aspect analysis in Georgia

2017See United States v. Lall, 607 F3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2010) (“While we look to the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of [a defendant’s] confession, a significant aspect of that inquiry here involves the effect of deception in obtaining a confession.”); Chulpayev, 296 Ga. at 779 (3) (a) (citing Lall, 607 F3d at 1285 ).

2017See United States v. Lall, 607 F3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2010) (“While we look to the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of [a defendant’s] confession, a significant aspect of that inquiry here involves the effect of deception in obtaining a confession.”); Chulpayev, 296 Ga. at 779 (3) (a) (citing Lall, 607 F3d at 1285 ).

2017And although “knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.” State v. Tye, 276 Ga. 559, 560 (1) ( 580 SE2d 528 ) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (“While the state of the accused’s mind, and the failure of the police to advise the accused of his rights, were certainly factors to be evaluated in assessing the ‘voluntariness’ of an accused’s responses, they were not in and of themselves determinative.”).

2017And although “knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.” State v. Tye, 276 Ga. 559, 560 (1) ( 580 SE2d 528 ) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (“While the state of the accused’s mind, and the failure of the police to advise the accused of his rights, were certainly factors to be evaluated in assessing the ‘voluntariness’ of an accused’s responses, they were not in and of themselves determinative.”).

2017And although “knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.” State v. Tye, 276 Ga. 559, 560 (1) ( 580 SE2d 528 ) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (“While the state of the accused’s mind, and the failure of the police to advise the accused of his rights, were certainly factors to be evaluated in assessing the ‘voluntariness’ of an accused’s responses, they were not in and of themselves determinative.”).

2017And although “knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.” State v. Tye, 276 Ga. 559, 560 (1) ( 580 SE2d 528 ) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (“While the state of the accused’s mind, and the failure of the police to advise the accused of his rights, were certainly factors to be evaluated in assessing the ‘voluntariness’ of an accused’s responses, they were not in and of themselves determinative.”).

2024Cf. Boone v. State, 313 Ga. 78, 80 ( 868 SE2d 202 ) (2022) (even under former case law allowing out-of-time 7 appeals, the granting of an out-of-time appeal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel “is not a mechanism for pursuing an untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea”). “[A] defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after the expiration of the term of court in which [he] was sentenced can do so only in habeas.” Schoicket v. State, 312 Ga. 825, 829 (1) ( 865 SE2d 170 ) (2021). 2.

2024Cf. Boone v. State, 313 Ga. 78, 80 ( 868 SE2d 202 ) (2022) (even under former case law allowing out-of-time 7 appeals, the granting of an out-of-time appeal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel “is not a mechanism for pursuing an untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea”). “[A] defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after the expiration of the term of court in which [he] was sentenced can do so only in habeas.” Schoicket v. State, 312 Ga. 825, 829 (1) ( 865 SE2d 170 ) (2021). 2.

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024Cf. Boone v. State, 313 Ga. 78, 80 ( 868 SE2d 202 ) (2022) (even under former case law allowing out-of-time 7 appeals, the granting of an out-of-time appeal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel “is not a mechanism for pursuing an untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea”). “[A] defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after the expiration of the term of court in which [he] was sentenced can do so only in habeas.” Schoicket v. State, 312 Ga. 825, 829 (1) ( 865 SE2d 170 ) (2021). 2.

2024Cf. Boone v. State, 313 Ga. 78, 80 ( 868 SE2d 202 ) (2022) (even under former case law allowing out-of-time 7 appeals, the granting of an out-of-time appeal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel “is not a mechanism for pursuing an untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea”). “[A] defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after the expiration of the term of court in which [he] was sentenced can do so only in habeas.” Schoicket v. State, 312 Ga. 825, 829 (1) ( 865 SE2d 170 ) (2021). 2.

2024We necessarily begin this aspect of our analysis with “familiar and binding canons of construction.”54 And in considering the meaning of a statute, our charge as an appellate court is to “presume that the [legislative body] meant what it said and said what it meant.”55 Toward that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,56 consider the text contextually,57 read the text “in its most natural demonstrating proper venue). 54 Holcomb v. Long, 329 Ga. App. 515, 517 (1) ( 765 SE2d 687 ) (2014); accord In the Interest of L.

2024We necessarily begin this aspect of our analysis with “familiar and binding canons of construction.”54 And in considering the meaning of a statute, our charge as an appellate court is to “presume that the [legislative body] meant what it said and said what it meant.”55 Toward that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,56 consider the text contextually,57 read the text “in its most natural demonstrating proper venue). 54 Holcomb v. Long, 329 Ga. App. 515, 517 (1) ( 765 SE2d 687 ) (2014); accord In the Interest of L.

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2024T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 591 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014). 55 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1). 56 See Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 517 (1); accord Deal, 294 Ga. at 172 (1) (a); see also Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) ( 775 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636 ( 742 SE2d 149 ) (2013) (“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original [or] p

2017See United States v. Lall, 607 F3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2010) (“While we look to the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of [a defendant’s] confession, a significant aspect of that inquiry here involves the effect of deception in obtaining a confession.”); Chulpayev, 296 Ga. at 779 (3) (a) (citing Lall, 607 F3d at 1285 )).

1976Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 153 (90 SC 1598, 26 LE2d 142) (1970) and First Nat.