self-defense instruction in District of Columbia

2014There, even though the defense presented a witness who testified that he and the defendant "were playing with knives” when a police officer encountered them in an alley surrounded by other men, we held that the defendant was entitled to a self-defense instruction because "the circumstance of [his] engaging in an argument with several others while holding a knife could have indicated that [he] was outnumbered and was in the process of warding off an attack by the group.” Id. at 367 .

2013“Although it is most frequently the testimony of a defendant that will provide evidence of a defendant’s reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury, it is possible to put a self-defense claim before the jury without a defendant’s testimony.” Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 367 (D.C.1990) (citations omitted).

2017See also Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1158 (D.C. 2013) (“To invoke self-defense, there must be some evidence that; ‘(1) [appellant] actually believed he was in imminent danger of bodily harm, and (2) he had reasonable grounds for that belief.’") (quoting Gu illard v. United States, 596 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C. 1991)); Snell v. United States, 754 A.2d 289, 290 (D.C. 2000) ("Reasonable force may be used in self-defense if the actor reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of bodily harm.”); McPhaul v. United States, 452 A.2d 371 , 374 & n.2 (D.C. 1982) (upholding the instructi

2017Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 9.500 (5th ed. rev. 18 See also Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1158 (D.C. 2013) (“To invoke self-defense, there must be some evidence that: ‘(1) [appellant] actually believed he was in imminent danger of bodily harm, and (2) he had reasonable grounds for that belief.’”) (quoting Guillard v. United States, 596 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C. 1991)); Snell v. United States, 754 A.2d 289, 290 (D.C. 2000) (“Reasonable force may be used in self-defense if the actor reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of bodily harm.”); McPh

2023Under the doctrine of self-defense, acquittal of a homicide is possible if a defendant can show: (1) “an actual belief both that he or she [was] in imminent danger of serious bodily harm or death and in the need to use deadly force in order to save himself or herself” and (2) “the defendant’s [actual] belief [was] objectively reasonable.” Id. at 930 .

2016See Swann v. United States, 648 A.2d 928 , 930 n.7 (D.C. 1994) (noting that even when the other conditions of a self-defense claim are satisfied, "a defendant cannot claim self-defense if the defendant was the aggressor, or if s/he provoked the conflict upon himself/herself”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Andrews, 125 A.3d at 321 (“A legitimate claim of self-defense is not available to a defendant who voluntarily—knowingly and unnecessarily—placed himself in a position where he had reason to believe his presence would provoke the violence from which he then found it necessary to

2001See, e.g., Adams, 558 A.2d at 350 (holding that the trial court erred in denying a self-defense instruction when the defendant denied that weapons were even used because “mere inconsistency between defenses does not constitute a proper basis for the denial of a defense instruction”); Reid, 581 A.2d at 367 (holding that a defendant may put on contradictory defenses without jeopardizing the availability of a self-defense instruction); Gray v. United States, 549 A.2d 347 , 349 n. 2 (D.C.1988) (“[A] defendant is entitled upon request to an instruction on any issue fairly raised by the evidence, re

1996We explained that “an accused is entitled to a self-defense instruction if the evidence, either that of the defense or prosecution, fairly raises the issue.” Id. at 63 (quoting Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101 , 1103 n. 1 (D.C.1978)) (emphasis added in Guillard).

2024To be entitled to a self-defense instruction, the evidence must show that “(1) there was an actual or apparent threat to the defendant; (2) the threat was unlawful and immediate; (3) the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm; and (4) the defendant’s response was necessary to save himself from danger.” Rorie v. United States, 882 A.2d 763, 771 (D.C. 2005) (internal quotation and brackets omitted). 9 For cases applying the “however weak” standard, see, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 266 A.3d 228 , 238 (D.C. 2022); Lewis v. Unite

2016See Swann v. United States, 648 A.2d 928 , 930 n.7 (D.C. 1994) (noting that even when the other conditions of a self-defense claim are satisfied, "a defendant cannot claim self-defense if the defendant was the aggressor, or if s/he provoked the conflict upon himself/herself”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Andrews, 125 A.3d at 321 (“A legitimate claim of self-defense is not available to a defendant who voluntarily—knowingly and unnecessarily—placed himself in a position where he had reason to believe his presence would provoke the violence from which he then found it necessary to

2018Accord Gay v. United States, 12 A.3d 643, 648 (D.C. 2011) (“The right of self-defense, and especially the degree of force the victim is permitted to use to prevent bodily harm, is premised substantially on the victim‟s own reasonable perceptions of what is happening.” (quoting Fersner v. United States, 482 A.2d 387, 391 (D.C. 1984))); Edwards, 619 A.2d at 38 (Rejecting a self-defense claim where defendant pointed a gun at his alleged assailant, Mr. Booker, as Mr. Booker ran away from defendant, observing that defendant‟s “right of self-defense at the onset of the encounter did not survive Mr.

2018Accord Gay v. United States , 12 A.3d 643 , 648 (D.C. 2011) ("The right of self-defense, and especially the degree of force the victim is permitted to use to prevent bodily harm, is premised substantially on the victim's own reasonable perceptions of what is happening." (quoting Fersner v. United States , 482 A.2d 387 , 391 (D.C. 1984) ) ); Edwards , 619 A.2d at 38 (Rejecting a self-defense claim where defendant pointed a gun at his alleged assailant, Mr. Booker, as Mr. Booker ran away from defendant, observing that defendant's "right of self-defense at the onset of the encounter did not survi

2018Accord Gay v. United States, 12 A.3d 643, 648 (D.C. 2011) (“The right of self-defense, and especially the degree of force the victim is permitted to use to prevent bodily harm, is premised substantially on the victim‟s own reasonable perceptions of what is happening.” (quoting Fersner v. United States, 482 A.2d 387, 391 (D.C. 1984))); Edwards, 619 A.2d at 38 (Rejecting a self-defense claim where defendant pointed a gun at his alleged assailant, Mr. Booker, as Mr. Booker ran away from defendant, observing that defendant‟s “right of self-defense at the onset of the encounter did not survive Mr.

2018Accord Gay v. United States , 12 A.3d 643 , 648 (D.C. 2011) ("The right of self-defense, and especially the degree of force the victim is permitted to use to prevent bodily harm, is premised substantially on the victim's own reasonable perceptions of what is happening." (quoting Fersner v. United States , 482 A.2d 387 , 391 (D.C. 1984) ) ); Edwards , 619 A.2d at 38 (Rejecting a self-defense claim where defendant pointed a gun at his alleged assailant, Mr. Booker, as Mr. Booker ran away from defendant, observing that defendant's "right of self-defense at the onset of the encounter did not survi

2017In addition, the dissent cites one case, Potter v. United States, 534 A.2d 943, 946 (D.C. 1987) (cited post, at 859 (dissenting opinion)), that does not reference "necessity” at all and conducts a step one analysis to conclude that a self-defense instruction should have been given, because a jury could have found that defendant "believe[d], reasonably, that he had to throw a brick to fend off imminent bodily harm.” The dissent cannot point to a single case where this court has indicated — much less held — that, even where a defendant actually and reasonably believed she was in imminent danger

2017In addition, the dissent cites one case, Potter v. United States, 534 A.2d 943, 946 (D.C. 1987) (cited post, at 50 (dissenting opinion)), that does not reference “necessity” at all and conducts a step one analysis to conclude that a self-defense instruction should have been given, because a jury could have found that defendant “believe[d], reasonably, that he had to throw a brick to fend off imminent bodily harm.” The dissent cannot point to a single case where this court has indicated—much less held—that, even where a defendant actually and reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of bo

2017See also Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1158 (D.C. 2013) (“To invoke self-defense, there must be some evidence that; ‘(1) [appellant] actually believed he was in imminent danger of bodily harm, and (2) he had reasonable grounds for that belief.’") (quoting Gu illard v. United States, 596 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C. 1991)); Snell v. United States, 754 A.2d 289, 290 (D.C. 2000) ("Reasonable force may be used in self-defense if the actor reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of bodily harm.”); McPhaul v. United States, 452 A.2d 371 , 374 & n.2 (D.C. 1982) (upholding the instructi

2017Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 9.500 (5th ed. rev. 18 See also Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1158 (D.C. 2013) (“To invoke self-defense, there must be some evidence that: ‘(1) [appellant] actually believed he was in imminent danger of bodily harm, and (2) he had reasonable grounds for that belief.’”) (quoting Guillard v. United States, 596 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C. 1991)); Snell v. United States, 754 A.2d 289, 290 (D.C. 2000) (“Reasonable force may be used in self-defense if the actor reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of bodily harm.”); McPh

2017Under this construct — where the first inquiry is whether a defendant actually and reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of bodily harm and the second inquiry is whether, taking this belief into account, she employed excessive force — motive is not an additional, separate consideration. 23 If the government has not disproved that a defendant actually and reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of bodily harm, we accept that she acted out of that belief. 24 See Garibay v. United States, 634 A.2d 946, 948 (D.C. 1993) (explaining the binary motive inquiry by juxtaposing two possib

2017In addition, the dissent cites one case, Potter v. United States, 534 A.2d 943, 946 (D.C. 1987) (cited post, at 50 (dissenting opinion)), that does not reference “necessity” at all and conducts a step one analysis to conclude that a self-defense instruction should have been given, because a jury could have found that defendant “believe[d], reasonably, that he had to throw a brick to fend off imminent bodily harm.” The dissent cannot point to a single case where this court has indicated—much less held—that, even where a defendant actually and reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of bo

2016See Swann v. United States, 648 A.2d 928 , 930 n.7 (D.C. 1994) (noting that even when the other conditions of a self-defense claim are satisfied, "a defendant cannot claim self-defense if the defendant was the aggressor, or if s/he provoked the conflict upon himself/herself”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Andrews, 125 A.3d at 321 (“A legitimate claim of self-defense is not available to a defendant who voluntarily—knowingly and unnecessarily—placed himself in a position where he had reason to believe his presence would provoke the violence from which he then found it necessary to

2016Thus, to defeat appellant’s claim of self-defense and secure a conviction, the government needed to disprove at least one of the four aforementioned conditions beyond a reasonable doubt.7 6 See Swann v. United States, 648 A.2d 928 , 930 n.7 (D.C. 1994) (noting that even when the other conditions of a self-defense claim are satisfied, “a defendant cannot claim self-defense if the defendant was the aggressor, or if s/he provoked the conflict upon himself/herself”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Andrews, 125 A.3d at 321 (“A legitimate claim of self-defense is not available to a defe

2014For a defendant charged with the use of deadly force to be entitled to a self-defense instruction, he “must have believed that he was in immediate peril of death or serious bodily harm, and that his response was necessary to save himself therefrom.” Harper v. United States, 608 A.2d 152, 155 (D.C.1992) (quoting United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 (D.C.Cir.1973)) (alterations omitted).

1998In Harper, supra, this court laid out the requirements for entitlement to a self-defense instruction as a matter of law: The right of self-defense is a law of necessity, arising only when the necessity begins, and equally ends with the necessity; and never must the necessity be greater than when the force employed defensively is deadly.

2014For a defendant charged with the use of deadly force to be entitled to a self-defense instruction, he “must have believed that he was in immediate peril of death or serious bodily harm, and that his response was necessary to save himself therefrom.” Harper v. United States, 608 A.2d 152, 155 (D.C.1992) (quoting United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 (D.C.Cir.1973)) (alterations omitted).

2004D.C. 219, 226-27, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229-30 (1973). “[A]n accused is entitled to a self-defense instruction if the evidence, either that of the defense or prosecution, fairly raises the issue,” Guillard v. United States, 596 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C.1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); “the testimony of the defendant is not necessary to put [the] claim before the jury.” McClam, supra note 3, 775 A.2d at 1104 (citing Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 367 (D.C.1990)).

2014See Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26 , 41 & n. 17 (D.C.1990).

1995See Comber, 584 A.2d at 41 .

1993In Byrd v. United States, 364 A.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. 1975), for example, there was no evidence to support a self-defense claim since the only evidence was that the victim had not had anything in his hands when the defendant returned to the scene of an earlier argument to shoot him.

1993In Byrd v. United States, 364 A.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C.1975), for example, there was no evidence to support a self-defense claim since the only evidence was that the victim had not had anything in his hands when the defendant returned to the scene of an earlier argument to shoot him.

2025When a self-defense claim supported by some evidence is raised, the threshold question is whether the government disproved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the “appellant actually and reasonably believed that [s]he was in imminent danger of bodily harm.” Parker v. United States, 155 A.3d 835 , 845 (D.C. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Higgenbottom v. United States, 923 A.2d 891, 900 (D.C. 2007)).

2017A defendant may use “only reasonable force to repel the perceived attack.” Higgenbottom, 923 A.2d at 900 .

2024See id. (defendant not entitled to self-defense instruction because “no evidence was presented that gave the jury a basis for finding 31 that appellant reasonably believed that [the decedent] was about to start shooting” (internal quotation omitted)).

2017Cf. Henry v. United States, 94 A.3d 752, 757 (D.C. 2014) (noting that evidence supporting a self-defense instruction "may be an amalgam of 'portions ... of the government’s evidence and [portions] of defense evidence’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Hernandez v. United States, 853 A.2d 202 , 206 n.4 (D.C. 2004))). 11 .

2019Cir. 1966) ); see also Outlaw v. United States , 806 A.2d 1192 , 1200 (D.C. 2002) (holding that defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction where he "walked away from a confrontation with [the victim], went to a truck, retrieved a gun, and returned to shoot [the victim]"). 20 See Brown , 619 A.2d at 1182 ("In determining whether a self-defense instruction was properly denied, the evidence must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the defendant."). 21 See Washington v. United States , 689 A.2d 568 , 573 (D.C. 1997) (holding that where the evidence at trial does not support in

2002This behavior is inconsistent with at least two factors showing entitlement to a self-defense instruction — that he “honestly and reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm”; and that “[his] response was necessary to save himself from danger.” Brown v. United States, 619 A.2d 1180, 1182 (D.C.1992) (citations omitted); see also Sams v. United States, 721 A.2d 945, 953 (D.C.1998) (“[S]elf-defense is not available to a defendant who deliberately puts himself in a position where he has reason to believe that his presence will provoke trouble even if his purp

2019Stated differently, only upon a " 'bizarre reconstruction' of the evidence," Tyree v. United States , 942 A.2d 629 , 639 (D.C. 2008), could jurors have thought that appellant acted to ward off imminent harm to himself by shooting at Campbell but was not entitled to a self-defense claim because of the earlier shoulder-grab or push and the rule set out in the provocation instruction.

2019Stated differently, only upon a “‘bizarre reconstruction’ of the evidence,” Tyree v. United States, 942 A.2d 629, 639 (D.C. 2008), could jurors have thought that appellant acted to ward off imminent harm to himself by shooting at Campbell but was not entitled to a self-defense claim because of the earlier shoulder-grab or push and the rule set out in the provocation instruction.

2018Accord Gay v. United States, 12 A.3d 643, 648 (D.C. 2011) (“The right of self-defense, and especially the degree of force the victim is permitted to use to prevent bodily harm, is premised substantially on the victim‟s own reasonable perceptions of what is happening.” (quoting Fersner v. United States, 482 A.2d 387, 391 (D.C. 1984))); Edwards, 619 A.2d at 38 (Rejecting a self-defense claim where defendant pointed a gun at his alleged assailant, Mr. Booker, as Mr. Booker ran away from defendant, observing that defendant‟s “right of self-defense at the onset of the encounter did not survive Mr.

2018Accord Gay v. United States , 12 A.3d 643 , 648 (D.C. 2011) ("The right of self-defense, and especially the degree of force the victim is permitted to use to prevent bodily harm, is premised substantially on the victim's own reasonable perceptions of what is happening." (quoting Fersner v. United States , 482 A.2d 387 , 391 (D.C. 1984) ) ); Edwards , 619 A.2d at 38 (Rejecting a self-defense claim where defendant pointed a gun at his alleged assailant, Mr. Booker, as Mr. Booker ran away from defendant, observing that defendant's "right of self-defense at the onset of the encounter did not survi

2017Under this construct — where the first inquiry is whether a defendant actually and reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of bodily harm and the second inquiry is whether, taking this belief into account, she employed excessive force — motive is not an additional, separate consideration. 23 If the government has not disproved that a defendant actually and reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of bodily harm, we accept that she acted out of that belief. 24 See Garibay v. United States, 634 A.2d 946, 948 (D.C. 1993) (explaining the binary motive inquiry by juxtaposing two possib

2017In addition, the dissent cites one case, Potter v. United States, 534 A.2d 943, 946 (D.C. 1987) (cited post, at 50 (dissenting opinion)), that does not reference “necessity” at all and conducts a step one analysis to conclude that a self-defense instruction should have been given, because a jury could have found that defendant “believe[d], reasonably, that he had to throw a brick to fend off imminent bodily harm.” The dissent cannot point to a single case where this court has indicated—much less held—that, even where a defendant actually and reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of bo

2017See also Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1158 (D.C. 2013) (“To invoke self-defense, there must be some evidence that; ‘(1) [appellant] actually believed he was in imminent danger of bodily harm, and (2) he had reasonable grounds for that belief.’") (quoting Gu illard v. United States, 596 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C. 1991)); Snell v. United States, 754 A.2d 289, 290 (D.C. 2000) ("Reasonable force may be used in self-defense if the actor reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of bodily harm.”); McPhaul v. United States, 452 A.2d 371 , 374 & n.2 (D.C. 1982) (upholding the instructi

2017Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 9.500 (5th ed. rev. 18 See also Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1158 (D.C. 2013) (“To invoke self-defense, there must be some evidence that: ‘(1) [appellant] actually believed he was in imminent danger of bodily harm, and (2) he had reasonable grounds for that belief.’”) (quoting Guillard v. United States, 596 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C. 1991)); Snell v. United States, 754 A.2d 289, 290 (D.C. 2000) (“Reasonable force may be used in self-defense if the actor reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of bodily harm.”); McPh

2014Conversely, a defendant is not entitled to a self-defense instruction if he “deliberately places himself in a position where he has reason to believe his presence would ... provoke trouble.” Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C.1995) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 399 A.2d 866, 869 (D.C.1979)).

2011See also In re D.E., 991 A.2d 1205, 1212 (D.C.2010) (finding constitutional violation in exclusion of one defense witness to charged assault even though a second defense eyewitness testified); McDonald v. United States, 904 A.2d 377, 381 (D.C.2006) (trial court's preclusion of defendant from testifying about his injuries during his arrest held unconstitutional, though defendant was able to present "some evidence" of his injuries through his wife's testimony; "for that opportunity [to present a defense] to be meaningful, it must be full and fair, not arbitrarily and significantly curtailed"); H

2013Due to the lack of evidence establishing that appellant acted to defend himself from imminent harm, the self-defense instruction “would have invited the jury to engage in speculation and a trial court is not required to instruct the jury on a defense theory that indulges or encourages speculation about events or beliefs not supported by testimony.” Bonilla v. United States, 894 A.2d 412, 418 (D.C.2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2010The evidence to support the trial court’s giving a self-defense instruction “is insufficient if the jury is required to cross the bounds of permissible inference and enter the forbidden territory of conjecture and speculation.” Bonilla, 894 A.2d at 418 (quoting Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C.1987) (internal editing omitted)).

2008There is no question that the accused may present prior acts of violence committed by the victim and known to the accused to support a self-defense claim, as “such evidence is relevant to the reasonableness of the accused’s fear of the victim.” Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140, 143 (D.C. 1992).

2008There is no question that the accused may present prior acts of violence committed by the victim and known to the accused to support a self-defense claim, as "such evidence is relevant to the reasonableness of the accused's fear of the victim." Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140, 143 (D.C. 1992).

1993Bostick v. United States, 605 A.2d 916 , 917 6 n. 7 (D.C.1992) (quoting Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 63 , 108 S.Ct. at 887 , and in note 7 citing Womack v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 40 , 336 F.2d 959 (1964)). 17 See Guillard v. United States, supra note 16, 596 A.2d at 62-64; Reid v. United States 581 A.2d 359, 367 (D.C.1990); Adams, supra, 558 A.2d at 349. “[S]o long as a reasonable juror acting reasonably could credit the evidence,” the defendant is entitled to the requested instruction.

1993Bostick v. United States, 605 A.2d 916 , 917 6 n. 7 (D.C.1992) (quoting Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 63 , 108 S.Ct. at 887 , and in note 7 citing Womack v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 40 , 336 F.2d 959 (1964)). 17 See Guillard v. United States, supra note 16, 596 A.2d at 62-64; Reid v. United States 581 A.2d 359, 367 (D.C.1990); Adams, supra, 558 A.2d at 349. “[S]o long as a reasonable juror acting reasonably could credit the evidence,” the defendant is entitled to the requested instruction.

1990Similarly, in Johns v. United States, 434 A.2d 463, 469 (D.C.1981), a criminal assault case, we explained that evidence about the assault victim’s violent character is relevant to a self-defense claim not only to show whether the defendant was in reasonable fear of imminent great bodily injury but also to answer “the objective question who was the aggressor.” The instant case does not include an issue of self-defense, and thus Phillips and Johns do not squarely decide the evidentia-ry issue presented.

1986When a defendant “testifies about a deceased victim’s violent character for its relevance to the reasonable fear and/or ‘aggressor’ aspects of a self-defense claim, the general rule of policy against admission of evidence about the defendant’s own character prevails.” Id. at 471 .

2018And even the government‟s cases acknowledge that the trial court must exercise its discretion so as to deliver an instruction that “considered as a whole, fairly and accurately states the law.” Fearwell v. United States, 886 A.2d 95, 101 (D.C. 2005).22 We conclude that the retreat instruction delivered by the trial court did not clearly prohibit the jury from considering conduct that occurred before Mr. Dawkins employed deadly force or had a possible justification to do so.23 22 See also Pannu v. Jacobson, 909 A.2d 178, 198 (D.C. 2006) (“[I]t is incumbent on the trial court to properly instruc

2018And even the government's cases acknowledge that the trial court must exercise its discretion so as to deliver an instruction that "considered as a whole, fairly and accurately states the law." Fearwell v. United States , 886 A.2d 95 , 101 (D.C. 2005). 22 We conclude that the retreat instruction delivered by the trial court did not clearly prohibit the jury from considering conduct that occurred before Mr. Dawkins employed deadly force or had a possible justification to do so. 23 *236 The trial court's instruction first informed the jury that there was no duty to retreat before using nondeadly

2017Cf. Henry v. United States, 94 A.3d 752, 757 (D.C. 2014) (noting that evidence supporting a self-defense instruction "may be an amalgam of 'portions ... of the government’s evidence and [portions] of defense evidence’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Hernandez v. United States, 853 A.2d 202 , 206 n.4 (D.C. 2004))). 11 .

2014His claim of self-defense is premised on the fact that Bryant fired the gun at the ceiling only after Marshall and Mays “attacked” him, showing that he “did nothing to precipitate the attack, and that the government witnesses were the first aggressors.” 30 A defendant is “entitled to a self-defense instruction if the evidence, either that of the defense or prosecution, fairly raises the issue.” Hernandez v. United States, 853 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C. 2004) (quoting Guillard v. United States, 596 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C.1991)).

2014We held that a self-defense instruction was warranted because "the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defense, provide[d] at least some support for a finding that [the defendant] struck at [the officer,]” as the officer testified, “only ... after [the officer] ... violently pulled [the defendant] off the bus and forced him to the ground.” Id. at 673 .

2001See Wilson v. United States, 673 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C.1996) (“[A]n accused is entitled to a self-defense instruction if the evidence, either that of the defense or prosecution, fairly raises the issue”) (emphasis added) (quoting Guillard v. United States, 596 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C.1991)); Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 367 (D.C.1990) (holding that the testimony of the defendant is not necessary to put a claim before the jury).