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8 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mansorgreen2 sentences2022Thus, it is enough for purposes of this appeal to address only one: the ruling that the warrant was “overbroad.” Overbreadth is an aspect of the requirement in Article I, section 9, that warrants issue only “upon proba- ble cause, * * * and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.” See Mansor, 363 Or at 212 (emphasizing that the particularity require- ment is informed by the “related, but distinct, concepts” of specificity and overbreadth). 2022The constitutional require- ment means that, “even if the warrant is sufficiently spe- cific, it must not authorize a search that is broader than the supporting affidavit supplies probable cause to justify.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Wayne R. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Oregon State Bargreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 434 , 909 P2d 846 (1996) (holding that, for a claim to be ripe, “ ‘[t]he controversy must involve present facts as opposed to a dispute which is based on future events of a hypothetical issue’ ”) (quoting Brown v. Oregon State Bar, 293 Or 446, 449 , 648 P2d 1289 (1982)). 2004See, e.g., McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 434 , 909 P2d 846 (1996) (holding that, for a claim to be ripe, “ ‘[t]he controversy must involve present facts as opposed to a dispute which is based on future events of a hypothetical issue’ ”) (quoting Brown v. Oregon State Bar, 293 Or 446, 449 , 648 P2d 1289 (1982)). | 1 | 1 |
McIntire v. Forbesgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 434 , 909 P2d 846 (1996) (holding that, for a claim to be ripe, “ ‘[t]he controversy must involve present facts as opposed to a dispute which is based on future events of a hypothetical issue’ ”) (quoting Brown v. Oregon State Bar, 293 Or 446, 449 , 648 P2d 1289 (1982)). 2004See, e.g., McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 434 , 909 P2d 846 (1996) (holding that, for a claim to be ripe, “ ‘[t]he controversy must involve present facts as opposed to a dispute which is based on future events of a hypothetical issue’ ”) (quoting Brown v. Oregon State Bar, 293 Or 446, 449 , 648 P2d 1289 (1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Inkley v. Forest Fiber Products Co.green1 sentence1982See also, Grable v. Weyerhaeuser Company, 291 Or 387, 402 , 631 P2d 768 (1981). 3 We also spoke in Inkley, 288 Or at 343 , of a “rule governing allocation of liability among several employers.” Because only one employer is liable, it is more accurate to say that the rule assigns rather than allocates responsibility. 4 Arguably, given the wording of ORS 656.005(8), above, the date when symptoms necessitate medical treatment could also be deemed a triggering date for liability or a substitute for proof of causation. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Compensation of Grablegreen2 sentences1982See also, Grable v. Weyerhaeuser Company, 291 Or 387, 402 , 631 P2d 768 (1981). 3 We also spoke in Inkley, 288 Or at 343 , of a “rule governing allocation of liability among several employers.” Because only one employer is liable, it is more accurate to say that the rule assigns rather than allocates responsibility. 4 Arguably, given the wording of ORS 656.005(8), above, the date when symptoms necessitate medical treatment could also be deemed a triggering date for liability or a substitute for proof of causation. 1982See also, Grable v. Weyerhaeuser Company, 291 Or 387, 402 , 631 P2d 768 (1981). 3 We also spoke in Inkley, 288 Or at 343 , of a “rule governing allocation of liability among several employers.” Because only one employer is liable, it is more accurate to say that the rule assigns rather than allocates responsibility. 4 Arguably, given the wording of ORS 656.005(8), above, the date when symptoms necessitate medical treatment could also be deemed a triggering date for liability or a substitute for proof of causation. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baffert v. California Horse Racing Board
green
2 sentences2005In Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 186 Or.App. 291, 297 , 63 P.3d 598 , rev. den., 335 Or. 578 , 74 P.3d 112 , cert. den., 540 U.S. 1075 , 124 S.Ct. 940 , 157 L.Ed.2d 746 (2003), the state asserted for the first time on appeal that the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim was not `ripe' because the plaintiff had failed to establish that Article I, section 18, of the state constitution did not afford it a remedy. 2005In Boise Cascade *367 Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 186 Or App 291, 297 , 63 P3d 598 , rev den, 335 Or 578 , cert den, 532 US 923 , 124 S Ct 940 , 157 L Ed 2d 746 (2003), the state asserted for the first time on appeal that the plaintiffs Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim was not ‘ripe’ because the plaintiff had failed to establish that Article I, section 18, of the state constitution did not afford it a remedy. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Caballero v. Meyers, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Rockview
green
2 sentences2005In Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 186 Or.App. 291, 297 , 63 P.3d 598 , rev. den., 335 Or. 578 , 74 P.3d 112 , cert. den., 540 U.S. 1075 , 124 S.Ct. 940 , 157 L.Ed.2d 746 (2003), the state asserted for the first time on appeal that the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim was not `ripe' because the plaintiff had failed to establish that Article I, section 18, of the state constitution did not afford it a remedy. 2005In Boise Cascade *367 Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 186 Or App 291, 297 , 63 P3d 598 , rev den, 335 Or 578 , cert den, 532 US 923 , 124 S Ct 940 , 157 L Ed 2d 746 (2003), the state asserted for the first time on appeal that the plaintiffs Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim was not ‘ripe’ because the plaintiff had failed to establish that Article I, section 18, of the state constitution did not afford it a remedy. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry
green
2 sentences2005In Boise Cascade *367 Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 186 Or App 291, 297 , 63 P3d 598 , rev den, 335 Or 578 , cert den, 532 US 923 , 124 S Ct 940 , 157 L Ed 2d 746 (2003), the state asserted for the first time on appeal that the plaintiffs Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim was not ‘ripe’ because the plaintiff had failed to establish that Article I, section 18, of the state constitution did not afford it a remedy. 2005In Boise Cascade *367 Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 186 Or App 291, 297 , 63 P3d 598 , rev den, 335 Or 578 , cert den, 532 US 923 , 124 S Ct 940 , 157 L Ed 2d 746 (2003), the state asserted for the first time on appeal that the plaintiffs Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim was not ‘ripe’ because the plaintiff had failed to establish that Article I, section 18, of the state constitution did not afford it a remedy. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Beck v. City of Portland
green
2 sentences2019App. 360 , 366, 122 P.3d 131 (2005) (quoting Coast Range Conifers v. Board of Forestry , 192 Or. 2019As used here, "ripeness" refers to " 'an aspect of the doctrine of justiciability, specifically, the requirement that there be an actual, as opposed to a hypothetical, injury to the individual invoking the judicial power.' " Beck v. City of Portland , 202 Or. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. State Ex Rel. Oregon State Board of Forestry
green
1 sentence2019App. 360 , 366, 122 P.3d 131 (2005) (quoting Coast Range Conifers v. Board of Forestry , 192 Or. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Dixon v. Regents of the University of New Mexico
green
1 sentence2005In Boise Cascade *367 Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 186 Or App 291, 297 , 63 P3d 598 , rev den, 335 Or 578 , cert den, 532 US 923 , 124 S Ct 940 , 157 L Ed 2d 746 (2003), the state asserted for the first time on appeal that the plaintiffs Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim was not ‘ripe’ because the plaintiff had failed to establish that Article I, section 18, of the state constitution did not afford it a remedy. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Davis v. Judy
green
1 sentence2005In Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 186 Or.App. 291, 297 , 63 P.3d 598 , rev. den., 335 Or. 578 , 74 P.3d 112 , cert. den., 540 U.S. 1075 , 124 S.Ct. 940 , 157 L.Ed.2d 746 (2003), the state asserted for the first time on appeal that the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claim was not `ripe' because the plaintiff had failed to establish that Article I, section 18, of the state constitution did not afford it a remedy. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
SAIF Corp. v. Allen
green
2 sentences1994The Board also awarded claimant an assessed attorney fee pursuant to ORS 656.386(1). 1 Citing our decision in SAIF v. Allen, 124 Or App 183 , 861 P2d 1018 (1993), rev allowed 318 Or 478 (1994), employer argues that, because the only aspect of the claim on which claimant prevails relates to medical services, there is no basis for an award of fees under that statute. 1994The Board also awarded claimant an assessed attorney fee pursuant to ORS 656.386(1). 1 Citing our decision in SAIF v. Allen, 124 Or App 183 , 861 P2d 1018 (1993), rev allowed 318 Or 478 (1994), employer argues that, because the only aspect of the claim on which claimant prevails relates to medical services, there is no basis for an award of fees under that statute. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Yundt v. D & D BOWL, INC.
green
2 sentences1982In that case the majority of this court, in an opinion by Bryson, J., held ( 259 Or. at 259 , 486 P.2d 553 ) that the question to be decided is whether the subject matter of the question to be decided by a jury is of such a nature that the jury is "equally qualified" to decide that question "without help from opinion testimony", or whether the subject matter of the question is of such a nature that the jury is "not equally qualified" to decide that question and "needs help to find the truth." As stated by McCormick, Evidence § 13, at 27-30 (2d ed 1972) some courts emphasize "this aspect of the 1982In that case the majority of this court, in an opinion by Bryson, J., held ( 259 Or. at 259 , 486 P.2d 553 ) that the question to be decided is whether the subject matter of the question to be decided by a jury is of such a nature that the jury is "equally qualified" to decide that question "without help from opinion testimony", or whether the subject matter of the question is of such a nature that the jury is "not equally qualified" to decide that question and "needs help to find the truth." As stated by McCormick, Evidence § 13, at 27-30 (2d ed 1972) some courts emphasize "this aspect of the | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.