Robinson motion in Alabama

2011Later that same day, defense counsel submitted to the trial court a copy of the United States Supreme Court opinion in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). 1 The case-action summary contains the following entry dated July 21, 2010: “Order Grant Mo To Dismiss.” (C. 3.) The record also contains a copy of Robinson’s motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial, with what appears to be a stamp indicating that the motion was granted and bearing a line for the date and the trial judge’s name; the corresponding *691 lines in the stamped area con

2011Later that same day, defense counsel submitted to the trial court a copy of the United States Supreme Court opinion in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). 1 The case-action summary contains the following entry dated July 21, 2010: “Order Grant Mo To Dismiss.” (C. 3.) The record also contains a copy of Robinson’s motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial, with what appears to be a stamp indicating that the motion was granted and bearing a line for the date and the trial judge’s name; the corresponding *691 lines in the stamped area con

2011(C. 30.) The record does not affirmatively indicate that the trial court weighed each of the factors as required by Barker, supra. See also Ex parte Walker, supra. Therefore, we remand this case for the trial court to make specific, written findings of fact as to each Barker factor with reference to the principles set forth by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Walker, supra. See generally Parris v. State, 885 So.2d 813 (Ala.Crim.App.2001).

2011(C. 30.) The record does not affirmatively indicate that the trial court weighed each of the factors as required by Barker, supra. See also Ex parte Walker, supra. Therefore, we remand this case for the trial court to make specific, written findings of fact as to each Barker factor with reference to the principles set forth by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Walker, supra. See generally Parris v. State, 885 So.2d 813 (Ala.Crim.App.2001).

2011In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court set forth the following factors that must be weighed when reviewing a speedy-trial claim: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the accused’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the degree of prejudice the accused suffered due to the delay.

2011In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court set forth the following factors that must be weighed when reviewing a speedy-trial claim: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the accused’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the degree of prejudice the accused suffered due to the delay.

2011(C. 30.) The record does not affirmatively indicate that the trial court weighed each of the factors as required by Barker, supra. See also Ex parte Walker, supra. Therefore, we remand this case for the trial court to make specific, written findings of fact as to each Barker factor with reference to the principles set forth by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Walker, supra. See generally Parris v. State, 885 So.2d 813 (Ala.Crim.App.2001).

2003We recognize that "[a] direct and substantial promise to drop other cases against the defendant is sufficient to require exclusion of a confession obtained by that promise." Rutledge v. State , 651 So.2d 1141 , 1144 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994).

2001Robinson's motion was granted, without a hearing, on July 6, 1999." 776 So.2d at 33 .

2001Robinson's motion was granted, without a hearing, on July 6, 1999." 776 So.2d at 33 .

1999Just as former cases setting forth the appropriate standard for reviewing a judgment entered on a directed verdict are authoritative with respect to a judgment as a matter of law in a jury case ( see Glenlakes Realty , 721 So.2d at 177 ), precedents addressing the effect of involuntary dismissals under former Rule 41(b) should be equally applicable to judgments entered on partial findings pursuant to Rule 52(c), Ala.R.Civ.P.

1999However, because the trial court could, under Feaster , 410 So.2d at 402 , "weigh and consider the evidence" on Robinson's motion, the resolution of this "conflicting evidence" was for the trial court.

1992Because malice may be inferred from a lack of probable cause, Kitchens v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 456 So.2d 45 (Ala.1984), the question with regard to the appropriateness of the summary judgment is whether McPherson had probable cause to bring a charge of reckless endangerment.

1969Nothing in Simpson v. Rice, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 , supports Robinson’s claim of error, even if this case were adjudged by Federal habeas corpus standards.

1969Nothing in Simpson v. Rice, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 , supports Robinson’s claim of error, even if this case were adjudged by Federal habeas corpus standards.

1881In Loeb v. Peters, 63 Ala. 243 , the consideration of the purchase was a credit for the amount on a pre existing indebtedness from the seller to the buyer, by account.