self-defense instruction in Hawaii

2008See also Pemberton, 71 Haw. at 477 , 796 P.2d at 85 (explaining that "the standard for judging the reasonableness of a defendant's belief for the need to use deadly force is determined from the point of view of a reasonable person in the [d]efendant's position"); State v. Faafiti, 54 Haw. 637, 645 , 513 P.2d 697, 703 (1973) (holding that the degree of force to which a person is lawfully entitled to use is "limited by what a reasonable person in the same situation ... would believe to be necessary"); Nupeiset, 90 Hawai`i at 186, 977 P.2d at 194 (holding that the self-defense instruction was pro

2008See also Pemberton, 71 Haw. at 477 , 796 P.2d at 85 (explaining that "the standard for judging the reasonableness of a defendant's belief for the need to use deadly force is determined from the point of view of a reasonable person in the [d]efendant's position"); State v. Faafiti, 54 Haw. 637, 645 , 513 P.2d 697, 703 (1973) (holding that the degree of force to which a person is lawfully entitled to use is "limited by what a reasonable person in the same situation ... would believe to be necessary"); Nupeiset, 90 Hawai`i at 186, 977 P.2d at 194 (holding that the self-defense instruction was pro

2014See State v. Auld, 114 Hawai'i 135, 149 , 157 P.3d 574, 588 (App. 2007) (Nakamura, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[Tjhe question of whether the defendant should have a say in how to defend against the charges presented to the jury by forgoing a self-defense instruction is different from the question ... of whether the defendant can prevent the jury from considering his or her guilt on lesser included offenses.”) Trial courts are mandated by statute to instruct the jury as to any lesser included offense for which “there is a rational basis in the evidence.” HRS § 701-109(5) (1993) (“The court

2014See State v. Auld, 114 Hawai'i 135, 149 , 157 P.3d 574, 588 (App. 2007) (Nakamura, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[Tjhe question of whether the defendant should have a say in how to defend against the charges presented to the jury by forgoing a self-defense instruction is different from the question ... of whether the defendant can prevent the jury from considering his or her guilt on lesser included offenses.”) Trial courts are mandated by statute to instruct the jury as to any lesser included offense for which “there is a rational basis in the evidence.” HRS § 701-109(5) (1993) (“The court

2014In Faafiti , this court approved jury instructions that stated that "[u]nder the law of self-defense, it is lawful for a person who is being assaulted to defend himself from attack if, as a reasonable person, he has grounds for believing and does believe that bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon him.” Id. at 645 , 513 P.2d at 703 (emphasis added); see also Lubong, 77 Hawai'i at 433 , 886 P.2d at 770 (stating that the first prong of the self-defense test "requires a determination of whether the defendant had the requisite belief that deadly force was necessary” (emphasis added)).

2014In Faafiti , this court approved jury instructions that stated that "[u]nder the law of self-defense, it is lawful for a person who is being assaulted to defend himself from attack if, as a reasonable person, he has grounds for believing and does believe that bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon him.” Id. at 645 , 513 P.2d at 703 (emphasis added); see also Lubong, 77 Hawai'i at 433 , 886 P.2d at 770 (stating that the first prong of the self-defense test "requires a determination of whether the defendant had the requisite belief that deadly force was necessary” (emphasis added)).

2020Section 702-204 provides, in relevant part: "When the state of mind required to establish an element of an offense is not specified by the law, that element is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly." 11/ While the Hawai#i appellate courts have not directly addressed the interplay between a defendant's self-defense claim and his or her prior acts of domestic abuse against the same victim, a number of courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that such acts can be admissible in some circumstances to rebut a defendant's self-defense claim,

2020Section 702-204 provides, in relevant part: "When the state of mind required to establish an element of an offense is not specified by the law, that element is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly." 11/ While the Hawai#i appellate courts have not directly addressed the interplay between a defendant's self-defense claim and his or her prior acts of domestic abuse against the same victim, a number of courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that such acts can be admissible in some circumstances to rebut a defendant's self-defense claim,

2014The self-defense instruction at issue in Augustin also stated that ''[t]he reasonableness of the defendant's belief that the use of such protective force was immediately necessary shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant's position under the circumstances of which the defendant was aware or as the defendant reasonably believed them to be.” Augustin, 101 Hawai'i at 130 , 63 P.3d at 1100 (Acoba, J., dissenting). .

2014The self-defense instruction at issue in Augustin also stated that ''[t]he reasonableness of the defendant's belief that the use of such protective force was immediately necessary shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant's position under the circumstances of which the defendant was aware or as the defendant reasonably believed them to be.” Augustin, 101 Hawai'i at 130 , 63 P.3d at 1100 (Acoba, J., dissenting). .

2014See State v. Auld, 114 Hawai'i 135, 149 , 157 P.3d 574, 588 (App. 2007) (Nakamura, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[Tjhe question of whether the defendant should have a say in how to defend against the charges presented to the jury by forgoing a self-defense instruction is different from the question ... of whether the defendant can prevent the jury from considering his or her guilt on lesser included offenses.”) Trial courts are mandated by statute to instruct the jury as to any lesser included offense for which “there is a rational basis in the evidence.” HRS § 701-109(5) (1993) (“The court

2014See State v. Auld, 114 Hawai'i 135, 149 , 157 P.3d 574, 588 (App. 2007) (Nakamura, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[Tjhe question of whether the defendant should have a say in how to defend against the charges presented to the jury by forgoing a self-defense instruction is different from the question ... of whether the defendant can prevent the jury from considering his or her guilt on lesser included offenses.”) Trial courts are mandated by statute to instruct the jury as to any lesser included offense for which “there is a rational basis in the evidence.” HRS § 701-109(5) (1993) (“The court

2014In Faafiti , this court approved jury instructions that stated that "[u]nder the law of self-defense, it is lawful for a person who is being assaulted to defend himself from attack if, as a reasonable person, he has grounds for believing and does believe that bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon him.” Id. at 645 , 513 P.2d at 703 (emphasis added); see also Lubong, 77 Hawai'i at 433 , 886 P.2d at 770 (stating that the first prong of the self-defense test "requires a determination of whether the defendant had the requisite belief that deadly force was necessary” (emphasis added)).

2008See also Pemberton, 71 Haw. at 477 , 796 P.2d at 85 (explaining that "the standard for judging the reasonableness of a defendant's belief for the need to use deadly force is determined from the point of view of a reasonable person in the [d]efendant's position"); State v. Faafiti, 54 Haw. 637, 645 , 513 P.2d 697, 703 (1973) (holding that the degree of force to which a person is lawfully entitled to use is "limited by what a reasonable person in the same situation ... would believe to be necessary"); Nupeiset, 90 Hawai`i at 186, 977 P.2d at 194 (holding that the self-defense instruction was pro

2025When we interpret a statute, we start with "the language of the statute itself." Barker v. Young, 153 Hawai#i 144, 148, 528 P.3d 217, 221 (2023). "[W]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning."9 Id.

2025When we interpret a statute, we start with "the language of the statute itself." Barker v. Young, 153 Hawai#i 144, 148, 528 P.3d 217, 221 (2023). "[W]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning."9 Id.

2018See id. ("we treated general character evidence and specific prior acts (including those reflected in the victim's criminal record) the same for purposes of corroborating a defendant's self-defense claim as to who was the aggressor.").

2018In DeLeon's trial, as part of the circuit court's self-defense instruction, the court stated, "[t]he use of deadly force is not justifiable if the defendant, with the intent of causing death or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter." In Basque , the trial court gave a similar instruction. 66 Haw. at 513 , 666 P.2d at 602 .

2014A self-defense instruction is incomplete if it does not “instruct [the jury] to consider the situation from [the defendant’s] position.” State v. Pond, 118 Hawai'i 452, 492 , 193 P.3d 368, 408 (2008) (Acoba, J., concurring and dissenting).

2014A self-defense instruction is incomplete if it does not “instruct [the jury] to consider the situation from [the defendant’s] position.” State v. Pond, 118 Hawai'i 452, 492 , 193 P.3d 368, 408 (2008) (Acoba, J., concurring and dissenting).

2013The circuit court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on self-defense Although Metcalfe did not object to the self-defense instruction given at trial, he asserts on appeal that the self-defense instruction was “incomplete, misleading, and contributed to [his] conviction.” Specifically, Metcalfe argues that: (1) this court’s decision in State v. Van Dyke, 101 Hawai'i 377, 379-88 , 69 P.3d 88, 90-99 (2003), was applicable to this case; (2) the omission of the definition of “confinement” constituted error; (3) the self-defense instruction along with the ICA’s decision in State v. Lubong,

2013The circuit court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on self-defense Although Metcalfe did not object to the self-defense instruction given at trial, he asserts on appeal that the self-defense instruction was “incomplete, misleading, and contributed to [his] conviction.” Specifically, Metcalfe argues that: (1) this court’s decision in State v. Van Dyke, 101 Hawai'i 377, 379-88 , 69 P.3d 88, 90-99 (2003), was applicable to this case; (2) the omission of the definition of “confinement” constituted error; (3) the self-defense instruction along with the ICA’s decision in State v. Lubong,

2010See Auld, 114 Hawai'i at 149 , 157 P.3d at 588 (Nakamura, J., concurring and dissenting) (“the question of whether the defendant should have a say in how to defend against the charges presented to the jury by forgoing a self-defense instruction is different from the question decided in Haanio of whether the defendant can prevent the jury from considering his or her guilt on lesser included offenses”); People v. Barton, 12 Cal.4th 186 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 (1995).

2010See Auld, 114 Hawai'i at 149 , 157 P.3d at 588 (Nakamura, J., concurring and dissenting) (“the question of whether the defendant should have a say in how to defend against the charges presented to the jury by forgoing a self-defense instruction is different from the question decided in Haanio of whether the defendant can prevent the jury from considering his or her guilt on lesser included offenses”); People v. Barton, 12 Cal.4th 186 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 (1995).

2010See Shells v. State, 642 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (“To find fundamental error in this case[, where a trial court failed to sua sponte give a self-defense instruction,] would place an unrealistic burden on the trial judge concerning trial tactics and strategy that should be left to defense counsel.” (citing State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 310 (Fla.1990)) (emphasis added)).

2010See Shells v. State, 642 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) ("To find fundamental error in this case[, where a trial court failed to sua sponte give a self-defense instruction,] would place an unrealistic burden on the trial judge concerning trial tactics and strategy that should be left to defense counsel. " (citing State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 310 (Fla.1990)) (emphasis added)).

2010See Shells v. State, 642 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (“To find fundamental error in this case[, where a trial court failed to sua sponte give a self-defense instruction,] would place an unrealistic burden on the trial judge concerning trial tactics and strategy that should be left to defense counsel.” (citing State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 310 (Fla.1990)) (emphasis added)).

2010See Shells v. State, 642 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) ("To find fundamental error in this case[, where a trial court failed to sua sponte give a self-defense instruction,] would place an unrealistic burden on the trial judge concerning trial tactics and strategy that should be left to defense counsel. " (citing State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 310 (Fla.1990)) (emphasis added)).

2008Id. at 354-55 , 388 P.2d at 851 (emphasis added).

2008Id. at 354-55 , 388 P.2d at 851 (emphasis added).

2008The ICA held that "[the court's] decision to preclude the admission of evidence that [Complainant] allegedly struck [Petitioner] on a prior occasion did not constitute an abuse of discretion[]” and that "no abuse of discretion occurred when the [court] precluded [Petitioner] from cross-examining [Complainant] about her alleged marijuana use[.]” 117 Hawai'i at 350, 181 P.3d at 429 (emphasis added). .

2007See United States v. Applegate, 424 F.2d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir.1970).

2007See United States v. Applegate, 424 F.2d 1042, 1043 (9th Cir.1970).

2007Hawai`i law is clear that when requested by a defendant, the trial court is required to give a self-defense instruction if the evidence fairly raises the issue of self-defense, regardless of "how weak, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive the testimony might have appeared to the court." State v. Irvin, 53 Haw. 119, 120 , 488 P.2d 327, 328 (1971).

2007Hawai`i law is clear that when requested by a defendant, the trial court is required to give a self-defense instruction if the evidence fairly raises the issue of self-defense, regardless of "how weak, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive the testimony might have appeared to the court." State v. Irvin, 53 Haw. 119, 120 , 488 P.2d 327, 328 (1971).

2003Thus, inasmuch as a reasonable juror could have found that, notwithstanding Paoa’s death, Montez employed “force,” and not “deadly force,” in the course of his altercation with Paoa, which, if justified, would have entitled Montez to an acquittal, see supra section III.A, we cannot conclude that the circuit court’s self-defense instruction, when read and considered as a whole, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 15 See State v. Locquiao, 100 Hawai'i 195, 205 , 58 P.3d 1242, 1252 (2002) (“[I]t is the trial judge’s duty to insure that the jury instructions cogently explain the law applicable

2003Thus, inasmuch as a reasonable juror could have found that, notwithstanding Paoa’s death, Montez employed “force,” and not “deadly force,” in the course of his altercation with Paoa, which, if justified, would have entitled Montez to an acquittal, see supra section III.A, we cannot conclude that the circuit court’s self-defense instruction, when read and considered as a whole, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 15 See State v. Locquiao, 100 Hawai'i 195, 205 , 58 P.3d 1242, 1252 (2002) (“[I]t is the trial judge’s duty to insure that the jury instructions cogently explain the law applicable

2003In this case, considering (1) the fact that Cabasag was not charged with assault; (2) Cabasag’s testimony; (3) the precedent that the offense of assault is not included within the offense of Robbery in the First Degree described in HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(i), State v. Arlt, 9 Haw.App. 263, 268 , 833 P.2d 902, 905 (1992); and (4) defense counsel’s closing argument, it is clear why defense counsel did not request a self-defense instruction and why the court did not give one.

2003In this case, considering (1) the fact that Cabasag was not charged with assault; (2) Cabasag’s testimony; (3) the precedent that the offense of assault is not included within the offense of Robbery in the First Degree described in HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(i), State v. Arlt, 9 Haw.App. 263, 268 , 833 P.2d 902, 905 (1992); and (4) defense counsel’s closing argument, it is clear why defense counsel did not request a self-defense instruction and why the court did not give one.