aspect inquiry in Louisiana

2012CLARK, Justice, additionally concurring. |,I agree with the court’s opinion, but write separately to concur so that I may address an aspect of the defense’s argument in brief regarding the “strike or waive” rule announced by this court in State v. Fallon, 290 So.2d 273 (La.1974), and generally followed thereafter.

2012The defendant points out the court, in State v. Lucky, 96-1687 (La.4/13/99), 755 So.2d 845 , with similar factual circumstances (a defendant faced with the choice to use an available peremptory challenge on a par ticular juror or save them for remaining jurors), analyzed the merits of Lucky’s claim instead of finding the defendant waived review of the issue.

2002CLK Company, L.L.C., 98-0802 at 21-22, 719 So.2d at 1109 .

1999App.2d Cir.6/24/98), 715 So.2d 688 , clearly states the law relative to a defendant responding to the request of a peace officer (though in Poland, supra, the reason for the request was officer safety): The critical aspect of that inquiry turns upon whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the requests or otherwise terminate the encounter with the law enforcement personnel.

1998Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); State v. Haygood, 26,102 |2(La.App.2d Cir. 08/17/94), 641 So.2d 1074 , writ denied, 94-2373 (La.01/13/95), 648 So.2d 1337 .

1998Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); State v. Haygood, 26,102 |2(La.App.2d Cir. 08/17/94), 641 So.2d 1074 , writ denied, 94-2373 (La.01/13/95), 648 So.2d 1337 .

1998Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); State v. Haygood, 26,102 |2(La.App.2d Cir. 08/17/94), 641 So.2d 1074 , writ denied, 94-2373 (La.01/13/95), 648 So.2d 1337 .

1998Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); State v. Haygood, 26,102 |2(La.App.2d Cir. 08/17/94), 641 So.2d 1074 , writ denied, 94-2373 (La.01/13/95), 648 So.2d 1337 .

1994We disagree. *505 In Foreman v. West Calcasieu-Cameron Hospital, 625 So.2d 1104 (La.App. 3d Cir.1993), writ denied, 631 So.2d 450 (La. 1994), this court held a claimant's failure to introduce any evidence to show there were outstanding medical expenses did not preclude the hearing officer from ordering the employer to pay any and all outstanding medical bills.

1994We disagree. *505 In Foreman v. West Calcasieu-Cameron Hospital, 625 So.2d 1104 (La.App. 3d Cir.1993), writ denied, 631 So.2d 450 (La. 1994), this court held a claimant's failure to introduce any evidence to show there were outstanding medical expenses did not preclude the hearing officer from ordering the employer to pay any and all outstanding medical bills.

1988The history of Jones Act jurisprudence demonstrates, and a case cited by defendants, Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp., 812 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.1987), rehearing denied, 823 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.1987), specifically holds that if one is a longshoreman under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act § 2(3) as amended 33 U.S.C.A. § 902 (3), he cannot be considered to be a seaman under the Jones Act, supra. Still the duties of piloting the vessels owned by John E.

1988The history of Jones Act jurisprudence demonstrates, and a case cited by defendants, Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp., 812 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.1987), rehearing denied, 823 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.1987), specifically holds that if one is a longshoreman under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act § 2(3) as amended 33 U.S.C.A. § 902 (3), he cannot be considered to be a seaman under the Jones Act, supra. Still the duties of piloting the vessels owned by John E.

1972The Board asserts to us that lack of knowledge of the age of the minor, after reasonable effort has been made to determine age, is not a defense, citing Thibodeaux v. City of Sulphur, 140 So.2d 49 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1962).

1965It may acquire, own, administer, alienate, and otherwise dispose of all kinds of property, movable and immovable, tangible and intangible; contract; adopt, alter, or destroy an official seal; sue and be sued, implead, and be impleaded." LSA-R.S. 48:22 has been interpreted so as not to include tort liability, Westwego Canal & Terminal Co. v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 200 La. 990 , 9 So.2d 389 (1942); Kilberg v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 1928, 8 La.App. 441 , but has been interpreted to include liability for breach of contract.

1965It may acquire, own, administer, alienate, and otherwise dispose of all kinds of property, movable and immovable, tangible and intangible; contract; adopt, alter, or destroy an official seal; sue and be sued, implead, and be impleaded." LSA-R.S. 48:22 has been interpreted so as not to include tort liability, Westwego Canal & Terminal Co. v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 200 La. 990 , 9 So.2d 389 (1942); Kilberg v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 1928, 8 La.App. 441 , but has been interpreted to include liability for breach of contract.

1965It may acquire, own, administer, alienate, and otherwise dispose of all kinds of property, movable and immovable, tangible and intangible; contract; adopt, alter, or destroy an official seal; sue and be sued, implead, and be impleaded." LSA-R.S. 48:22 has been interpreted so as not to include tort liability, Westwego Canal & Terminal Co. v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 200 La. 990 , 9 So.2d 389 (1942); Kilberg v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 1928, 8 La.App. 441 , but has been interpreted to include liability for breach of contract.