ruled error in California

2026As explained, however, each of the three documents in the agreement to arbitrate contained a valid and enforceable PAGA waiver and reflected the parties’ intent not “to require arbitration of any matter or claim which the courts of this jurisdiction have expressly held are not subject to mandatory arbitration.” Because the agreement to arbitrate included a severance provision, the court should have severed the sole unenforceable (and inconsistent) wholesale PAGA waiver provision, rather than concluding the entire agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable.5 (See Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at

2026As explained, however, each of the three documents in the agreement to arbitrate contained a valid and enforceable PAGA waiver and reflected the parties’ intent not “to require arbitration of any matter or claim which the courts of this jurisdiction have expressly held are not subject to mandatory arbitration.” Because the agreement to arbitrate included a severance provision, the court should have severed the sole unenforceable (and inconsistent) wholesale PAGA waiver provision, rather than concluding the entire agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable.5 (See Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at

2021(Sandoval v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 932, 936 [“California law is settled that pending appeal a trial court judgment is not final and will not be given res judicata effect”]; see Samara v. Matar, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 28 p. 333 [“[t]he availability of a direct appeal reflects a sensible determination that the process culminating in a trial court’s disputed decision is not sufficient to resolve litigation conclusively”]; Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1174 [“in California the rule is that the finality required to invoke the pre

2021(Ibid.) The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that “once the appeal is settled favorably to the plaintiff and thereafter dismissed, the Restatement analysis and reason itself dictate that the trial court judgment reemerges with sufficient finality to permit the application of collateral estoppel.” (Sandoval, supra, 140 Cal.App.3d at p. 937 .) The Sandoval court saw “nothing in the dismissal with prejudice concept that forecloses a finding of finality sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issues decided against the defendant.

2023(Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 256 ; see also Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 522 (Greenspan) [rejecting trial court’s “cryptic” order on objections that “No. 28 is overruled; all others are sustained”].) In any event, even if the manner in which the trial court ruled was error, our de novo review of the objections would reach the same result.

2023(See Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535 [conducting de novo review of objections on appeal].) Hudson does not challenge the merits of any of respondents’ objections.

2023The court ruled that the factors the Supreme Court articulated in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 802 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) weighed in favor of finding Arellano guilty of murder as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life beyond a reasonable doubt.

2022(Id. at pp. 701-702.) The last factor is an inquiry into the private entity’s “origin”: Did a government agency incorporate the entity or create the entity “pursuant to ‘special legislation?’ ”11 (Fortgang, supra, 387 P.3d at p. 702 .) The test articulated by respondent superior court is a two-factor test that would sweep into CPRA many more local nonprofit entities than the Legislature and the voters, via Proposition 59, likely intended, viz.: (1) does the nonprofit receive any government 11 (Cf. O’Connell v. City of Stockton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1061, 1075 [concluding a statute could not “be ch

2022Appeals Bd. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1287-1288 ; accord SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 741, 755-756 .) 16 involvement in the entity’s activities, and (4) whether the entity was created by the government.” (Fortang, supra, 387 P.3d at p. 695 .) The court ruled that the test developed in Washington appellate courts that “derives from case law interpreting” FOIA, “further[ed]” the purposes of Washington’s Public Record Act, “by preventing governments from evading public oversight through creative contracting,” and was “consistent with . . . the approach taken b

2022Appeals Bd. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1287-1288 ; accord SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 741, 755-756 .) 16 involvement in the entity’s activities, and (4) whether the entity was created by the government.” (Fortang, supra, 387 P.3d at p. 695 .) The court ruled that the test developed in Washington appellate courts that “derives from case law interpreting” FOIA, “further[ed]” the purposes of Washington’s Public Record Act, “by preventing governments from evading public oversight through creative contracting,” and was “consistent with . . . the approach taken b

2022Appeals Bd. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1287-1288 ; accord SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 741, 755-756 .) 16 involvement in the entity’s activities, and (4) whether the entity was created by the government.” (Fortang, supra, 387 P.3d at p. 695 .) The court ruled that the test developed in Washington appellate courts that “derives from case law interpreting” FOIA, “further[ed]” the purposes of Washington’s Public Record Act, “by preventing governments from evading public oversight through creative contracting,” and was “consistent with . . . the approach taken b

2021(Sandoval v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 932, 936 [“California law is settled that pending appeal a trial court judgment is not final and will not be given res judicata effect”]; see Samara v. Matar, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 28 p. 333 [“[t]he availability of a direct appeal reflects a sensible determination that the process culminating in a trial court’s disputed decision is not sufficient to resolve litigation conclusively”]; Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1174 [“in California the rule is that the finality required to invoke the pre

2021(Sandoval v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 932, 936 [“California law is settled that pending appeal a trial court judgment is not final and will not be given res judicata effect”]; see Samara v. Matar, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 28 p. 333 [“[t]he availability of a direct appeal reflects a sensible determination that the process culminating in a trial court’s disputed decision is not sufficient to resolve litigation conclusively”]; Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1174 [“in California the rule is that the finality required to invoke the pre

2021(Sandoval v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 932, 936 [“California law is settled that pending appeal a trial court judgment is not final and will not be given res judicata effect”]; see Samara v. Matar, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 28 p. 333 [“[t]he availability of a direct appeal reflects a sensible determination that the process culminating in a trial court’s disputed decision is not sufficient to resolve litigation conclusively”]; Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1174 [“in California the rule is that the finality required to invoke the pre

2021(Sandoval v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 932, 936 [“California law is settled that pending appeal a trial court judgment is not final and will not be given res judicata effect”]; see Samara v. Matar, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 28 p. 333 [“[t]he availability of a direct appeal reflects a sensible determination that the process culminating in a trial court’s disputed decision is not sufficient to resolve litigation conclusively”]; Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1174 [“in California the rule is that the finality required to invoke the pre

2021(Sandoval v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 932, 936 [“California law is settled that pending appeal a trial court judgment is not final and will not be given res judicata effect”]; see Samara v. Matar, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 28 p. 333 [“[t]he availability of a direct appeal reflects a sensible determination that the process culminating in a trial court’s disputed decision is not sufficient to resolve litigation conclusively”]; Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1174 [“in California the rule is that the finality required to invoke the pre

2021(Sandoval v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 932, 936 [“California law is settled that pending appeal a trial court judgment is not final and will not be given res judicata effect”]; see Samara v. Matar, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 28 p. 333 [“[t]he availability of a direct appeal reflects a sensible determination that the process culminating in a trial court’s disputed decision is not sufficient to resolve litigation conclusively”]; Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1174 [“in California the rule is that the finality required to invoke the pre

2019The court ruled the defense was untimely and excluded the evidence. 12 Assn. v. Wesley Palms Retirement Community (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1147, 1152 .) Although such a right may be created through adoption of enforceable CC&R’s (see, e.g., Posey v. Leavitt (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1250 ), “[i]t is a general rule that restrictive covenants are construed strictly against the person seeking to enforce them, and any doubt will be resolved in favor of the free use of land.” (White v. Dorfman (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 892, 897 (White); accord, Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App

2019The court ruled the defense was untimely and excluded the evidence. 12 Assn. v. Wesley Palms Retirement Community (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1147, 1152 .) Although such a right may be created through adoption of enforceable CC&R’s (see, e.g., Posey v. Leavitt (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1250 ), “[i]t is a general rule that restrictive covenants are construed strictly against the person seeking to enforce them, and any doubt will be resolved in favor of the free use of land.” (White v. Dorfman (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 892, 897 (White); accord, Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App

2019The court ruled the defense was untimely and excluded the evidence. 12 Assn. v. Wesley Palms Retirement Community (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1147, 1152 .) Although such a right may be created through adoption of enforceable CC&R’s (see, e.g., Posey v. Leavitt (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1250 ), “[i]t is a general rule that restrictive covenants are construed strictly against the person seeking to enforce them, and any doubt will be resolved in favor of the free use of land.” (White v. Dorfman (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 892, 897 (White); accord, Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App