43 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2026 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bushgreen2 sentences2023See Bush, 214 Ill. 2d at 328-29 (stating that where none of the Robinson factors were present, but other factors establishing intent to deliver were introduced at trial, the case presented a “routine sufficiency of the evidence question”). ¶ 36 We find that the State presented sufficient evidence in this case to permit the trial court to draw a reasonable inference of intent to deliver, and we cannot say that the evidence the court relied upon was so unsatisfactory or improbable that it created a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt. 2023See Bush, 214 Ill. 2d at 328-29 (stating that where none of the Robinson factors were present, but other factors establishing intent to deliver were introduced at trial, the case presented a “routine sufficiency of the evidence question”). ¶ 36 We find that the State presented sufficient evidence in this case to permit the trial court to draw a reasonable inference of intent to deliver, and we cannot say that the evidence the court relied upon was so unsatisfactory or improbable that it created a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt. | 6 | 10 |
People v. Bellgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318, 327 (2005) (evidence sufficient where defendant accepted money from two individuals and handed them unknown items in exchange); People v. Bell, 343 Ill. 2014See, e.g., People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318, 327 (2005) (evidence sufficient where defendant accepted money from two individuals and handed them unknown items in exchange); People v. Bell, 343 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Cruzgreen2 sentences2001Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d at 560 ; People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 374 (1994). 2001Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d at 560 ; People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 374 (1994). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2018Id. at 159-60 . ¶ 34 The court later explained, in People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 429, 438 (1981), that the Robinson court “did not deem a personal allegiance or loyalty to the public defender’s office sufficient to justify a rule that if one attorney employed by such an office were disqualified by reason of a conflict of interest, no other attorney employed by that office could undertake the -8- representation.” The basis for the Robinson rule again was repeated in People v. Banks, 121 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (1987), where the court stated that “Robinson rejected a per se conflicts rule precisely because 2017Id. at 159-60 , 37 Ill.Dec. 267 , 402 N.E.2d 157 . ¶ 34 The court later explained, in People v. Lewis , 88 Ill. 2d 429 , 438, 58 Ill.Dec. 743 , 430 N.E.2d 994 (1981), that the Robinson court "did not deem a personal allegiance or loyalty to the public defender's office sufficient to justify a rule that if one attorney employed by such an office were disqualified by reason of a conflict of interest, no other attorney employed by that office could undertake the representation." The basis for the Robinson rule again was repeated in People v. Banks , 121 Ill. 2d 36 , 42, 117 Ill.Dec. 266 , 520 N.E | 1 | 2 |
People v. Banksgreen2 sentences2018Id. at 159-60 . ¶ 34 The court later explained, in People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 429, 438 (1981), that the Robinson court “did not deem a personal allegiance or loyalty to the public defender’s office sufficient to justify a rule that if one attorney employed by such an office were disqualified by reason of a conflict of interest, no other attorney employed by that office could undertake the -8- representation.” The basis for the Robinson rule again was repeated in People v. Banks, 121 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (1987), where the court stated that “Robinson rejected a per se conflicts rule precisely because 2017Id. at 159-60 , 37 Ill.Dec. 267 , 402 N.E.2d 157 . ¶ 34 The court later explained, in People v. Lewis , 88 Ill. 2d 429 , 438, 58 Ill.Dec. 743 , 430 N.E.2d 994 (1981), that the Robinson court "did not deem a personal allegiance or loyalty to the public defender's office sufficient to justify a rule that if one attorney employed by such an office were disqualified by reason of a conflict of interest, no other attorney employed by that office could undertake the representation." The basis for the Robinson rule again was repeated in People v. Banks , 121 Ill. 2d 36 , 42, 117 Ill.Dec. 266 , 520 N.E | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hodgesgreen1 sentence2026Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16-17 (stating standard). ¶ 18 Affirmed. -6- | 1 | 1 |
People v. Browngreen1 sentence2026See Brown, 2026 IL 130930 , ¶ 60 n.3 (overruling Durant). ¶ 13 At the time of Robinson’s sentencing in 2015, subsection (a) of the general recidivism statute read: “(a) HABITUAL CRIMINALS. (1) Every person who has been twice convicted in any state *** court of an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now *** classified in Illinois as a Class X felony *** shall be adjudged an habitual criminal. *** (4) This Section does not apply unless each of the following requirements are satisfied: (A) The third offense was committed after July 3, 1980. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fullergreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., People v. Smallwood, 2024 IL App (5th) 210407, ¶ 28 (disagreeing with Durant); People v. Fuller, 2025 IL App (4th) 231457, ¶ 41 (same). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Blairgreen1 sentence2025See Blair, 215 Ill. 2d at 443 (noting res judicata bars claims that have been “definitively settled” (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 28 Factual Basis ¶ 29 Robinson’s claim depends, in part, on his birthdate and the day he committed a Class X offense the first time. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smallwoodgreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., People v. Smallwood, 2024 IL App (5th) 210407, ¶ 28 (disagreeing with Durant); People v. Fuller, 2025 IL App (4th) 231457, ¶ 41 (same). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Collinsgreen1 sentence2025Thus, he needed to support his claim with evidence about those two dates. ¶ 30 “The necessity of attaching ‘affidavits, records, or other evidence’ to the petition is addressed in section 122-2, which provides that ‘[t]he petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 66-67 (2002) (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2000)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wallacegreen2 sentences2025See Wallace, 2025 IL 130173, ¶ 23 (describing Stewart as “distinguishable”). ¶ 42 Finally, the trial court erred by finding Robinson’s claim did not present a constitutional issue. 2025See Wallace, 2025 IL 130173, ¶ 23 (describing Stewart as “distinguishable”). ¶ 42 Finally, the trial court erred by finding Robinson’s claim did not present a constitutional issue. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ellisongreen1 sentence2023See People v. Ellison, 2013 IL App (1st) 101261, ¶ 26 (due to the popularity of mobile communication devices, possessing a cell phone, without more, “provides little, if any, support to a finding that defendant intended to distribute drugs”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hoodgreen2 sentences2023The most important factors are the closeness of the evidence (see People v. Hood, 229 Ill. 2023The most important factors are the closeness of the evidence (see People v. Hood, 229 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rosalezgreen2 sentences2022See Rosalez, 2021 IL App (2d) 200086, ¶¶ 3, 133 . ¶ 65 The State also suggests that Elva’s affidavit cannot support a second-degree murder conviction because such a claim does not constitute a claim of actual innocence. 2022See Rosalez, 2021 IL App (2d) 200086, ¶¶ 3, 133 . ¶ 65 The State also suggests that Elva’s affidavit cannot support a second-degree murder conviction because such a claim does not constitute a claim of actual innocence. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Reedgreen2 sentences2022We note in passing that Justice Burke dissented from the majority’s opinion in Robinson and stated in his Reed concurrence that the Robinson standard was “so vague as to be virtually meaningless.” Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 65 (Burke, J., specially concurring). ¶ 51 Defendant asserts that Reed’s “clear and convincing” standard would not be appropriate at the leave-to-file stage because “determinations as to the reliability of the evidence can only be made at the third stage evidentiary hearing” and thus, the standard set forth in Robinson should be applied in this context of guilty plea petitione 2022We note in passing that Justice Burke dissented from the majority’s opinion in Robinson and stated in his Reed concurrence that the Robinson standard was “so vague as to be virtually meaningless.” Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 65 (Burke, J., specially concurring). ¶ 51 Defendant asserts that Reed’s “clear and convincing” standard would not be appropriate at the leave-to-file stage because “determinations as to the reliability of the evidence can only be made at the third stage evidentiary hearing” and thus, the standard set forth in Robinson should be applied in this context of guilty plea petitione | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2022See People v. Jones, 2021 IL App (1st) 180996, ¶ 33 (“We find it makes no sense to deny defendant’s claim now, only to see the same claim back again in a postconviction petition”). 2 ¶ 86 III. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sandersgreen2 sentences2022See Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 47 . ¶ 75 III. 2022See Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 47 . ¶ 75 III. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Parkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| O'Shield v. Lakeside Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2024In Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 44 , this court held that “leave of court should be granted where the petitioner’s supporting documentation raises the probability that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would -7- have convicted the petitioner in light of the new evidence.” The appellate court agreed that the Robinson standard was applicable regardless of whether the underlying judgment stemmed from a guilty plea or a trial. 2022 IL App (1st) 191101-B, ¶ 52 . ¶ 26 Applying the Robinson standard, the appellate court began by accepting the State’s concession that the Myles and Moo 2024In Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 44 , this court held that “leave of court should be granted where the petitioner’s supporting documentation raises the probability that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would -7- have convicted the petitioner in light of the new evidence.” The appellate court agreed that the Robinson standard was applicable regardless of whether the underlying judgment stemmed from a guilty plea or a trial. 2022 IL App (1st) 191101-B, ¶ 52 . ¶ 26 Applying the Robinson standard, the appellate court began by accepting the State’s concession that the Myles and Moo | 3 | 2021–2024 |
People v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2009To be sure, the Robinson factors are only examples of the “many different factors that have been considered by Illinois courts as probative of intent to deliver.” Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 408 . 2009To be sure, the Robinson factors are only examples of the “many different factors that have been considered by Illinois courts as probative of intent to deliver.” Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 408 . | 3 | 2009–2013 |
Pate v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1967That Robinson’s hearing would be held six years after the fact aggravates these difficulties.” 383 U.S. at 387 . 1967That Robinson’s hearing would be held six years after the fact aggravates these difficulties.” Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 , 15 L. | 3 | 1967–1977 |
People v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2026Among the factors a reviewing court should reconsider in deciding whether a state discovery violation warrants a new trial “are the closeness of the evidence, the strength of the undisclosed evidence, the likelihood that prior notice could have helped the defense discredit the evidence, and the willfulness of the State in failing to disclose the new evidence.” Id. at 81 . 20 ¶ 59 Looking at the last of the Robinson factors, we note that the trial court did not find that the State acted willfully in failing to disclose any of the discoverable materials. 2026Among the factors a reviewing court should reconsider in deciding whether a state discovery violation warrants a new trial “are the closeness of the evidence, the strength of the undisclosed evidence, the likelihood that prior notice could have helped the defense discredit the evidence, and the willfulness of the State in failing to disclose the new evidence.” Id. at 81 . 20 ¶ 59 Looking at the last of the Robinson factors, we note that the trial court did not find that the State acted willfully in failing to disclose any of the discoverable materials. | 2 | 2023–2026 |
People v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 159-60 . ¶ 34 The court later explained, in People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 429, 438 (1981), that the Robinson court “did not deem a personal allegiance or loyalty to the public defender’s office sufficient to justify a rule that if one attorney employed by such an office were disqualified by reason of a conflict of interest, no other attorney employed by that office could undertake the -8- representation.” The basis for the Robinson rule again was repeated in People v. Banks, 121 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (1987), where the court stated that “Robinson rejected a per se conflicts rule precisely because 2017Id. at 159-60 , 37 Ill.Dec. 267 , 402 N.E.2d 157 . ¶ 34 The court later explained, in People v. Lewis , 88 Ill. 2d 429 , 438, 58 Ill.Dec. 743 , 430 N.E.2d 994 (1981), that the Robinson court "did not deem a personal allegiance or loyalty to the public defender's office sufficient to justify a rule that if one attorney employed by such an office were disqualified by reason of a conflict of interest, no other attorney employed by that office could undertake the representation." The basis for the Robinson rule again was repeated in People v. Banks , 121 Ill. 2d 36 , 42, 117 Ill.Dec. 266 , 520 N.E | 2 | 2017–2018 |
People v. Hoskins
green
2 sentences2014“The search of the purse here was proper under Robinson as incident to the defendant’s lawful arrest. [Citations.] Thus, Robinson authorizes a warrantless search of the defendant’s purse, which is immediately associated with defendant’s person, simply on the lawful, custodial arrest.” Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d at 217 . 2014“The search of the purse here was proper under Robinson as incident to the defendant’s lawful arrest. [Citations.] Thus, Robinson authorizes a warrantless search of the defendant’s purse, which is immediately associated with defendant’s person, simply on the lawful, custodial arrest.” Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d at 217 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Robinson v. Oak Park & River Forest High School
green
2 sentences2004Robinson, 213 Ill. 2004Robinson, 213 Ill. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Weaver
green
2 sentences2001Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d at 560 ; People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 374 (1994). 2001Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d at 560 ; People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 374 (1994). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Robinson v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
green
2 sentences1998In rejecting this argument, Robinson explained that, in Flores , this court "held that a DWP was not final and appealable because the plaintiff had an absolute right to refile the complaint within the statutory limit now set forth in section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure; thus the DWP order did not terminate the litigation within the statutory limit." Robinson, 238 Ill.App.3d at 441 , 179 Ill.Dec. 783 , 606 N.E.2d 615 . 1998In rejecting this argument, Robinson explained that, in Flores, this court “held that a DWP was not final and appealable because the plaintiff had an absolute right to refile the complaint within the statutory limit now set forth in section 13— 217 of the Code of Civil Procedure; thus the DWP order did not terminate the litigation within the statutory Emit.” Robinson, 238 Ill. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Chambers
green
2 sentences2025Chambers, 2021 IL App (4th) 190151 , ¶ 81. ¶ 36 Contrary to the trial court’s finding, Robinson’s claim found a foothold in caselaw interpreting recent amendments to the Code. ¶ 37 In 2021, the legislature amended section 5-4.5-95 to state that both subsection (a) and subsection (b) do not apply unless the “first offense was committed when the person was 21 years of age or older.” Pub. 2025Chambers, 2021 IL App (4th) 190151 , ¶ 81 (“[T]o call the pro se petition in this case not arguable, we would have to call some decisions by the appellate court *** not arguable—which, of course, would be untenable.”). ¶ 41 Moreover, the State’s citation to the supreme court’s recent decision in Wallace fails. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Patel
green
2 sentences2022For these reasons, we find that the supreme court in Reed did not supplant the Robinson standard in evaluating petitions at the leave-to-file stage and thus, we apply the Robinson standard here. ¶ 53 We reject the State’s reliance on People v. Patel, 2021 IL App (3d) 170337 , and People v. Rocha, 2021 IL App (1st) 191714-U , for support of its argument that the standard espoused in Reed should apply here. 2022For these reasons, we find that the supreme court in Reed did not supplant the Robinson standard in evaluating petitions at the leave-to-file stage and thus, we apply the Robinson standard here. ¶ 53 We reject the State’s reliance on People v. Patel, 2021 IL App (3d) 170337 , and People v. Rocha, 2021 IL App (1st) 191714-U , for support of its argument that the standard espoused in Reed should apply here. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Cascade Builders Corp. v. Rugar
green
1 sentence2022“Even where a party is not privy to materials reviewed in camera and found to be privileged from discovery, that party can request the circuit court to submit those materials under seal for appellate review.” Cascade Builders Corp. v. Rugar, 2021 IL App (1st) 192410, ¶ 28 . ¶ 18 We hold that the record is insufficient to support Robinson’s claim of error. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Miller v. Alabama green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Collins v. Westlake Community Hospital green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Zeta Building Corp. v. Garst green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Department of Conservation v. First National Bank of Lake Forest green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| United States v. Chadwick red | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Puckett green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Green neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| The PEOPLE v. Jackson neutral | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Nettles v. Illinois green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| The PEOPLE v. Nettles green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| The PEOPLE v. Thompson green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.