Robinson standard in New York

2022Defendant posits in his brief that, under the Robinson standard, "it is not clear in the law whether a pretextual traffic stop is valid, and evidence seized as a result of the stop admissible as evidence, when the stop was motivated by racial profiling." In finding that a traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop, the Robinson Court explained that "neither the primary motivation of the officer nor a determination of what a reasonable traffic officer would have done under the circumstances is relevant" ( id. ).

2022Defendant posits in his brief that, under the Robinson standard, "it is not clear in the law whether a pretextual traffic stop is valid, and evidence seized as a result of the stop admissible as evidence, when the stop was motivated by racial profiling." In finding that a traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop, the Robinson Court explained that "neither the primary motivation of the officer nor a determination of what a reasonable traffic officer would have done under the circumstances is relevant" ( id. ).

2017The next case to revisit the Robinson doctrine was Gallewski, 301 N.Y. 164 , 93 N.E.2d 620 , an action by the administrator of the estate of Fritz B.

2017The next case to revisit the Robinson doctrine was Gallewski, 301 N.Y. 164 , 93 N.E.2d 620 , an action by the administrator of the estate of Fritz B.

2014On respondents’ appeal from the May 2009 order, we reversed, holding that “[t]he arbitrator’s failure to give preclusive effect to Robinson’s guilty plea of petit larceny was irrational,” and that “[t]he arbitrator’s award places Robinson back into a position where he has the responsibility to voucher property of individuals being brought into a juvenile [justice] facility” ( 82 AD3d at 645 ).

2014On respondents’ appeal from the May 2009 order, we reversed, holding that “[t]he arbitrator’s failure to give preclusive effect to Robinson’s guilty plea of petit larceny was irrational,” and that “[t]he arbitrator’s award places Robinson back into a position where he has the responsibility to voucher property of individuals being brought into a juvenile [justice] facility” ( 82 AD3d at 645 ).

1973That Robinson’s hearing would be held six years after the fact aggravates these difficulties. ’ (Pate v. Robinson, supra, p. 387 .) The court in Pate found that it would be virtually impossible to determine Robinson’s sanity at the time of trial solely from the printed record.

1967That Robinson’s hearing would be held six years after the fact aggravates these difficulties.” (Pate v. Robinson, supra, p. 387 .) The court in Pate found that it would be virtually impossible to determine Robinson’s sanity at the time of trial solely from the printed record.

2022In 2016, the First Department interpreted Robinson to mean that "a police stop that is motivated by discrimination or pretext may still be upheld if it is otherwise supported" by either reasonable suspicion (as was the standard being assessed in that case) or, in the case of a traffic violation, by probable cause ( Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of the City of N.Y., Inc. v City of New York[*4] , 142 AD3d 53, 66 [1st Dept 2016] [emphasis added], appeal dismissed 28 NY3d 978 [2016]).

2022In 2016, the First Department interpreted Robinson to mean that "a police stop that is motivated by discrimination or pretext may still be upheld if it is otherwise supported" by either reasonable suspicion (as was the standard being assessed in that case) or, in the case of a traffic violation, by probable cause ( Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of the City of N.Y., Inc. v City of New York[*4] , 142 AD3d 53, 66 [1st Dept 2016] [emphasis added], appeal dismissed 28 NY3d 978 [2016]).

2020In fact, defendant Robinson’s brief properly articulates the reasonable suspicion standard: “Police may not stop a car absent reasonable suspicion that a car’s occupants have been, are then, or are about to be engaged in conduct in violation of law” (Brief for defendant-appellant in People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341 [2001], available at 2001 WL 34151599 ). - 13 - - 14 - No. 46 Amendment” where the officer “has probable cause to detain a person temporarily for a traffic violation” (id. at 348, 351, citing Whren, 517 US 806 ).

2020The majority’s further claim that certifying specific legal questions is an “largely abandoned practice” is irrelevant (majority op at 22 n 15; see Olsen v Town of Richfield, 81 NY2d 1024 [1993]; Flick v Stewart-Warner Corp., 76 NY2d 50 [1990]). - 15 - - 16 - Nos. 1-4 B.

2019The evidence submitted in support of Robinson's motion demonstrated, prima facie, that Paul entered the subject intersection against a red light, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(d) ( see Napolitano v Sanderson , 167 AD3d 1024 , 1025; Lanicci v Hansen , 153 AD3d 687, 687 ; Turner v Butler , 139 AD3d 715, 716 ).

2019The evidence submitted in support of Robinson's motion demonstrated, prima facie, that Paul entered the subject intersection against a red light, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(d) ( see Napolitano v Sanderson , 167 AD3d 1024 , 1025; Lanicci v Hansen , 153 AD3d 687, 687 ; Turner v Butler , 139 AD3d 715, 716 ).

2016Pursuant to CPLR 306-b, a court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, grant a motion for an extension of time within which to effect service for good cause shown or in the interest of justice (see Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95 [2001]; Bumpus v New York City Tr.

1998The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Supreme Court had erred in denying Robinson’s motion to amend its answer to . include General Obligations Law § 15-108 as an affirmative defense (Whalen v Kawasaki Motors Corp., 242 AD2d 919 ).

1997The court should have granted Robinson’s motion to amend the answer to assert General Obligations Law § 15-108 as an affirmative defense (see, Ward v City of Schenectady, 204 AD2d 779, 781 ).

1985The Robinson decision itself is a two-line memorandum in which the court stated the rule quoted above but nevertheless affirmed the conviction on harmless error grounds (People v Robinson, 27 NY2d 864 , supra).

1985The Robinson decision itself is a two-line memorandum in which the court stated the rule quoted above but nevertheless affirmed the conviction on harmless error grounds (People v Robinson, 27 NY2d 864 , supra).

1985For a time it appeared that Iowa would accept the rule (see, State v Peterson, 219 NW2d 665 ) but now it is clear that New York stands alone (see, State v Mark, 286 NW2d 396, 412-413 [Iowa]; McCormick, Evidence § 205, at 619, n 31 [3d ed]).

1985For a time it appeared that Iowa would accept the rule (see, State v Peterson, 219 NW2d 665 ) but now it is clear that New York stands alone (see, State v Mark, 286 NW2d 396, 412-413 [Iowa]; McCormick, Evidence § 205, at 619, n 31 [3d ed]).