Robinson motion in Georgia

2015To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Robinson must prove both prongs of the test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695-696 (III) (B) ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

2015To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Robinson must prove both prongs of the test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695-696 (III) (B) ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

2015Robinson’s citation to Maxwell v. State, 282 Ga. 22, 25-26 (2) (a) ( 644 SE2d 822 ) (2007) does not warrant a different result.

2015Robinson’s citation to Maxwell v. State, 282 Ga. 22, 25-26 (2) (a) ( 644 SE2d 822 ) (2007) does not warrant a different result.

2015On the contrary, he testified on the basis of his own examinations and observations. 6 See Division 3, supra. 12 It follows that, even if trial counsel can be faulted for failing to discover that Felix examined Robinson’s test-fires, Felix’s testimony would have been admitted in evidence, see Hanson v. State, 263 Ga. at 47-48, and the outcome of the trial would not have been different. 5.

2015It follows that, even if trial counsel can be faulted for failing to discover that Felix examined Robinson’s test-fires, Felix’s testimony would have been admitted in evidence, see Hanson v. State, 263 Ga. at 47-48, and the outcome of the trial would not have been different.

2024We analyze this case under the well-established body of law applicable to slip- and-fall or trip-and-fall actions. “[T]o recover for injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall action, an invitee must prove (1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2) that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or conditions within the control of the owner/occupier.” Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748-749 (2) (b) ( 493 SE2d 403 ) (1997). 4 Because SMG does not claim that it lacked knowledge of the hazard in this ca

2024We analyze this case under the well-established body of law applicable to slip- and-fall or trip-and-fall actions. “[T]o recover for injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall action, an invitee must prove (1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2) that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or conditions within the control of the owner/occupier.” Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748-749 (2) (b) ( 493 SE2d 403 ) (1997). 4 Because SMG does not claim that it lacked knowledge of the hazard in this ca

2018At the hearing on Robinson's motion for new trial, his trial counsel testified that his theory of the case was that Robinson was not an accomplice, and his defense was to distance himself from Linley and Wise, so an instruction "may have not even been necessary." See generally Manner v. State , 302 Ga. 877 , 808 S.E.2d 681 , 687-688 (II) (A) (2017) (decision to forego charge on corroboration not objectively unreasonable when charge in conflict with defense theory that defendant was not accomplice and uninvolved in crime).

2018At the hearing on Robinson's motion for new trial, his trial counsel testified that his theory of the case was that Robinson was not an accomplice, and his defense was to distance himself from Linley and Wise, so an instruction "may have not even been necessary." See generally Manner v. State , 302 Ga. 877 , 808 S.E.2d 681 , 687-688 (II) (A) (2017) (decision to forego charge on corroboration not objectively unreasonable when charge in conflict with defense theory that defendant was not accomplice and uninvolved in crime).

2026Id. at 1319-20 (III). 4 Robinson’s brief in support of her motion to remand filed in the federal court has not been included in the appellate record before this Court.

2026See Cook v. Campbell-Cook, 349 Ga. App. 325, 328 (1) ( 826 SE2d 155 ) (2019) (affirming attorney fees award under OCGA § 9-15- 14, where the trial court made express findings of fact as to the statutory basis for the award).13 4.

2026See Cook v. Campbell-Cook, 349 Ga. App. 325, 328 (1) ( 826 SE2d 155 ) (2019) (affirming attorney fees award under OCGA § 9-15- 14, where the trial court made express findings of fact as to the statutory basis for the award).13 4.

2024As Justice Pinson has explained, an invitee cannot recover if she “either (a) knew about the hazard and intentionally disregarded it, or (b) could have discovered and avoided the hazard if she had exercised ordinary care for her own safety. . . .” Givens v. Coral Hospitality–GA, 317 Ga. 282 ( 892 SE2d 782 ) (2023) (Pinson, J., concurring) (citing American Multi- Cinema v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442, 445 (2) ( 679 SE2d 25 ) (2009)).

2024As Justice Pinson has explained, an invitee cannot recover if she “either (a) knew about the hazard and intentionally disregarded it, or (b) could have discovered and avoided the hazard if she had exercised ordinary care for her own safety. . . .” Givens v. Coral Hospitality–GA, 317 Ga. 282 ( 892 SE2d 782 ) (2023) (Pinson, J., concurring) (citing American Multi- Cinema v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442, 445 (2) ( 679 SE2d 25 ) (2009)).

2023So in response to Robinson’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity, Griffith “had the burden of establishing a waiver of sovereign immunity.” Bartow County v. Southern Dev., III, 325 Ga. App. 879, 882 (1) ( 756 SE2d 11 ) (2014) (citation omitted).

2023So in response to Robinson’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity, Griffith “had the burden of establishing a waiver of sovereign immunity.” Bartow County v. Southern Dev., III, 325 Ga. App. 879, 882 (1) ( 756 SE2d 11 ) (2014) (citation omitted).

2021Shortly thereafter, during the final jury charge, the trial court instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct, reckless conduct, malice murder, felony murder, 15 aggravated assault, armed robbery, and intent, and again instructed the jury not to concern itself with sentencing. “[W]e presume that jurors follow the law.” (Citations omitted.) Venturino v. State, 306 Ga. 391, 400 (4) (830 SE2d 110) (2019).

2021Shortly thereafter, during the final jury charge, the trial court instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct, reckless conduct, malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and intent, and again instructed the jury not to concern itself with sentencing. “[W]e presume that 15 jurors follow the law.” Venturino v. State, 306 Ga. 391, 400 (4) ( 830 SE2d 110 ) (2019).

2020When asked if the substance was readily visible or discernable, the Ingles employee replied, “No[.]” Robinson rule that to avoid summary judgment, “[plantiff] had to show: (1) that [defendant] had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance, and (2) that [plantiff] was without knowledge of it or for some reason attributable to [defendant] was prevented from discovering the foreign substance.” Williams, 226 Ga. App. at 657 (1).

2019See Ringold v. State, 304 Ga. 875, 880 ( 823 SE2d 342 ) (2019) (“For a defendant who did not receive his first appeal of right because of his counsel’s ineffective assistance, the remedy is an out-of-time appeal.”).4 Accordingly, because Robinson’s motion-for-new-trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are procedurally barred or otherwise remedied, his claims of ineffective assistance of motion-for-new-trial counsel also fail.5 Judgment affirmed.

2019See Ringold v. State, 304 Ga. 875, 880 ( 823 SE2d 342 ) (2019) (“For a defendant who did not receive his first appeal of right because of his counsel’s ineffective assistance, the remedy is an out-of-time appeal.”).4 Accordingly, because Robinson’s motion-for-new-trial counsel ineffectiveness claims are procedurally barred or otherwise remedied, his claims of ineffective assistance of motion-for-new-trial counsel also fail.5 Judgment affirmed.

2018(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lyman v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 322 (3) (a) ( 800 SE2d 333 ) (2017). “[T]here is no general duty on the part of defense counsel to anticipate changes in the law, and only in a rare case would it be ineffective assistance by a trial attorney not to make an objection that would be overruled under prevailing law.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 321 4 At the hearing on Robinson’s motion for new trial, his trial counsel testified that his theory of the case was that Robinson was not an accomplice, and his defense was to distance himself from Linley and

2018(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lyman v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 322 (3) (a) ( 800 SE2d 333 ) (2017). “[T]here is no general duty on the part of defense counsel to anticipate changes in the law, and only in a rare case would it be ineffective assistance by a trial attorney not to make an objection that would be overruled under prevailing law.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 321 4 At the hearing on Robinson’s motion for new trial, his trial counsel testified that his theory of the case was that Robinson was not an accomplice, and his defense was to distance himself from Linley and

2017As to the second prong of the Robinson test, we are authorized to reverse a denial of summary judgment to the defendant only when “the record shows plainly, palpably and without dispute that plaintiff had knowledge of the hazard equal or superior to that of defendants or would have had equal or superior knowledge had the plaintiff exercised ordinary care for personal safety” Callaway Gardens Resort v. Bierman, 290 Ga. App. 111, 112 ( 658 SE2d 895 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2017As to the second prong of the Robinson test, we are authorized to reverse a denial of summary judgment to the defendant only when “the record shows plainly, palpably and without dispute that plaintiff had knowledge of the hazard equal or superior to that of defendants or would have had equal or superior knowledge had the plaintiff exercised ordinary care for personal safety” Callaway Gardens Resort v. Bierman, 290 Ga. App. 111, 112 ( 658 SE2d 895 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2017When a plaintiff’s suit involves a static condition such as the ramp at issue here, and when “[the] invitee knows of the condition or hazard[,] there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does.” Callaway Gardens, 209 Ga. App. at 112, quoting Powell v. Woodridge Condo.

2017When a plaintiff’s suit involves a static condition such as the ramp at issue here, and when “[the] invitee knows of the condition or hazard[,] there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does.” Callaway Gardens, 209 Ga. App. at 112, quoting Powell v. Woodridge Condo.

2015“In the absence of any Fourth Amendment violation by [the officers] during the arrest, there is no basis for [Robinson’s] claim against [MARTA] under 42 USC § 19&3.” Kline v. KDB, Inc., 295 Ga. App. at 795 (3). 2 See also Bontwell v. Dept. of Corrections, 226 Ga. App. 524, 528-529 (5) ( 486 SE2d 917 ) (1997).

2015“In the absence of any Fourth Amendment violation by [the officers] during the arrest, there is no basis for [Robinson’s] claim against [MARTA] under 42 USC § 19&3.” Kline v. KDB, Inc., 295 Ga. App. at 795 (3). 2 See also Bontwell v. Dept. of Corrections, 226 Ga. App. 524, 528-529 (5) ( 486 SE2d 917 ) (1997).

2011Aguilera, supra, 293 Ga. App. at 525 (1). (d) Robinson argues that it was error to allow the State, over Robinson’s objection, to impeach him with his prior bail-jumping conviction.

2011Aguilera, supra, 293 Ga. App. at 525 (1). (d) Robinson argues that it was error to allow the State, over Robinson’s objection, to impeach him with his prior bail-jumping conviction.

2011Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Robinson’s motion for mistrial. (c) Robinson argues that it was error for the trial court to give *748 the State’s requested jury instruction on “deliberate ignorance.” “It is well established that in reviewing an allegedly erroneous jury instruction, we apply the plain legal error standard of review.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Judice v. State, 308 Ga. App. 229, 232 (3) ( 707 SE2d 114 ) (2011).

2011See Taylor, supra, 259 Ga. App. at 461 (2). 3.

2011See Taylor, supra, 259 Ga. App. at 461 (2). 3.

2011A trial court’s finding of the admissibility of prior convictions “is subject to scrutiny for harmless error and a new trial is not automatically required.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lawrence v. State, 305 Ga. App. 199, 203 (3) ( 699 SE2d 406 ) (2010).

2011A trial court’s finding of the admissibility of prior convictions “is subject to scrutiny for harmless error and a new trial is not automatically required.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lawrence v. State, 305 Ga. App. 199, 203 (3) ( 699 SE2d 406 ) (2010).

2010Ononye v. Ezeofor, 287 Ga. 201, 202 (2) ( 695 SE2d 234 ) (2010). 4 Judge McCorvey had originally issued an order, on June 26, 2006, which purported to grant a “writ of partition pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-160,” but the order of July 21, 2006, expressly deleted the language regarding the grant of partitioning, and in lieu thereof, granted Robinson only standing to seek partitioning of the subject property. 5 The order also stated that the previous ruling purporting to authorize partitioning was in error. 6 In fact, the only express mention of the necessity of equitable partitioning is found in Rob

2010Ononye v. Ezeofor, 287 Ga. 201, 202 (2) ( 695 SE2d 234 ) (2010). 4 Judge McCorvey had originally issued an order, on June 26, 2006, which purported to grant a “writ of partition pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-160,” but the order of July 21, 2006, expressly deleted the language regarding the grant of partitioning, and in lieu thereof, granted Robinson only standing to seek partitioning of the subject property. 5 The order also stated that the previous ruling purporting to authorize partitioning was in error. 6 In fact, the only express mention of the necessity of equitable partitioning is found in Rob