self-defense doctrine in Rhode Island

2021“In fact, we have cautioned that an instruction that is unsupported by the evidence adduced at trial runs the risk of confusing or misleading the jury and thus should not be given.” Martin, 68 A.3d at 474 . “[W]e also have observed that ‘one may not invoke the doctrine of self-defense if he or she has instigated the combative confrontation.’” Linde, 876 A.2d at 1130 (quoting State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 961 (R.I. 1995)).

2014In addition, “one may not invoke the doctrine of self-defense if he or she has instigated the combative confrontation.” State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 631 (R.I.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 961 (R.I.1995).

2021“In so doing, we examine the record in a light most favorable to the - 11 - defendant.” State v. Soler, 140 A.3d 755, 759-60 (R.I. 2016) (quoting State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 631 (R.I. 2011)). 2 The Withdrawal Exception In regard to a self-defense instruction, “we have held that a trial justice is obligated to give a proposed instruction on self-defense ‘regardless of how slight and tenuous the evidence may be on which the self-defense hypothesis is advanced.’” State v. Martin, 68 A.3d 467, 474 (R.I. 2013) (quoting State v. Linde, 876 A.2d 1115, 1130 (R.I. 2005)).

2014In addition, “one may not invoke the doctrine of self-defense if he or she has instigated the combative confrontation.” State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 631 (R.I.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 961 (R.I.1995).

2021“Self-defense is grounded on necessity, and one cannot provoke a difficulty, thus creating the necessity, and then justify the resulting homicide or - 12 - injury as an act of necessity and self-defense.” Id. (quoting State v. Guillemet, 430 A.2d 1066, 1069 (R.I. 1981)).

1990We have stated in State v. Guillemet, 430 A.2d 1066, 1068-69 (R.I.1981), that one may not invoke the doctrine of self-defense if he or she has instigated the combative confrontation.

2004The defendant asserts that because Michael was the initial aggressor there was sufficient evidentiary support to warrant a self-defense instruction pursuant to our holding in State v. Butler, 107 R.I. 489, 496 , 268 A.2d 433, 436-37 (1970).

2004The defendant asserts that because Michael was the initial aggressor there was sufficient evidentiary support to warrant a self-defense instruction pursuant to our holding in State v. Butler, 107 R.I. 489, 496 , 268 A.2d 433, 436-37 (1970).

2005However, we also have observed that “one may not invoke the doctrine of self-defense if he or she has instigated the combative confrontation.” Martinez, 652 A.2d at 961 (quoting State v. Lamoureux, 573 A.2d 1176, 1180 (R.I.1990)).

1996Thus, although “one may not invoke the doctrine of self-defense if he or she has instigated the combative confrontation,” State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 961 (R.I.1995) (quoting State v. Lamoureux, 573 A.2d 1176, 1180 (R.I.1990)), it is not necessary to demonstrate that the victim struck the first blow in order to assert a defense of self-defense.

2021“In so doing, we examine the record in a light most favorable to the - 11 - defendant.” State v. Soler, 140 A.3d 755, 759-60 (R.I. 2016) (quoting State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 631 (R.I. 2011)). 2 The Withdrawal Exception In regard to a self-defense instruction, “we have held that a trial justice is obligated to give a proposed instruction on self-defense ‘regardless of how slight and tenuous the evidence may be on which the self-defense hypothesis is advanced.’” State v. Martin, 68 A.3d 467, 474 (R.I. 2013) (quoting State v. Linde, 876 A.2d 1115, 1130 (R.I. 2005)).

2021“In fact, we have cautioned that an instruction that is unsupported by the evidence adduced at trial runs the risk of confusing or misleading the jury and thus should not be given.” Martin, 68 A.3d at 474 . “[W]e also have observed that ‘one may not invoke the doctrine of self-defense if he or she has instigated the combative confrontation.’” Linde, 876 A.2d at 1130 (quoting State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 961 (R.I. 1995)).

2014We have stated that the “very essence of the defense of self-defense [hinges on] how the defendant perceived the situation at the time of the incident in question.” D'Amario, 568 A.2d at 1385 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Linde, 876 A.2d at 1129 .

2004State v. D’Amario, 568 A.2d 1383, 1385-86 (R.I.1990) (per curiam).

2011Even if we assume that she acted in self-defense when she kicked up at Rodrigues, this theory cannot negate the charge: assault with a dangerous weapon, a hammer. 8 See Murphy-Bey, 982 A.2d at 690 (“[A] defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a theory of the case that negates his guilt of the crime charged if the instruction is supported by any evidence, however weak.”)- Because Pineda’s self-defense hypothesis was distinct from the criminal charge she was facing and would not have been legally sufficient to avoid a conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon, we hold that a self-def

2005See State v. DiChristofa-ro, 848 A.2d 1127, 1130 (R.I.2004) (stating that “one who is the aggressor is generally not entitled to rely on the defense of self-defense”).

2021“In so doing, we examine the record in a light most favorable to the - 11 - defendant.” State v. Soler, 140 A.3d 755, 759-60 (R.I. 2016) (quoting State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 631 (R.I. 2011)). 2 The Withdrawal Exception In regard to a self-defense instruction, “we have held that a trial justice is obligated to give a proposed instruction on self-defense ‘regardless of how slight and tenuous the evidence may be on which the self-defense hypothesis is advanced.’” State v. Martin, 68 A.3d 467, 474 (R.I. 2013) (quoting State v. Linde, 876 A.2d 1115, 1130 (R.I. 2005)).

2021“In so doing, we examine the record in a light most favorable to the - 11 - defendant.” State v. Soler, 140 A.3d 755, 759-60 (R.I. 2016) (quoting State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 631 (R.I. 2011)). 2 The Withdrawal Exception In regard to a self-defense instruction, “we have held that a trial justice is obligated to give a proposed instruction on self-defense ‘regardless of how slight and tenuous the evidence may be on which the self-defense hypothesis is advanced.’” State v. Martin, 68 A.3d 467, 474 (R.I. 2013) (quoting State v. Linde, 876 A.2d 1115, 1130 (R.I. 2005)).

2021“In fact, we have cautioned that an instruction that is unsupported by the evidence adduced at trial runs the risk of confusing or misleading the jury and thus should not be given.” Martin, 68 A.3d at 474 . “[W]e also have observed that ‘one may not invoke the doctrine of self-defense if he or she has instigated the combative confrontation.’” Linde, 876 A.2d at 1130 (quoting State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 961 (R.I. 1995)).

2014This Court has stated that the “very essence of the defense of self-defense is how the defendant perceived the situation at the time of the incident in question.” Urena, 899 A.2d at 1288 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2011Pineda explains that our jurisdiction recognizes a "shod foot” as a dangerous weapon, State v. Bolarinho, 850 A.2d 907, 908-09, 912 (R.I.2004), and that the instant parties agree that Pineda and others testified that she kicked at Rodrigues in an effort to escape the fight.

2011Even if we assume that she acted in self-defense when she kicked up at Rodrigues, this theory cannot negate the charge: assault with a dangerous weapon, a hammer. 8 See Murphy-Bey, 982 A.2d at 690 (“[A] defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a theory of the case that negates his guilt of the crime charged if the instruction is supported by any evidence, however weak.”)- Because Pineda’s self-defense hypothesis was distinct from the criminal charge she was facing and would not have been legally sufficient to avoid a conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon, we hold that a self-def

2011See Dorrough v. State, 812 So.2d 1077, 1081 (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction on the aggravated assault charge because the defendant testified that “he did not have a weapon” and the other witnesses, who testified that the defendant left the scene to retrieve the weapon and then returned to strike his victim, did not provide requisite support that the defendant used the weapon in self-defense).

2011See Dorrough v. State, 812 So.2d 1077, 1081 (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction on the aggravated assault charge because the defendant testified that “he did not have a weapon” and the other witnesses, who testified that the defendant left the scene to retrieve the weapon and then returned to strike his victim, did not provide requisite support that the defendant used the weapon in self-defense).

2006The defendant in that case took issue with the trial justice’s having included in his jury instructions the phrase: “[YJou determine from the facts that the defendant was entitled to invoke the doctrine of self-defense.” Id. at 849 n. *498 2. 14 The defendant contended that a reasonable juror could have inferred from such an instruction the notion that the defendant had to bear the burden of providing proof that he had acted in self-defense.

2006The charge in Kittell read in pertinent part as follows: "I am instructing you that the law of self-defense holds that a person who instigates the combative confrontation cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense. * * * Rather, where there is evidence of self-defense, and you determine from the facts that the defendant was entitled to invoke the doctrine of self-defense, the state must prove to each of you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” State v. Kittell, 847 A.2d 845, 849 (R.I. 2004).

2004State v. Hurteau, 810 A.2d 222, 224 (R.I.2002) (quoting State v. Krushnowski, 773 A.2d 243, 246 (R.I.2001)).

2004A Self-Defense The defendant takes issue with the following phrase from the trial justice’s instruction to the jury: “you determine from the facts that the defendant was entitled to invoke the doctrine of self-defense.” 2 Relying on State v. Baker, 417 A.2d 906, 910 (R.I.1980), defendant argues that this phrase implies to the jury “that before they can acquit they must ‘find’ the existence of a proposition that the defendant has claimed’* * *.” The defendant contends that a reasonable jury could imply from those instructions that defendant bore the initial burden of providing proof of self-def

2004A Self-Defense The defendant takes issue with the following phrase from the trial justice’s instruction to the jury: “you determine from the facts that the defendant was entitled to invoke the doctrine of self-defense.” 2 Relying on State v. Baker, 417 A.2d 906, 910 (R.I.1980), defendant argues that this phrase implies to the jury “that before they can acquit they must ‘find’ the existence of a proposition that the defendant has claimed’* * *.” The defendant contends that a reasonable jury could imply from those instructions that defendant bore the initial burden of providing proof of self-def

2004State v. Hurteau, 810 A.2d 222, 224 (R.I.2002) (quoting State v. Krushnowski, 773 A.2d 243, 246 (R.I.2001)).

1980See, e. g., People v. Booher, 18 Cal.App.3d 331 , 95 Cal.Rptr. 857 (1971); Purdy v. United States, 210 A.2d 1 (D.C.App.1965) (dictum); State v. Anderson, 40 N.C.App. 318 , 253 S.E.2d 48 (1979); State v. Wenger, 58 Ohio St.2d 336 , 390 N.E.2d 801 (1979). 6 In contrast, other jurisdictions focus on the conduct of the intervenor without regard to the self-defense claim of the arrestee and hold that an intervenor may aid another if it appears to be necessary, though he acts on a mistaken belief, even in a situation in which the person who is aided would not have had the right to claim self-defense

1980See, e. g., People v. Booher, 18 Cal.App.3d 331 , 95 Cal.Rptr. 857 (1971); Purdy v. United States, 210 A.2d 1 (D.C.App.1965) (dictum); State v. Anderson, 40 N.C.App. 318 , 253 S.E.2d 48 (1979); State v. Wenger, 58 Ohio St.2d 336 , 390 N.E.2d 801 (1979). 6 In contrast, other jurisdictions focus on the conduct of the intervenor without regard to the self-defense claim of the arrestee and hold that an intervenor may aid another if it appears to be necessary, though he acts on a mistaken belief, even in a situation in which the person who is aided would not have had the right to claim self-defense