aspect inquiry in Texas

2007Id. at 267-68 . [8] 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). [9] The argument that the Texas constitutional double-jeopardy provision is a lesser shield in the mistrial context has at least some plausible historical basis to it; I am unaware of any historical basis for concluding that it is any greater. [10] Bauder, 921 S.W.2d at 698 . [11] The Bauder majority stated, inter alia: "But, unlike the Supreme Court, we do not think the prosecutor's specific intent is a relevant aspect of the inquiry." 921 S.W.2d at 699 . "[I]t seems to us that the prosecutor' specific intent . . . is

2007Id. at 267-68 . [8] 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). [9] The argument that the Texas constitutional double-jeopardy provision is a lesser shield in the mistrial context has at least some plausible historical basis to it; I am unaware of any historical basis for concluding that it is any greater. [10] Bauder, 921 S.W.2d at 698 . [11] The Bauder majority stated, inter alia: "But, unlike the Supreme Court, we do not think the prosecutor's specific intent is a relevant aspect of the inquiry." 921 S.W.2d at 699 . "[I]t seems to us that the prosecutor' specific intent . . . is

2006Id.

2005Id.

2000Thomas, 290 S.W. 152 , and Turner v. Trinity Independent School District, 700 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ), the only judicial decisions to deal directly with conflicting loyalties incompatibility, specifically involve situations in which both positions are “offices.” Furthermore, a line of attorney general opinions, since at least 1990, has held that, for the conflicting loyalties doctrine to be applicable, both positions must be “offices.” See Tex. Att’y Gen.

2000Thomas , 290 S.W. 152 , and Turner v .

1999The “entanglement” question is now treated as “an aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect.” Agostini, 117 S.Ct. at 2015 .

1999The "entanglement" question is now treated as "an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect." Agostini, 117 S.Ct. at 2015 .

2020Our task is to determine “whether [our] particular [undisputed] historical facts give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id.

2019Young, 563 S.W.3d at 330 .

2018It would seem to contradict the Supreme Court’s requirement that the definition of intellectual disability be calibrated to only include those whose degree of intellectual disability falls within a national consensus regarding moral blameworthiness.18 On the other hand, we cannot rely solely upon the testimony of “a fourth grade 15 Id. at 1051-52 . 16 Id. at 1052 n.9. 17 See Eddings v. Oklahom a, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607 (1978)) (effectively defining what constitutes m itigating evidence by holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Am endm ents require

2018It would seem to contradict the Supreme Court’s requirement that the definition of intellectual disability be calibrated to only include those whose degree of intellectual disability falls within a national consensus regarding moral blameworthiness.18 On the other hand, we cannot rely solely upon the testimony of “a fourth grade 15 Id. at 1051-52 . 16 Id. at 1052 n.9. 17 See Eddings v. Oklahom a, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607 (1978)) (effectively defining what constitutes m itigating evidence by holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Am endm ents require

2018It would seem to contradict the Supreme Court’s requirement that the definition of intellectual disability be calibrated to only include those whose degree of intellectual disability falls within a national consensus regarding moral blameworthiness.18 On the other hand, we cannot rely solely upon the testimony of “a fourth grade 15 Id. at 1051-52 . 16 Id. at 1052 n.9. 17 See Eddings v. Oklahom a, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607 (1978)) (effectively defining what constitutes m itigating evidence by holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Am endm ents require

2017Ct. 1340,99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); Burtmv.W ihi ±ig1mPaikiigAutihorily, 365 U.S. 715 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); whetherthe actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Teny v.Adam s,345U.S. 461, 73S.Ct.809,97L.Ed. 1152 (1953); M ardiv.A]abama, 326 U.S. 501 , 66 S.Ct. 276 , 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946); cf. SanFranciscDArts& AtliMis,nhc.v.UnitelStatES Ofympt *622 Comm ., 483 U.S. 522, 544-545 ,107 S.Ct.2971,2985-2986, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987); and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a uniquewayby the incidents of governmental authority, seeSheBe/v.Kraan ei:, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S

2017Ct. 1340,99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); Burtmv.W ihi ±ig1mPaikiigAutihorily, 365 U.S. 715 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); whetherthe actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Teny v.Adam s,345U.S. 461, 73S.Ct.809,97L.Ed. 1152 (1953); M ardiv.A]abama, 326 U.S. 501 , 66 S.Ct. 276 , 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946); cf. SanFranciscDArts& AtliMis,nhc.v.UnitelStatES Ofympt *622 Comm ., 483 U.S. 522, 544-545 ,107 S.Ct.2971,2985-2986, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987); and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a uniquewayby the incidents of governmental authority, seeSheBe/v.Kraan ei:, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S

2017Ct. 1340,99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); Burtmv.W ihi ±ig1mPaikiigAutihorily, 365 U.S. 715 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); whetherthe actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Teny v.Adam s,345U.S. 461, 73S.Ct.809,97L.Ed. 1152 (1953); M ardiv.A]abama, 326 U.S. 501 , 66 S.Ct. 276 , 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946); cf. SanFranciscDArts& AtliMis,nhc.v.UnitelStatES Ofympt *622 Comm ., 483 U.S. 522, 544-545 ,107 S.Ct.2971,2985-2986, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987); and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a uniquewayby the incidents of governmental authority, seeSheBe/v.Kraan ei:, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S

2017Ct. 1340,99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); Burtmv.W ihi ±ig1mPaikiigAutihorily, 365 U.S. 715 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); whetherthe actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Teny v.Adam s,345U.S. 461, 73S.Ct.809,97L.Ed. 1152 (1953); M ardiv.A]abama, 326 U.S. 501 , 66 S.Ct. 276 , 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946); cf. SanFranciscDArts& AtliMis,nhc.v.UnitelStatES Ofympt *622 Comm ., 483 U.S. 522, 544-545 ,107 S.Ct.2971,2985-2986, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987); and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a uniquewayby the incidents of governmental authority, seeSheBe/v.Kraan ei:, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S

2017Ct. 1340,99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); Burtmv.W ihi ±ig1mPaikiigAutihorily, 365 U.S. 715 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); whetherthe actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Teny v.Adam s,345U.S. 461, 73S.Ct.809,97L.Ed. 1152 (1953); M ardiv.A]abama, 326 U.S. 501 , 66 S.Ct. 276 , 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946); cf. SanFranciscDArts& AtliMis,nhc.v.UnitelStatES Ofympt *622 Comm ., 483 U.S. 522, 544-545 ,107 S.Ct.2971,2985-2986, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987); and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a uniquewayby the incidents of governmental authority, seeSheBe/v.Kraan ei:, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S

2017Ct. 1340,99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); Burtmv.W ihi ±ig1mPaikiigAutihorily, 365 U.S. 715 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); whetherthe actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Teny v.Adam s,345U.S. 461, 73S.Ct.809,97L.Ed. 1152 (1953); M ardiv.A]abama, 326 U.S. 501 , 66 S.Ct. 276 , 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946); cf. SanFranciscDArts& AtliMis,nhc.v.UnitelStatES Ofympt *622 Comm ., 483 U.S. 522, 544-545 ,107 S.Ct.2971,2985-2986, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987); and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a uniquewayby the incidents of governmental authority, seeSheBe/v.Kraan ei:, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S

2017Ct. 1340,99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); Burtmv.W ihi ±ig1mPaikiigAutihorily, 365 U.S. 715 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); whetherthe actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Teny v.Adam s,345U.S. 461, 73S.Ct.809,97L.Ed. 1152 (1953); M ardiv.A]abama, 326 U.S. 501 , 66 S.Ct. 276 , 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946); cf. SanFranciscDArts& AtliMis,nhc.v.UnitelStatES Ofympt *622 Comm ., 483 U.S. 522, 544-545 ,107 S.Ct.2971,2985-2986, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987); and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a uniquewayby the incidents of governmental authority, seeSheBe/v.Kraan ei:, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S

2017Ct. 1340,99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); Burtmv.W ihi ±ig1mPaikiigAutihorily, 365 U.S. 715 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); whetherthe actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Teny v.Adam s,345U.S. 461, 73S.Ct.809,97L.Ed. 1152 (1953); M ardiv.A]abama, 326 U.S. 501 , 66 S.Ct. 276 , 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946); cf. SanFranciscDArts& AtliMis,nhc.v.UnitelStatES Ofympt *622 Comm ., 483 U.S. 522, 544-545 ,107 S.Ct.2971,2985-2986, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987); and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a uniquewayby the incidents of governmental authority, seeSheBe/v.Kraan ei:, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S

2017Although we haverecognized that this aspect of the analysis is oftena factbound inquiry,seeLugar, supra, 457 U.S., at 939 ,102S.Ct.,at 2754-55, our cases disclose certainprinciples of general application.Our precedents establishthat, in determining whethera particular action or course of conduct is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine the following: the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, see Tu]saPrDfessionalCoIlect±nServries,nhc.v.Pcpe, 485 U.S. 478 , 108S.

2017Although we haverecognized that this aspect of the analysis is oftena factbound inquiry,seeLugar, supra, 457 U.S., at 939 ,102S.Ct.,at 2754-55, our cases disclose certainprinciples of general application.Our precedents establishthat, in determining whethera particular action or course of conduct is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine the following: the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, see Tu]saPrDfessionalCoIlect±nServries,nhc.v.Pcpe, 485 U.S. 478 , 108S.

2017Ct. 1340,99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); Burtmv.W ihi ±ig1mPaikiigAutihorily, 365 U.S. 715 , 81 S.Ct. 856 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); whetherthe actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Teny v.Adam s,345U.S. 461, 73S.Ct.809,97L.Ed. 1152 (1953); M ardiv.A]abama, 326 U.S. 501 , 66 S.Ct. 276 , 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946); cf. SanFranciscDArts& AtliMis,nhc.v.UnitelStatES Ofympt *622 Comm ., 483 U.S. 522, 544-545 ,107 S.Ct.2971,2985-2986, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987); and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a uniquewayby the incidents of governmental authority, seeSheBe/v.Kraan ei:, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S

2015Turley. 4 I4 U.S. 70, 78, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322 , 38 L.Ed.2d Ne:d Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) g-ss:-ci--1ss(47T~Ecrza BTo-· -~-~-- ~~· It was this aspect of the privilege that we relied on in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 , 88 S.Ct. 1913 , a line of cases beginning with Garrity v. New Jersey, 20 L.Ed.2d I082 ( 1968), involved a policeman called 385 U.S. 493 . 87 S.Ct. 616 , 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967), to testifY before a grand jury investigating police and leading up to Lefkowitz v. Turley, supra. The corruption.

2015Turley. 4 I4 U.S. 70, 78, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322 , 38 L.Ed.2d Ne:d Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) g-ss:-ci--1ss(47T~Ecrza BTo-· -~-~-- ~~· It was this aspect of the privilege that we relied on in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 , 88 S.Ct. 1913 , a line of cases beginning with Garrity v. New Jersey, 20 L.Ed.2d I082 ( 1968), involved a policeman called 385 U.S. 493 . 87 S.Ct. 616 , 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967), to testifY before a grand jury investigating police and leading up to Lefkowitz v. Turley, supra. The corruption.

2015If jurisdiction over a specific state officer as op- posed to the State is conceived of as a further hurdle imposed by sovereign immunity, then Anderson would stand for the proposition that this aspect of immunity is “waived” when the State brings an enforcement suit and then “answer[s] [a counterclaim seeking to enjoin officers] in a court of compe- tent jurisdiction.” Id. at 110 .