self-defense claim in South Dakota

2023But even if it had been, demonstrating prejudice depends upon the strength of Ceplecha’s self-defense claim in the same way as the other specific claims. -12- #30228 assistance of counsel claims relate to the asserted “failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Steiner, 2011 S.D. 40, ¶ 9 , 815 N.W.2d at 552 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 ).

2023But even if it had been, demonstrating prejudice depends upon the strength of Ceplecha’s self-defense claim in the same way as the other specific claims. -12- #30228 assistance of counsel claims relate to the asserted “failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Steiner, 2011 S.D. 40, ¶ 9 , 815 N.W.2d at 552 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 ).

2023But even if it had been, demonstrating prejudice depends upon the strength of Ceplecha’s self-defense claim in the same way as the other specific claims. -12- #30228 assistance of counsel claims relate to the asserted “failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Steiner, 2011 S.D. 40, ¶ 9 , 815 N.W.2d at 552 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 ).

2023But even if it had been, demonstrating prejudice depends upon the strength of Ceplecha’s self-defense claim in the same way as the other specific claims. -12- #30228 assistance of counsel claims relate to the asserted “failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Steiner, 2011 S.D. 40, ¶ 9 , 815 N.W.2d at 552 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 ).

2023But even if it had been, demonstrating prejudice depends upon the strength of Ceplecha’s self-defense claim in the same way as the other specific claims. -12- #30228 assistance of counsel claims relate to the asserted “failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Steiner, 2011 S.D. 40, ¶ 9 , 815 N.W.2d at 552 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 ).

2023But even if it had been, demonstrating prejudice depends upon the strength of Ceplecha’s self-defense claim in the same way as the other specific claims. -12- #30228 assistance of counsel claims relate to the asserted “failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Steiner, 2011 S.D. 40, ¶ 9 , 815 N.W.2d at 552 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 ).

2023In fact, it strengthens it because the standard for withdrawing a guilty plea prior to -13- #30228 sentencing seems to be more favorable to a defendant than the standard for prejudice under Strickland is for a habeas petitioner. [¶34.] Where a defendant makes a motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to SDCL 23A-27-11 prior to sentencing, as Ceplecha did, “a court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor of withdrawal.” Ceplecha I, 2020 S.D. 11, ¶ 38 , 940 N.W.2d at 694 (quoting State v. Kvasnicka, 2016 S.D. 2 , ¶ 8, 873 N.W.2d 705, 708 ).

2023In fact, it strengthens it because the standard for withdrawing a guilty plea prior to -13- #30228 sentencing seems to be more favorable to a defendant than the standard for prejudice under Strickland is for a habeas petitioner. [¶34.] Where a defendant makes a motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to SDCL 23A-27-11 prior to sentencing, as Ceplecha did, “a court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor of withdrawal.” Ceplecha I, 2020 S.D. 11, ¶ 38 , 940 N.W.2d at 694 (quoting State v. Kvasnicka, 2016 S.D. 2 , ¶ 8, 873 N.W.2d 705, 708 ).

2023In fact, it strengthens it because the standard for withdrawing a guilty plea prior to -13- #30228 sentencing seems to be more favorable to a defendant than the standard for prejudice under Strickland is for a habeas petitioner. [¶34.] Where a defendant makes a motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to SDCL 23A-27-11 prior to sentencing, as Ceplecha did, “a court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor of withdrawal.” Ceplecha I, 2020 S.D. 11, ¶ 38 , 940 N.W.2d at 694 (quoting State v. Kvasnicka, 2016 S.D. 2 , ¶ 8, 873 N.W.2d 705, 708 ).

2023In fact, it strengthens it because the standard for withdrawing a guilty plea prior to -13- #30228 sentencing seems to be more favorable to a defendant than the standard for prejudice under Strickland is for a habeas petitioner. [¶34.] Where a defendant makes a motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to SDCL 23A-27-11 prior to sentencing, as Ceplecha did, “a court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor of withdrawal.” Ceplecha I, 2020 S.D. 11, ¶ 38 , 940 N.W.2d at 694 (quoting State v. Kvasnicka, 2016 S.D. 2 , ¶ 8, 873 N.W.2d 705, 708 ).

1989In State v. Means, 276 N.W.2d 699 (S.D.1979), this court cited with approval Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55 , 41 S.E.2d 500 (1947), which held that "conditions brought about by one’s own conduct may not be relied upon to invoke the excuse of self-defense.” Id. at 701.

1989In State v. Means, 276 N.W.2d 699 (S.D.1979), this court cited with approval Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55 , 41 S.E.2d 500 (1947), which held that "conditions brought about by one's own conduct may not be relied upon to invoke the excuse of self-defense." Id. at 701.

1989In State v. Means, 276 N.W.2d 699 (S.D.1979), this court cited with approval Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55 , 41 S.E.2d 500 (1947), which held that "conditions brought about by one’s own conduct may not be relied upon to invoke the excuse of self-defense.” Id. at 701.

1989In State v. Means, 276 N.W.2d 699 (S.D.1979), this court cited with approval Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55 , 41 S.E.2d 500 (1947), which held that "conditions brought about by one’s own conduct may not be relied upon to invoke the excuse of self-defense.” Id. at 701.

2026State v. Bolden, 2024 S.D. 22, ¶ 41 , 6 N.W.3d 238 , 247 (citing State v. Smith, 2023 S.D. 32, ¶ 48 , 993 N.W.2d 576, 592 ).

2026State v. Bolden, 2024 S.D. 22, ¶ 41 , 6 N.W.3d 238 , 247 (citing State v. Smith, 2023 S.D. 32, ¶ 48 , 993 N.W.2d 576, 592 ).

2026State v. Bolden, 2024 S.D. 22, ¶ 41 , 6 N.W.3d 238 , 247 (citing State v. Smith, 2023 S.D. 32, ¶ 48 , 993 N.W.2d 576, 592 ).

2023Despite the acknowledgment that the Kentucky “General Assembly has made unmistakably clear its intent to create a true immunity, not simply a defense to criminal charges[,]” Rodgers, 285 S.W.3d at 753 , the Kentucky court nonetheless concluded that the immunity statute merely “created a new procedural bar to prosecution[]” that could be applied retroactively.

2004State v. Bogenreif, 465 N.W.2d 777 (1991) South Dakota: “A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his or her theory of defense if there is evidence to support it and a proper request is made.

1990Means v. Solem, 646 F.2d 322 (8th Cir.1980), stands only for the proposition that a defendant may be entitled to a self-defense instruction or defense of others in a riot situation if excessive force is used.

1990Means v. Solem, 646 F.2d 322 (8th Cir.1980), stands only for the proposition that a defendant may be entitled to a self-defense instruction or defense of others in a riot situation if excessive force is used.

1990In State v. Jaques, 428 N.W.2d 260 (S.D.1988), the same self-defense instruction which Luckie now objects to was given to the jury.

1989See, e.g., Swier v. Norwest Bank, 409 N.W.2d 121 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., dissenting); Connelly v. Sherwood, 268 N.W.2d 140 (S.D.1978); accord Swee v. Myrl & Roy’s Paving, Inc. 283 N.W.2d 570 (S.D.1979); Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (S.D.1977).

1989See, e.g., Swier v. Norwest Bank, 409 N.W.2d 121 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., dissenting); Connelly v. Sherwood, 268 N.W.2d 140 (S.D.1978); accord Swee v. Myrl & Roy's Paving, Inc. 283 N.W.2d 570 (S.D.1979); Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (S.D.1977).

1989See, e.g., Swier v. Norwest Bank, 409 N.W.2d 121 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., dissenting); Connelly v. Sherwood, 268 N.W.2d 140 (S.D.1978); accord Swee v. Myrl & Roy’s Paving, Inc. 283 N.W.2d 570 (S.D.1979); Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (S.D.1977).

1989See, e.g., Swier v. Norwest Bank, 409 N.W.2d 121 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., dissenting); Connelly v. Sherwood, 268 N.W.2d 140 (S.D.1978); accord Swee v. Myrl & Roy's Paving, Inc. 283 N.W.2d 570 (S.D.1979); Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (S.D.1977).

1982Means v. Solem, 480 F.Supp. 128 (D.S.D.1979). .

1982Means v. Solem, 480 F.Supp. 128 (D.S.D.1979). [4] Appellant contends that the trial court erred in instructing on lesser included offenses on both counts of aggravated assault.