23 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Robinson v. Stategreen2 sentences2019When a sentencing order sets forth days spent in presentence confinement but fails to mention credit time earned, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted the following appellate presumption: such an order “shall be understood by courts and by the Department of Correction automatically to award the number of credit time days equal to the number of pre-sentence confinement days.” Id. [19] A panel of this Court applied the Robinson presumption in Pettiford v. State, 808 N.E.2d 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 2019When a sentencing order sets forth days spent in presentence confinement but fails to mention credit time earned, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted the following appellate presumption: such an order “shall be understood by courts and by the Department of Correction automatically to award the number of credit time days equal to the number of pre-sentence confinement days.” Id. [19] A panel of this Court applied the Robinson presumption in Pettiford v. State, 808 N.E.2d 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). | 1 | 4 |
Pettiford v. Stategreen2 sentences2019When a sentencing order sets forth days spent in presentence confinement but fails to mention credit time earned, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted the following appellate presumption: such an order “shall be understood by courts and by the Department of Correction automatically to award the number of credit time days equal to the number of pre-sentence confinement days.” Id. [19] A panel of this Court applied the Robinson presumption in Pettiford v. State, 808 N.E.2d 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 2019When a sentencing order sets forth days spent in presentence confinement but fails to mention credit time earned, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted the following appellate presumption: such an order “shall be understood by courts and by the Department of Correction automatically to award the number of credit time days equal to the number of pre-sentence confinement days.” Id. [19] A panel of this Court applied the Robinson presumption in Pettiford v. State, 808 N.E.2d 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). | 1 | 2 |
Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Kianggreen1 sentence2023See Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that the proximity in time of the historical facts alleged in the affidavit to the matter concerning the motion for a change of judge is a relevant inquiry). [33] Lastly, we restate Robinson’s third argument as whether the post-conviction court clearly erred in denying Robinson’s motion for a change of judge because Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023 Page 24 of 26 the post-conviction court judge’s 1992-2003 marriage to Cappelletti supports a rational inference of bias or | 1 | 1 |
Pruitt v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 939 (explaining that where Pruitt’s post-conviction court judge was the same judge who had presided over his trial and where Pruitt’s affidavit in support of his motion for a change of judge had shown no historical facts that had demonstrated personal bias on the part of the post-conviction court judge, Pruitt had been provided with a full and fair post-conviction relief hearing before an impartial judge). [35] Affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
Garland v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See Garland, 788 N.E.2d at 433 . | 1 | 1 |
Calvert v. Stategreen1 sentence2023In Calvert v. State, 498 N.E.2d 105, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), this Court concluded “that a trial judge must disqualify [her]self from a proceeding in which [s]he has actively served as an attorney for one of the parties regardless of whether actual bias or prejudice exists.” Here, there is no allegation that the post-conviction court judge actively served as a deputy prosecutor on Robinson’s case. | 1 | 1 |
Kingery v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Robinson’s motion to strike the police report, we can provide no relief on Robinson’s invited error. “‘A party may not invite error, then later argue that the error supports reversal, because error invited by the complaining party is not reversible error.’” Booher v. State, 773 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1710-CT-2441 | December 31, 2018 Page 18 of 46 N.E.2d 814 , 822 (Ind. 2002) (citing Ellis v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 803 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Kingery v. State, 659 N.E.2d 490, 494 ( | 1 | 1 |
Sidener v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1052 | December 12, 2018 Page 7 of 9 457 N.E.2d 600, 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Sidener v. State, 446 N.E.2d 965, 966 (Ind. 1983)) (“It is well-settled in Indiana that a defendant who chooses to proceed pro se will not be given special consideration and cannot later complain of his lack of the assistance of counsel.”).4 The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Robinson’s motion to correct erroneous sentence. | 1 | 1 |
Funk v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See I.C. § 35-38-1-15; Funk v. State, 714 N.E.2d 746, 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied. 2018See I.C. § 35-38-1-15; Funk v. State, 714 N.E.2d 746, 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Ellis v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Robinson’s motion to strike the police report, we can provide no relief on Robinson’s invited error. “‘A party may not invite error, then later argue that the error supports reversal, because error invited by the complaining party is not reversible error.’” Booher v. State, 773 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1710-CT-2441 | December 31, 2018 Page 18 of 46 N.E.2d 814 , 822 (Ind. 2002) (citing Ellis v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 803 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Kingery v. State, 659 N.E.2d 490, 494 ( | 1 | 1 |
Dack v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1052 | December 12, 2018 Page 7 of 9 457 N.E.2d 600, 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Sidener v. State, 446 N.E.2d 965, 966 (Ind. 1983)) (“It is well-settled in Indiana that a defendant who chooses to proceed pro se will not be given special consideration and cannot later complain of his lack of the assistance of counsel.”).4 The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Robinson’s motion to correct erroneous sentence. | 1 | 1 |
Jeffrey M. Miller and Cynthia S. Miller v. Central Indiana Community Foundation, Inc., and Brian Paynegreen1 sentence2018See Miller, 11 N.E.3d at 956 (“When specific statements that are alleged to be defamatory have not been sufficiently identified in a plaintiff’s complaint, an award of summary judgment for the defendant is proper.”). | 1 | 1 |
Perez v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Plea agreements “are in the nature of contracts entered into between the defendant and the [S]tate.” Perez v. State, 866 N.E.2d 817, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
In re Carrgreen1 sentence2017Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A04-1511-CR-2040 | January 17, 2017 Page 5 of 10 found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. 2013) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Diaz v. Stategreen2 sentences2014In Diaz v. State, 753 N.E.2d 724 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), this court for the first time construed the phrase “pattern consistent with rehabilitation” and held that, “[g]iven that a pattern is a mainly unvarying routine, and the statute is designed to reward good behavior, ... demonstrating a ‘pattern consistent with rehabilitation’ ... means, at the least that the inmate’s record must remain free of disciplinary convictions while the inmate is participating in an educational ... program.” Id. at 729 (emphasis added). 2014In Diaz v. State, 753 N.E.2d 724 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), this court for the first time construed the phrase “pattern consistent with rehabilitation” and held that, “[g]iven that a pattern is a mainly unvarying routine, and the statute is designed to reward good behavior, ... demonstrating a ‘pattern consistent with rehabilitation’ ... means, at the least that the inmate’s record must remain free of disciplinary convictions while the inmate is participating in an educational ... program.” Id. at 729 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCaagreen1 sentence2014Citing State v. McCaa, 963 N.E.2d 24, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop when the defendant drove “slowly and off of the roadway twice”), the trial court stated it “reviewed the video on approximately ten occasions and cannot conclude from the video that the defendant’s vehicle actually left the roadway . . . but it does show the vehicle veering on two occasions onto 2 Ind. Code § 9-24-19-2 (2010 & Supp. 2013). 3 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11 (1) (2008 & Supp. 2013). 4 Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2 (b) (2010). 5 Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1 (a)(2) (2010). 3 the white fog line.” A | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gastongreen1 sentence2014Citing State v. McCaa, 968 N.E.2d 24, 31 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012) (finding reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop when the defendant drove “slowly and off of the roadway twice”), the trial court stated it “reviewed the video on approximately ten occasions and cannot conclude from the video that the defendant’s vehicle actually left the roadway ... but it does show the vehicle veering on two occasions onto the white fog line.” App. at 33. | 1 | 1 |
Troxel v. Troxelgreen1 sentence2012See Troxel v. Troxel, 5 737 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ind. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Conn v. Stategreen1 sentence2007Conn v. State, 831 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Reese v. Reesegreen2 sentences2003See Reese v. Reese, 696 N.E.2d 460, 462 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). 2003See Reese v. Reese, 696 N.E.2d 460, 462 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Bouvean
green
1 sentence2018Id. [15] Turning to Robinson’s challenge to the admission of Detective Hendricks’ direct examination testimony, we conclude that he has failed to meet his burden of showing fundamental error. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Buchanan v. State
green
1 sentence2017“Prima facie means at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. [7] The State contends that Robinson’s plea agreement waived his right to appeal. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Richardson v. State
green
1 sentence2005In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999), our supreme court outlined the two-part test for whether two convictions violate Indiana's double jeopardy provision. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Campbell v. State
green
1 sentence2003The State relies on Campbell v. State, 714 N.E.2d 678 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) for this contention. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Robinson v. State
green
2 sentences2003Id. at 967 . 2003Id. at 967 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Faceson v. State
green
1 sentence2002In arguing his trial counsel’s performance prejudiced his defense, Robinson cites Faceson v. State, 642 N.E.2d 985 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), which held that the trial court committed reversible error when it gave the jury additional instructions on the definitions of “dealing,” “intent,” “delivery,” and “possession.” Robinson argues that his defense was prejudiced because courts have previously held that giving supplemental instructions to a jury is reversible error. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2000We recognize that Robinson’s claim is similar to that of the petitioner in Harrison v. State, 707 *637 N.E.2d 767 (Ind.1999) (an appeal of the denial ,of post-conviction relief). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Robinson v. Anderson
neutral
2 sentences1996The Supreme Court held that invalidity of the verdict for Anderson upon Robinson’s claim for payment was “clear beyond any question.” 106 Ind. at 155 , 6 N.E. at 14 . 1996The Supreme Court held that invalidity of the verdict for Anderson upon Robinson’s claim for payment was “clear beyond any question.” 106 Ind. at 155 , 6 N.E. at 14 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. LENOX
green
2 sentences1979In State v. Lenox, (1968) 250 Ind. 482 , 237 N.E.2d 248 , the appellant argued that the trial court erred in not striking the testimony of a certain witness. 1979In State v. Lenox, (1968) 250 Ind. 482 , 237 N.E.2d 248 , the appellant argued that the trial court erred in not striking the testimony of a certain witness. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.