Robinson factors in Texas

2021Indeed, in Gammill, the Supreme Court recognized that the Robinson factors may not apply to certain testimony.10 See 972 S.W.2d at 720, 726 (recognizing 10 Appellees advocate that we evaluate the reliability of psychiatric expert testimony or “soft” science testimony based upon the Court of Criminal Appeals’ Nenno factors, rather than 28 that Robinson factors did not apply to the mechanical engineer expert under consideration even though his claimed expertise was scientific in nature).

2021Indeed, in Gammill, the Supreme Court recognized that the Robinson factors may not apply to certain testimony.10 See 972 S.W.2d at 720, 726 (recognizing 10 Appellees advocate that we evaluate the reliability of psychiatric expert testimony or “soft” science testimony based upon the Court of Criminal Appeals’ Nenno factors, rather than 28 that Robinson factors did not apply to the mechanical engineer expert under consideration even though his claimed expertise was scientific in nature).

2022Expert testimony is reliable if it meets the six non-exclusive Robinson factors, see id. at 557 , or if the trial court can otherwise confirm its reliability, Innovative Block of S. Tex., Ltd. v. Valley Builders Supply, Inc., 603 S.W.3d 409 , 422 (Tex. 2020).

2021However, Robinson’s analysis—on its face—is limited to scientific expert evidence and the methodology necessary to establish that scientific evidence is reliable. 923 S.W.2d at 557 (“[T]he underlying scientific technique or principle must be reliable.

2015Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 709 . “pass[ ] muster” under a trial court Robinson objection—“to present the best evidence available”—before an appellate [21] Nevertheless, the dissent would hold that Maritime's court considers whether legally sufficient evidence supports decision to argue the weight of both parties' experts' testimony a judgment.

2011Havner , 953 S.W.2d at 718 . [20] The Robinson factors include: (1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested, (2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert, (3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication, (4) the technique’s potential rate of error, (5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community, and (6) the nonjudicial uses that have been made of the theory or technique.

2015When the testimony involves scientific 56. knowledge, the expert's conclusions must be “grounded ‘in the methods and procedures of science.’ ” Robinson, Mack argues that the court of appeals' analysis is flawed. 923 S.W.2d at 557 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Mack urges that Elwell's inability to demonstrate at least one Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 of the Robinson factors, coupled with his inability to eliminate L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)).

2015When the testimony involves scientific 56. knowledge, the expert's conclusions must be “grounded ‘in the methods and procedures of science.’ ” Robinson, Mack argues that the court of appeals' analysis is flawed. 923 S.W.2d at 557 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Mack urges that Elwell's inability to demonstrate at least one Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 of the Robinson factors, coupled with his inability to eliminate L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)).

2013But while the court’s “criteria for assessing reliability must vary depending on the nature of the evidence,” the court should consider the Robinson factors “when doing so will be helpful in determining reliability of the expert’s testimony, regardless of whether the testimony is scientific in nature or experience-based.” Id. “[I]n very few cases will the evidence be such that the trial court’s reliability determination can properly be based only on the experience of a qualified expert to the exclusion of factors such as those set out in Robinson, or, on the other hand, properly be based 21 on

2013But while the court’s “criteria for assessing reliability must vary depending on the nature of the evidence,” the court should consider the Robinson factors “when doing so will be helpful in determining reliability of the expert’s testimony, regardless of whether the testimony is scientific in nature or experience-based.” Id. “[I]n very few cases will the evidence be such that the trial court’s reliability determination can properly be based only on the experience of a qualified expert to the exclusion of factors such as those set out in Robinson, or, on the other hand, properly be based 21 on

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572 (2006) 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 80 experience, and not science, application of the analytical gap and determine which factors and evaluation methodology test, as opposed to use of Robinson factors, was appropriate. are most appropriate to apply.

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572 (2006) 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 80 experience, and not science, application of the analytical gap and determine which factors and evaluation methodology test, as opposed to use of Robinson factors, was appropriate. are most appropriate to apply.

2012The significance of “V” patterns relied upon by Russo to determine the place of origin has been criticized as a “discredited” theory in this context. 13 Moreover, Russo relied heavily on the characterization of the doors to the hot box as having been “pushed open” or “blown open,” yet he provided no explanation meeting the Robinson standard for how such a rupture could have occurred despite the fact that after the fire the bunghole caps for the Gharda drums were found resting undisturbed on the tops of the drums where CSI personnel had left them. 14 We cannot ignore such “fatal gaps in an expe

2012The significance of “V” patterns relied upon by Russo to determine the place of origin has been criticized as a “discredited” theory in this context. 13 Moreover, Russo relied heavily on the characterization of the doors to the hot box as having been “pushed open” or “blown open,” yet he provided no explanation meeting the Robinson standard for how such a rupture could have occurred despite the fact that after the fire the bunghole caps for the Gharda drums were found resting undisturbed on the tops of the drums where CSI personnel had left them. 14 We cannot ignore such “fatal gaps in an expe

2021Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 727 ; see also Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 39 ; Cooper Tire & 9 The Robinson factors include: “(1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; (2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert; (3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; (4) the technique’s potential rate of error; (5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and (6) the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique.” Robins

2021Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 727 ; see also Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 39 ; Cooper Tire & 9 The Robinson factors include: “(1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; (2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert; (3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; (4) the technique’s potential rate of error; (5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and (6) the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique.” Robins

2021Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 727 ; see also Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 39 ; Cooper Tire & 9 The Robinson factors include: “(1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; (2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert; (3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; (4) the technique’s potential rate of error; (5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and (6) the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique.” Robins

2021Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 727 ; see also Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 39 ; Cooper Tire & 9 The Robinson factors include: “(1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; (2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert; (3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; (4) the technique’s potential rate of error; (5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and (6) the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique.” Robins

2003Cf. Maritime, 971 S.W.2d at 414 (Gonzalez, J., concurring) (stating cases in which expert testimony is untenable on its face, and thus excusing a Robinson hearing, “will be comparatively rare”); Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 728 (availability of cross-examination does not relieve the trial court of its threshold responsibility as gatekeeper).

2003Cf. Maritime, 971 S.W.2d at 414 (Gonzalez, J., concurring) (stating cases in which expert testimony is untenable on its face, and thus excusing a Robinson hearing, “will be comparatively rare”); Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 728 (availability of cross-examination does not relieve the trial court of its threshold responsibility as gatekeeper).

2011See Kraft, 77 S.W.3d at 807 ; Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 409 ; see also City of Sugar Land v. Home & Hearth Sugarland, L.P., 215 S.W.3d 503 , 511 n. 4 *147 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2007, pet. denied) (holding pretrial motion to exclude preserved appellate complaint concerning reliability of expert testimony).

2011See Kraft, 77 S.W.3d at 807 ; Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 409 ; see also City of Sugar Land v. Home & Hearth Sugarland, L.P., 215 S.W.3d 503 , 511 n. 4 *147 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2007, pet. denied) (holding pretrial motion to exclude preserved appellate complaint concerning reliability of expert testimony).

2020Expert testimony is reliable if it meets the six non-exclusive Robinson factors, see id. at 557 , or if the trial court can otherwise assess its reliability, see Helena Chemical Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001).

2015Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001) (″The Robinson factors may not apply to certain testimony.″). 1471 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 578-79 (Tex. 2006) (rejecting court of appeals’ implication that Gammill’s ″analytical gap″ test replaced the Robinson factors when the expert’s testimony was based primarily on the expert’s knowledge, training, and experience). 1472 See id. at 579 (observing that Gammill was not intended ″to imply that a trial court should never consider the Robinson factors when evaluating the reliability of expert testimony that is based on knowledge,

2024Moreover, in accident reconstruction cases, the Robinson factors are “particularly difficult to apply.” Hughes, 306 S.W.3d at 235 .

2024Moreover, in accident reconstruction cases, the Robinson factors are “particularly difficult to apply.” Hughes, 306 S.W.3d at 235 .

2009Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 558 ; Tucker's Beverages, Inc. v. Fopay, 145 S.W.3d 765, 767 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.). [12] Wal-Mart objected to Dr. Beyler's affidavit in its "Objections to Summary Judgment Evidence in Support of Plaintiffs' Response." Wal-Mart complained that Dr. Beyler's affidavit contained hearsay, was speculative, and was conclusory.

2009Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 558 ; Tucker's Beverages, Inc. v. Fopay, 145 S.W.3d 765, 767 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.). [12] Wal-Mart objected to Dr. Beyler's affidavit in its "Objections to Summary Judgment Evidence in Support of Plaintiffs' Response." Wal-Mart complained that Dr. Beyler's affidavit contained hearsay, was speculative, and was conclusory.

2016Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 215-17 (Tex. 2010) (discussing legal standard under the Robinson analysis and the Gammill analysis); Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc. 972 S.W.2d 713, 726-28 (Tex. 1998) (outlining the Gammill analysis); Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (listing six non-exclusive factors).

2016Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 215-17 (Tex. 2010) (discussing legal standard under the Robinson analysis and the Gammill analysis); Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc. 972 S.W.2d 713, 726-28 (Tex. 1998) (outlining the Gammill analysis); Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (listing six non-exclusive factors).

2025As noted previously, there is a strong public interest in the creation of the business courts to expedite complex business cases, create consistent precedent, and free up district courts for other matters. 25 Further, H.B. 19’s retroactive application does not impair any right; to the contrary, the 21 Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 335 S.W.3d 126, 145 (Tex. 2010). 22 Id. at 146 . 23 Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 222 (Tex. 2002). 24 Hogan v. S. Methodist Univ., 688 S.W.3d 852 , 863 (Tex. 2024). 25 See, e.g., Foundation and House Research, supra, at

2021However, the Court in Robinson considered the entire legislative record and additional related information, see id., and we have done the same in subsequent cases, see Zaatari, 615 S.W.3d at 189 (considering 14 legislative record and other pertinent information when applying Robinson test); Texas Educ.

2021Although 14 Appellants cite to two pages in the record wherein the objection was purportedly made, but a review of the record indicates only a challenge to the denial of appellants’ request for a predicate question regarding the necessity of a written contract. 20 reviewing courts generally determine the reliability of an expert’s chosen methodology by applying the Robinson factors, “[w]hether an expert’s testimony is reliable is based on more than whether the expert’s methodology satisfies the Robinson factors.” Gharda USA, 464 S.W.3d at 348–49 (citing Helena Chem.

2021Although 14 Appellants cite to two pages in the record wherein the objection was purportedly made, but a review of the record indicates only a challenge to the denial of appellants’ request for a predicate question regarding the necessity of a written contract. 20 reviewing courts generally determine the reliability of an expert’s chosen methodology by applying the Robinson factors, “[w]hether an expert’s testimony is reliable is based on more than whether the expert’s methodology satisfies the Robinson factors.” Gharda USA, 464 S.W.3d at 348–49 (citing Helena Chem.

2004Co. v. Navarro , 90 S.W.3d 747, 758 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (applying Daubert/Robinson factors and Gammill analytical gap test).

2003Co. v. Navarro, 90 S.W.3d 747, 758 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (applying Daubeti/Robinson factors and Gammill analytical gap test).

2004Gammill , 972 S.W.2d at 726 ; see Couch v. Simmons , 108 S.W.3d 338, 342-43 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (applying Daubert/Robinson factors and Gammill analytical gap test); see also Missouri Pacific R.

2003Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726 ; see Couch v. Simmons, 108 S.W.3d 338, 342-43 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (applying Daubeti/Robinson factors and Gammill analytical gap test); see also Mo. Pac.

2016Martini v. City of Pearland, No. 14-11-00111-CV, 2012 WL 1345744 , at *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 17, 2012, pet. denied) (mem.op.) (discussing both Robinson factors and Gammill analytical-gap analysis); see Coastal Transp., 136 S.W.3d at 233 .

2016The Texas Supreme Court has held that, even in the context of no-evidence attacks on expert testimony, a Daubert/Robinson challenge to the reliability of the underlying data “must be timely made in order to allow the court to exercise its gatekeeper function.” Coastal Transport, 136 S.W.3d at 229 (citing Mar.

2015Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001) (″The Robinson factors may not apply to certain testimony.″). 1471 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 578-79 (Tex. 2006) (rejecting court of appeals’ implication that Gammill’s ″analytical gap″ test replaced the Robinson factors when the expert’s testimony was based primarily on the expert’s knowledge, training, and experience). 1472 See id. at 579 (observing that Gammill was not intended ″to imply that a trial court should never consider the Robinson factors when evaluating the reliability of expert testimony that is based on knowledge,

2015Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001) (″The Robinson factors may not apply to certain testimony.″). 1471 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 578-79 (Tex. 2006) (rejecting court of appeals’ implication that Gammill’s ″analytical gap″ test replaced the Robinson factors when the expert’s testimony was based primarily on the expert’s knowledge, training, and experience). 1472 See id. at 579 (observing that Gammill was not intended ″to imply that a trial court should never consider the Robinson factors when evaluating the reliability of expert testimony that is based on knowledge,

2003Although the Wiggs cite Henderson v. State , 77 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.), In re D.S. , 19 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, no pet.), and J.C.Penney Life Insurance Co., 33 S.W.3d 417 , none of these cases hold that it is an abuse of discretion to apply Robinson factors to determine the reliability of medical expert causation testimony.

2003Although the Wiggs cite Henderson v. State, 77 S.W.3d 321 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.), In re D.S., 19 S.W.3d 525 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.), and JCPenney Life Insurance Co., 33 S.W.3d 417 , none of these cases hold that it is an abuse of discretion to apply Robinson factors to determine the reliability of medical expert causation testimony.

2012Halim v. Ramchandani, 203 S.W.3d 482, 490 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (a court need not apply the six Robinson factors to expert testimony, whether scientific or not, that is based on the expert's experience and knowledge in his field) (citing Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726–28); see also In re D.S., D.S., D.S. and C.R.R., 132 S.W.3d 613 , 620–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 2000, no pet.).

2006See Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726-28 ; Taylor v. American Fabritech, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 613, 619 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).

2016At the outset, we note that Cathy relies heavily on this Court’s decision in In re J.B., wherein a prior composition of this Court concluded- that similar testimony from Dr. Shinder in another termination case was inadmissible because Dr. Shinder “offered no specific, independent sources to support the reliability of his methodology” in light of'the Robinson factors. 3 93 S.W.3d 609 , 625-26 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. denied).

2016At the outset, we note that Cathy relies heavily on this Court’s decision in In re J.B., wherein a prior composition of this Court concluded- that similar testimony from Dr. Shinder in another termination case was inadmissible because Dr. Shinder “offered no specific, independent sources to support the reliability of his methodology” in light of'the Robinson factors. 3 93 S.W.3d 609 , 625-26 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. denied).

2017Contrary to Loomis’s position, we have previously held that it is within the trial court’s discretion “whether, when, and how to hold a Robinson hearing.” Piro v. Sarofim, 80 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see also Gomez v. Am.

2017Contrary to Loomis’s position, we have previously held that it is within the trial court’s discretion “whether, when, and how to hold a Robinson hearing.” Piro v. Sarofim, 80 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see also Gomez v. Am.

2013Co. v. Rodriguez, 88 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g))); see also Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556 (noting that “an expert scientific opinion must be grounded, at the very least, on some demonstrable underlying scientific data or logical inferences therefrom”).

2013Co. v. Rodriguez, 88 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g))); see also Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556 (noting that “an expert scientific opinion must be grounded, at the very least, on some demonstrable underlying scientific data or logical inferences therefrom”).

2013See Gross, 149 S.W.3d at 238 (“Thus, regardless of whether the Robinson factors are applied, the proponent of the expert testimony must prove that it is based upon a reliable foundation.” (citing State Farm Fire & Cas.

2013See Gross, 149 S.W.3d at 238 (“Thus, regardless of whether the Robinson factors are applied, the proponent of the expert testimony must prove that it is based upon a reliable foundation.” (citing State Farm Fire & Cas.