isn’t relying on justifiable use of force.” See King, ¶ 24 (upholding a district court decision that, for a defendant to avail himself of a self-defense claim against a charge of deliberate homicide, there must be “sufficient facts in the record” to find that, although the defendant “purposely or knowingly caused the death of another he was justified in doing so because he reasona | 1 | 1 |
Day v. Paynegreen2 sentences2005Day v. Payne (1996), 280 Mont. 273, 276 , 929 P.2d 864, 866 (citation omitted). 2005Day v. Payne (1996), 280 Mont. 273, 276 , 929 P.2d 864, 866 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. R.S.A.
neutral
2 sentences2025Accord State v. Nick, 2009 MT 174, ¶ 13 , 350 Mont. 533 , 208 P.3d 864 (citing People v. Joyner, 278 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ill. 1972) (“[b]y its very nature,” self-defense “relates to knowingly and intentionally using force to deter another” and not to an accident)); State v. R.S.A., 2015 MT 202, ¶¶ 31-37 , 380 Mont. 118 , 357 P.3d 899 (where defendant “essentially den[ied] he had used any force during the confrontation,” he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction, or instruction on the State’s responsive burden, until he “admitted to stabbing, punching, and/or kicking his pursuers”; testimo 2025Accord State v. Nick, 2009 MT 174, ¶ 13 , 350 Mont. 533 , 208 P.3d 864 (citing People v. Joyner, 278 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ill. 1972) (“[b]y its very nature,” self-defense “relates to knowingly and intentionally using force to deter another” and not to an accident)); State v. R.S.A., 2015 MT 202, ¶¶ 31-37 , 380 Mont. 118 , 357 P.3d 899 (where defendant “essentially den[ied] he had used any force during the confrontation,” he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction, or instruction on the State’s responsive burden, until he “admitted to stabbing, punching, and/or kicking his pursuers”; testimo | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. R.S.A.
neutral
1 sentence2025Accord State v. Nick, 2009 MT 174, ¶ 13 , 350 Mont. 533 , 208 P.3d 864 (citing People v. Joyner, 278 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ill. 1972) (“[b]y its very nature,” self-defense “relates to knowingly and intentionally using force to deter another” and not to an accident)); State v. R.S.A., 2015 MT 202, ¶¶ 31-37 , 380 Mont. 118 , 357 P.3d 899 (where defendant “essentially den[ied] he had used any force during the confrontation,” he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction, or instruction on the State’s responsive burden, until he “admitted to stabbing, punching, and/or kicking his pursuers”; testimo | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Bower
green
2 sentences1994Bower, 833 P.2d at 1111 . 1994Bower, 833 P.2d at 1111 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Reiner
green
2 sentences1992Similarly, in State v. Reiner (1978), 179 Mont. 239, 254 , 587 P.2d 950, 959 , we held that “[t]he mere fact that defendant testified to a self-defense claim does not entitle him to an acquittal.” We stated that where the evidence on a self-defense claim is conflicting, it is the function of the trier of fact to weigh the testimony and decide whether the defendant acted with the belief that the use of force was necessary and, if so, whether such belief was reasonable. 1992Similarly, in State v. Reiner (1978), 179 Mont. 239, 254 , 587 P.2d 950, 959 , we held that “[t]he mere fact that defendant testified to a self-defense claim does not entitle him to an acquittal.” We stated that where the evidence on a self-defense claim is conflicting, it is the function of the trier of fact to weigh the testimony and decide whether the defendant acted with the belief that the use of force was necessary and, if so, whether such belief was reasonable. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Cooper
neutral
1 sentence1980While the instruction was not improper in light of the facts in this case, we reaffirm our holding in State v. Cooper, supra, and urge that the self-defense instruction approved in that case be used in all criminal cases involving an issue of self-defense. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Houk
neutral
2 sentences1978(Citations omitted.)” (Bracketed material in original.) The Criminal Law Study Commission’s comment to section 94-3-102 indicates that the section is a codification of prior Montana law: “This section codifies prior Montana law in which the section is intended to test the right of self-defense as measured by what a reasonable person would have done under like or the same circumstances [Citing State v. Houk (1906), 34 Mont. 418, 423 , 87 P. 175, 176 .] A person attacked can act upon appearances and might justifiably kill his attacker, though not in actual peril if the circumstances are such tha 1978(Citations omitted.)” (Bracketed material in original.) The Criminal Law Study Commission’s comment to section 94-3-102 indicates that the section is a codification of prior Montana law: “This section codifies prior Montana law in which the section is intended to test the right of self-defense as measured by what a reasonable person would have done under like or the same circumstances [Citing State v. Houk (1906), 34 Mont. 418, 423 , 87 P. 175, 176 .] A person attacked can act upon appearances and might justifiably kill his attacker, though not in actual peril if the circumstances are such tha | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences1978(Citations omitted.)” (Bracketed material in original.) The Criminal Law Study Commission’s comment to section 94-3-102 indicates that the section is a codification of prior Montana law: “This section codifies prior Montana law in which the section is intended to test the right of self-defense as measured by what a reasonable person would have done under like or the same circumstances [Citing State v. Houk (1906), 34 Mont. 418, 423 , 87 P. 175, 176 .] A person attacked can act upon appearances and might justifiably kill his attacker, though not in actual peril if the circumstances are such tha 1978(Citations omitted.)” (Bracketed material in original.) The Criminal Law Study Commission’s comment to section 94-3-102 indicates that the section is a codification of prior Montana law: “This section codifies prior Montana law in which the section is intended to test the right of self-defense as measured by what a reasonable person would have done under like or the same circumstances [Citing State v. Houk (1906), 34 Mont. 418, 423 , 87 P. 175, 176 .] A person attacked can act upon appearances and might justifiably kill his attacker, though not in actual peril if the circumstances are such tha | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Daw
neutral
2 sentences1978State v. Daw (1935), 99 Mont. 232, 239 , 43 P.2d 240, 243 , states the rule that appearance rather than actuality of imminent danger must govern the jury’s consideration of the defendant’s self-defense claim: “. . . a person assailed may act upon appearances as they present themselves to him, meet force with force, and even slay his assailant; and though in fact he was not in any actual peril, yet if the circumstances were such that a reasonable man would be justified in acting as he did, the slayer [or person assaulting another under such circumstances] will be held blameless. 1978State v. Daw (1935), 99 Mont. 232, 239 , 43 P.2d 240, 243 , states the rule that appearance rather than actuality of imminent danger must govern the jury’s consideration of the defendant’s self-defense claim: “. . . a person assailed may act upon appearances as they present themselves to him, meet force with force, and even slay his assailant; and though in fact he was not in any actual peril, yet if the circumstances were such that a reasonable man would be justified in acting as he did, the slayer [or person assaulting another under such circumstances] will be held blameless. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.