38 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1967–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lewis v. Beavergreen2 sentences2011See Lewis v. Beaver, 588 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(holding that appellants could not deny attorney’s authority to act on their behalf in entering into an agreed judgment and obtain review by writ of error where there was no evidence in the record to support their claim). 2011See Lewis v. Beaver, 588 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.)(holding that appellants could not deny attorney’s authority to act on their behalf in entering into an agreed judgment and obtain review by writ of error where there was no evidence in the record to support their claim). | 3 | 3 |
Williams v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2014See Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 509 (holding that trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for new trial on basis of inadequate deaf-interpretation because the "record reflect[ed] that appellant understood the proceedings well enough to assist in her own defense; moreover, whatever communication difficulties might have existed between appellant and her trial counsel were not apparent in the record"); see also Tuivailala v. State, 127 Hawai'i 242 , 277 P.3d 336 (Hawai’i App.2012) (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to request interpreter because record refl 2014See Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 509 (holding that trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for new trial on basis of inadequate deaf-interpretation because the "record reflect[ed] that appellant understood the proceedings well enough to assist in her own defense; moreover, whatever communication difficulties might have existed between appellant and her trial counsel were not apparent in the record"); see also Tuivailala v. State, 127 Hawai'i 242 , 277 P.3d 336 (Hawai’i App.2012) (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to request interpreter because record refl | 2 | 2 |
Sanchez v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 509 (holding that trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for new trial on basis of inadequate deaf-interpretation because the "record reflect[ed] that appellant understood the proceedings well enough to assist in her own defense; moreover, whatever communication difficulties might have existed between appellant and her trial counsel were not apparent in the record"); see also Tuivailala v. State, 127 Hawai'i 242 , 277 P.3d 336 (Hawai’i App.2012) (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to request interpreter because record refl 2014See Linton , 275 S.W.3d at 509 (holding that trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for new trial on basis of inadequate deaf-interpretation because the " record reflect[ed] that appellant understood the proceedings well enough to assist in her own defense; moreover, whatever communication difficulties might have existed between appellant and her trial counsel were not apparent in the record"); see also Tuivailala v. State , 277 P.3d 336 (Hawaii App. 2012) (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel's failure to request interpreter because record reflected that defe | 2 | 2 |
Linton v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 509 (holding that trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for new trial on basis of inadequate deaf-interpretation because the "record reflect[ed] that appellant understood the proceedings well enough to assist in her own defense; moreover, whatever communication difficulties might have existed between appellant and her trial counsel were not apparent in the record"); see also Tuivailala v. State, 127 Hawai'i 242 , 277 P.3d 336 (Hawai’i App.2012) (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to request interpreter because record refl 2014See Linton , 275 S.W.3d at 509 (holding that trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for new trial on basis of inadequate deaf-interpretation because the " record reflect[ed] that appellant understood the proceedings well enough to assist in her own defense; moreover, whatever communication difficulties might have existed between appellant and her trial counsel were not apparent in the record"); see also Tuivailala v. State , 277 P.3d 336 (Hawaii App. 2012) (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel's failure to request interpreter because record reflected that defe | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2014See Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 509 (holding that trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for new trial on basis of inadequate deaf-interpretation because the "record reflect[ed] that appellant understood the proceedings well enough to assist in her own defense; moreover, whatever communication difficulties might have existed between appellant and her trial counsel were not apparent in the record"); see also Tuivailala v. State, 127 Hawai'i 242 , 277 P.3d 336 (Hawai’i App.2012) (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to request interpreter because record refl 2014See Linton , 275 S.W.3d at 509 (holding that trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for new trial on basis of inadequate deaf-interpretation because the " record reflect[ed] that appellant understood the proceedings well enough to assist in her own defense; moreover, whatever communication difficulties might have existed between appellant and her trial counsel were not apparent in the record"); see also Tuivailala v. State , 277 P.3d 336 (Hawaii App. 2012) (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel's failure to request interpreter because record reflected that defe | 2 | 2 |
Cornish v. Stategreen2 sentences2011In Young, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that “while a defendant is not required to request the trial court make a comparison analysis of the reasons given for striking various venirepersons in order to preserve the issue for an appellate determination, such defendant is limited to the evidence in the record to support such analysis.” Cornish v. State, 848 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (en banc) (interpreting Young, 826 S.W.2d at 144 ). 2011In Young, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that "while a defendant is not required to request the trial court make a comparison analysis of the reasons given for striking various venirepersons in order to preserve the issue for an appellate determination, such defendant is limited to the evidence in the record to support such analysis." Cornish v. State, 848 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (en banc) (interpreting Young, 826 S.W.2d at 144 ). | 2 | 2 |
McDonald v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See McDonald , 64 S.W.3d at 89 (assertions of fact in appellate brief do not constitute evidence on appeal). 2009See McDonald, 64 S.W.3d at 89 (assertions of fact in appellate brief do not constitute evidence on appeal). | 2 | 2 |
Bankr. L. Rep. P 71,664 in Re John Hugh Niland, Debtor. Tim Truman and John Niland v. Darwin Deason v. Continental Savings Associationgreen2 sentences2007In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801, 809 (5th Cir.1987) (quoting Lincoln v. Bennett, 138 Tex. 56, 59 , 156 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex.1941)). . 2007Accordingly, Cadle must rely solely on the Ortizes' testimony and the documents in the record to support its claim of estoppel. [14] In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801, 809 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Lincoln v. Bennett, 138 Tex. 56, 59 , 156 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex.1941)). [15] Brown v. Bank of Galveston, Nat'l Ass'n, 963 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex.1998). [16] McKinzie, 869 S.W.2d at 595 . | 2 | 2 |
Lincoln v. Bennettgreen2 sentences2007Accordingly, Cadle must rely solely on the Ortizes' testimony and the documents in the record to support its claim of estoppel. [14] In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801, 809 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Lincoln v. Bennett, 138 Tex. 56, 59 , 156 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex.1941)). [15] Brown v. Bank of Galveston, Nat'l Ass'n, 963 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex.1998). [16] McKinzie, 869 S.W.2d at 595 . 2007Accordingly, Cadle must rely solely on the Ortizes' testimony and the documents in the record to support its claim of estoppel. [14] In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801, 809 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Lincoln v. Bennett, 138 Tex. 56, 59 , 156 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex.1941)). [15] Brown v. Bank of Galveston, Nat'l Ass'n, 963 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex.1998). [16] McKinzie, 869 S.W.2d at 595 . | 2 | 2 |
Ivy v. Carrellgreen2 sentences2004These included the following: that the child has a meaningful relationship with Comanche extended family members and that she is entitled to substantial rights and valuable benefits as a member of the Comanche Nation. 6 While Ivy v. Carrell requires a motion for new trial’s meritorious defense to be accompanied by affidavit or other supporting evidence, see 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex.1966), and the Comanche Nation filed only its motion and supporting brief, we disagree with the dissent that there is no evidence in the record to support this defense, when the movant has asked the court to conside 2004These included the following: that the child has a meaningful relationship with Comanche extended family members and that she is entitled to substantial rights and valuable benefits as a member of the Comanche Nation. (6) While Ivy v. Carrell requires a motion for new trial's meritorious defense to be accompanied by affidavit or other supporting evidence, see 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966), and the Comanche Nation filed only its motion and supporting brief, we disagree with the dissent that there is no evidence in the record to support this defense, when the movant has asked the court to cons | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Stategreen2 sentences1993See Miller v. State, 755 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 815 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). 1993See Miller v. State, 755 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1988), reversed on other grounds, 815 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Stategreen2 sentences1993See Miller v. State, 755 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 815 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). 1993See Miller v. State, 755 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1988), reversed on other grounds, 815 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). | 2 | 2 |
McKinney v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 571 . 2023See McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 571 . | 1 | 1 |
Freeman v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505 , 506–07 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Bone v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 837 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Reyna v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Therefore, even if Ross did make it clear to the trial court that he wished to relitigate the legality of the search of his bedroom, we hold Ross failed to preserve error on the basis of the Confrontation Clause. 3 See Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 179 (“Because [the appellant] ‘did not clearly articulate’ that the Confrontation Clause demanded admission of the evidence, the trial judge ‘never had the opportunity to rule upon’ [that] rationale.”) (quoting Clark v. State, 881 S.W.2d 682, 694 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Therefore, even if Ross did make it clear to the trial court that he wished to relitigate the legality of the search of his bedroom, we hold Ross failed to preserve error on the basis of the Confrontation Clause. 3 See Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 179 (“Because [the appellant] ‘did not clearly articulate’ that the Confrontation Clause demanded admission of the evidence, the trial judge ‘never had the opportunity to rule upon’ [that] rationale.”) (quoting Clark v. State, 881 S.W.2d 682, 694 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Bank of Galveston, National Ass'ngreen1 sentence2007Accordingly, Cadle must rely solely on the Ortizes' testimony and the documents in the record to support its claim of estoppel. [14] In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801, 809 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Lincoln v. Bennett, 138 Tex. 56, 59 , 156 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex.1941)). [15] Brown v. Bank of Galveston, Nat'l Ass'n, 963 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex.1998). [16] McKinzie, 869 S.W.2d at 595 . | 1 | 1 |
| Adams v. Norsworthy Ranch, Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Sentell v. Williamson Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| McQuarters v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Velasquezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carmouche v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Badgett v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Walker v. Packer
green
2 sentences2012Id. 2011Id. | 4 | 2011–2012 |
Ex Parte Golden
green
2 sentences2016Ex parte Golden, 991 S.W.2d 859 , 862 n.2 (Tex. Crim. 2012Ex parte Golden , 991 S.W.2d 859 , 862 n.2 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 2012–2016 |
Young v. State
green
2 sentences2011In Young, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that “while a defendant is not required to request the trial court make a comparison analysis of the reasons given for striking various venirepersons in order to preserve the issue for an appellate determination, such defendant is limited to the evidence in the record to support such analysis.” Cornish v. State, 848 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (en banc) (interpreting Young, 826 S.W.2d at 144 ). 2011In Young, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that "while a defendant is not required to request the trial court make a comparison analysis of the reasons given for striking various venirepersons in order to preserve the issue for an appellate determination, such defendant is limited to the evidence in the record to support such analysis." Cornish v. State, 848 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (en banc) (interpreting Young, 826 S.W.2d at 144 ). | 2 | 1993–2011 |
Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026“However, where the case proceeds to trial with a fact question as to when the plaintiff discovered, it is the plaintiff who benefits by the discovery rule who must ensure that such an issue is submitted.” Id. 8 In its brief, Herc asserts that it learned of the alleged transfer of goodwill at Diaz’s deposition on March 26, 2021, when, it says, it obtained bank records and Diaz admitted that he started a new company to avoid debt obligations. 7 However, Herc does not cite any evidence in the record to support its claim about when and how it learned of the transfer, when it received bank records | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Fiengo v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2023As we explained in Fiengo, equitable estoppel “is established when (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts, (2) is made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts, (3) with the intention that it should be acted upon, (4) to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge of the facts, (5) who detrimentally relies on the representations.” Fiengo, 225 S.W.3d at 861 . –9– Appellants do not cite to anything in the record to support these factors. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira
green
1 sentence2020In his First Amended Supplemental Brief, Puente also asserts that, under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019), he is exempt from coverage under Section 1 of the FAA. 1 Puente has not directed this court to any evidence in the record to support his claim that Conn’s knew that the “manifest disregard” language was unenforceable at the time it entered into the Arbitration Agreement with Puente, nor has he cited to evidence in the record that Conn’s knew at the time the Arbitration Agreement was drafted that manifest disregard was not a proper ba | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Blakeway v. National Credit Corporation
green
1 sentence2015TEX. tional Credit Corporation, 439 S.W.2d 155 [**9] (Tex. R. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Liberty Sign Company v. Newsom
green
1 sentence2015To complain of error on damages have been approved in Liberty Sign Co. v. appeal, it is incumbent upon the complaining party to Newsom 426 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1968); Blakeway v. Na- submit evidence in the record to support his claim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2014Id. at 692-94 ; see also Lafler v. (...continued) unreasonable in failing to request an interpreter if the applicant is unable to point to specific instances in the record to support his claim. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Swearingen v. State
green
1 sentence2014According to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, “[a] literal reading of the statute unequivocally mandates that all evidence to be tested must first be proven to contain biological material.” Swearingen, 303 S.W.3d at 732 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Gray v. Nash
green
1 sentence2014App. P. 38.1(i); Gray, 259 S.W.3d at 294 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Wallace v. McKinzie
green
1 sentence2007Accordingly, Cadle must rely solely on the Ortizes' testimony and the documents in the record to support its claim of estoppel. [14] In re Niland, 825 F.2d 801, 809 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Lincoln v. Bennett, 138 Tex. 56, 59 , 156 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex.1941)). [15] Brown v. Bank of Galveston, Nat'l Ass'n, 963 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex.1998). [16] McKinzie, 869 S.W.2d at 595 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Dinwiddie v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Hill v. Board of Adjustment of City of Castle Hills green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.