aspect claim in Connecticut

2019In Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 286 , 130 A.2d 293 (1957), we recognized the distinction between immunity from suit and from liability, and held that a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity constituted a waiver of suit and provided a remedy to enforce such liability as the general law recognizes. . . . [T]he state’s waiver of its immunity from liability only arises after a prior determination that it has waived its immu- nity from suit, and that a waiver of immunity from suit does not necessarily imply a waiver of immunity from all aspects of liability. ‘‘Thus . . . the state’s sovereign

2019In Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 286 , 130 A.2d 293 (1957), we recognized the distinction between immunity from suit and from liability, and held that a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity constituted a waiver of suit and provided a remedy to enforce such liability as the general law recognizes. . . . [T]he state’s waiver of its immunity from liability only arises after a prior determination that it has waived its immu- nity from suit, and that a waiver of immunity from suit does not necessarily imply a waiver of immunity from all aspects of liability. ‘‘Thus . . . the state’s sovereign

2019Although this claim is not preserved because it was not raised to the trial court, we nevertheless review it under State v. Golding , 213 Conn. 233 , 239-40, 567 A. 2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R , 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). 9 We conclude that the trial court, under the circumstances of this case, did not violate the defendant's due process rights by failing to order, sua sponte, that his shackles be removed.

2019Although this claim is not preserved because it was not raised to the trial court, we nevertheless review it under State v. Golding , 213 Conn. 233 , 239-40, 567 A. 2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R , 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). 9 We conclude that the trial court, under the circumstances of this case, did not violate the defendant's due process rights by failing to order, sua sponte, that his shackles be removed.

2017We therefore treat this claim as abandoned." (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hampton , supra, 293 Conn. at 446 n.9, 988 A.2d 167 . 5 See Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 6 With regard to this claim, the petitioner challenged the verdicts on both of the sexual assault charges, counts seven and eight.

2017We therefore treat this claim as abandoned." (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hampton , supra, 293 Conn. at 446 n.9, 988 A.2d 167 . 5 See Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 6 With regard to this claim, the petitioner challenged the verdicts on both of the sexual assault charges, counts seven and eight.

2025The petitioner’s claim implicates Haselkamp’s advice regarding the decision to plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. ‘‘For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of the plea process, the United States Supreme Court has modified the second 10 Although we conclude in part II of this opinion that the petitioner is entitled to a new trial on the aspect of his claim in count two of the amended petition, alleging that Miller was ineffective for failing to raise the claims identified in count one, we first address the petitioner’s claim that the habeas court erred b

2025The petitioner’s claim implicates Haselkamp’s advice regarding the decision to plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. ‘‘For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of the plea process, the United States Supreme Court has modified the second 10 Although we conclude in part II of this opinion that the petitioner is entitled to a new trial on the aspect of his claim in count two of the amended petition, alleging that Miller was ineffective for failing to raise the claims identified in count one, we first address the petitioner’s claim that the habeas court erred b

2025The petitioner’s claim implicates Haselkamp’s advice regarding the decision to plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. ‘‘For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of the plea process, the United States Supreme Court has modified the second 10 Although we conclude in part II of this opinion that the petitioner is entitled to a new trial on the aspect of his claim in count two of the amended petition, alleging that Miller was ineffective for failing to raise the claims identified in count one, we first address the petitioner’s claim that the habeas court erred b

2025The petitioner’s claim implicates Haselkamp’s advice regarding the decision to plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. ‘‘For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of the plea process, the United States Supreme Court has modified the second 10 Although we conclude in part II of this opinion that the petitioner is entitled to a new trial on the aspect of his claim in count two of the amended petition, alleging that Miller was ineffective for failing to raise the claims identified in count one, we first address the petitioner’s claim that the habeas court erred b

2023Henderson v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 778, 792 , 189 A.3d 135 , cert. denied, 329 Conn. 911 , 186 A.3d 707 (2018); see Peeler v. Commissioner of Correction, 161 Conn. App. 434 , 460, 127 A.3d 1096 (2015) (‘‘[i]n determining whether the court improperly denied the petition for certification with regard to the actual innocence claim . . . it is appropriate that we limit our consideration to that narrow issue, as it is the only aspect of the claim [on] which the habeas court was asked to exercise its discretion’’).

2023Henderson v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 778, 792 , 189 A.3d 135 , cert. denied, 329 Conn. 911 , 186 A.3d 707 (2018); see Peeler v. Commissioner of Correction, 161 Conn. App. 434 , 460, 127 A.3d 1096 (2015) (‘‘[i]n determining whether the court improperly denied the petition for certification with regard to the actual innocence claim . . . it is appropriate that we limit our consideration to that narrow issue, as it is the only aspect of the claim [on] which the habeas court was asked to exercise its discretion’’).

2023Henderson v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 778, 792 , 189 A.3d 135 , cert. denied, 329 Conn. 911 , 186 A.3d 707 (2018); see Peeler v. Commissioner of Correction, 161 Conn. App. 434 , 460, 127 A.3d 1096 (2015) (‘‘[i]n determining whether the court improperly denied the petition for certification with regard to the actual innocence claim . . . it is appropriate that we limit our consideration to that narrow issue, as it is the only aspect of the claim [on] which the habeas court was asked to exercise its discretion’’).

2023Henderson v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 778, 792 , 189 A.3d 135 , cert. denied, 329 Conn. 911 , 186 A.3d 707 (2018); see Peeler v. Commissioner of Correction, 161 Conn. App. 434 , 460, 127 A.3d 1096 (2015) (‘‘[i]n determining whether the court improperly denied the petition for certification with regard to the actual innocence claim . . . it is appropriate that we limit our consideration to that narrow issue, as it is the only aspect of the claim [on] which the habeas court was asked to exercise its discretion’’).

2023Third, the defendant at oral argument before this court abandoned the aspect of his claim based on the third category of statements. 18 As an initial matter, we agree with both parties that it is immaterial whether the defendant’s one objection to the prosecutor’s use of the term ‘‘victim’’ preserved his prosecutorial impropriety claim because ‘‘under set- tled law, a defendant who fails to preserve claims of prosecutorial [impropri- ety] need not seek to prevail under the specific requirements of State v. Golding, [supra, 213 Conn. 239–40], and, similarly, it is unnecessary for a reviewing co

2023Third, the defendant at oral argument before this court abandoned the aspect of his claim based on the third category of statements. 18 As an initial matter, we agree with both parties that it is immaterial whether the defendant’s one objection to the prosecutor’s use of the term ‘‘victim’’ preserved his prosecutorial impropriety claim because ‘‘under set- tled law, a defendant who fails to preserve claims of prosecutorial [impropri- ety] need not seek to prevail under the specific requirements of State v. Golding, [supra, 213 Conn. 239–40], and, similarly, it is unnecessary for a reviewing co

2023Third, the defendant at oral argument before this court abandoned the aspect of his claim based on the third category of statements. 18 As an initial matter, we agree with both parties that it is immaterial whether the defendant’s one objection to the prosecutor’s use of the term ‘‘victim’’ preserved his prosecutorial impropriety claim because ‘‘under set- tled law, a defendant who fails to preserve claims of prosecutorial [impropri- ety] need not seek to prevail under the specific requirements of State v. Golding, [supra, 213 Conn. 239–40], and, similarly, it is unnecessary for a reviewing co

2017It does not appear that the latter aspect of the claim raised on appeal, which is not based upon the state's failure to disclose information concerning Ortiz, but rather on the state's failure to correct allegedly perjured testimony given by Ortiz under Napue v. Illinois , supra, 360 U.S. 264 , 79 S.Ct. 1173 , was distinctly raised before the habeas court or that the court considered this claim in denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

2017It does not appear that the latter aspect of the claim raised on appeal, which is not based upon the state's failure to disclose information concerning Ortiz, but rather on the state's failure to correct allegedly perjured testimony given by Ortiz under Napue v. Illinois , supra, 360 U.S. 264 , 79 S.Ct. 1173 , was distinctly raised before the habeas court or that the court considered this claim in denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

2017We therefore treat this claim as abandoned." (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hampton , supra, 293 Conn. at 446 n.9, 988 A.2d 167 . 5 See Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 6 With regard to this claim, the petitioner challenged the verdicts on both of the sexual assault charges, counts seven and eight.

2017We therefore treat this claim as abandoned." (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hampton , supra, 293 Conn. at 446 n.9, 988 A.2d 167 . 5 See Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 6 With regard to this claim, the petitioner challenged the verdicts on both of the sexual assault charges, counts seven and eight.

2016Citing Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 304 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , and State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474 , 484, 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S.Ct. 397 , 83 L.Ed.2d 331 (1984), the court also noted that, in the purely constitutional context "arising out of failure to give a 'no adverse inference' instruction, we expressly reserved the question whether noncompliance with so central an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination could ever be considered harmless error." State v. Sinclair, supra, 197 Conn. at 585 , 500 A.2d 539 .

2016Citing Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 304 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , and State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474 , 484, 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S.Ct. 397 , 83 L.Ed.2d 331 (1984), the court also noted that, in the purely constitutional context "arising out of failure to give a 'no adverse inference' instruction, we expressly reserved the question whether noncompliance with so central an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination could ever be considered harmless error." State v. Sinclair, supra, 197 Conn. at 585 , 500 A.2d 539 .

2016Citing Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 304 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , and State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474 , 484, 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S.Ct. 397 , 83 L.Ed.2d 331 (1984), the court also noted that, in the purely constitutional context "arising out of failure to give a 'no adverse inference' instruction, we expressly reserved the question whether noncompliance with so central an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination could ever be considered harmless error." State v. Sinclair, supra, 197 Conn. at 585 , 500 A.2d 539 .

2016Citing Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 304 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , and State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474 , 484, 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S.Ct. 397 , 83 L.Ed.2d 331 (1984), the court also noted that, in the purely constitutional context "arising out of failure to give a 'no adverse inference' instruction, we expressly reserved the question whether noncompliance with so central an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination could ever be considered harmless error." State v. Sinclair, supra, 197 Conn. at 585 , 500 A.2d 539 .

2016Citing Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 304 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , and State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474 , 484, 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S.Ct. 397 , 83 L.Ed.2d 331 (1984), the court also noted that, in the purely constitutional context "arising out of failure to give a 'no adverse inference' instruction, we expressly reserved the question whether noncompliance with so central an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination could ever be considered harmless error." State v. Sinclair, supra, 197 Conn. at 585 , 500 A.2d 539 .

2016Citing Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 304 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , and State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474 , 484, 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S.Ct. 397 , 83 L.Ed.2d 331 (1984), the court also noted that, in the purely constitutional context "arising out of failure to give a 'no adverse inference' instruction, we expressly reserved the question whether noncompliance with so central an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination could ever be considered harmless error." State v. Sinclair, supra, 197 Conn. at 585 , 500 A.2d 539 .

2016Citing Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 304 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , and State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474 , 484, 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S.Ct. 397 , 83 L.Ed.2d 331 (1984), the court also noted that, in the purely constitutional context "arising out of failure to give a 'no adverse inference' instruction, we expressly reserved the question whether noncompliance with so central an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination could ever be considered harmless error." State v. Sinclair, supra, 197 Conn. at 585 , 500 A.2d 539 .

2016Citing Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 304 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , and State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474 , 484, 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S.Ct. 397 , 83 L.Ed.2d 331 (1984), the court also noted that, in the purely constitutional context "arising out of failure to give a 'no adverse inference' instruction, we expressly reserved the question whether noncompliance with so central an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination could ever be considered harmless error." State v. Sinclair, supra, 197 Conn. at 585 , 500 A.2d 539 .

2016Citing Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 304 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , and State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474 , 484, 479 A.2d 763 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 , 105 S.Ct. 397 , 83 L.Ed.2d 331 (1984), the court also noted that, in the purely constitutional context "arising out of failure to give a 'no adverse inference' instruction, we expressly reserved the question whether noncompliance with so central an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination could ever be considered harmless error." State v. Sinclair, supra, 197 Conn. at 585 , 500 A.2d 539 .

2011The lease permits the plaintiff to store materials outside of buildings. 6 The court ordered that a hearing be scheduled to address the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. 7 In support of this aspect of its claim, the plaintiff contends that “[wjhere ... a plaintiff shows that it is likely to succeed on the merits of a CUTPA claim, it need not show irreparable harm.” In support of its contention, the plaintiff cites Dept. of Transportation v. Pacitti, 43 Conn. App. 52, 58 , 682 A.2d 136 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937 , 684 A.2d 707 (1996). “[T]he enactment of the statute by implication assumes

2011The lease permits the plaintiff to store materials outside of buildings. 6 The court ordered that a hearing be scheduled to address the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. 7 In support of this aspect of its claim, the plaintiff contends that “[wjhere ... a plaintiff shows that it is likely to succeed on the merits of a CUTPA claim, it need not show irreparable harm.” In support of its contention, the plaintiff cites Dept. of Transportation v. Pacitti, 43 Conn. App. 52, 58 , 682 A.2d 136 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937 , 684 A.2d 707 (1996). “[T]he enactment of the statute by implication assumes

2011The lease permits the plaintiff to store materials outside of buildings. 6 The court ordered that a hearing be scheduled to address the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. 7 In support of this aspect of its claim, the plaintiff contends that “[wjhere ... a plaintiff shows that it is likely to succeed on the merits of a CUTPA claim, it need not show irreparable harm.” In support of its contention, the plaintiff cites Dept. of Transportation v. Pacitti, 43 Conn. App. 52, 58 , 682 A.2d 136 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937 , 684 A.2d 707 (1996). “[T]he enactment of the statute by implication assumes

2011The lease permits the plaintiff to store materials outside of buildings. 6 The court ordered that a hearing be scheduled to address the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. 7 In support of this aspect of its claim, the plaintiff contends that “[wjhere ... a plaintiff shows that it is likely to succeed on the merits of a CUTPA claim, it need not show irreparable harm.” In support of its contention, the plaintiff cites Dept. of Transportation v. Pacitti, 43 Conn. App. 52, 58 , 682 A.2d 136 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937 , 684 A.2d 707 (1996). “[T]he enactment of the statute by implication assumes

2011The lease permits the plaintiff to store materials outside of buildings. 6 The court ordered that a hearing be scheduled to address the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. 7 In support of this aspect of its claim, the plaintiff contends that “[wjhere ... a plaintiff shows that it is likely to succeed on the merits of a CUTPA claim, it need not show irreparable harm.” In support of its contention, the plaintiff cites Dept. of Transportation v. Pacitti, 43 Conn. App. 52, 58 , 682 A.2d 136 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937 , 684 A.2d 707 (1996). “[T]he enactment of the statute by implication assumes

2011The lease permits the plaintiff to store materials outside of buildings. 6 The court ordered that a hearing be scheduled to address the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. 7 In support of this aspect of its claim, the plaintiff contends that “[wjhere ... a plaintiff shows that it is likely to succeed on the merits of a CUTPA claim, it need not show irreparable harm.” In support of its contention, the plaintiff cites Dept. of Transportation v. Pacitti, 43 Conn. App. 52, 58 , 682 A.2d 136 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937 , 684 A.2d 707 (1996). “[T]he enactment of the statute by implication assumes

2011The lease permits the plaintiff to store materials outside of buildings. 6 The court ordered that a hearing be scheduled to address the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. 7 In support of this aspect of its claim, the plaintiff contends that “[wjhere ... a plaintiff shows that it is likely to succeed on the merits of a CUTPA claim, it need not show irreparable harm.” In support of its contention, the plaintiff cites Dept. of Transportation v. Pacitti, 43 Conn. App. 52, 58 , 682 A.2d 136 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937 , 684 A.2d 707 (1996). “[T]he enactment of the statute by implication assumes

2009Accordingly, we deem this aspect of the claim to be preserved. [14] In connection with his challenge to the court's instruction on reasonable doubt, the defendant also argues: "The majority of the reasonable doubt instruction in the present case has been upheld in recent appeals; see State v. Davis, 283 Conn. 280 , 929 A.2d 278 (2007); State v. Jackson, 283 Conn. 111 , 925 A.2d 1060 (2007); however, for the purposes of federal review, the defendant submits [that] those decisions were wrongly decided and that the challenged language infringes on his federal constitutional protections." Absent a

2009Accordingly, we deem this aspect of the claim to be preserved. [14] In connection with his challenge to the court's instruction on reasonable doubt, the defendant also argues: "The majority of the reasonable doubt instruction in the present case has been upheld in recent appeals; see State v. Davis, 283 Conn. 280 , 929 A.2d 278 (2007); State v. Jackson, 283 Conn. 111 , 925 A.2d 1060 (2007); however, for the purposes of federal review, the defendant submits [that] those decisions were wrongly decided and that the challenged language infringes on his federal constitutional protections." Absent a